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Chapter 1. Introduction: Research Design and Theoretical Orientation
... Relationships between policy-making and enforcement of policy in the 
Community have a hazy aspect that allows fogging of issues and 
surprising degrees of ambiguity. Since its arms and its eyes are not under 
its control - enforcement and fact-finding are all controlled elsewhere - 
pragmatism creeps in not through doctrine, but through selective 
awareness. Readiness to accept murky or even distorted fact-statements 
is not unknown to other systems, but it is built into Community 
relationships (Krislov, Ehlermann & Weiler 1986: 22).
1.1 Introduction1
This introductory chapter presents a research framework for analysing the 
implementation of European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) programmes. The 
implementation of such programmes since the late 1980s according to the principle of 
partnership has created a complex arena involving a multiplicity of actors in the 
policy field of regional economic development. Defined in the Regulations governing 
the implementation of the European Community's Structural Funds2 as 'close 
consultations ... between the Commission, the Member State concerned and the 
competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other 
level, with each party acting as a partner in pursuit o f a common goal [emphasis 
added]', the principle of partnership stands at the centre of this analysis.3 Involving 
regional and local actors in the implementation of a five-year regional development 
programme may enhance the capacity of the programme to respond to economic 
circumstances by allowing the European Commission access to highly dispersed
1 Following the terminology of the Maastricht Treaty, the term European Community (EC) is employed 
throughout to denote the economic and social 'pillar' of the European Union (EU). The thesis does not 
deal directly with the other two pillars - the Common Foreign and Security Policy and co-operation in 
the field of justice and home affairs. The term European Union is employed herein only when referring 
to the collectivity of the member states. Similarly, for the sake of convenience, the Commission of the 
European Communities is referred to throughout simply as the European Commission.
2 The Structural Funds currently comprise three grant making instruments: the European Social Fund 
(ESF) aims to improve employment prospects in the European Union; the Guidance Section of the 
European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) supports national agricultural aid 
schemes and aims to develop and diversify rural areas, and the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF) supports measures to reduce regional economic disparities. The reasons for the focus of this 
study on the ERDF are explained later in this chapter
3 The rules governing the operation of the Structural Funds were overhauled during 1988 through three 
Regulations which came into effect on 1 January 1989, the so-called 'Framework', 'Horizontal' and 
Implementing’ Regulations as follows: Regulation (EEC) 20S2/88, O.J. No LI85, 24/6/88, Regulation 
(EEC) 4253/88, O.J. No. 374, 19/12/88; Regulation (EEC) 4254/88, O.J. No. 374, 19/12/88 
'Partnership' is one of the four key principles underpinning the reformed Regulations, which were revised 
anew in 1993. The four key principles are considered in detail in Chapters 3 and 4 The definition of 
partnership presented here is taken from the preamble to the Framework Regulation
information on the regional economy. However, how is the implementation of the 
programme in turn shaped by the institutional complexity ushered in under the 
partnership principle? More specifically, how does the European Commission seek to 
shape the implementation process to maximise its access to local information, but 
minimise the likelihood that its own regional development priorities are displaced 
through the involvement of a multitude of actors with competing priorities0
Such questions concerning the implementation of EC policies remain largely 
neglected in the literature of political science and public policy analysis. As the 
relative importance of structural spending among European policies involving direct 
expenditure has increased, it is indeed the case that academic attention has been 
drawn to this policy field. The Structural Funds are due to reach around one third of 
the total budget of the European Union by the end of the century, rising from ECU 7.2 
billion in 1987 to ECU 27.4 billion in 1999 (European Commission 1993c: 16). The 
seemingly inexorable growth of the Structural Funds budget over the last two decades 
has long held the attention of political scientists, given the apparent compensatory 
logic of structural spending (Wallace 1977; 1983; Hull 1979; Marks 1992) Most of 
the research concerning the ERDF has therefore focused on the horizontal 
negotiations between member states at the European level regarding the size of the 
overall budget and their respective shares from it. The role of the European 
Commission is generally interpreted as marginal to what is essentially an 
intergovernmental bargaining process. Analysis of the vertical process of actually 
spending allocations within EC member states, however, has been comparatively 
neglected, despite the efforts of the European Commission to carve out a greater role 
for itself in the process during the 1980s. In general terms, it remains the case that the 
literature on the implementation as distinct from the negotiation of international 
policies is sparse' (Wallace 1984: 129).
Almost three decades ago, Hoffmann famously described the role of member 
state governments as 'gatekeepers' between the supranational Community and 
domestic actors (1966). In recent years, successive reforms of the ERDF have led to 
its development as a policy field in which it is possible to analyse the extent to which 
the Commission is able to act beyond the member states' 'gatekeeping' position to 
influence the ultimate utilisation of its funds. This study seeks to show that a shift in 
focus from inter-state bargaining to intra-state implementation reveals a complex 
inter-organisational environment involving the European Commission behind the 
outer-shell of the member state. The extent to which the European Commission is 
able to frame a regional policy reflecting its own objectives, and which it is able to 
implement in the environment of partnership, provides a useful test-case of the 
Commission's role in the process of policy-making and implementation.
The primary aim of this research is to develop a model of policy 
implementation that illuminates the complexity of the ERDF partnership process jind 
facilitates analysis of the role of the European Commission in implementation in this 
policy field.4 Drawing on the literature of modem political economy - and lessons of 
economic neo-institutionalism in particular - to bolster the policy implementation 
perspective, the agreement between the member state, the European Commission and 
the regional partners to implement a programme of regional economic development is 
conceptualised as a 'contract'. The nature of the contract is of central interest to this 
research. Subsequent chapters suggest that it is impossible (and probably undesirable) 
to foresee (and plan for) at the moment of agreement all the possible contingencies 
that could arise during the course of a five-year regional development programme. 
Problems inevitably arise in a multi-actor arena where each actor has its own 
priorities and decision-making system. As is widely recognised in economics, the 
perfectly-fashioned, complete contract specifying the course of action to be adopted 
in all eventualities is practically impossible to achieve under normal circumstances. 
The process of bargaining does not come to a conclusion when a decision is taken on 
the contract: by contrast, bargaining is a feature of all stages in the preparation and 
execution of the regional development programme. A model of policy 
implementation as 'incomplete contracting' is therefore developed in chapter 2. The 
central research question can thus be stated as follows: what is the nature o f the 
governance structures the European Commission has been able to fashion in order to 
seek to shape the implementation o f the ’incomplete contract' over the course o f the 
programme in order to pursue its own objectives?
ERDF programme implementation in the case of Western Scotland is 
examined in depth in chapters 5, 6 and 7. These chapters provide and analyse, for the 
first time, detailed, longitudinal data on the vertical process of actually spending 
ERDF allocations within a region of the United Kingdom. The sheer number of 
participants testifies to the complexity of the partnership process there. All agencies 
eligible for Structural Fund support in Western Scotland are designated 'partners' in 
the implementation of the European funded programme. Revealingly, only six public 
sector authorities - alongside the United Kingdom central government and the 
Commission of the European Communities - participated in the first ERDF 
programme implemented in the west of Scotland between 1984 and 1987.5 By 1994, 
however, there were over 140 'partners' involved in the process of consultation and
4 It should be emphasised that the aim of the research is not to examine the 'optimal' assignment of
policy tasks in this field. Armstrong (1983, 198S) considers the assignment of regional policy powers in 
the EC to such an end. v-
5 As explained in chapter 5, "Western Scotland' refers to the area covered by the post-1988 ERDF 
programme centred on the city of Glasgow.
negotiation surrounding the preparation and implementation of the regional 
development programme for Western Scotland. The model of policy implementation 
as 'incomplete contracting1 developed in this thesis seeks to provide a tool for 
illuminating the complexity of ERDF programme implementation generally. Of 
course, the model developed herein is not unique in this regard. Nevertheless, this 
thesis seeks to show that the incomplete contracting model is both an empirically 
accurate and analytically useful contribution to the policy implementation literature.
Before elaborating the model of policy implementation as incomplete 
contracting, the remainder of this introductory chapter sketches some of the basic 
elements of the research design and theoretical orientation. Section 1.2 considers 
briefly the current fashionableness of the region' as an analytical concept and 
emphasises the lack of research looking at the Structural Funds from rr European 
Commission perspective. Section 1.3 then explains the public policy approach 
adopted herein and introduces the policy under focus: European regional economic 
development policy. Section 1.4 sets out the assumptions and introduces the main 
features of the analytical model developed fully in chapter 2, before Section 1.5 
specifies the research design and method of the study. The introductory chapter 
concludes (Section 1.6) with a concise statement of the structure of the chapters 
which follow. It is to the fashionableness of the region', however, that the chapter 
now turns
1.2 'Regions' In Vogue
In a recent paper, Perry Anderson has written of the valorization of the 
region', whereby the notion of the region' now enjoys 'an unambiguously positive 
valency1: today, affirmation of the value of regional loyalties and identities is all but 
universal, and, endorsement of the principle of their political representation an 
increasingly prominent theme of official discourse in Western Europe' (1994: 9-10). 
Three general forces are deemed to have contributed to the emergence of the region 
as a point of political identification throughout western Europe: the uneven economic
development of post-war capitalism; the modernisation and concentration of the
means of mass communication (and the resultant cultural backlash); and the advent 
the European Community. The wider implication is that the conventional form of 
government, the modern nation-state, is in a condition of economic, cultural and 
political crisis. However, much of the research currently focusing on the region' 
adopts the normative slant of assuming that regional solutions (in the form of 
regionalism and/or régionalisation) can, and more importantly ought to, provide a
4
solution to the current problems of the state.6 The importance of the régionalisation of 
the state in increasing a sense of democratic participation in government has been 
stressed in most European Union member states (and by European institutions 
themselves) in recent years.7
The widespread perception of a decline in the contemporary relevance of the 
concept of unfettered nation-state sovereignty, coupled with the rise of sub-state 
regionalism and nationalism in recent years have led to a thriving industry in studies 
of the 'regional dimension' of the European Community. The introduction to one 
authoritative account suggests that this academic interest can be explained by the fact 
that 'Europeanism and regionalism have represented twin challenges to the nation­
state as a framework for making and delivering public policy', and that 'both have 
their roots in the problems of managing the modem industrial state, particularly to 
stimulate development and growth' (Keating & Jones 1985: l ).8 With few exceptions 
(Cameron 1981; Kolinsky & Bell 1978), earlier accounts of regions and regionalism 
in western Europe generally paid little attention to the specific EC context of 
regionalist demands and tensions in territorial politics (Rokkan & Urwin 1982; Mény 
& Wright 1985; Rhodes & Wright 1987). Since the relance of the European 
Community in the mid-1980s, however, studies of regions and regionalism in western 
Europe have mirrored the rhetoric of regionalist parties by paying close attention to 
the potential of the EC, and the wider process of European integration, as stimuli for 
regional mobilisation (Kellas 1991a; Day & Rees 1991). Labasse (1991) and
Bullmann (1994) have provided general accounts of régionalisation and regionalism
^  \
in the EC, whileJHarvie ( 1994) has addressed the question of regional cultural identity 
I in the Europeanjcontextjln short, by contrast with earlier accounts of regionalism, 
which largely ignored the European dimension, the European Community is now tte  
most-remarked upon influence* in the current fashionableness of the region as an 
analytical concept (Anderson 1994:11).
6 By way of example, while the new economics of flexible specialisation' is deemed to have provoked 
crises in those traditional national economies organised along the lines of standardised mass production 
and mass consumption, solutions have been proposed in the form of high-productivity, high-skills 
responses organised at the level of the regional economy. Such studies often draw on the perceived 
success of regions in the Third Italy' (see Murray 1991: 18-19; Marquand 1989^ , Likewise, Stumann 
(1990) proposes the strengthening of regional cultural identity and regiotial political mobilisation as
r^esponses to political change in contemporary Europe
7 For a survey of régionalisation in Europe see Bennett (1989). For an interpretation of the challenges 
and opportunities to democratic government at the sub-state level presented by the European 
Community, see Bogdanor (1992) or Benington (1994), or the publications of the Local Government 
International Bureau (e.g. Local Government International Bureau 1989).
8 The wider international phenomenon of sub-national government involvement in political and 
economic relations beyond the boundaries of the state has been examined in Duchacek (1986) and 
Duchacek, Latouche and Stevenson (1988)
It is in the, notion of the 'Europe of the Regions' that the marriage between 
European institutions and regional phenomena is most famously celebrated. The 
focus of studies which endeavour to trace signs of an emerging "Europe of the 
Regions' is invariably on the extent to which the participation of regional actors is 
enhanced in the process of European integration. Anderson himself suggests that the 
relationship between the processes of European integration and régionalisation may 
indeed be complementary: the emergence of supra-national administration, more 
distant from immediate experience than any previous public authority, has - as one 
would expect - put an understandable premium -on sub-national administration, as a 
compensating mechanism. There has also been, one might argue, an element of 
collusion, as well as compensation, in the relationship between the two' ( 1994: 11 ; cf. 
Hams worth 1993: 211). What is missing, however, is a focus on the extent to which 
the increased participation of regional actors, if indeed this has occurred, has affected 
the performance of European policies. It is accepted herein that the European 
Commission has actively sought the involvement of regional actors in the formulation 
and implementation of Community policies. Indeed, chapter 3 illustrates the extent to 
which the Commission struggled against member state governments in the first 
decade of the ERDFs existence to ensure the direct involvement of regional actors. 
However, chapter 2 suggests that the reason for the Commission's persistence in this 
regard may have been motivated not only by the desire to provide a democratic gloss 
to this policy area, but also because regional actors held much of the highly-prized 
information on regional economic problems and potential. How then did the 
confirmation of the partnership principle in 1988 impact upon the performance of 
European regional economic development policy? Is there a trade-off between 
'democratic' involvement of regional actors and the extent to which the European 
Commission is able to implement its own regional policy priorities?9
The common bond between the vast majority of studies of the regional 
phenomenon in the European context is what might be termed their 'region-centric' 
perspective. The majority of contemporary studies focus on opportunities for regional 
mobilisation and the articulation of regional interests at the Community level (see 
Leonardi 1992). In this respect, the research presented herein swims against the tide 
of current studies. Questions of regional identity, regionalism and the mobilisation of ^  
regional interests are not addressed herein. By contrast, the research presented 
analyses the implementation of ERDF programmes from the perspective o f the
9 Murray has suggested that the strengthening of the principles of partnership and programming 
(whereby muhi-anmial development plans have now replaced the financing of individual projects) lias 
pushed the responsibility for development down the line, and as a result has opened the way for a more 
pluralist approach to regional policy1 (1992: 301). He does not, however, address the implications of this 
'pluralist approach' for the European Commission's ability to shape regional policy.
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European Commission10 The research aims to assess the extent to which the 
European Commission is able to shape the implementation of ERDF programmes. 
The vast majority of the current crop of studies of the Structural Funds (addressed in 
chapter 4) adopt the perspective of regional actors: the focus is overwhelmingly on 
the extent to which the reform of the Structural Funds has increased opportunities for 
regional actors to exercise influence in the formulation and implementation of such 
policy. Only the studies by Deeken (1993) and Hooghe (1993) view the Structural 
Funds explicitly from the Commission's perspective. While Deeken focuses on the 
policy entrepreneurial' role of the Commission in restructuring this policy area (to 
enhance the prospects for economic and monetary union), Hooghe primarily considers 
the internal bureaucratic politics of the European Commission with respect to the 
Structural Funds. Both studies are therefore focused on the horizontal politics of the 
supra-national level. Neither study presents significant data on the Commission's 
involvement in the vertical process of implementing Structural Fund policy This 
research, by contrast, analyses Commission involvement at the regional level11 to 
assess its ability to steer policy implementation. The conceptualisation of public 
policy adopted herein, and an introduction to the policy under analysis, should 
therefore be provided at this stage.
13 The Policy Context
This research draws on the tools of policy analysis in studying the 
implementation of ERDF programmes, highlighting the policy objectives of the 
European Commission in order to assess the extent to which current governance 
structures at the regional level facilitate the pursuit of those objectives.12 As such, the 
policy analysis approach does not constitute a distinct theory', but it does allow some
10 The research framework developed herein endeavours to ensure a normarively neutral significance for 
the 'region'. Much of the contemporary writing on the Structural Funds assumes a positive normative 
significance for the involvement of regional actors, given the perceived importance of participation and 
démocratisation in this field While not denying the potential importance of regional actors in this regard, 
this research assesses the implications of strengthened 'partnership' for the European Commission's 
ability to shape regional development programmes. It should be emphasised, however, that adopting the 
perspective of the European Commission implies neither a positive nor a negative significance for the 
region ~
11 Of course, definition of the term 'region' is 'a game which can be played with almost infinite variations' 
(Holland 1976: 4). This research does not spend a great deal of effort playing this game, partly because 
it does not adopt a 'region-centric' perspective. The definition of the term used herein is simply the 
administrative definition adopted by the European Commission, referring to entities situated immediately 
below the level of the central state, granted political representation, the latter being ensured by the 
existence of an elected regional council, or failing this, by an association or a body constituted at 
regional level by the local authorities at the immediately lower level (Eurostat 1989). What this means in 
the Scottish context is addressed in chapter 5.
12 The question of whether a satisfactory definition of'policy analysis' exists is acknowledged, but left 
unexplored (see Lasswel) 1951; Wildavsky 1979, Hogwood & Gunn 1984).
order to be placed on the policy process for analytical purposes, organising the 
process according to 'policy fields' or 'stages' in the policy process. A key distinction 
in the policy analysis literature is that between 'analysis of and 'analysis for* policy 
(see Hill 1993: 3). This research is primarily concerned with 'analysis of policy, in
to improve the quality oFsuch policy. Beyond this distinction, however, Dye's 
assertion that all definitions of policy analysis 'really boil down to the same thing - the 
description and explanation of the causes and consequences of government action' is 
accepted as the basic starting point (quoted in Ham & Hill 1984: 4). By contrast, the 
conceptualisation of 'public policy' utilised in this research framework is of greater 
significance and should be made explicit. What actually is public policy? This 
deceptively simple question must be addressed at the outset. As Heclrr observes, 
'policy is not, of course, a self-evident term' (1972: 84).
The key to understanding the policy process, and in particular a policy field 
such as the ERDF, is that policy is more than just a smgle decision. Consequently, G. 
K. Robert's classic definition of'public policy' is instructive:
A set of interrelated decisions taken by a political actor or group of 
actors concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving 
them within a specified situation where these decisions should, in 
principle, be within the power of these actors to achieve (quoted in 
Jenkins 1978. 15).
Although this definition is not all-encompassing - for example it does not appear to 
acknowledge the difficulty of implementation when it assumes that it should be 
within the power of actors to achieve a set of goals - it has important strengths.13 Most 
importantly, it stresses the fact that policy is more than just a single decision and that 
it typically involves a pattern of action over time involving many decisions (Jenkins 
1978: 16). The discussion in chapter 2 below on the conceptual split between 
formulation/adoption and implementation as 'stages' in the policy process will return 
to this aspect of the definition. At this point, however, it should be emphasised that 
the framework developed herein accepts the notion of interaction between policy and 
action and subscribes to the following observation:
13 Heclo's suggestion that 'a policy may usefully be considered as a course of action or inaction rather 
than specific decisions or actions’ (1972: 85) has the additional benefit of emphasising the possibility of 
inaction. Moreover, he insists that such courses of (in)action have to be 'perceived and identified by the 
analyst' as policy is not 'a self-defining phenomenon': on the contrary, 'it is an analytic category, the 
contents of which are identified by the analyst rather than by the policy-maker or pieces of legislation or 
administration' (ibid.: 85).
particular with analysis of ‘ ermines regional policy rather than providing data
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... (T)here is a recursive relation between policy and action, with 
'policy' itself representing an essentially dynamic set of constructions 
of the situation. In this case, we argue that it is a mistake to conceive 
of policy analysis as the study of identifiable things called policies 
which are produced, or crystallise, at a particular stage in the decision 
process (Gordon, Lewis & Young 1993: 8).
It is suggested that the 'recursive' interpretation of the policy process is 
particularly apt for the ERDF given the fact that the European Commission is not able 
to rely upon its own structure for implementation within each member state. By 
contrast, it is obliged to rely on local and regional level actors, within an 
implementation framework which, as will be shown for the UK, is tightly constrained 
by central government. When, therefore, does policy emerge? It would-be a gross 
simplification to assume that policy is crystallised when the Structural Fund 
Regulations are adopted in the Council of Ministers, smce^as Elmore reminds 115 
'decisions are not self-executing' (1979: 605J. Does policy crystallise when the 
regional development plan for an eligible region is submitted by central government 
to the European Commission? ¿1 the UK, does it emerge in the negotiations between 
the European Commission and the Department of Trade and Industry over the 
contents of the plan? Does it emerge when the European Commission publishes the I 
so-called 'Community Support Framework’ (CSF) setting out the strategy foj/ 
economic development in the region? JDoes it emerge when local actors in an eligible 
region bring forward projects for consideration within the framework of the CSF? 
Does it emerge when local actors barter among themselves and with central 
government to decide which lists of projects will receive support? This list of 
questions could be extended, but, the crucial point to grasp is that policy is not a static 
concept and does not crystallise at any of these stages in isolation. It emerges as a 
result of the complex (recursive) interaction between all these stages. ERDF policy is 
constituted by a set of interrelated decisions over time, spreading across all stages of 
the process, from initial decisions in the Council of Ministers on the contents of the 
Structural Fund Regulations to the 'nuts and bolts' of building a road (for example) as 
a project receiving ERDF support under a programme in an eligible region. In the 
same way, the search for the 'real' policy-makers is likely to prove fruitless if policy 
emerges from the interaction of a multiplicity of actors across time.
Given the fluidity which lies at the centre of this definition of public policy, 
the question must then be asked whether is it in fact possible to observe, and hence 
analyse, any specific policy? Majone suggests that it is, since, although policies are 
constantly changing, the most immediate experience of policy, both for actors and 
observers, is a sense of continuity through time’ (1989: 150). This continuity is of 
great importance for the policy analyst as 'without some stability and consistency in
actions and expectations it would be impossible to detect any pattern in a stream of 
apparently disconnected decisions and discrete pieces of legislation and 
administration' (ibid.: ISO). What then are the elements of stability and consistency 
that allow us to identify and observe regional policy? This question must be addressed 
before the implementation of such policy can be conceptualised.
1.3.1 What Does a Regional Policy Look Like 9
As Majone suggests, both continuity and change should be inherent in our 
conception of policy:
What gives a policy stability is that some of its values, assumptions, 
methods, goals, and programs are held to be central and only to be 
abandoned, if at all, under the greatest stress and at the risk of severe 
internal crises. What gives the policy adaptability is that many values, 
assumptions, methods, goals, and programs are disposable, modifiable, 
or replaceable by new ones (1989. 150).
To draw an analytical distinction between the relatively rigid part of a policy 
and its more flexible components, Majone develops the visual metaphor of'corer (the 
stable part) and 'periphery' (the flexible part). Although the core represents the stable, 
central principles of the policy, this is not to suggest that it is immutable. The core 
can indeed be modified, but changes are more gradual than is the case with the 
elements of the periphery that are the policy’s transitory end-products. Radical 
transformation or abandonment of the core would mark a major change in policy - 
policy revolution rather than policy evolution Such radical transformations of the 
central goals of policy are comparatively rare, and have been labelled as shifts in the 
'policy paradigm' by Peter Hall (1993). He suggests that, while the way in which a 
policy instrument is employed may change frequently ('first-order change'), the 
instruments themselves usually change less frequently ('second-order change'). Policy 
paradigm shifts (third-order changes') are relatively uncommon (ibid.: 281-287), and 
can be compared to shifts in the policy core to use Majone's terms. These concepts are 
particularly useful in charting the shape of regional policy over time.
Establishing conceptually the 'core', the ’periphery', and the main positive and 
negative strategies adopted to translate the general principles of the policy core into 
action leads us a long way to discovering what a regional policy looks like.14 The core 
principle of regional development policy in general is that there is a role for the
14 The terms 'core' and 'periphery are used in this context as tools to conceptualise the nature of public 
policy and should not be confused with the conventional use of core and periphery as geographic or 
economic terms when discussing regional policy.
IV
public sector, on economic and social grounds, to intervene in the market to reduce 
spatial economic disparities which arise as a consequence of market forces, in other 
words, there is a role for government in attempting to influence the geographical 
distribution of economic activity. As stated in a review conducted for the OECD, 
regional development policy is based upon the notion that 'governments have both the 
duty and the power to guide ... change in the general interest, and not simply to 
intervene with palliative measures in particular places' (Wadley 1986: 46). When did 
this core principle emerge?
In the seminal text on regional policy in Britain, McCrone begins by arguing 
that the problem of regional economic disparities is a natural accompaniment to 
economic development (1969: 13). Changes in industrial structures and patterns of 
trade have taken place to the advantage of some regions and the disadvantage of 
others since the time of the industrial revolution. However, the idea that such forces 
could be controlled by government policy - in the conceptual terms introduced above, 
the emergence of the core principle - is of relatively recent origin. Although early 
efforts to intervene/in the market to address regional economic disparities can be 
traced in the UK to the Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934, 
I'regional anti-disparity policy emerged in western Europe principally in the post-wfcr
While the core principle of regional development policy remained constant in 
the post-war era, the way in which the general principle of state intervention was 
actually carried out - the periphery of regional development policy - varied between 
states and over time. As the above mentioned OECD study explained, the obvious fact 
that different states have a range of governmental systems meant that the delivery of 
regional policy varied considerably. The emphasis placed by a government on 
regional policy would normally reflect that government's position along the spectrum 
between total laissez faire and full command economic policy (Wadley 1986: 46). 
And yet, further subtleties emerge in the policy periphery. Government intervention of 
a positive nature can be at a macro- or micro-economic level, can be driven primarily 
by central or regional administrations, and can consist of incentives or disincentives 
to investment.15 The key point to note is that such variations in the exact 
configuration of the policy periphery need not imply a threat to the centrality of the 
core principle.
15 The 'negative strategy' of limiting company location in high-growth. low-unemployment regions 
through disincentives such as requiring companies to apply for development certificates has been 
relatively rare compared to the 'positive strategy' of offering incentives to locate in low-growth, high- 
unemployment regions. The political feasibility of adopting such a 'negative strategy' at the European 
level to achieve regional development goals, particularly in the context of the principle of the free 
movement of capital, is very low indeed. See Jarrett (1975) for an early account by an official of DG 
XVI of the desirability of such a policy of disincentives at the Community level.
period as an extension of Keynesian macroeconomic demand mai
Following this distinction between policy core and periphery, it is widely 
argued that the policy periphery in the field of regional economic development 
experienced a profound shift in the 1980s. In short, emphasis shifted from centrally- 
driven 'hardware provision’ (e.g. the construction of basic infrastructure, roads, 
advance factory buildings) with the aim of influencing the location of growth 
activities, to locally-driven 'software provision’ (e.g. research and development 
projects, business support measures, training schemes) with the aim of promoting 
development from within the local economy. Stôhr distinguishes between regional 
development policy from above and policy front below (1990). The former refers to 
traditional regional policy with its emphasis on centrally determined redistributive 
strategy, through the spatial allocation of public infrastructure investment, the spatial 
differentiation of selective incentives for private activities or through-the spatial 
allocation of nationalised activities. In recent years policies ’from below1 have been 
more common, designed by local actors to enhance the entrepreneurial climate of 
local labour markets from within, usually through the development of Small- and 
Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) (see Murray 1991). To quote Stôhr, in the 1980s 
there emerged ’an emphasis on indigenous business creation which replaced 
smokestack chasing in most areas’ (1990: 37-39).
This shift in emphasis has been hailed as the emergence of a 'new paradigm’ of 
regional economic growth policies across western Europe (Velasco 1991).16 In part, 
the emergence of the ’new paradigm’ can be explained by the fewer number of 
transnational corporations floating around Europe with branch plants to ’parachute in’ 
to depressed regions (Clout, Blacksell, King & Pinder 1989: 201), and, in part, by the 
wider shift towards supply-side economic policies in the 1980s.17 Regional economic 
policy was no exception as central governments turned from interventionist to 
market-led approaches across a variety of policy areas. As a result of the general shift 
to supply-side economic policies and the demise of Keynesianism (not only in its 
spatial form), the finances allocated to regional policies were progressively cut-back 
in the member states of the European Community throughout the 1980s. In most EC 
member states, however, the role of intervention in the market to reduce geographical 
economic disparities was taken up by actors in the regions themselves. Following the 
above conceptual distinction, this shift in emphasis in regional policy can be viewed 
as a change in the configuration of the policy periphery while the core principle of 
government intervention remained largely unchanged, albeit that the governmental
16 The significance of this shift for the ERDF and its influence on the European Commission's efforts to 
promote an 'integrated approach' to development at the regional level are analysed in chapters 3,4 and 
5.
17 Bennett and Krebs (1991: 8-13) provides a useful summary of the dynamics underlying this shift in 
the periphery of regional policy.
level involved shifted in most west European states from the central to the regional 
and local level.18 In other words, the core principle of regional policy was retained but 
pursued most visibly through regional and local activism, often with the 
encouragement of central government.19
The UK represents the member state of the EC in which state interventionism 
in the economy was trimmed to the greatest extent during the 1980s (see Appendix 2 
for an account of the domestic regional policy framework in the UK). Central 
government in the UK not only reduced its own expenditure and level of intervention 
in the economy, but also restricted the capacity" of local government to intervene in 
the regional economic development process. The core principle of regional 
development policy was anathema to the New Right governments of the 1980s in the 
UK. As Martin and Tyler explain, the main premises of 'spatial Keynesianism’ were 
rejected in line with the Thatcherite focus on monetary constraints, supply side 
economics and free market liberalism (1991: 8). The existence and persistence of 
markedly higher unemployment in the regions of the UK was re-interpreted in terms 
of 'institutional rigidities' in those areas. Strong unionisation in the regions 
experiencing de-industrialisation was deemed to maintain real wages in excess of that 
warranted by productivity and local labour market conditions, thereby creating 
unemployment and preventing investment. Moreover, in a reversal of the traditional 
notion of 'work to the workers', the labour force in the depressed regions was 
criticised for its lack of geographical mobility. Far from encouraging local or regional 
actors to take on the burden of addressing these problems - as was taking place in 
other member states of the EC (Meny & Wright 1985) - central government in the UK 
viewed local government as part o f the problem. Local authority expenditure was 
'crowding out' the private sector and hence a weakening of the autonomy of local 
government was justified in terms of the search for monetarist and free-market 
solutions to the problems of the UK economy (Martin 1986: 252-258; Anderson 
1990). In short, in the UK the core principle of regional economic development has 
been eroded and government is deemed to have no role in planning: economic 
development is free-market, private-sector led and foresees no role as such for the 
public sector.
18 Velasco's suggestion that the shift in emphasis amounted to a new paradigm (1991) is questionable, if 
by a shift in the policy paradigm he means 'third-order change' in policy. Rather, using Hall's (1993) 
conceptualisation, 'second-order changes' took place as instruments were overhauled, while the core 
policy goals remained intact
19 It has been suggested that this shift of responsibility from central to sub-national actors amounts to 
*the decentralization of penury' (Meny & Wright 1985: 7). Central governments, after decades of 
disappointing policy remits and the demise of Keynesianism, combined drastic expenditure cuts on 
social and economic programmes with a shift in the burden of responsibility to local and regional actors. 
At the same time, this decentralization was often accompanied with 'rhetorical flourishes about the 
values of local democracy, initiative, and autonomy* (Anderson 1991a: 67).
The widespread decline of centrally-driven regional policy in western Europe, 
and the decentralisation of regional policy functions, occurred at the same time as an 
active regional policy was being developed at the European Community level. The 
debate surrounding the reasons for this increase in European level regional policy 
expenditure has been alluded to above, and is considered briefly below. At this point, 
however, it is more important to highlight the tensions which arise when the 
European Commission seeks to shape strategic regional development programmes 
involving public actors in the UK. As central government officials dealing with ERDF 
programmes acknowledge, the European Commission attempts to super-impose 
public-sector led regional development strategies on a vacuum. It is commonly 
suggested that the Commission system of regional development planning is based 
largely upon the Contrats de Plan approach of French regional planning (Pontier 
1985; Waniek 1992). This system of regional planning finds no counterpart in the 
UK.20 How this conundrum is solved when there is such strong disagreement between 
the UK government and the Commission over core values is one empirical focus of 
this thesis.
This mismatch, not just in the tools of the policy periphery but in the core 
values of that policy, poses a question of wider relevance for policy implementation 
in the European Community. When the Commission has a key role in policy 
development, and the core value of that policy differs from the member state who has 
to implement the policy, what is the outcome in terms of institutional procedures and 
policy results? This question is addressed below in the field of European regional 
development policy as it is implemented in the UK. European regional policy itself 
should now be introduced at this point.
20 The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities noted in 1984 that the regional 
planning structure which had existed in the UK in the 1960s and 1970s, prior to the existence of the 
ERDF, was progressively abolished at the time when the European Commission sought to promote such 
a structure in the field of European regional policy: 'evidence has pointed to the striking contrast 
between the steady dismantling of the regional planning apparatus, including the demise of the Regional 
Planning councils in 1979, with the rising demands from the Community for increasingly sophisticated 
regional planning strategies, programmes and statistical analysis' (House of Lords 1984: xxxi). This 
contrast is examined in depth in chapter S.
14
1.3.2 Regional Policy at the European Level21
Although regional economic development objectives had been indirectly 
addressed through other Community policy instruments prior to its creation, the 
European Regional Development Fund was not created until 1975, almost two 
decades after the Treaty of Rome. The other two Structural Funds - the European 
Social Fund (ESF) and the Guidance Section of the European Agricultural Guidance 
and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) - existed prior to 1975. The ESFJiad been established 
in 1958 to improve the employment opportunities of workers across the Community 
by part-financing vocational training projects. When it was revised in 1971, the ESF 
included a commitment to direct assistance toward regions experiencing acute 
employment problems. Similarly, the Guidance Section of the EAGGF, the structural 
component of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) with the aim of assisting the 
process of economic diversification in agricultural areas, provided financial 
assistance for disadvantaged, .agricultural regions (Wallace 1977: 139). Alongside 
these grant providing instruments, loans were also made available in problem regions 
through bodies such as the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Coal 
and Steel Community (ECSC). Although policy instruments such as the ESF, and EIB 
and ECSC loan schemes are considered in the empirical chapters of this research, the 
focus is predominantly on the ERDF. At this point, therefore, some explanation 
should be given for the decision to focus on the ERDF.
The reasons for focusing on the ERDF are primarily fourfold. Firstly, and at 
the most basic level, the ERDF is the largest of the Structural Funds in terms of 
financial resources. The funding package agreed for Strathclyde (in western Scotland) 
for the period 1988-1992 consisted of £232 million ERDF support as compared to £42 
million ESF. Secondly, and more importantly, the problem of additionality, or central 
government's refusal to increase expenditure in an eligible region in accordance with 
the amount of Structural Funds assistance received, has been more acute with the 
ERDF than in the case of the ESF. A focus on the ERDF therefore allows greater 
attention to be paid to this crucial area of political contention between the European 
Commission and UK central government. Thirdly, a key focus of this research is on
21 As the then Director-General in DG XVI told the House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Communities in 1984, the ERDF by itself does not constitute Community regional policy, but 
'just an instrument towards a policy' (House of Lords 1984: 134). By contrast. Community regional 
policy also involves efforts to co-ordinate other policies with regional implications This point has been 
recognised by many academics, suchasPreston (1988) and Armstrong and Taylor (1993). Nevertheless, 
as Wise and Croxfbrd point out, the ERDF constitutes “the financial heart of Community regional policy1 
(1988: 163). Focusing on the Vertical' process of ERDF implementation, this research uses the term EC 
regional policy in the specific sense of the ERDF. Although it is bo me in mind that the ERDF constitutes 
only one element of the Community regional policy 'periphery', to use the concept elaborated above, the 
ERDF is still the major single element of that policy.
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the complicated issue of'policy objectives' and the extent to which these are contested 
by the variety of participating actors. To analyse two policy instruments with 
objectives which are not the same would complicate the research yet further. Finally, 
and perhaps most importantly, the methodology presented herein is actor-driven and 
places the Commission Directorate-General for Regional Policies (DG XVI) at the 
centre of the research question. To consider two policy instruments would therefore 
involve a focus not just on DG XVI, but also on the Directorate-General for 
Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs (DG V), thereby increasing the 
number of actors involved and multiplying the potential number of objectives to be 
taken into consideration.22 For these reasons, although other instruments are 
considered, the focus is predominantly on the ERDF.23
It is often pointed out that regional policy arrived very much as irlatecomer 
among European Community policies. As is shown in the following chapter, it was 
not an absence of regional disparities that explained the lack of an explicit regional 
policy at the Community level before 1975. McCrone's suggestion that regional 
disparities as an economic fact pre-date their emergence as a 'political' problem 
(1969:13) applies equally to the EC as to individual states. The regional fund was 
created in 1975 (and not in 1965 for example) as a consequence of the first 
enlargement of the Community in 1973. More specifically, it was clear that the largest 
element of the EC budget - the Common Agricultural Policy price support framework 
- had little to offer the United Kingdom, which was therefore set to become a major 
net contributor. Consequently, the regional fund was established as 'clearing house' or 
budgetary redistribution mechanism. The Fund was therefore usually explained in its 
early years in purely intergovernmental terms, almost completely dominated by 
member states with little role for the Commission. Providing a thorough review of the 
secondary literature on the ERDF from the mid-1970s, the aim of chapters 3 and 4 of 
this research is to give an account of the evolution of Community regional policy in 
the context of the changing nature of theorising about European Community policy­
making.
Alongside the doubling of the Structural Funds budget in 1988, new principles 
underlying the implementation of the funds were agreed. In general, the Commission 
(more precisely, DG XVI) was given more discretion over funding. Marks, however,
22 Despite the moves in recent years to integrate the three Structural Funds. Lañan rightly points out 
that they have developed at different speeds under various legal frameworks, and that they are still 
administered as separate entities within the European Commission (1989 44)
23 Similarly, the focus at the European level is on the European Commission and not on other bodies 
such as the Council of Ministers, the European Parliament, the Court of Auditors, the Committee of the 
Regions or the Economic and Social Committee The sparse attention devoted to these organisations 
herein is a reflection of the focus adopted here on implementation, and the nature of the involvement of 
the European Commission behind the outer-shell of the member state
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suggests that since 1989 the Commission has played 'an autonomous and powerful 
role in spending' and that 'when one lifts the lid on the practice of structural policy it 
is clear that the Commission has played a vital role in designing the institutional 
framework. Within that framework, the Commission is the key actor in the process of 
policy making and implementation' (1993: 399). For Marks, the implementation of 
^Structural Fund programmes can be conceptualised as an example of 'multilevel 
governance, a system of continuous negotiation among nested governments at several 
territorial tiers - supranational, national, regional and local - as the result of a broad 
process of institutional creation and decisional- reallocation that has pulled somej  
 ^ previously centralized functions of the state up to the supranational level and some 
down to the local/regional level' (Marks 1993: 392). While acknowledging the utility 
of 'multilevel governance' in drawing attention to the current interdependence of 
actors in the structural policy process, it is suggested in chapter 4 below that Marks 
does not provide sufficient data on the Vertical' process of implementation in the UK 
to allow him to draw such broad conclusions, j By contrast, the simultaneous
cisional reallocation' upwards to the European Commission and downwards to 
lucal and regional actors identified by Maries reflects the dynamics of the 'Europe of
---
the Regions' discourse.
The^model developed herein is designed to provide a tool with which to look 
behind the 'outer-shell' of the member state to examine the complexities of policy 
implementation involving the European Commission at the regional level. The model 
not only goes into more depth than Marks' conceptualisation of multilevel 
governance, but also allows for a sharper analysis than the rather uni-dimensional 
accounts of neo-functionalism or intergovemmentalism considered in chapter 3. It is 
to the key assumptions and the basic contours of the incomplete contracting model 
that this introductory chapter now turns.
1.4 The Analytical Model
Models in the social sciences can never be exhaustive, nor can they lay claim 
to being unique in their explanation of complex phenomena. Dowding suggests that a 
model is 'a description of a situation which picks out certain features which are 
important to understanding that situation' (1994b: 112). The emphasis on certain 
features is crucial: a model would be over-stretched were it expected to highlight all 
the features relevant to a given situation. This fact is perhaps best illustrated by 
Thompson, Frances, Levacic and Mitchell who treat a 'model' simply as 'a kind of 
mapping device' (1991: 2). They use the analogy of'a torch emitting a beam of light', 
and point out that by shining their 'model-torch on the complexity of social existence',
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they 'only expect it to highlight some of that complexity' (ibid.: 2). This thesis does not 
seek to achieve the impossible and provide a floodlight illuminating all of the features 
relevant to the relationship between the European Commission, central and regional 
actors in the implementation of ERDF programmes. Rather, it seeks to model the most 
important features and thereby throw some light on our understanding of the European 
Commission's ability to steer the process of implementation. The basic features of the 
model that is adopted and developed herein should be outlined at this point.
The literature of policy implementation provides the broad backdrop to this 
thesis. Chapter 2 presents a review of the policy implementation literature in both its 
■top-down' and 'bottom-up' versions, which shows how the methodological 
sophistication of research adopting an implementation perspective has advanced since 
the early boom following the publication of Pressman and Wildavsky's 
Implementation (1973). The main conclusion of the review, however, is that the 
policy implementation literature per se is not particularly useful in explaining how 
one actor attempts to steer a complex process of policy implementation involving a 
multitude of actors. In the case of the European Regional Development Fund, there is 
descriptive power in both the top-down and bottom-up approaches. However, much of 
the debate is simply normative: policy ought to be implemented from the bottom-up 
or from the top-down. This thesis therefore concurs with O'Toole in his statement that 
the study of policy implementation stands in need of additional assistance in 
rendering theoretically sensible the important issues that are the subjects of 
investigation’ (1993: 28). Hence, it draws additional assistance from theories of 
economic neo-institutionalism in order to develop a new conceptual framework that 
attempts to integrate the key concerns of both the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to policy implementation.
The starting point of the model developed herein is the adoption of an 
exchange-based conceptualisation o f power. Macneil explains that exchange, in 
social, political or economic forms 'involves a voluntary transfer of resources between 
actors on the basis of at least some kind of reciprocity' (1990: 152). As such, 
exchange is one way to resolve the very common problem that 'one actor stands in the 
need of the cooperation of other actors, if he wants to realize his goals and interests' 
(ibid.: 152). The concept of exchange has been most clearly developed in studies of 
state-interest group relations. As shown in chapter 2, it is widely acknowledged in that 
literature that the traditional, hierarchical state no longer has the capacity to act 
unilaterally to address the increasingly complex problems of advanced industrial 
economies. Rather, in an era of governmental ’overload' the state now relies on the 
assistance of organised interests for the provision of policy-related expertise and often 
depends upon them for the implementation of policy. In essence, the exchange-based
conceptualisation of power suggests that power-dependence relationships characterise 
contemporary state-interest relations. Power is thus determined by the exchange of 
resources.
Rhodes points out that the key concept in the analysis of power and exchange 
is dependence. Quoting Blau's perceptive definition of that concept, he explains that, 
*by supplying services in demand to others, a person establishes power over them. If 
he regularly renders needed services they cannot readily obtain elsewhere, others 
become dependent on and are obligated to him for these services, and unless they can 
furnish other benefits to him that produce interdependence by making him equally 
dependent on them, their unilateral dependence obligates them to comply with his 
requests lest he cease to continue to meet their needs [emphasis added]' (1980: 299). 
The resources exchanged between organisations can be of many forms: services, 
capital and workers are perhaps most obvious, but political legitimacy itself is also a 
valuable resource (Marin 1990a). It is suggested in chapter 2 below that exchange 
relationships and interdependence are not simply evident in the relationship between 
the state and functional interest groups. Rather, similar phenomena are apparent in the 
process of policy implementation and often involve the state and other territorial 
interests.
A key analytical focus of this thesis is the examination of the nature of the 
exchange relationship between the European Commission, central government and 
sub-national actors in the implementation of ERDF actions in the UK. In this case, 
exchange relationships emerge as a result of the fact that the European Commission 
cannot implement directly its own policies. Rather, it part-finances projects brought 
forward by sub-national actors. These actors exchange a steady supply of projects for 
co-financing (as well as information and local expertise) for some predictability in 
financial flows. Consequently, they are not strictly subordinate to central government 
or the European Commission. As bottom-up approaches to policy implementation 
teach us, they therefore enjoy some discretion in the implementation of ERDF 
actions. However, these exchanges are not concentrated solely at the ultimate stage of 
allocating finances to projects.
It is suggested in chapter 2 that traditional approaches to the study of 
implementation, in particular the top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy, 
inadvertently obscure the fact that exchanges are an ongoing feature of the 
relationship between actors participating in arenas of policy-making and 
implementation. By focusing primarily on the ability of central actors to shape the 
implementation process in advance through legal means and the deployment of 
^political resources, top-down approaches do not appreciate the significance of the „ 
motivations of local actors. These motivations mean that the objectives of local actors
need not be aligned with central objectives. Local actors may therefore deploy their 
resources in the policy-execution phase in an opportunistic manner, thereby 
displacing the original goals of the policy decision. By contrast, bottom-up 
approaches to policy implementation focus at the level of the motivations of local 
actors and hence their room for uncontrolled discretion in the phase after a policy 
decision has been taken. Consequently, such approaches to the study of policy 
implementation do not address the significance of the ex-ante co-ordination of actors, 
the exchange of localised information for the ability to influence the shape of the 
original policy decision. What is required is a framework by which to integrate those 
conceptual 'phases' of policy-making and implementation, thus focusing on the 
ongoing nature of the exchange relationship.
Theories of economic neo-institutionalism, and the 'economic organisation 
theory' of Williamson (1985) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992) in particular, provide 
the conceptual tools with which to attempt this integration. Focusing on the transfer 
of goods or services from one person or organisation to another (usually by 
exchange), these authors highlight the costs of negotiating and canying out 
transactions. The transaction costs' approach to economic organisation treats the 
basic unit of analysis as the transaction, suggesting that organisational forms are 
driven by the intention of rational actors to economise on the costs of transacting. The 
main tasks of economic organisation are to co-ordinate the actions of participants to 
the transaction so that they form a coherent plan, and also to motivate the participants 
to act in accordance with the plan (Milgrom & Roberts 1992:49). Hence, by focusing 
on the transaction as the basic unit of analysis, economic organisation theory provides 
a means by which to emphasise both the task of co-ordination and motivation. The 
thesis seeks to develop a model of policy implementation that borrows some of the 
theoretical insights of economic organisation theory and hence contributes to 
conceptual advancement in the study of policy implementation.
Under the model developed herein, policy implementation is conceptualised 
as a process of contracting. The concepts of transaction' and 'contract' are closely 
linked As Majone points out, in the language of new institutionalism a contract is 
'any agreement (not necessarily binding) among actors who recognize their mutual 
interests and agree to modify their behaviour in ways that are mutually beneficial' 
(1994: 13). Contracts do not require formal, legal status to be considered as such. The 
agreement to exchange resources (in whatever form) can be conceptualised as a 
contract, irrespective of whether or not the contract takes a written form. Policy 
implementation as a process of contracting therefore allows for an ongoing exchange 
of resources. It focuses on the exchange as the primary unit of analysis rather than on 
the ex-ante legal structuring of the exchange relationship or the ex-post motivations
of lower level actors. Markets, hierarchies and any other form of governance structure 
(including policy networks) can thus be conceptualised as different contractual 
responses to the problem of co-ordinated action.
At this stage, the crucial point to note in this brief introduction to the model of 
policy implementation developed fully in chapter 2, is that complete contracting is 
practically impossible to achieve. That is, when actors recognise their mutual interests 
and agree to modify their behaviour in ways that are mutually beneficial to paraphrase 
Majone, they cannot foresee at the time of agreeing to transact all the possible 
contingencies that might occur during the course of the relationship. Complete 
contracting would require, 'inter alia, that the partners be able to foresee and 
accurately describe all the relevant contingencies that might arise in the course of the 
contract, and that they be willing and able to agree upon an efficient count of action 
for each possible contingency. Also, each partner should be able to determine whether 
the contract's terms are being met and, if they are violated, to enforce the agreement 
[emphasis in original]' (1994: 13). Economic contracts under real conditions can 
rarely, if ever, take such a complete form. By extension, policy implementation as 
complete contracting is equally unlikely. The requirements of complete contracting 
can never be met under actual contracting arrangements for a number of reasons: 
foremost among these are the bounded rationality and the opportunism of actors. In 
the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting developed in this 
study, the two primary assumptions are that actors are boundedly rational (and they 
know that they are) and that they act opportunistically. These assumptions underpin 
the analysis presented herein. Therefore, before turning specifically to the nature of 
incomplete contracting and how it helps us to conceptualise the process of policy 
implementation, the assumptions should be explored in some detail.
1.4.1 The Assumption o f Opportunism
The first key assumption of the model of policy implementation as incomplete 
contracting, which should be made explicit at the outset, is that political actors 
behave in an essentially opportunistic manner. 'Opportunism' in this context is defined 
as 'self-interest seeking with guile' (Williamson 1985: 47). The ’with guile' element of 
this definition is vital, as it suggests that actors will adopt strategies to pursue their 
own self-interest. As such, this definition replaces subtle for simple self-interest 
seeking. Williamson explains that simple self-interest seeking implied that actors 
'fully and candidly disclosed their positions upon inquiry, state of the world 
declarations will be accurate, and execution is oath- or rule-bound* (ibid.: 49). By 
contrast, his own definition of opportunism 'refers to the incomplete or distorted
disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, 
obfuscate, or otherwise confuse. It is responsible for real or contrived conditions of 
information asymmetry, which vastly complicate problems of economic organization' 
(ibid.: 48). In other words, opportunistic actors may not provide all the relevant 
information required at the outset to allow an effective contract to be drawn up. On 
the contrary, they can use this information as a strategic resource in seeking self- 
interest.
It is not suggested herein that all political actors act opportunistically all of the 
time, nor that political actors act in such a way ttfthe same degree. Moreover, it is not 
assumed that the self-interest seeking of political actors is governed by calculations of 
personal wealth maximisation. Nevertheless, as Czada and Windhoff-Heritier point 
out, political action implies that political actors have a particular awareness of 
individual and collective goals, which they seek to make congruent' (1991: 11). The 
motivations of actors arise not simply as a result of calculations of individual gain, 
but as a consequence of the institutional arrangements framing the actions.
The opportunism of real actors has profound implications for the way in 
which contracts are arranged. As Williamson points out, opportunism is a source of 
uncertainty and limits the ability to specify in advance the actions of those party to a 
contract. In the absence of opportunism, it would be easier to specify 'complete 
contracts’, since this uncertainty would vanish if individuals were fully open and 
honest in their efforts to realize individual advantage (simple self-interest seeking) or 
were fully subordinate, self-denying and obedient' (1985: 49). In other words, were it 
not for opportunism, future behaviour could be governed by general legal rules as 
actors agreed ex-ante the action to be undertaken under every possible circumstance.
Of course, Williamson's assumption of opportunistic behaviour is obviously 
not universally accepted. Sabel labels such an approach 'the science of suspicion', 
pointing out that it 'makes the pursuit of self-interest and the fear of deception 
(because the others are pursuing their own interest, too) the spring of individual 
action and the guiding motive of institutional construction' (1993: 65). He goes on to 
claim that the presumption of generalized opportunism in exchange relations is 
empirically dubious ... and theoretically presumptuous. There are more 
comprehensive countertheories that assert the possibility of creating trust in a wide 
range of social settings without presuming that we are in general trusting rather than 
opportunistic' (ibid.: 81). Trust is indeed a central concern of this thesis. Empirically, 
the case study finds evidence of the evolution of trust amongst the partnership 
implementing ERDF actions. Conceptually, the model places emphasis on the 
importance of shared beliefs, trust, and reputation. Moreover, the concluding chapter 
even presents some ideas on how these can be strengthened. The assumption of
opportunistic behaviour does not therefore imply that the partnership for the ERDF 
implementation in Western Scotland exists in a Hobbesian ’state of nature'. By 
contrast, the assumption of opportunism is commonly made in studies of policy 
implementation.
The assumption that individual motivations, and hence opportunism, are 
important, is wholly consistent with the bottom-up approach to policy 
implementation, which emphasises the incentives determining whether local actors 
exercise their discretion in line with central policy objectives. For example, Barrett 
and Fudge insist that implementers are not 'passive agents on the receiving end of 
policy’, but 'semi-autonomous groups actively pursuing their own goals and objectives 
(i.e. engaging in self-interested behaviour) which may or may not be in accord with 
those of the policy-makers' (1981: 23). It need not be the case that such incentives are 
linked to individual gain. For opportunism to arise, it is enough that there are simply 
different organisational objectives in a given policy field. In fact, the idea of 
objectives stands at the centre of policy analysis. As Hogwood argues, 'almost by 
definition, policy is concerned with purposive action, that is action which is designed 
to carry out certain objectives' (1987: 4). Of course, even within organisations goals 
are complex and differentiated and cannot be reduced to a consistent and clear set of 
objectives. In a public policy involving many actors then, it may be the case that the 
objectives of the policy are unclear or inconsistent. Moreover, publicly stated 
objectives and real objectives are often not the same and there is rarely unity among 
actors over objectives. And yet, the idea of motiveless policies is difficult to 
comprehend: public policies 'are not things that just happen, they are the results of 
conscious action' (Hogwood 1987:4).
To quote Hanf and OToole, the dominant feature of the public sector is the 
relationship between many organized actors with separate interests, goals and 
strategies' (1992: 167). The problem of motivating public actors in line with policy 
intent is hence that of aligning different interests. As suggested above, legal remedies 
are of little use. Interdependent actors want to keep their relationship going, and 
hence the development of trust is generally valued Williamson thus suggests that 
transactions that are subject to ex post opportunism will benefit if appropriate 
safeguards can be devised ex ante. Rather than reply to opportunism in kind, 
therefore, the wise prince is one who seeks both to give and to receive "credible 
commitments". Incentives may be realigned, and/or superior governance structures 
within which to organize transactions may be devised' (Williamson 1985: 48-49). 
Some rather more normative suggestions as to how the wise prince' may seek to align 
incentives are presented in the concluding chapter of this thesis.
It is also worth emphasising at this point that in the case of the ERDF 
examined herein, actors pursue a number of competing objectives, and that they act 
with guile to pursue their own interests in the implementation process. As the 
Commission itself has pointed out, partnership 'brought together authorities which did 
not necessarily share the same views at the outset' (quoted in Marks 1992: 5). More 
generally, economic development has been highlighted as a policy field where 
ambiguity of objectives is the norm and symbolic politics are common (Booth, Pitt & 
Money 1982). Keating suggests that 'development policy is not a rational, goal- 
oriented activity but a political process in which diverse goals compete and outcomes 
are complex and unique to localities' (forthcoming). Nevertheless, economic 
development actors continue to participate in the policy as it allows them at least to 
claim that 'something is being done' to address regional or urban problems. The 
symbolic importance of economic development policy should not be under-estimated 
(Edelman 1964; 1971), despite the disagreement amongst participating actors 
concerning the true objectives of such policy. The lack of unity concerning the real 
objectives of European regional development policy among the key actors involved in 
the process may mean that there is very little common 'purposive action' when we 
look behind the general statements of policy.
In the case of the ERDF, it is certainly the case that objectives are clear and 
consistently stated and that there is apparent unity over these stated objectives. At the 
most general level, Article 130A of the Single European Act states that the 
'Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the various regions and the 
backwardness of the least favoured regions'.24 This objective is reaffirmed in the 
Regulations governing the implementation of the ERDF. At the implementation stage 
the programme document sets out clear objectives for all participants. In declining 
industrial regions this is invariably stated as the reduction of unemployment and the 
promotion of wider economic development. It could be argued that this is a very 
general objective, but the programme documents also set out priorities for achieving 
this objective and are intended in the strictest sense, to constitute strategies for 
regional economic development. All actors (local, central, and supranational) 
participate in the preparation of this strategy and all are fully aware of its stated 
objectives. Whether these stated objectives are the 'real' objectives of the participants 
is less clear.
Of course, if stated and real objectives are not the same, the task of the policy 
analyst becomes highly complicated. Without direct participation in a policy field the 
unearthing of'real' objectives is not straightforward Moreover, given the potential for
24 As shown in chapter 4, it was not until the time of the Single European Act that the ERDF took its 
place in the Treaties alongside the other Structural Funds
goal differentiation within organisations, even direct participation could provide a 
one-sided bias of the 'true' goals of policy actors. This is a problem of research design 
that cannot be avoided when studying policy implementation. The symbolic function 
of many policies is such that they cannot be considered purely on their stated original 
goals (Ingram & Mann 1980: 20). Moreover, conflicts among actors over the 'true' 
objectives of a policy mean that, for the policy analyst, implicit assumptions of 'clear 
and stable policy intent' are based on a simplistic understanding of implementation 
and are likely to lead to a 'fundamental misunderstanding of the policy process’ 
(Baier, March & Saetren 1986: 169). Assumptions concerning objectives should 
therefore be made explicit, always bearing in mind the ambiguity of the context in 
which those objectives are framed. In the case of the ERDF, it is assumed herein that 
although the programme objectives of job creation and economic development are of 
some importance for all participants in the implementation process, actors are likely 
to behave opportunistically to pursue their own interests.
However, it is a key working hypothesis of this research that in the case of the 
European Commission (DG XVI) the stated objectives of economic development (as 
expressed in the regional development 'contract') come closest to the real objectives. 
This view is supported by an earlier attempt to study the implementation of the ERDF 
which did not even question that the aim of the Commission was 'to influence long­
term economic developments' (Coates & Wallace 1984: 164). By contrast, it is 
suggested that there are strong incentives for the other actors in the implementation 
process in the UK to behave in an opportunistic manner, such that the overtly stated 
policy objectives are in fact implicitly modified during the implementation process. 
Greater attention is given to the key actors in chapter 5, but at this stage, the potential 
conflict in objectives should be identified.
Although central government states publicly that it supports the ERDF 
programme objectives, it is argued herein that the real objective of central 
government in the UK is to maximise ERDF resources in order to offset the UK's net 
contribution to the EC budget. As suggested above, the ERDF was set up in 1975 
following the enlargement of the Community in the early 1970s precisely because the 
UK stood to gain little from the Common Agricultural Policy price support 
mechanism and would be a major net contributor to the EC budget in the absence of a 
countervailing transfer of resources (Wallace 1977). Ingram and Mann remind us that 
governments often lack the power and will to address problems straightforwardly; 
thus roundabout means are chosen' (1980: 20). Central government in the UK in the 
early years of the ERDF made little secret of the fact that ERDF expenditure at the 
regional level was not additional and that the major beneficiary of the process was 
Her Majesty's Treasury. Of course, the question of additionality has evolved over the
past two decades and is considered in chapters 3 and 4, but it is argued that central 
government officials in the UK continue to treat ERDF primarily as a budgetary 
redistribution mechanism from the EC to the Treasury. Chapter 7 shows how central 
government uses the flexibility built into the incomplete contract to re-shape the 
contract to this end after its terms have been agreed.
The incentives of local agencies (in particular local authorities) are more 
transparent. Local authorities participate in the ERDF process and, like central 
government, publicly subscribe to the programme objectives of maximising job 
creation and prompting economic development.-'They participate in an apparently 
rational programming procedure under which an economic analysis of the needs and 
development problems in the region is conducted; the 'partnership' works together to 
determine the priorities for development on the basis of this analysis; objectives are 
formulated on the basis of these priorities; a general strategy is drawn up to 
accomplish these objectives. However, as Keating's observation (quoted above) on the 
fundamentally political nature of economic development policy suggests, the politics 
of real policy enter this idealised process at all stages. What sort of regional 
development 'strategy' should be adopted? In practice the question is not approached 
on the basis of a rational analysis of the development needs of the region, but on the 
basis of the interests of the local agencies. It will be shown in chapter 5 that, as a 
result, the 'strategy' drawn up for a region usually resembles a bolt-together of local 
actors' pre-existing spending programmes, within constraints determined by central 
government concerns over non-additionality, rather than a response to the 
development needs of a region suffering high unemployment.
It should be stressed at this point that it is not an aim of the research to 
castigate central or local actors for their 'failure' to act by the publicly stated 
objectives of the ERDF development programme. Rather, it is acknowledged that 
there are structural factors shaping and constraining the actions of the participants. In 
the case of the local authorities in particular, it should be noted that the 1980s were a 
period of severe financial constraint, with successive attempts by central government 
to restrict local expenditure in the name of national macroeconomic spending targets. 
Against the background of such expenditure cuts, the increasing involvement of the 
European Commission in economic development at the local level over the course of 
the 1980s, and moreover the expanded budget at the Commission's disposal, appeared 
to offer a new source of support for resource-starved local authorities. Despite the 
problems of continuing non-additionality, the 'Whitehall by-pass' came to signify the 
perceived ability of local authorities to turn to 'Brussels' for assistance when 'London' 
said 'No'. The efforts of local authorities to maximise their own share of the ERDF 
resources available in an eligible region is not criticised. It should be noted, however,
that such 'competitive' action may often contradict the 'co-operative', superficially 
rational strategy drawn up for the region under the partnership procedure. The 
research therefore seeks to examine the extent to which DG XVI is able to shape the 
implementation process, maintaining the objectives of economic development at the 
centre of the process in the face of fierce competition for funds, and hence the 
opportunism of local actors.
Of course, the European Commission itself may also be subject to 
organisational objectives in contradiction to those of the programme. For example, it 
is undoubtedly the case that DG XVI (like most Organisations) wants to spend its full 
budget every year. It is therefore conceivable that, if resources have not been folly 
committed towards the end of a programme, DG XVI may be prepared to see large 
projects pass through the selection procedure simply to spend the allocated 
expenditure. Another criticism, more widely voiced, of the European Commission's 
attitude towards the ERDF is that it simply allows DG XVI to engage in symbolic 
action, to at least appear to be 'doing something at the local level'. Some support for 
the argument that the ERDF is simply a 'cosmetic policy' can be found in the European 
Commission fascination with publicity - signboards, press releases etc. - for assisted 
projects (Wise & Croxford 1988: 171). It is acknowledged that this may have been 
true to some extent of DG XVI action in the early years of the ERDF, however, it is a 
centra] working hypothesis of this research that since the late 1980s and the reform of 
the Structural Funds, economic development objectives have been paramount.
It should also be recognised that the European Commission is not a monolithic 
structure with consistent objectives pursued across all policy areas throughout the 
various Directorates-General. The traditional tension between DG XVI and the 
Directorate-General for Competition Policy (DG IV) is frequently one of the most 
obvious cases of disagreement (Ballantyne & Bachtler 1990). At the collegiate level of 
the 17 Commissioners it is also conceivable that the ERDF does not elicit agreement 
over fundamental objectives. At the level of intergovernmental negotiation, it can be 
argued that the Structural Funds as a whole constitute an elaborate 'side-payments' 
mechanism (Marks 1992) whereby wealthier member states compensate the poorer 
member states worried by the potential consequences of further integration measures. 
There is no reason to assume that such a minimalist view of the role of the ERDF is 
not shared by individual Commissioners. The Structural Funds would therefore be 
viewed as 'the price to be paid' for further integration.25 This, however, does not negate 
the fact that at the operational level there are Directorates in DG XVI which seek to
25 Antonio Giolitti, the Commissioner for Regional Policies in the late 1970s, famously acknowledged 
that the ERDF was not a central Community policy. Rather, it was simply 'an accompanying measure', 
tacked on to address the detrimental effects of the main Community policies (quoted in Mawson,
Martins & Gibney 1985: 20).
treat the ERDF as a real regional policy instrument in pursuit of regional economic 
development objectives. The research focuses on the ability of such Directorates to 
pursue their objectives amidst the wider lack of unity over policy goals.
As March and Olsen suggest, even in complex, unstable, little-understood 
environments where they are placed in 'a world over which they often have only 
modest control', organisational participants will try to understand what is going on, to 
activate themselves and their resources in order to solve their problems and move the 
world in desired directions' (1976: 21). This exploration of the assumption of 
opportunism made herein has suggested that it is rare for 'desired directions' to 
coincide perfectly in a policy field involving a multiplicity of actors. Although none 
of the participants in the ERDF implementation process would conceivably object to 
regional economic development were this actually to be achieved amidst the tangling 
together of assorted objectives, the opportunism of real actors (defined as self-interest 
seeking with guile) means that the programmes prepared for any given region cannot 
constitute a complete contract, specifying exhaustively in advance the action to be 
taken by each participant under every possible contingency. The incomplete nature of 
the agreement is compounded by the bounded rationality of real actors.
1.4.2 The Assumption o f Bounded Rationality
The second key assumption of the model of policy implementation as 
incomplete contracting is that political actors are boundedly rational, and they know 
it. The concept of bounded rationality was most famously elaborated by Herbert 
Simon in the 1950s. His definition pointed out that the capacity of the human mind 
for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size 
of the problems whose solution is required for objectively rational behavior in the real 
world (quoted in Williamson 1975 : 9). Hence, bounded rationality refers to human 
behaviour that is 'intendedly rational, but only limitedly so' (ibid.: 21). Williamson 
himself identifies neurophysiological limits and language limits to rationality. The 
former limits 'take the form of rate and storage limits on the powers of individuals to 
receive, store, retrieve, and process information without error', while the latter refer to 
'the inability of individuals to articulate their knowledge or feelings by the use of 
words, numbers, or graphics in ways which permit them to be understood by others' 
(1975: 21-22). These limits obviously constrain the ability of real actors to plan 
ahead.
Milgrom and Roberts have provided a concise summary of the phenomenon of 
bounded rationality as follows:
Real people are not omniscient nor perfectly far-sighted They cannot 
solve arbitrarily complex problems exactly, costlessly, and 
instantaneously, and they cannot communicate with one another freely 
and perfectly. Instead they are boundedly rational, and they know it.
They recognise that they cannot possibly foresee all the things that 
might matter for them, they understand that communication is costly 
and imperfect and that understandings are often flawed and they 
know that they are not likely to find the mathematically best solution 
to difficult problems. They then act in an intentionally rational 
manner, trying to do the best they can given the limitations under 
which they work. And they leam [emphasis in original] (1992: 129- 
130).
It is assumed in this thesis that political actors are rational to the extent that they 
pursue courses of action designed to achieve their objectives, but they arTnot hyper- 
rational. In other words, it is not assumed that such actors are 'capable of 
instantaneous, unlimited perfect, and costless calculation', or that they can 
'effectively and effortlessly forecast all possible eventualities and the full implications 
of any information or decision, and that they completely optimize in all situations' 
(Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 43). The rational maximiser of classical economic theory 
is of little relevance herein.
Just as the assumption of opportunism outlined above found some support in 
the bottom-up approach to policy implementation, so too can the relevance of the 
assumption of bounded rationality be traced in the policy implementation literature. 
The limits to rational behaviour, when combined with the effects of a complex or 
uncertain environment, have profound implications for public policy-making. The 
Majone and Wildavsky quotation presented at the start of chapter 2 below hints at the 
importance of bounded rationality when it points out that policies do not 'spring fully 
armed from the forehead of an omniscient policymaker', but that discretion is both 
inevitable and necessary (1979: 189). In a similar fashion, the bottom-up approach 
taught researchers in the field of policy implementation that perfectly pre­
programmed implementation is not feasible. Rather, actors at the point of policy 
delivery must develop standard operating procedures and rules of thumb in response 
to the discretion they inevitably enjoy. In this way, the recursive relation between 
policy and action discussed above implies that policy is made and re-made throughout 
the process of policy-making and implementation. Complete contracting is not 
feasible.
The two assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism underpin the 
analysis presented in this thesis. Together they explain why any contract, that is, any 
agreement among interdependent actors to recognise their mutual interests and 
modify their behaviour accordingly, can only eveT be incomplete. As Williamson
himself concludes, 'rather than attempt to anticipate all possible contingencies from 
the outset, the future is permitted to unfold' (1975: 9). This is the essence of polic>’ 
implementation as incomplete contracting.
1.4.3 Incomplete Contracting
The basic contours of the model of policy implementation as incomplete 
contracting have been sketched in the pages above. The starting point of the model is 
an exchange-based conceptualisation of power. The primary methodological 
innovation proposed by the model is a shift in the unit of analysis to the ongoing 
exchange between the various actors involved in the process of policy 
implementation. The importance of exchange in the ex-ante co-ordmatiomrf actors to 
form a coherent plan, as well as in the ex-post motivation of actors to abide by that 
plan is stressed. The agreement of interdependent actors to recognise their mutual 
interests and to co-ordinate their actions is conceptualised as a contract. The model of 
policy implementation as contracting provides a valuable conceptual tool by which to 
emphasise the importance of both co-ordination and motivation. However, given the 
opportunism and bounded rationality of real actors, contractual agreements can only 
ever be incomplete.
Chapter 2 sets out the model in greater detail and emphasises precisely what it 
is about the exchange between actors that is relevant to implementation analysis. 
Without pre-empting chapter 2, it is suggested that three key elements of the 
exchange are central to the analytical model of policy implementation as incomplete 
contracting. The complexity and uncertainty of determining what performance will be 
required, the asset specificity of the resources brought to the exchange by each 
participant, and the frequency of the exchanges and the duration of exchange 
relationship determine the nature of the contractual agreement reached by participants 
in an exchange relationship. Furthermore, the model teaches us to look for a number 
of phenomena (such as the evolution of trust, or the setting up of third parties or 
special purpose institutions) that are relevant to the analysis of policy 
implementation. These are the basic elements of the model elaborated in chapter 2 
and tested in the case study of Western Scotland.
It should be acknowledged at the outset that the model developed in chapter 2 
is one that is of most relevance when there is the capacity for participants in the 
policy process to act in a 'problem solving' mode. In other words, participants must 
recognise their common interest and not solely claim the benefits of co-ordinated 
action for themselves. Scharpf rightly notes that 'distributive issues are legitimate 
even in a Gemeinschaft, but if disagreements relating to the best way of achieving
common goals are always reduced to disagreement over the individual distribution of 
costs and benefits, then 'mutual distrust' is more likely than an 'orientation towards 
common goals, values and norms' (1988: 264-265). In short, the model developed 
herein is of less relevance when redistribution between the actors participating in the 
policy is the sole reason for which they participate (Majone 1993c). Although it is not 
a key assumption of the thesis (in the way that opportunism and bounded rationality 
are set out above) that this is the case, it must be acknowledged that the inability of 
actors to see beyond their own distributional interests would limit the insights of the 
model. . ’
It should be noted at this point that the model of incomplete contracting, 
although not yet applied to the vertical process of policy implementation within a 
Community member state, has been used to analyse the horizontal—process of 
negotiation between member states in the context of the Single Market programme 
(Garrett & Weingast 1991; Garrett 1992). Again, this use of the model is considered in 
chapter 2. Essentially, Garrett suggests that the co-ordinated opening of domestic 
markets can be interpreted as a collective action problem. All member states favour 
this option, but there are strong incentives to defect. Since the actors cannot specify in 
advance the action required under all contingencies (and monitoring performance is 
difficult), they delegate authority to a third party (1992: 535). Moravcsik takes a 
sideswipe in passing at this use of the model, pointing out that it is not a useful general 
theory of EC policy-making as it fails to explain different forms of delegation or why 
delegation sometimes does not occur (1994: 509). From the perspective of this thesis, 
Garett and Weingast's work is only of limited use as it has a strong judicial element. 
They use the model primarily to justify the existence of the European Court of Justice, 
whereas the more detailed use of the model developed below emphasises the fact that 
legal remedies are not desirable given the importance of developing trust. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the model has already made a brief 
appearance on the stage of European policy-making theory.
Empirical support for the concept of 'incomplete contracts' can also be found 
relatively early in the history of the ERDF. In 1981 the European Commission sought 
to reform the pale shadow of a Community regional policy that it had inherited as a 
result of the original 1975 Regulation. Heavily influenced by the contemporaneous 
development of the French regional planning system of the Controls de Plan, the 
European Commission proposed the introduction of formal 'programme contracts' with 
each member state detailing the development programme to which it would be 
committed by its agreement with the Commission. The fate of this proposal is 
considered in detail in chapter 3, but it is worth indicating briefly at this point that 
from the point of view of the Commission's ability to gain approval of the proposal,
the timing of the Commission bid was wrong. It caused great consternation among 
member state governments where the ERDF was still seen primarily as a budgetary 
redistribution mechanism. The UK House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities took the view that the legalistic flavour' of the word 'contract' alarmed 
member state governments: 'the Commission is in fact seeking a formal agreement 
with Member States about the financing of a number of programmes of regional 
development of at least three years' duration whose shape however could be altered at 
a later date with the agreement of the Fund Management Committee. Clearly a 
balance has to be struck between a programme that is so loose in construction that it 
can finance almost any project and a programme that is so specific that the projects it 
supports cannot be altered or rescheduled in the light o f changing economic 
circumstances [emphasis added] (1982: xiii)'. After a two-year stalemate-a watered- 
down reform of the ERDF was agreed with no mention of'contracts' and little advance 
made by the European Commission on the principle of programming.
The underlying thrust of current analysis of the Structural Funds is generally 
that, although the Commission lost the battle in the early 1980s, it won the war in 
1988 with the reform of the Regulations. Although the Commission's revised draft of 
1983 dropped all reference to contracts, the programming procedure introduced in the 
mid-1980s and strengthened in 1988 constitutes a de facto system of contracting 
between the European Commission, the relevant member state government and the 
sub-national actors responsible for bringing forward projects within the strategic 
framework. However, as suggested in this section, the key to understanding the ERDF 
implementation process is that no regional development contract can completely 
foresee all eventualities. The bounded rationality of the parties to the contract means 
that it is impossible to foresee all contingencies over the course of a five-year 
development programme. Interest rate changes in the wider economy, unexpected 
factory closures or even 'windfall' opportunities are only three potential eventualities 
that would have direct consequences for the nature of the regional development 
strategy drawn up for a given region. Such uncertainty necessarily renders the 
regional development contract incomplete. The model of policy implementation as 
incomplete contracting therefore throws light not only upon the importance of co­
ordinating actors to achieve a coherent plan, but also upon the importance of 
motivating actors to make any necessary adaptations without subverting the original 
objectives of the plan. Before elaborating this model in chapter 2, some attention 
should be devoted to the way in which the model is employed, that is, to the research 
design and method.
1.5 Research Design and Method
As suggested above, the central aim of this thesis is to develop a model of 
policy implementation that illuminates the complexity of the ERDF partnership 
process and facilitates analysis of the role of the European Commission in 
implementation in this policy field. The basic contours and the two central 
assumptions of the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting were 
set out in the previous section. Chapter 2 details the model at length before the 
remainder of the thesis tests the applicability and utility of the model. To borrow a 
term from statistics, the empirical chapters of the thesis test the goodness o f fit of the 
model. Chapters 3 and 4 examine the evolution of the ERDF at the European level to 
assess the extent to which the Regulations provide the European Commission with the 
tools to engage in exchange relationships with member state and sub-national actors 
in this policy field. Chapters 5,6  and 7 then turn to the regional level to present a case 
study of ERDF implementation in Western Scotland. The aim of the case study is to 
assess the extent to which the model provides an accurate description of the process 
of policy implementation. More importantly, what aspects of the process does the 
model highlight, and what analytical insights does it provide? Some attention should 
be devoted at this stage to the selection of Western Scotland as the case study region.
Against the wider background of the continuing movement for self- 
government, the task of studying Scottish political or sociological phenomena is 
generally seen as uncovering what is distinctive in that part of the United Kingdom. 
Consequently, to focus on policy-making and implementation in Scotland usually 
implies engaging with the debate on whether policy-making there is best viewed as a 
distinct 'political system' (Kellas 1983), as a 'sub-system' (Rose 1982) or more 
generally in terms of a series of 'complex networks, linking Scottish actors to one 
another and to non-Scottish networks' (Keating & Midwinter 1983: 3).26 However, it 
should be emphasised that the debate on the distinctiveness of policy-making in 
Scotland is not of concern to this research. In selecting Western Scotland as the 
Objective 2 region to be analysed in this research, the intention is consequently not to 
demonstrate any level of distinctiveness vis-à-vis other Objective 2 regions in the UK 
that may derive from the trinity of Scottish national identity, autonomous institutions 
and distinctive interests. Rather, Western Scotland was selected to assess the lessons 
that can be drawn more generally about the implementation of European Regional
26 Moore and Booth have conducted a useful review of this debate (1989; 1990). Although they accept 
that the existence of a sense of national identity, a set of relatively autonomous institutions, and 
distinctive patterns of interest representation and intermediation allow a differentiation of Scotland from 
the rest of the UK in its patterns of government and decision-making, the authors rightly urge that the 
autonomy for separate policy development is relative and changes over time and with issues
Development Fund programmes, and as a test for the model of the implementation 
process as incomplete contracting.
Four main empirical reasons justify the selection of Western Scotland for the 
case study. Firstly, the severity of the problems caused by 'de-industrialisation' in 
Western Scotland makes the region a highly typical Objective 2 region in European 
terms. Secondly, the length of time for which there have been ERDF programmes in 
Western Scotland (that is, since 198S) facilitates longitudinal analysis of the role of 
the European Commission in the implementation of such programmes in the UK, and 
allows an assessment of the extent to which a sense of trust has developed among the 
partnership there. The Glasgow National Programme of Community Interest approved 
in 1985 was one of the first in the Community. Moreover, when it was approved in 
1988, the Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation was the largest financial 
package of its kind in the EC. Thirdly, the wide variety of institutions (over 140) 
currently involved in the partnership process there provides a useful test-case of 
implementation amidst institutional complexity and uncertainty over commitment to 
stated policy objectives. Fourthly, in 1989 the Strathclyde IDO Programme Executive, 
unique at that time in the UK, was established. This body (examined in detail in 
chapter 6) is nominally independent of the participating actors, does not sponsor 
projects itself, and claims that its sole responsibility is to the implementation of the 
development programme. The Executive, which has expanded over the years since its 
creation, provides an illustration of an attempt to establish an 'independent' third party 
to oversee the contract, and is hence of central concern to this research focus. These 
four reasons have guided the selection of Western Scotland as the case study region 
presented herein. The range of the empirical data sources utilised for the case study 
should now be acknowledged.
1.5.1 Research Data Sources
The research method employed in this study is eclectic. Most obviously, the 
secondary sources comprise a vast literature both on the ERDF and on policy 
implementation (although the overlap between these two bodies of literature remains 
marginal). The bibliography presented at the end of this thesis testifies to the fact that 
these respective bodies of literature were examined exhaustively to provide the 
framework for the analysis presented herein. The literature of economic neo­
institutionalism and the contracting approach was plundered to the extent that it 
provides the tools of analysis appropriate to the model of incomplete contracting.
Figure 1.1: List of Sources Utilised
i. Secondary literature; 
ii. Official reports, policy documents, press cuttings; 
iii. Six reports of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 
dealing with the ERDF (spanning 1975 to 1992); 
iv. Commissioned evaluations of Structural Fund programmes; 
v. Over 50 actors interviewed, many several times; 
vi. 'Participant observation' in both DG XVI and UK central government.
The empirical sources utilised were both wide and varied. As Figure 1.1 shows, 
the primary sources consulted include various forms of documentation such as official 
reports, press cuttings, and policy documents. The House of Lords Select Committee 
on the European Communities reports on the ERDF (House of Lords 1977; 1981; 
1982; 1984; 1988; 1992) have been particularly useful, especially for the historical 
context provided in chapters 3 and 4. Moreover, a wide variety of policy evaluations 
conducted for various actors in the ERDF process have provided a rich source of data. 
Such evaluations, listed in the bibliography, of course need to be treated with caution, 
for the obvious reason that consultants often report what the contractor wishes to hear. 
At a minimum, however, they provide useful data and occasionally challenging ideas. 
In addition to these sources, a series of semi-structured personal interviews with key 
protagonists elicited high-quality, detailed information from individual actors (which 
often highlighted the errors of the evaluations noted above). Over fifty interviewees 
were interviewed, many more than once, over a period of more than four years (a list 
of interviewees is provided in Appendix 1). These included officials of the European 
Commission, Members of the European Parliament, central government officials in 
the UK and officials from a variety of regional and local bodies in Scotland. These 
interviews provided valuable insights to supplement the other sources listed above.
An extra dimension is added to the eclectic nature of the research method by 
virtue of the author’s own participation in the process of implementation of ERDF 
programmes. During the course of conducting this research, the author spent an 
extended period in Brussels undertaking a five-month traineeship in the Directorate of 
DG XVI of the European Commission with responsibility for ERDF programmes in 
the declining industrial regions of the EC. More significantly, following this stage, the 
author undertook an eleven-month contract of employment in the Scottish Office 
Industry Department in Edinburgh, participating directly in the numerous committee 
meetings surrounding the implementation of Structural Fund programmes in Scotland.
Consequently, this research has benefited from the opportunity to view the ERDF 
implementation process 'from the inside' of both the European Commission and UK 
central government.
Blowers, in his fascinating study of the distribution of power between 
politicians and professional planners in Bedfordshire, following a period when he was 
Chairman of the Environmental Services Committee of Bedfordshire County Council, 
writes of the potential significance of direct access to data sources for the political 
scientist:
The inaccessibility of the political process is protected by the carapace 
of secrecy which is one of its inherent features. Much of my source 
material is not to be found in the written word, but in the essence of the 
interactions at committees, or between decision-makers. I attempTEd to 
record viewpoints and comments expressed verbally by keeping a diary 
of the events of the period I describe and this proved to be a valuable 
source when I came to the difficult task of trying to connect up the 
various stages in policy-making. I believe my method based upon the 
valuable and unique insight it gave to the process does reveal much of 
what lies hidden, and goes some way towards explaining the how and 
why of certain decisions (1980: x).
While not claiming to have enjoyed an insight comparable to that gained by 
Blowers during his years serving on Bedfordshire County Council, it is certainly the 
case that direct access to the files and internal memoranda of both the European 
Commission (DG XVI) and UK central government, as well as the opportunity to 
participate directly as an employee of the latter in the implementation of ERDF 
programmes in Scotland, has informed much of the analysis presented in the following 
chapters.27 Moreover, extended periods in these organisations frequently made it 
possible to follow-up interviews in order to seek further clarification of any given 
point. At a minimum, such exchanges were facilitated by the fact that the interviewer 
and the interviewee shared a common conceptual language. More importantly, it was 
hopefully the case (at least during the period spent at the Scottish Office) that the 
interviewer was regarded primarily as an insider, a fellow employee, and only 
secondarily, if at all, as a researcher.
Of course, 'participant observation1 brings its own problems for the 
researcher.28 Most obviously, much of the data amassed from government files and
27 Unlike Ross (1995) who provides a narrative account of the 'process of European integration' based 
on participant observation in the Delors' Cabinet, direct insight in this research has supplemented rather 
than guided the data collection process.
28 Drawing lessons from the field of anthropology, Isaak suggests that the objective of participant 
observation is not only to observe behavior first-hand but to get a feel for the culture by actually being
memoranda is of a sensitive nature and cannot be cited explicitly in the final research 
report. Due care has been taken not to reproduce information of such a sensitive 
nature. Another problem of information gathered from such sources, particularly 
information gleaned from participation in committee meetings, is that it is often 
difficult to gather and aggregate systematically. Finally, and more subtly, as Blowers 
remarked in the conclusion of his study, 'a great deal depends on the individual 
researcher's ability to make intuitive leaps from his own detailed knowledge to the 
wider issues which his study provokes ... his knowledge o f the whole is heavily 
conditioned by specific experience (emphasis added)' (1980: 181). This point is 
openly acknowledged herein, but the research design (and range of sources) is 
constructed in such a way as to minimise the danger of relying too heavily on specific 
experience. On balance, however, the benefits of introducing the 'researcher into the 
research situation' (Isaak 1985: 57) outweigh the associated methodological problems 
in this case given the difficulties faced by early attempts to analyse the 
implementation of the ERDF in the UK.29
Finally, it should be emphasised that the broader methodology informing this 
research design does not reflect a desire to record the actions of specific individuals. 
Specifically, the importance assigned to the actions of institutional actors in this 
framework does not signal an attempt to castigate individuals involved in the 
implementation of ERDF programmes. By contrast, it should be emphasised that the 
research shares the aim of Blowers not simply to record from the inside the 
motivations of particular individuals, but to analyse structural and institutional 
determinants in the process of policy-making and implementation (1980). As Dowding 
explains more generally, 'when explaining a particular political process and its 
resultant outcomes by means of individual behaviour one does not need to do so 
without taking into account the institutions which help to shape that behaviour', since 
methodological individualism 'cannot ignore the structures and institutions which 
suggest certain courses of action rather than others' (1994b: 109).30 The focus of the 
model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting elaborated in the following 
chapter is upon the motivations of actors (and hence their actions), but within a 
structure imposed partly as a result of the attempt to co-ordinate their actions through 
'partnership'.
part of it' (1985: 57). For a discussion of'observation studies', and the distinction between 'complete 
participant observation' and 'active participant observation', see Harrop (1985: 163).
29 Coates and Wallace, in their 1984 study of the implementation of EC funds in the UK, suggest that 
organisational complexity and the opaque nature of the process inhibit analysis (1984: 177-178).
30 In discussing the methodological divide between those explanations in political science influenced by 
sociology, and those influenced by economics, Shepsle (1989: 133) cites the earlier observation by 
James Duesenberry that 'economics is all about how people make choices; sociology is all about how 
they don't have any choices to make'. It is proposed in this thesis that the choices made by individual 
actors are suggested, and constrained, by the organisations of which they form part.
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1.6 Research Structure
This chapter has presented the research framework for the analysis of the 
implementation of European Regional Development Fund programmes in Western 
Scotland. The principle of 'partnership' in the implementation of such programmes 
stands at the centre of analysis. Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (quoted at the start of 
this chapter) observed that the Community’s 'arms and eyes are not under its control' 
(1986: 22). This statement needs to be re-assessed in the field of EC regional policy, 
where the Commission's ability to observe what is taking place in the regions of the 
Community has increased significantly since 1988. Even with this increased 'vision' 
for the European Commission, however, central, regional, and local actors in the 
member state retain significant discretion in the implementation of ERDF 
programmes; and, despite the significance of the 'hazy' relationship between policy­
making and enforcement identified by Krislov et al., the implementation of EC 
policies remains neglected in the literature of political science and public policy 
analysis. This research constitutes an attempt to redress the balance by analysing the 
grey zone between policy intent and policy output in the field of European Community 
regional policy.
The booming literature in regional studies has been identified above. It has 
been suggested that there is a gap in this literature in that there is very little analysis of 
the ERDF from the European Commission perspective. The general policy context has 
been sketched, both in conceptual terms and in terms of the policy under focus. The 
introductory chapter then set out the key assumptions and introduced the model of 
policy implementation as incomplete contracting, summarising the research method 
by which this model will be tested. Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive review of the 
policy implementation literature, before setting out the model fully. The remaining 
chapters then focus on the exchange between interdependent actors in an 
implementation setting as the key level of analysis.
Chapter 3 provides an account of the background, creation and first decade of 
the ERDF and its operation. This account emphasises that the 'real' objectives of the 
ERDF have always been highly contested. The chapter suggests that it has never been 
fully accepted by all participating actors that the Fund was first and foremost a tool for 
regional economic development. Rather, the ERDF was conceived as a mechanism for 
budgetary redistribution between the member states and this has shaped the operation 
of the Fund from the outset, not least through the practice whereby many central 
governments ignore the principle of additionality. Nevertheless, the European 
Commission has consistently sought to promote the Fund's stated objectives of
regional economic development, and the chapter examines the extent to which it 
succeeded in the early years of the ERDF by focusing on the key principles 
underpinning EC regional policy. This evolution is considered in the context of early 
theories of policy-making in the EC, adapted largely from International Relations and 
studies of the process of European integration. The chapter also considers the handful 
of studies that have examined the ERDF from an implementation perspective. Both 
policy-making and implementation accounts emphasise the dominant role of central 
governments in the EC regional policy process. In short, chapter 3 considers the extent 
of the European Commission's dependence (in formal and informal terms) on central 
government in these years, and examines DG XVTs attempts to widen the process of 
territorial political exchange to involve sub-national actors.
This process of territorial political exchange was radically altered-through the 
Structural Fund reforms of 1988 analysed in Chapter 4. The role of sub-national 
actors was recognised under the principle of partnership, the general rationale for 
which was the promotion of a 'rational' development strategy on the basis of all 
available information according to the European Commission. As the Director- 
General of DG XVI noted, 'the aim of partnership is for all those involved in 
development to define together the measures which they are going to undertake 
jointly. This guarantees full understanding of all the objectives sought, the methods to 
be used and the most rational utilisation of the funds available' (Landaburu 1990: 99). 
Chapter 4 examines the extent to which the 1988 Regulations provided the European 
Commission with the tools necessary to fashion the regional economic development 
contracts with sub-national actors behind the outer-shell of the member state.
While chapters 3 and 4 focus primarily upon European-level changes in EC 
regional policy, chapters 5, 6 and 7 then adopt the model of policy implementation to 
look beyond the outer-shell to the regional level. These chapters constitute the case 
study of the region of Western Scotland. The time-frame for these chapters spans 1985 
to 1994, with particular emphasis on the years 1988 to 1993. The years 1985 to 1988 
are considered briefly as this period covers the first attempts to introduce the 
programming of ERDF expenditure in Western Scotland, and hence the earliest 
contracts. The emphasis on the years 1988 to 1993 reflects the fact that these years 
cover the period of the 'Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation', the key 
programme analysed herein.
Chapter 5 considers the preparation of the regional development contract 
This chapter emphasises that the shift over time in the use of ERDF resources away 
from projects supporting capital-financed hardware (supported by central 
government), towards projects supporting revenue-financed software such as business 
support schemes (supported by DG XVI) indicates the increased capacity of the
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European Commission to shape the overall priorities of the development programme. 
However, regional development programmes can never be completely elaborated to 
cover all the eventualities that might arise over the course of the five-year 
programme. The possibility of unforeseen economic difficulties or changing 
development opportunities mean that there must be some room for manoeuvre: 
discretion is inevitable in that programmes must be allowed to unfold to a certain 
extent. The task of motivating the development partners to abide by the terms of the 
programme under changing circumstances is therefore vital.
Chapter 6 . analyses the institutional structures that DG XVI has sought to 
shape at the regional level not just to prepare the development programme, but to 
monitor its implementation so as to maximise the likelihood that the spirit of the 
programme will be respected. However, Chapter 7 illustrates the extent to which 
central government in the UK has been able to use the inevitable flexibility of the 
contract to re-direct expenditure after the approval o f the programme away from 
software measures back to hardware measures. As suggested above, European 
Community regional development policy emerges across the numerous steps in the 
entire process from the agreement of the Structural Fund Regulations to the financing 
and execution of individual projects at the regional level. The incomplete nature of the 
original development contract means that the final shape of the ERDF-financed 
programme of assistance is malleable at a multitude of points. The wider conclusions 
of this thesis are detailed in Chapter 8, which emphasises the contribution made to 
implementation research by the model of policy implementation as incomplete 
contracting and sketches some ideas as to how the emerging sense of trust and shared 
values at the regional level can be strengthened. At this point, the model should now 
be elaborated in greater detail. It is to the elusiveness of the ’complete contract’ that the 
thesis now turns.
Chapter 2. The Policy Implementation Perspective: The Elusiveness of the
Complete Contract
Unless one is willing to assume that policies spring fully armed from 
the forehead of an omniscient policymaker, discretion is both 
inevitable and necessary. Unless administration is programmed - a 
robot comes to mind - discretion can be controlled only by indirect 
means. Again, we must rely on learning and invention rather than on 
instruction and command ... We require the impossible when we 
expect our bureaucrats to be at the same time literal executors and 
successful implementers of policy mandates. Something has to be left 
to chance [emphasis added] (Majone & Wildavsky 1979: 189).
2.1 Introduction —
This chapter sets out the theoretical background of the research and elaborates 
the model of policy implementation as 'incomplete contracting' that is utilised in 
subsequent chapters. Section 2.2 highlights the key phenomena that must be 
conceptualised in any analytical model of the European Commission's control over 
policy implementation. These include the relatively small size of the European 
Commission as an organisation and its consequent dependence on external actors for 
policy-relevant information, as well as the obvious fact that the European 
Commission does not directly implement its own policies. These factors generally 
contribute to a high level of interdependence between the actors involved in the 
formulation and implementation of European policy. Parri's model of territorial 
political exchange' (1989; 1990) is therefore sketched in Section 2.2 to illustrate the 
potential complexity of policy-making involving a variety of actors at different 
territorial levels. Reference is made at this point to the specific example of the ERDF, 
to illustrate the dependence of the European Commission on external actors in policy 
formulation and implementation. Inter-organisational dependencies, a potentially 
fluid policy environment and the sheer difficulty of designing policy responses to 
complex problems support Majone and Wildavsky's claim (quoted above) that 
policies cannot simply 'spring fully armed from the head of an omniscient 
policymaker1. It is indeed true that something has to be left to chance. However, this is 
not to deny that each actor may try to steer the complex policy environment in its own 
favour. The remainder of this chapter sets out a model for analysing the extent to 
which the European Commission is able to shape the inherently complex process of 
the implementation of ERDF programmes.
Section 23  presents the policy implementation perspective through an 
extensive review of the literature dealing with the subject of implementation. The
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'top-down' and 'bottom-up' approaches to implementation research are contrasted 
before Section 2.4 considers later attempts to elaborate models moving beyond the 
traditional top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy. However, as is argued below, such 
models generally share the defect common to both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches to policy implementation: traditional approaches suggest that bargaining 
(the exchange of resources) is concentrated in either the ex-ante preparation phase of 
a policy decision, or in the ex-post execution phase. A conceptual framework must be 
developed to emphasise the fact that bargaining is an ongoing feature of the 
relationship between actors involved in policy-making and cannot be concentrated in 
either phase. The over-emphasis of top-down (pre-programmed) approaches on the 
importance of the co-ordination of actors in line with central objectives is mirrored by 
the over-emphasis of bottom-up (adaptive) approaches on the motivations-of lower- 
level actors. It is suggested herein that both co-ordination and motivation (of actors to 
abide by the spirit o f the policy decision) are indispensable, given the uncertainty and 
complexity surrounding the implementation of public policies. The process of 
bargaining is neither concentrated in the ex-ante co-ordination of actors to reach 
agreement, nor in the ex-post enforcement of the terms of that agreement. A 
conceptual framework emphasising the importance of both co-ordination and 
motivation would provide an elegant means by which to integrate the primary 
concerns of both sides of the traditional dichotomy in implementation studies.
The mutual importance of the tasks of co-ordination and motivation is widely 
recognised in the literature on 'contracting' as developed in recent theories of 
economic neo-institutionalism. The 'transaction costs approach' in particular 
highlights the link between these tasks under a variety of forms of social and 
economic interaction. Section 2.5 therefore addresses this literature in search of 
assistance in strengthening extant models of policy implementation. The agreement of 
actors to co-ordinate their actions and modify their behaviour in ways that are 
mutually beneficial is conceptualised as a contract. Implementation is thus 
conceptualised as a process of contracting. However, given the assumptions of 
bounded rationality and opportunism highlighted in the previous chapter, the contract 
can only ever involve an agreement that is incomplete in key respects Section 2.5 sets 
out the key dimensions of the exchange relationship which determine the nature of 
the contractual arrangement, that is the nature of the implementation structure. The 
elaboration of the model concludes by pointing out the key aspects of the contractual 
arrangement (such as the development of trust or the emergence of third parties) that 
it teaches us to look for. Section 2.6 provides a summary of the key arguments made 
in this chapter and a concise statement of the model of policy implementation as 
incomplete contracting. Before turning directly to the question of policy
implementation per se, however, Section 2.2 sketches some of the general sources of 
uncertainty and complexity in contemporary policy-making.
2.2 European Commission Involvement in Processes of 'Territorial Political
Exchange'
The increasing complexity of government action in the post-war state has been 
a central theme in recent social science literature. A general consensus seems to have 
emerged that the capacity of the traditional, hierarchically organised state to act 
unilaterally in the face of the problems of advanced industrial economy and society is 
on the wane. The growth of public responsibilities in welfare and economic 
management has been accompanied by concerns of demand overload and general 
ungovernability (Rose 1980; Kaufman, Majone & Ostrom 1986; Marin 1990b; Hanf 
& OToole 1992; Scharpf 1993). Simultaneously, the state has experienced a 
significant internationalisation of key policy areas. Hence, examination of those 
'structural features of the political-administrative system [which] might account for 
the inability of governments to guide socio-economic processes and developments 
more effectively' has long been identified as a key task of social science research 
(Hanf 1978: 1). In short, this general consensus is best summed up by O'Toole's 
assertion that the notion of an 'omniscient, omnicompetent and omnipotent state' is 
now severely outdated (1993: 52).
Social science research in this vein has focused primarily on functional 
interdependence and more specifically on the phenomenon of 'private interest 
government' (Streeck & Schmitter 1985). In an environment of rapid scientific and 
technical change where social and economic development is associated with 
'increasing differentiation, specialisation and functional interdependence' (Scharpf 
1993: 125), the capacity for unilateral action by the state comes under increasing 
strain. The reliance of modem government on private sector interests for information 
and expertise extends from policy formation through to policy implementation, and is 
also documented in 'newly emerging forms of transnational regimes' (Greenwood, 
Grote & Ronit 1992: 20). It has been argued in this context that 'governments should 
no longer command such an exclusive hold' on the attention of political scientists. 
Rather, attention should shift to 'governance', that is to the action of government plus 
its interaction with its nongovernmental partners in the process of governing - in their 
collective relationship with the economy and public policy' (Boyer 1990: 50-51; 
Kooiman 1993). The concepts of 'governance' and 'governance structures' are 
considered in greater depth in Section 2.5, but at this stage it is essential to note that 
the complexity and interdependence implied by these terms are not confined solely to
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the relationship between the state and functional segments of society. Complexity and 
interdependence also characterise relations between the state and other territorial 
units.
Pam has presented a model for analysing contemporary territorial politics that 
goes beyond the static and formal juridical analyses inherent in many of the early 
centralisation versus decentralisation debates (1989, 1990). He argues that 
'contemporary governance is no longer a question of the mere deployment of state 
authority through decrees and enforcement', and that this lesson should be extended 
from the functional to the territorial realm of politics (1989: 197). Traditional studies 
of intergovernmental relations were, according to Parri, largely legalistic accounts of 
administrative processes that overlooked the fundamentally political aspects of the 
relationship between central and regional (or local) government institutions (1989: 
198). By contrast, Parri's model of 'territorial political exchange (TPE)' uses an 
'exchange-based concept of power1, which he argues is more useful than concepts of 
liierarchical control' or 'subordination'.1 Specifying the potential 'resource domains' of 
the respective actors, Parri draws attention to the expertise, field information and 
knowledge resources possessed by 'sub-national governments' in situations of 
territorial political exchange. Such exchange is therefore defined as the phenomenon 
whereby sub-national governments mobilise these resources to force central 
government to negotiate the content of decision-making and implementation:
[A] TPE occurs when one of the two public actors, normally the one 
at the higher territorial level, allows the other to influence the content 
of the public decisional ... and implementation processes ... so that it 
can profit from part of the public policy outputs and outcomes, and 
when, in exchange for this, the latter gives its consensus to the former 
(1990:217).
Of course, the exchange process need not be balanced and the central actor may have 
access to greater resource domains than local actors.2 Nevertheless, a key advantage
1 Appropriately for a study of implementation, Parri raises the question that if sub-national actors were 
indeed subordinate, why would 'goal displacement' and 'uncontrolled discretion' occur? (1989: 198).
2 For example, the ability of local actors in the UK to frustrate centra] government should not be 
overestimated. As Sharpe correctly points out, 'where the centre sees the partisanship of the localities as 
a major obstacle to achieving its major policies and its coordination aims it may seek to alter the very 
foundations of the central local relationship or the even more drastic remedy of altering the structure of 
the decentral system itself so as to render it more malleable to the centre's aims' (1986: 165-166). During 
the years of the Thatcher governments, both these options were applied in the UK and, as is shown in 
chapter 5, it has been argued that the current process of local government reorganisation in Scotland is 
inspired principally by the political desire of the Conservative government to dismantle the large Labour- 
controlled regional councils Although it is assumed that, under normal circumstances, central-local 
relations in the UK are characterised by elements of political exchange, such 'sledgehammer' options 
should be borne in mind when referring to 'bottom-up' accounts of policy implementation below
of this 'interdependence' approach, as opposed to notions of independence or 
dependence, is that it draws attention to the informal political aspects of the 
relationship as well as the purely formal (cf. Rhodes 1980: 292). The TPE' model has 
therefore been introduced to provide a first illustration of the potential complexity of 
multi-organisational policy-making, and to highlight the exchange-based 
conceptualisation of power upon which the model of policy implementation as 
incomplete contracting is founded. The involvement of the European Commission in 
processes of territorial political exchange is an increasingly obvious phenomenon in 
the EC. -
Another dimension is added to the complexity of territorial political exchange 
when the European Commission is introduced as an actor at a Tiigher territorial level', 
to borrow Pani's term. Broad accounts of the relationship between sub-national 
governments and the European Union are multiplying rapidly in number, but are often 
largely descriptive in nature (Hull & Rhodes 1977; Bray & Morgan 1985; Cini 1990; 
Preston 1992, Rhodes, 1992; Goldsmith 1993). Other accounts are designed as guides 
for local authorities (Audit Commission 1991a). More specifically, despite Mawson 
and Gibney's early observations (1985: 149-157), the literature on lobbying has been 
slow to address the phenomenon of sub-national actors forming pressure groups at the 
European level (McAleavey & Mitchell 1994: 238). Moreover, in most cases, the 
normative echoes of Europe of the Regions' fantasies can usually be heard in the 
background. As a whole, this literature is perhaps most notable for the prodigious 
production of new labels and metaphors to describe the increasing intensity of contact 
between supranational and sub-national actors.3 The analytical contribution of much 
of this literature to an understanding of patterns of three- or four-level territorial 
political exchange has been limited.
The primary lesson to be drawn from this burgeoning literature on sub- 
national government involvement in EC affairs was discovered relatively early: 
'information lies at the heart of the relationship between the Community and 
subnational government' (Parsons 1979: 40; Rhodes & Hull 1977). The importance of 
information as a political resource should not be under-estimated. As Bish has pointed 
out, since 'no one is omniscient, information is itself a valuable good that is costly to 
obtain in a complex and changing environment' (1978: 20). The value of information 
in the EC is particularly high, given that policy-making in the Community relies on 
the exchange of expertise to facilitate the search for consensus between 
representatives of institutionalised or organised interests (Siedentopf & Ziller 1988: 
78-79). The European Commission, as an organisation charged with the task of
3 For example, one account of'tri-level interaction' from the early years of the ERDF referred to 
transactions between the sub-state system and the supra-state system in terms of leapfrogging' by the 
former over the heads of central government to the latter (Rudolph 1977: 349).
45
making policy proposals that achieve consensus among member states, is therefore 
highly dependent upon external actors for the supply of necessary policy information.
The European Commission is a very small organisation relative to the wide 
anay of functions it undertakes. As such, its 4,000 or so 'A' grade officials4 involved 
in the formulation of policies, the drafting of legislation and the supervision of the 
execution of such legislation are highly dependent on outside expertise.5 The 
Directorate-General for Regional Policies (DG XVI) is no exception to this general 
rule. Since the establishment of the Regional Development Fund in 1975, DG XVI 
has consistently sought to strengthen communication channels with regional and local 
actors in an effort to inform the preparation of regional development programmes for 
the Community's economically disadvantaged regions. Indeed, when compared with 
officials in other DGs responsible for Community-wide sectoral policies,-it could be 
argued that the need of DG XVI officials for expertise, field information and 
knowledge resources from the far-flung comers of the Community's territory is 
significantly greater. Between 1989 and 1993, DG XVTs grade 'A' officials (who 
number well under 100, and not all of whom are engaged in programme 
implementation) were partly responsible for the deployment of more than ECU 60 
billion (in 1989 prices) through over 140 development programmes covering 43% of 
the Community's population. From the European Commission's perspective, the 
involvement of regional and local actors, providing information on the economic 
problems and opportunities in the eligible regions, was a prerequisite for the 
preparation of co-ordinated regional development plans. In the words of Pinder, the 
Fund is a responsive instrument dependent on regional demand being channelled 
upwards to it '(1989: 18).
In the early years of the European Regional Development Fund, as shown in 
chapter 3, Directorate-General XVI had to rely on occasional, informal visits to 
Brussels by British local authority officials and actors involved in regional 
development for direct information on disadvantaged regions there. Although local 
authorities in the UK were often pro-active in taking the initiative and visiting DG 
XVI in Brussels, the contact was strictly informal. Preston and Hogg captured the 
mood of many local government officials at this time who maintained they were 
generally *kept in the dark' regarding European initiatives (1988: 33). The introduction 
of the partnership principle and the strengthening of monitoring procedures under the 
Structural Fund reforms of 1988, however, resulted in major institutional innovations
4 Richard Hay, Director-General of Personnel and Administration of the European Commission, 
describes A grade officials as the senior Commission officials most directly involved in policy-making. 
Such officials work to instructions from the Commissioners, preparing policies, drafting reports and 
legislation and overseeing policy execution (Hay 1989).
5 Nugent has estimated that while EU member states average 322 civil servants per 10,000 inhabitants, 
for all EU institutions the figure is 0.8 per 10,000 inhabitants (1994: 89).
which radically altered the intensity of contact between local actors and European 
Commission officials. In particular, the Commission hoped that its objective of 
involving project applicants directly in all stages of the decision-making process 
would be facilitated through the creation of monitoring committees at a regional 
level.
The establishment of monitoring committees in the late 1980s meant that DG 
XVI officials no longer had to wait in Brussels to receive delegations of local actors. 
By contrast, internally appointed Commission desk-officers for specific regions could 
regularly visit the regions for which they held responsibility themselves. As well as 
providing a formal forum in which the European Commission and local authorities 
could raise politically sensitive issues in the presence of central government officials, 
the monitoring committee requirements allowed regular informal contact between DG 
XVI and local officials around the fringes of the meetings. In this way, the 1989 
Structural Fund reforms were designed to improve the channels for information flow 
between DG XVI and actors in the disadvantaged regions. Recalling Krislov, 
Ehlermann and Weller's suggestion that the Commission's arms and eyes are not 
under its control (1986: 22), quoted at the start of the introductory chapter above, the 
ERDF clearly represents a field where this statement now requires modification. 
Although the arms of the Community remain outwith its direct control (after all the 
European Commission does not directly spend the money itself), the introduction of 
programming, partnership and monitoring committees significantly enhances its 
ability to observe what is takes place at the regional level.
Although the policy implementation literature has largely neglected European 
Community policies, the general significance of the European Commission's relative 
'smallness' and hence of its dependence on outside expertise for policy information 
has been recognised in other approaches to the study of EC policy-making. Most 
notably, the booming industry in analyses of lobbying at the EC level6 often draws 
attention to the expertise supplied by Brussels-based lobbies to the European 
Commission. Defining 'information' as 'any description of reality, considered to be of 
use to the receiver and possessing both factual validity and subjective values, 
interpretations or viewpoints', Van Schendelen considers the extent to which the 
exchange of information allows a lobbyist to influence the European Commission 
(1993: 3). Similarly, the adoption of North American theories of regulation and their 
application to EC policy-making has drawn attention to the importance of specialised
6 See Andersen and Eliassen (1991), Streeck and Schmitter (1991), Greenwood, Grote and Ronit 
(1992), Mazey and Richardson (1992; 1993), and Gorges (1993). Although lobbying by sub-national 
government has been a notable feature of EC lobbying in recent years, this phenomenon has remained 
largely unexplored as yet in the literature. Mazey and Richardson (1993) and John (1994b) are 
exceptions in this regard.
agencies at the European level charged with the tasks of 'fact-finding, rule-making, 
and enforcement’ (Majone 1990: 2). It is suggested in chapter 3, however, that the 
policy implementation literature has been slow to address the significance of the 
European Commission’s dependence on external actors for information and the 
execution of policy.
An attempt is made herein to address the policy implementation literature to a 
specific EC policy. A conceptualisation of partnership in the context of ERDF 
programme implementation as a territorial political exchange involving three 
territorial levels is therefore a useful starting point to frame the implementation 
analysis which follows. The European Commission was heavily dependent on central 
government for information and expertise regarding the regional economic problems 
to be addressed in the early years of the ERDF. With the strengthening of-partnership 
and programming the European Commission has succeeded in involving sub-national 
authorities directly in regional policy formulation and implementation, thereby 
reducing the length of the hierarchical chain of information transmission and seeking 
a more co-operative approach to the problem of regional economic development 
involving all competent authorities. In return, however, sub-national authorities 
expect to be involved in the negotiation of the development programmes and to 
influence the implementation process.
The problems of co-ordination resulting from the involvement of a multitude 
of regional level actors are common in situations of interdependence between levels 
of government. O'Toole has specified some of the key problems generally arising 
from the complexity of multi-organisational implementation settings: the lack of 
knowledge of other participants' preferences and motivations; the large number of 
units involved in the implementation setting; the opaqueness of the structure of 
interdependence; and, difficulties in monitoring and enforcement (1993: 40-41). 
These problems are all characteristic of the current ERDF implementation process, 
yet it remains a valid research question to assess the extent to which one actor can try 
to shape that process. The remainder of this chapter provides the theoretical 
background to approach this question. An 'implementation perspective' is adopted and 
should therefore be introduced at this stage.
23  Policy Implementation: 'Top-Down Pathology' or 'Bottom-Up Physiology'
2.3.1 The Policy Implementation Perspective
Although the subject of policy implementation has been a focus of sustained 
interest in the policy analysis literature for only two decades, the de facto problems of
implementation have been apparent since the earliest of times: 'studying 
implementation is a new way of wonying about old problems' (Moran 1981: 39). 
Dunsire provides biblical examples to support his claim that 'scholars and advisors to 
princes' have been aware of the pitfalls of implementation, 'if not in so many words, 
since the beginning of the literature of civilised man' (1978: 20). The crux of the 
problem can thus be reduced to a crude form: one is rarely able to realise one’s own 
plans, and bring them into effect exactly as intended within the time-frame 
anticipated. Within the recent policy implementation literature, however, how is 
implementation conceptualised?
It would be convenient if implementation could be defined simply as 'putting 
policy into effect', or as what happens after a decision has been taken, but this would 
not give sufficient attention to the recursive relation between policy-and action 
addressed in chapter 1. A recent attempt to analyse the phenomenon of Thatcherism 
and its impact upon British society in the 1980s illustrates more clearly what is meant 
by 'an implementation perspective'. The authors identify an 'unambiguous tendency' in 
literature on Thatcherism to overestimate the Thatcher effect because of 
concentrating upon legislative change rather than upon change in policy outcomes' 
(Rhodes & Marsh 1992b: 3). Instead, the challenge should be to establish the extent to 
which policies changed substantially and then to answer why actual change is almost 
invariably less than expected. The distinction between outcome and output is 
addressed briefly below, but the Rhodes and Marsh study pinpoints clearly the 
essence of the problem. It is the relationship between intended output and output 
achieved (in a suitable time-frame) which is addressed by the implementation 
perspective.
The classic view on such questions is dated to an essay by Woodrow Wilson 
in 1887. Strange as it now seems, it used to be assumed that, under normal 
circumstances, the decisions made by elected politicians would automatically be put 
into action as long as bureaucrats were clearly under the control of the politicians. 
Politics as a goal-setting process was therefore distinguishable from administration as 
the transfer of goals into action. It was accepted that bureaucracy was a creative 
process and would involve bureaucrats reacting to unforeseen difficulties in 
transferring politicians' goals into action, but the classic view was 'prone to disregard 
the extent to which this activity would tend to transform policy, often fundamentally1 
(Hill 1993: 235). The apparent failure of the social welfare programmes of the 
Johnson era in the USA led to a reappraisal of this simplistic distinction between 
politics and administration and gave birth to the first generation of research in the 
policy analysis tradition focusing on implementation per se.
Pressman and Wildavskys account of the ill-fated attempt by the US Federal 
Government to create 3,000 jobs for unemployed members of the ethnic minority 
communities in Oakland (California) has been labelled the 'classic post-mortem on 
the failures of the Johnson era' (Hyder 1984: 3). Prevailing wisdom seemed to assume 
that implementation was a straightforward administrative task; when expected events 
did not occur or turned out badly, consternation was not unusual. Pressman and 
Wildavsky sought to promote the opposite understanding, that implementation, even 
under the best of circumstances, is exceedingly difficult and that if a 'few good things 
really happened' it should come as a pleasant surprise (1973: xiii). The study of policy 
implementation therefore came to be the study of the missing link' between the 
decision to act and the outcome of the action (Hargrove 1975). In drawing attention to 
this erstwhile gap in the policy analysis literature, Pressman and Wildavsky went 
'beyond the bounds' of traditional public administration, thereby providing a separate 
identity for the new field of implementation studies (Sabatier 1991: 258).7 The 
authors changed the study of implementation in two critical ways: firstly, by stressing 
the complexity inherent in all inter-organisational action; and secondly, by drawing 
attention to the importance of the causal theories upon which all public policies are 
based. These should be considered in turn.
For Pressman and Wildavsky, 'the complexity of joint action' derives from the 
vast number of 'clearance points' inherent in implementing a policy in which many 
organisations are involved. The multiplicity of points at various levels of government 
at which the assent, or even the active co-operation, of participants is necessary for a 
programme to meet its objectives results in a dilution of the initial policy content. 
Consequently, the apparently simple and straightforward is really complex and 
convoluted':
We are initially surprised because we do not begin to appreciate the 
number of steps involved, the number of participants whose 
preferences have to be taken into account, the number of separate 
decisions that are part of what we think of as a single one. Least of all 
do we appreciate the geometric growth of interdependencies over time 
where each negotiation involves a number of participants with 
decisions to make, whose implications ramify over time (1973:93).
Sabatier points to this stress upon inter-organisational relations and policy networks 
as a distinguishing feature of implementation research, in stark contrast to the focus 
of traditional administrative studies on single organisations (1991: 258). Moreover, 
inter-organisational relations are characterised by actions carried out in a 'defensive
7 Although Dunsire (1978) has provided a 'prehistory' of the implementation literature. Pressman and 
Wildavsky's 1973 work is widely regarded as a watershed in implementation studies
mode'. Each actor is more concerned with the possibility of losing out than by the 
potential for collective gain, so that co-operative behaviour is the exception rather 
than the rule (Hyder 1984: 4). In this respect, the actors in inter-organisational 
implementation processes are normally risk-averse and prone to opportunism.
The second critical way in which the study of implementation was changed 
was the emphasis on policy outcomes (as opposed to legislative decisions). The 
dependent variable for implementation research became policy outcomes (for 
example, the number of new jobs created in the case of Oakland), and a key 
independent variable became the causal theory upon which a policy is based. Policy' 
was therefore defined as 'a hypothesis containing initial conditions and predicted 
consequences': 'policies imply theories. Whether stated explicitly or not, policies point 
to a chain of causation between initial conditions and future consequencesrlf X, then 
Y  (Pressman & Wildavsky 1973: xiv-xv). In other words, the assumption is that if X 
is done at time ti , then Y will result at time to. Policies are often turned into 
programmes in order to meet some specified objectives and programmes are therefore 
distinguishable from policies.8 A public programme consists of government action to 
achieve a set of objectives whose attainment is seen as a problem to be overcome. 
However, the very existence of a programme signifies that the 'if stage' of the 
hypothesis has been completed: in other words, X now exists at or after time ti. If Y 
now fails to materialise at time t2, then this failure may be explained not only by the 
multiplicity of clearance points required between ti and t2, but also because the causal 
theory upon which the policy was based may have been faulty. Predicted 
consequences, even with the best of intentions and the most efficient organisational 
arrangements, will fail to materialise if the causal theory is based upon incorrect 
assumptions.9 If policy is 'a hypothesis bound up in uncertainties', then 
implementation is the working out in practice of the hypothesis' (Hyder 1984: 15). 
Not only may there be significant difficulties in trying to put the hypothesis into 
practice (such as inter-organisational constraints), but the hypothesis itself may be ill- 
informed.
The publication of Pressman and Wildavsky's classic heralded a wave of 
implementation research in the mid-1970s. It has been noted that these early studies,
8 Alternatively, drawing upon the conceptualisation of’policy' set out above in the introductory chapter, 
we can more accurately suggest that programmes are not distinct from some concrete entity of'policy'. 
Rather, programmes can be conceptualised as elements of the policy periphery, the flexible end- 
products of policy formulation.
9 A distinction repeatedly made in this thesis is that between regional policy as the provision of 
'development hardware' (basic infrastructure such as roads or advance factory buildings), and regional 
policy as the provision of'development software' (such as vocational training initiatives or technology 
transfer schemes). These variants of regional policy rely upon distinct causal theories In other words, 
they make different assumptions about the nature of the regional economic problems to be addressed 
and hence about the causal mechanisms to bring about economic development
which were largely carried out in the United States, were primarily case studies and 
came to very pessimistic conclusions about the possibility of effective 
implementation (Sabatier 1986: 21). The basic approach of Pressman and Wildavsky, 
starting from a policy decision and then examining the extent to which, and the 
reasons why, the objectives of that policy decision were achieved, was that adopted 
by these early case studies. This early wave came to be known as the ‘top-down' 
approach to implementation research.
2.3.2 Top-Down’ Approaches to Implementation Research
Top-down approaches to implementation research were generally noted for 
presenting long lists of criteria which would have to be met to allow perfect and 
effective implementation. Hood (1976), echoing Woodrow Wilson's early separation 
of politics and administration, sets out in the first few pages of The Limits o f 
Administration the criteria for perfect administration, and then devotes the rest of the 
book to showing how this can never accord with reality. Similarly, Hogwood and 
Gunn (1984) present a list of preconditions which would have to be satisfied if perfect 
implementation were to be achieved in practice in order to demonstrate 'why "perfect 
implementation" is unattainable' (1984: 198-206). The following list of questions, 
drawn up by Gunn, has been quoted at length as it shows clearly the problems 
highlighted by the top-down approach:
Are there likely to be insuperable physical, political or other external 
constraints upon the programme? Will sufficient time and adequate 
resources be available? Will the necessary combinations of resources 
be available when required? Are there any relatively inflexible stocks 
of resources likely to be in short supply? Does the policy seem based 
upon an adequate understanding of the problem to be solved? Is the 
policy response perhaps over-elaborate, requiring too many links of 
assumed cause and effect to be forged? How dependent is the 
programme on getting the co-operation or consent of other agencies 
and powerful groups - and how many of them are likely to be 
involved? Are those who must participate in the programme all aware 
of, and agreed upon, its objectives? Have such aids been employed as 
are available to identify and sequence the detailed tasks needed to 
carry out the programme? (quoted in Hyder 1984: 2).
However, not even this survey of criteria for effective implementation is 
exhaustive. Sabatier and Mazmanian sought to identify all the legal and political 
'tractability* variables affecting the different stages of the implementation process. 
Through the 'Sabatier-Mazmanian Framework', they then sought to 'synthesise this
large number of variables into a shorter list of six sufficient and generally necessary 
conditions' for effective implementation:
(i) the policy must have clear and consistent objectives;
(ii) the policy must be based upon an adequate causal theory;
(iii) the implementation process must be legally structured to enhance compliance 
by implementing officials and target groups;
(iv) there must be skilful and committed implementing officials;
(v) the support of interest groups and sovereigns (in the legal and executive
senses) is required; and,
(vi) changes in socio-economic conditions should not substantially undermine 
political support or the causal theory (Sabatier 1986: 23-5; Sabatier & 
Mazmanian 1980).
Such prescriptive lists, often favoured by writers adopting the top-down 
approach, echoed older themes in the literature of political science and 
administration. In particular, the philosophy of the top-down approach has been 
compared to that of other rationalist models in political science, and scientific schools 
in management thought. Each of these can be summarised briefly in turn to give the 
full essence of the top-down approach as it was presented in the 1970s.
The rational systems model is a normative approach attributed the status of a 
'dignified myth' in which policy-making is essentially a rational process based on the 
classic steps from problem formulation, to appraisal of alternatives through to 
implementation. In such a model, 'the problem is seen as technical, the climate as 
consensual and the process as controlled' (Gordon, Lewis & Young 1993: 7). Linked 
to such models of the policy process were rationalist approaches to the study of 
decision-making within the process (Gregory 1989). The quintessential rationalist 
approach to decision making consists of the following stages: firstly, a search process 
is undertaken to discover goals; secondly, objectives are formulated on the basis of 
this search; thirdly, alternatives (strategies) are selected to accomplish these 
objectives; finally, outcomes are evaluated (Smith & May 1980: 148). 'Good' 
decisions were deemed to be those that had emerged from such a process. In other 
words, such rationalist models sought to be both explanatory and normative.
Within studies of organisational theory and organisational sociology there 
were also schools of management thought which later found echoes in the top-down 
approach to policy implementation. From the late 19th century, factory work involved 
the specialisation of activities, sub-division of tasks and fragmentation of functions 
(Pollitt 1993: 299). Emerging from the body of thought which developed in order to 
address the problems of managing such complexity was the school of 'scientific 
management' most closely associated with F. W. Taylor. The influence of his work
Principles o f Scientific Management (1911) was enormous in both the private and the 
public sectors and the notion of Taylorism' was introduced in which 'systematic 
management' was a normative organising principle. The introduction to his 1911 work 
stressed the great loss which the whole country (the USA) is suffering through 
inefficiency in almost all of our daily acts’ and that the remedy for this inefficiency 
lies in systematic management’ (quoted in Pollitt 1993: 300). For Taylor, the best 
management was a true science, based upon clearly defined laws, rules and principles 
and he endeavoured to show this through his pioneering time and motion' techniques, 
whereby he studied in efficiency terms the detailed movements of individual workers 
completing specific tasks.
Of course, such rational/scientific approaches in both political science and 
organisational sociology have been attacked over the years, and these criticisms will 
be considered below. At this stage, however, the key point is to recognise the 
similarities between such approaches and the top-down approach to implementation. 
The rational/scientific approaches outlined above shared with the top-down approach 
to policy implementation a heavy emphasis on the importance of hierarchical control 
and the subordination of lower level actors. In short, the focus was predominantly on 
the task o f co-ordinating actors in line with central objectives and neglected the task 
o f motivating lower level actors to pursue those objectives, nationalist' and 
'managerialist* became terms of scorn applied by social scientists to writers in the top- 
down tradition of implementation research. It is to the alternative tradition that this 
chapter now turns.
2.3.3 ’Bottom-Up' Approaches to Implementation Research
By the late 1970s, the top-down approach was increasingly questioned by a 
number of authors. One criticism of the approach was that it made the conceptual 
distinction between policy formulation/adoption on the one hand, and policy 
implementation on the other hand seem clearer in theory than it actually was in 
practice (Barrett & Fudge 1981). In contrast to this distinction, it may be the case that 
'action precedes policy* and that 'where policy "stops" and implementation "starts" 
may be extremely difficult to determine' (Barrett & Hill 1984: 219). Under such 
circumstances, policy is not a static concept. Rather, policy is an evolving concept in 
which the interplay between implementation and the perception of the problem to be 
addressed is constant, so that implementation may even be the major determinant of
how the problem is shaped. Under later interpretations, the policy/action continuum 
became blurred.10
Such reservations about the utility of drawing a clear distinction between 
policy formulation/adoption on the one hand, and policy implementation on the other 
had actually been addressed in the early implementation framework. In the second 
edition of Pressman and Wildavsky's Implementation, Majone and Wildavsky point 
out that the original edition did indeed allow for a blurred distinction between these 
two conceptual 'stages' in the policy-making process. Having said that there must be a 
goal against which to judge implementation, the' authors accepted that the goal and 
the implementing actions were part of a process of interaction: 'what comes first, 
then, the chicken of the goal or the egg of implementation?' (Majone & Wildavsky 
1979. 178). The proposed answer to this conundrum was that the interaction between 
the two is complex, and while policies undoubtedly shape actions, they are also 
'continuously transformed by implementing actions that simultaneously alter 
resources and objectives'(ibid.: 184).
A more developed critique of the top-down approach to implementation 
research was advanced by those scholars who adopted the label rbottom-up' to 
characterise their approach. While the overall focus of the top-down approach was 
upon how to steer the system to achieve (top-level) policy-makers’ intended policy 
results, the bottom-up approach put the overall focus on 'strategic interaction among 
multiple actors in a policy network' (Sabatier 1986: 33). Researchers adopting the 
bottom-up approach identified a series of flaws in the top-down approach as follows:
(i) the theoretical distinction between policy formulation and policy 
implementation was again criticised as unsustainable in practice as policies
are made and re-made in the process of implementation;
(ii) too much attention was given under the top-down approach to the objectives 
of top-level actors since it is rarely the case that policies embody clear and 
consistent objectives;
(iii) often there is no clear policy as such, but rather a multitude of directives;
(iv) policy decision makers were assumed to be the key actors in the process, with 
low level actors viewed as mere impediments to the achievement of top-level 
objectives;
(v) the lists of criteria drawn up in many top-down accounts as essential for 
effective implementation were unrealistic and ignored the extent to which 
discretion at the lower levels is inevitable; and,
10 The example of the 'recursive' nature of the policy process given in chapter 1 is likewise appropriate 
in illustrating the blurring of the policy/action continuum. ERDF 'policy' (as it emerges from Brussels) 
cannot be clearly distinguished from the actions of Department of Trade and Industry officials in 
interpreting Regulations or from the actions of local actors who must submit project applications in line 
with those Regulations It is not particularly helpful to try to split 'policy' from 'action' under such 
circumstances.
(vi) similar to (v), 'street level' actors will assume adaptive strategies to deal with 
the unintended consequences which inevitably result from the lack of full 
information at the centre (Sabatier 1986: 30-1; Rhodes & Marsh 1992b: 6-7).
In essence, the bottom-up approach of Hanf and Scharpf (1978) and Barrett 
and Fudge (1981) argued that legislative intent is usually sufficiently vague and the 
amount of hierarchical control within organizations sufficiently weak that street-level 
implementing officials have veiy substantial discretion' (Sabatier 1991: 259). The 
concept of 'street level bureaucrats', and their role as de facto creators of policy, is 
therefore of vital importance in the bottom-up approach. The fact that policy is rarely 
applied by decision makers directly to the outside world, but is almost always 
mediated through institutions and actors is accepted by both top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. However, what for top-level policy makers was the problem of the 
implementation deficit' was turned on its head by Michael Lipsky (1993) to advance a 
theory of the work of lower level officials as they experience it as individuals. Many 
of Lipsky's 'street level bureaucrats' were (semi-) professional workers in public 
welfare who found themselves in positions of power vis-à-vis both their employing 
agency (usually the government) and their clients. Policy-makers cannot envisage 
(even if they wanted to) all unforeseen circumstances. The result is that street level 
bureaucrats find themselves with quite considerable levels of discretion at the 'coal 
face' in dealing with situations that had not been planned for (Hudson 1993). They 
'routinise' their actions so that their work experience is dictated by 'coping strategies', 
designed to deal with the problem of discretion in the context of unclear guidelines 
from above. Lipsky’s seminal work therefore advanced a model whereby 'the 
decisions of street level bureaucrats, the routines they establish and the devices they 
invent to cope with uncertainties and work pressures effectively become the public 
policies they cany out' (1993: 382).
This radical departure from the rationalism of the top-down tradition 
consequently advocated a phenomenological approach to understanding the 
subjective behaviour of local level actors. A key work in the bottom-up approach to 
pick up and develop this methodological innovation was that of Hjem and Porter. 
These authors suggested that 'perceptions of deficits in programme implementation 
are distorted and exaggerated by analytic frameworks which use organizations or 
individuals as the basic unit of analysis’ (1993: 248). They pointed to a gap between 
atomistic theories in economics on the one hand, and comprehensive planning and 
management theories in public administration on the other. Economic theories of 
bureaucracy advocated competition among governments in order to enhance 
economic efficiency. Public administration theorists, by contrast, tried to design 
'comprehensive, functionally uniform, and hierarchical organizations' where all
functions were brought together under one roof, characterised by the authors as the 
Lonely Organization Syndrome' (ibid.: 249). For Hjem and Porter, however, both 
views were anachronistic since policies were neither implemented by the invisible 
hand of markets nor by monolithic government bureaucracies. To bridge this gap they 
suggested a focus on 'implementation structures', or 'multiorganizational clusters of 
organizations', some of which may be parts of markets while others may be parts of 
government hierarchies. Moreover, the authors suggested that such clusters would 
involve parts of many public and private organisations co-operating in 
implementation, and not necessarily the whole ofeach organisation.11
Hjem and Porter also argued that goals within organisations are complex and 
differentiated. As such, they cannot be reduced to a consistent and clear set of 
objectives. The authors identified two general orientations towards administration and 
implementation: an 'organizational rationale' and a 'programme rationale'. A subset of 
members of an organisation will follow an 'organizational rationale', that is, 'they 
adapt the goals of the programmes within the organization to fit a "holistic" strategy 
which conforms with their perception of the niche the organization fills within its 
environment' so that 'programmes, in this context, are treated as instruments for 
ensuring the overall survival of an organization' (1993: 253). But almost no 
programmes are implemented by one organisation or by one organisation itself in 
isolation:
Programmes are implemented by a cluster of parts of public and 
private organizations, i.e. implementation structures. An 
implementation structure is comprised of subsets of members within 
organizations which view a programme as their primary (or an 
instrumentally important) interest. For these actors, an implementation 
structure is as much an administrative structure through which 
purposive actions are taken as the organisations in which they are 
employed (Hjem & Porter 1993:253).
11 Goggin, Bowman, Lester and O'Toole suggest that the 'network analysis' approach was developed 
largely by Benny Hjem and his colleagues - David Porter, Ken Hanf and Chris Hull: 'it begins by 
identifying the "network of actors” involved in service delivery in one or more local areas and asks them 
about their goals, strategies, resources, activities and contacts. Essentially the researcher sets out to 
reconstruct what actors are part of the implementation process, then describes and analyses their 
patterns of social interaction' (1990: 190). The network analysis approach views the implementation 
process from the bottom-up. Hanf and O’Toole (1992) have suggested, however, that research on 
networks now focuses on the formulation of public policy to the neglect of studies of implementation of 
such policy. For the debate on the wider use of the network concept in policy studies, see Jordan 
(1990), Rhodes (1990), Rhodes and Marsh (1992a), Marsh and Rhodes (1992) and Van Waarden 
(1992). Dowding (1994a) highlights some of the limits of the policy networks concept. In short, the 
emphasis placed herein on resource interdependencies amongst local actors overlaps with the network 
concept, but no further use is made of the concept in this research framework As Scharpf has 
suggested, the concept is generally strong on description, but weak on explanatory power (1993: 22).
Within implementation structures, members are therefore likely, to some extent, to 
place programme objectives above organisational objectives, in other words, to adopt 
a 'programme rationale' according to the authors. This is a key distinction. It is 
important to note at this stage that, according to the authors, participants in an 
implementation structure address either organisational goals or programme goals or 
both. Again, the 'implementation structures’ approach sought to be prescriptive as well 
as descriptive. Implementation structures provided not only a new unit of analysis and 
a methodological approach, but the authors suggested it should form the core of a 
strategy for administering multi-organisational programmes.12
In genera] then, bottom-up approaches stressed implementation as a political 
rather than a managerial problem. The essence of the bottom-up approach has been 
captured succinctly as follows: ~
Implementation is seen as a negotiating process in which individual 
actors pursue their disparate objectives employing multiple strategies. 
Compliance with central objectives is an inappropriate yardstick of 
success and failure. They adopt an action perspective, focusing on the 
perceptions of individual actors, the organizations within which they 
work and the factors which influence behaviour. The emphasis is 
placed on the multiplicity and complexity of linkages, the problem of 
control and co-ordination and the management of conflict and 
consensus (Rhodes & Marsh 1992b: 7).
The 'management of conflict and consensus' (the simple acceptance of politics into 
the implementation equation) also echoes older debates in political science and 
administration literature in the manner sketched above for the top-down approach. In 
contrast to the rational systems model of policy-making, there was an alternative 
interpretation of policy making as 'an inescapably political activity into which the 
perceptions and interests of individual actors enter at all stages. In this case 
implementation becomes a problematic activity rather than something that can be 
taken for granted, as in the rational process model, policy is seen as a bargained 
outcome, the environment as conflictual and the process itself is characterised by 
diversity and constraint' (Gordon et al. 1993: 7).
Rationalist approaches to decision making came under attack most notably in 
the work of Charles E. Lindblom. His alternative science of 'muddling through' or
12 Richard F. Elmore likewise proposed a prescriptive strategy for policy implementation His model of 
'backward mapping' suggested a strategy for capitalising on discretion as 'a device for improving the 
reliability and effectiveness of policies at the street level' (1979: 610). Beginning not at 'the top' of the 
implementation process, but 'at the last possible stage, the point at which administrative actions intersect 
private choices' (ibid.: 604), the assumption of the 'backward mapping' model was that if the motivations 
of'the bottom' were incorporated into policy design, then, policy would be more likely to be 
implemented successfully
'disjointed incrementalism' has been celebrated as endowing political science with the 
wisdom that 'politics is not for "curing’" (Gregory 1989: 142). The problems of 
managing conflict and consensus never disappear and Lmdblom has been praised for 
resisting *the temptation to regard politics, in any of its multitude of forms, as 
pathological obstructions to the achievement of more rational policy outcomes' (ibid.: 
151). Instead, Lindblom's criticism of rationalist approaches was two-sided (both 
sides rooted in a pluralist analysis of politics): firstly, the pressures upon decision 
makers are such that 'rationality' cannot be attained and most decisions are 
incremental in that they involve only smallr adjustments to previous practice; 
secondly, rational decision making may approximate to social engineering while the 
most advanced democratic process would involve incremental adjustment on the basis 
of pluralistic pressures on decision makers. The conceptual inheritance shared by the 
incremental approach to decision making and the bottom-up approach to 
implementation is obvious, especially when the assumed relationship between means 
and ends in the former is considered:
This model [disjointed incrementalism] posits the decision maker as 
starting not with some ideal goal but with policies currently in force ...
In contrast to the conventional [rationalist] view which sees means 
adjusted to ends, incrementalism promotes the opposite, allowing for a 
continuous and reciprocal relationship between means and ends (Smith 
& May 1980: 150-1).
Similarly, management/organisational thought has developed from the early 
days of Taylorism to incorporate less rationalistic models with concepts that were later 
adopted in bottom-up accounts of policy implementation. In an influential article 
published in 1978, Elmore used the organisational studies literature to construct four 
models of social programme implementation. Taylorism and its central assumption 
that subordinate actors were merely 'manipulable cogs in an organisational machine' 
(Hill 1993: 297) was very much the tradition referred to in Elmore’s organisational 
model of 'implementation as systems management'. In such a model, organisations 
operate as 'rational value maximisers' where 'the essential attribute of rationality is 
goal-directed behaviour' and organisations are deemed 'effective to the extent that they 
maximise performance on their central goals and objectives' (Elmore 1978: 191). 
Implementation in this model is therefore a supremely rational process which 'consists 
of defining a detailed set of objectives that accurately reflect the intent of a given 
policy, assigning responsibilities and standards of performance to subunits consistent 
with these objectives, monitoring system performance, and making internal 
adjustments that enhance the attainment of the organization's goals' (ibid.: 191).
In contrast to this model, Elmore identifies in the organisational studies 
literature three variants of the bottom-up model of implementation: the bureaucratic 
process model; the organisational development model; and, the conflict and 
bargaining model. The key principle of the model of implementation as a 
bureaucratic process is that the central attributes of organisations are 'the irreducible 
discretion exercised by individual workers in their day-to-day decisions and the 
operating routines that they develop to maintain and enhance their position in the 
organization'. Implementation therefore 'consists of identifying where discretion is 
concentrated and which of an organization's repertoire of routines need changing, 
devising alternative routines that represent the intent of policy, and inducing 
organizational units to replace old routines with new ones' (1978: 199-200). In the 
model of implementation as organizational development the key principle is that 
'organizations should function to satisfy the basic psychological and social needs of 
individuals - for autonomy and control over their own work, for participation in 
decisions affecting them, and for commitment to the purposes of the organization'. 
The implementation process according to this model is therefore 'one of consensus 
building and accommodation between policy-makers and implementors. The central 
problem of implementation is not whether implementors conform to prescribed policy 
but whether the implementation process results in consensus in goals, individual 
autonomy, and commitment to policy on the part of those who must cany it out' 
(ibid.: 209). The third variant of the bottom-up approach, implementation as conflict 
and bargaining, views organisations as 'arenas of conflict in which individuals and 
subunits with specific interests compete for relative advantage in the exercise of 
power and the allocation of scarce resources'. In this model implementation therefore 
'consists of a complex series of bargained decisions reflecting the preferences and 
resources of participants. Success or failure of implementation cannot be judged by 
comparing a result against a single declaration of intent, because no single set of 
purposes can provide an internally consistent statement of the interests of all parties 
to the bargaining process. Success can only be defined relative to the goals of one 
party to the bargaining process or in terms of the preservation of the bargaining 
process itself (ibid.: 217-8).
These models have been sketched briefly to show the development o f’bottom- 
up' ideas in the organisational studies literature and thereby to clarify the conception 
of the bottom-up approach to implementation in policy studies. Rather than ’bottom- 
up ideas', however, it is more accurate to speak of a common emphasis on the 
importance of motivational concerns. The various approaches outlined above shared 
with the bottom-up approach to policy implementation a heavy emphasis on the 
importance of discretion in the behaviour of lower level actors. In short, the focus is
predominantly on the motivations o f lower level actors and neglects the task o f 
ensuring co-ordination in the pursuit o f central objectives. As such the focus can be 
contrasted with that which guides top-down analysis.
Bottom-up approaches to implementation analysis are clearly distinguishable 
from top-down approaches in the intellectual heritage of the concepts employed as 
well as the overall focus adopted. Three key strengths of the bottom-up approach have 
been identified by Sabatier as follows: it developed an explicit methodology for 
identifying and analysing policy networks (the 'implementation structures' approach 
of Hjem and Porter); it did not focus exclusively on the attainment of formal policy 
objectives and was therefore free to identify all sorts of unintended consequences of 
actions; and it could deal with policy areas where no actor is pre-eminent (1986: 34). 
On the other hand, the bottom-up approach was also subject to criticisrfrand had a 
number of serious flaws:
(i) just as top-down approaches can overestimate the importance of central vis-à- 
vis local level actors, bottom-up approaches can overemphasise the ability of 
local level actors to frustrate the centre, since discretion may well only exist 
within tightly defined 'rules of the game';
(ii) linked to (i), the centre can often indirectly alter the goals and strategies of 
local level actors through its ability to affect the institutional structure in 
which they operate;
(iii) present participants in an implementation structure are taken as given without 
examining the prior effort of various actors to affect participation; and,
(iv) actors' perceptions and activities are identified but are relied upon too heavily 
so that the bottom-up approach suffers from the flaws of'grounded theory' 
(Sabatier 1986: 34-5; Rhodes & Marsh 1992b: 7).
In general, the bottom-up approach is not concerned with the implementation 
of central objectives but with the motivations and interaction of actors in a policy 
sector. As such, they have tended to concentrate on policy sectors where 
organisational complexity is a predominant feature, such as local economic 
development or human resource development. As Sabatier points out, the vast 
majority of early case studies (both top-down and bottom-up) dealt with social 
programmes initiated by federal authorities in the United States of America or in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (e.g. Pressman & Wildavsky 1973, Hanf & Scharpf 
1978) and almost certainly exaggerated the autonomy of street level implementers 
vis-à-vis formal policy makers (1991: 261). There may be, by contrast, other 
constitutional settings and policy sectors where the multitude of actors is not so 
confusing and where central objectives are clearly identifiable. The question therefore 
arose, when is the top-down approach more appropriate than the bottom-up approach, 
and vice versa?
Like many such dichotomies in the social sciences, the gulf between top-down 
and bottom-up approaches within the implementation perspective oversimplifies 
practical situations. Pressman and Wildavsky were 'pathologists' according to Dunsire 
(1978), interested in dissecting the corpse of failed policies to understand where they 
went wrong and what were the causes of death (cf. Hogwood & Peters 1985).13 
Dunsire, by contrast, claims to be interested in the physiology of the normal process' 
(quoted in Hyder 1984: 5). Should policy analysts be pathologists in their approach to 
the problem of implementation (with all the pessimism that implies), or should they 
be physiologists looking optimistically at lively processes throughout the policy 
system (not just at the head)? Alternatively, can a model be devised by which to 
consider simultaneously the respective concerns and build upon the strengths of both? 
It is to attempts to achieve the latter that the chapter now turns.
2.4 Beyond the 'Top-Down' versus 'Bottom-Up' Dichotomy
This section considers in more detail the apparent dichotomy between top- 
down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation. In particular, it considers 
the normative weight attached to each, before addressing the suggestion by Rhodes 
and Marsh that different approaches should be chosen according to the problem that 
is to be explained. Three attempts to move beyond the top-down versus bottom-up 
dichotomy are then sketched to complete the review of the policy implementation 
literature. Firstly, Berman's model of 'programmed' and 'adaptive implementation' 
(1980) is highlighted to illustrate his claim that different practical approaches to 
implementation depend upon the policy situation in which any governmental actor is 
located. Secondly, longer term approaches to policy change are then considered and 
the concept of 'policy learning' is introduced (Sabatier 1986; 1991). Thirdly, the 
'evolutionary model' of policy implementation (Hyder 1984) is outlined. The section 
then concludes with a critique of the policy implementation literature and indicates 
the conceptual weaknesses that need to be addressed in any reformulated model of 
policy implementation.
Policy studies in general necessarily absorb contributions from various 
academic disciplines. In trying to explain interrelations between the state, politics, 
economy and society, contributions to policy studies are drawn from economics, 
political science, sociology, anthropology, geography, planning, management and 
even applied sciences (Minogue 1983). This interdisciplinary mix, however, conceals 
a danger. When the field in policy studies is so full of 'alternative, competing
13 In a lighter vein. Pressman and Wildavsky themselves deny that their aim is to be *Monday morning 
quarterbacks', to discuss mistakes *with the clarity that only hindsight can give' (1973: 6).
constructions of reality', researchers must guard against the danger of passing time in 
their respective trenches sniping at each other. For Minogue, this problem 'resides 
partly in the lack of experience of policy in practice among those who predominate in 
the theoretical field’; moreover, the problem is cumulative because there is nothing 
more likely to widen the gap between practitioners and theorists than the latter 
indulging in overarching grand constructions of 'reality' (1983: 65). The debate 
between top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation has, on 
occasion, exaggerated the defects of either approach.
There are several examples of caricatures of both the top-down and the 
bottom-up approaches in the literature on implementation theory by proponents of the 
opposite approach. These arise partly as a result of the normative weight assigned to 
each by its respective advocates. In criticising the bottom-up approach, Hogwood and 
Gunn ask whether we should view with equanimity the persistence of racist attitudes 
at the street-level among police officers when the Home Office is trying to promote 
better relationships between the police and black youths? Similarly, if the UK 
parliament decided to move from left-hand to right-hand driving on roads there, 
should it be left up to traffic wardens or road-users when (if at all) the change-over 
should take effect (1984: 208)? Similar caricatures of the top-down approach are 
evident in the writing of some bottom-up proponents. Hill, for example, criticises the 
statement that means justify ends (a statement often attributed to top-down 
approaches where central objectives take on paramount importance). He points out 
that such justifications for an 'autonomous state' often involve engaging in rational 
planning in the style of Orwell's Big Brother' (1993: 196).14 Such caricatures bring the 
normative implications of each model to the fore.
In attempting to account for such caricatures, it has been argued that 
rationalistic top-down approaches provide guides of how policy ought to be carried 
out, while incrementalist bottom-up approaches are descriptions of how the process 
actually operates (Hogwood & Gunn 1984: 207; Smith & May 1980). As shown 
above, however, Gregory (1989), Elmore (1979) and Hjem and Porter (1993) clearly 
present normative models in which decision making and implementation ought to be 
incremental and bottom-up. Conceiving of top-down approaches as prescriptive, and 
bottom-up approaches as descriptive does not therefore take us beyond the impasse. 
By contrast, it has been argued that the different approaches explain elements and 
stages of the same process in different ways. It is most important simply to select the 
approach best suited to the approach at hand. As Rhodes and Marsh explain, they do 
not set out to identify local implementation structures in order to understand the
14 Likewise, in defence of incrementalism in politics, Gregory presents a formidable attack on political 
rationality. However, citing the Tinal Solution' of the Third Reich as a dramatic illustration of political 
rationalism (1989: 143) stretches the debate to a ludicrous extent.
patterns of interaction within sectors. Rather, given Thatcher’s intention to operate 
'conviction government' by setting objectives and forcing them through against all 
opposition, the UK government in the 1980s had clearly stated policy objectives. The 
authors set out to assess the varying outcomes in relation to central policy decisions. It 
would also have been possible to conduct the study adopting a bottom-up approach to 
determine the extent to which local level actors were able to frustrate central 
objectives. However, the choice of a top-down approach by the authors reflects their 
hypothesis that the failure’ of the Thatcher Government was due to a 'self-inflicted 
implementation gap': the fact that the Thatcher Government itself adopted a rigid top- 
down strategy contributed to the many shortfalls in expected outcome. Had the 
explanatory framework for Rhodes and Marsh been conceived differently, a bottom- 
up approach could have been adopted to look at the record of implementation in the 
Thatcher years (1992b).
The emergence of the contending approaches to policy implementation can be 
explained partly as a result of the fact that different writers looked at different types 
of policy. Just as the development of a theoretical context for any study depends on 
what the problem at hand actually is, so the prescriptive choice of a practical strategy 
for implementing a policy depends upon the nature of that particular policy and the 
organisational context in which it operates (Hyder 1984: S). The two basic strategies 
identified by Berman (1980), 'programmed implementation' and 'adaptive 
implementation', deserve some consideration in this context. Given the relevance of 
these concepts for the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting set 
out below, it is worth quoting Berman at some length here:
Two schools of thought and practice have developed regarding the 
design of implementation strategies. One view, which could be called 
programmed implementation, assumes that implementation problems 
can be made tolerable, if not eliminated, by careful and explicit pre­
programming of implementation procedures. The other view, which 
could be called adaptive implementation, holds that policy execution 
can be improved only by processes that allow initial plans to be 
adapted to unfolding events and decisions. Although these approaches 
are not truly opposites, they are strikingly different in point of view 
and practice. They diagnose the source of implementation problems 
differently and offer apparently contrary prescriptions ... I will not 
choose sides, however, for the debate itself can distract policy makers 
and researchers from a fundamental truth of implementation: there is 
no universally best way to implement policy. Either programmed or 
adaptive implementation can be effective if applied to the appropriate 
policy situation, but a mismatch between approach and situation 
aggravates the very problems these approaches seek to overcome 
(1980: 205-6).
Programmed implementation calls for 'clarity, precision and 
comprehensiveness' of the preliminary policy before the final decision on policy 
alternatives is taken. In other words, the real effort in devising an effective policy is 
required in the period before a decision is taken. After the decision is taken, all levels 
of government or of the organisation involved are expected to follow the pre­
programmed implementation procedures. Implementation becomes essentially a 
monitoring task. Implementation problems, according to the programmed approach, 
can result from three sources:
(i) ambiguity in policy goals resulting in or caused by misunderstanding, 
confusion, or value conflict;
(ii) participation of too many actors with overlapping authority; and, ~
(iii) implementors' resistance, ineffectualness, or inefficiency (ibid.: 208).
Programmed implementation is therefore clearly based on the general insights
of the top-down approach, and on the importance of co-ordination in particular.
Adaptive implementation, by contrast, offers a 'different diagnosis and prescription', 
reflecting the general insights of the bottom-up approach and the specific importance 
of involving and motivating lower level actors:
Implementation problems arise because of the over specification and 
rigidity of goals, the failure to engage relevant actors in decision­
making, and the excessive control of deliverers. The ideal of adaptive 
implementation is the establishment of a process that allows policy to 
be modified, specified, and revised - in a word, adapted - according to 
the unfolding interaction of the policy with its institutional setting. Its 
outcomes would be neither automatic nor assured, and it would look 
more like a disorderly learning process than a predictable procedure 
(ibid.: 210-1).
This distinction between programmed and adaptive approaches to 
implementation is useful, particularly as the strategy adopted should be contingent 
upon different delivery systems in different situations. Berman offers five situational 
parameters (the scope of change implied by a policy, the level of certainty over the 
validity of the theory or technology underlying a policy, the degree of conflict over 
policy goals, the structure of a policy's institutional setting, and the stability of a 
policy's environment) which determine the strategy appropriate for any given 
situation. The notion that implementation must be uniform for all policy situations, 
invariable over time and homogeneous across all organisational levels is therefore 
rejected. However, the possibility that appropriate elements o f each strategy may be
required simultaneously by an institution is not given enough attention in Berman's 
model. From the perspective of central actors, co-ordination of lower level actors is 
important and hence a degree of programming should take place. However, as was 
emphasised at the beginning of this chapter, no central policy-maker is omniscient. In 
many policy situations, therefore, elements of both programmed and adaptive 
strategies are required by central policy-makers. Far from being mutually exclusive, 
the two are complementary. Before turning to the mutual importance of co-ordination 
and motivation as emphasised in the contracting approach under economic neo­
institutionalism, however, other attempts to move beyond the top-down versus 
bottom-up dichotomy should be considered.
Another suggested means by which to move beyond the simple top-down 
versus bottom-up dichotomy is to look at the implementation of a given policy over a 
longer time frame. In attempting to provide a synthesis of top-down and bottom-up 
approaches, Sabatier proposed the longer term 'advocacy coalition framework of 
policy change' (1986). He proposed a focus on 'advocacy coalitions', actors from 
various public and private organisations who share a set of beliefs with regard to a 
policy and seek to realise their common goals over time. His central argument was 
that early studies of implementation processes adopted a relatively short time span of 
2-4 years study after the basic policy decision, which in many instances was a new 
law. By contrast, when a 10-15 year time span is adopted, a large extent of 'policy 
oriented learning' can be identified. Over time, vague objectives can be clarified, poor 
causal theories can be improved, and support for policy adaptation can be built up at 
all levels. As such, Sabatier sought to harness some of the presumed technical 
expertise of the top-down approach with the more openly political policy process of 
the bottom-up approach. In other words, he sought to incorporate bottom-up concerns 
over the variety of actors and perspectives with top-down concerns over the extent to 
which socio-economic conditions and legal instruments constrain the options of all 
actors. The focus thereby shifts at one and the same time from policy implementation 
in the present to policy change over periods of a decade or more, and from specific 
governmental organisations to policy sub-systems, or policy networks (Sabatier 1991; 
Jenkins-Smith & Sabatier 1994). However, in such a framework, attention shifts from 
immediate policy implementation per se to policy change over long time spans of 
several decades.
A similar, longer term approach, focusing on the importance of the policy 
cycle as a learning process, was sketched out in Hyder's 'evolutionary model' of policy 
implementation (1984). In the liarsh world of the 1980s' in the UK (the author cites 
'rolling back the state', economic restraint, and inter-organisational turbulence), 
implementation procedures had to be flexible and experimental and pay the fullest
attention to the policy environment. Policy outcomes were uncertain and policies 
themselves necessarily had to be adaptable. Hyder therefore accepted the conception 
of implementation as a 'policy-action continuum in which an interactive and 
negotiative process is taking place over time, between those seeking to put policy into 
effect and those upon whom action depends' (Barrett & Fudge 1981. 25). 
Implementation procedures, as in the 'adaptive approach' of Berman, must necessarily 
leave scope for innovation. Furthermore, the policy cycle should be viewed as a 
learning process.
As suggested above, one of the innovations of Pressman and Wildavsky's 1973 
study was to show the importance of the causal theories upon which policies are 
based. All policies contain initial hypotheses which are worked out in practice 
through the process of implementation. However, this process is evolutionary. A 
problem (Pi) will be addressed by a policy based upon a hypothesis (Hi), will be 
implemented, and will be evaluated. The problem will thereby be reformulated (P2) 
and the policy will evolve upon the basis of a revised hypothesis (H2) etc. The model 
is evolutionary because policy learning occurs so that through the process the initial 
policy based upon hypothesis Hi takes on new forms based on H2 then H? etc. 
Subsequent policies are not necessarily 'better' than previous ones, but new 
hypotheses emerge as a response either to the process of implementation acting on the 
environment or to extrinsic changes in the environment itself. The model is defended 
from the criticism that it is simply a restatement of classic incrementalism by pointing 
out that there is nothing at all that assumes that changes should be gradual (Hyder 
1984).
It is clear from the above review that the last two decades of implementation 
research have produced a wealth of literature adopting the implementation 
perspective'. The initial top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy, echoing longer 
running debates in political science, organisational sociology and administration, 
clearly set out the terms of debate in the field. Reviewing the field of implementation 
studies in 1987, Palumbo wrote of the theoretical developments to that time.
To date, only a partial or middle-range theoiy of implementation has 
been developed. It explains how implementation usually is done, some 
of the conditions under which implementation may succeed, the 
reasons why adaptation and change during implementation are 
inevitable, and something about the direction of adaptation and 
change (1987: 91).
The inevitability of policy adaptation and change through implementation is perhaps 
the most valuable lesson of this literature. Further lessons are greatly disputed. 
Despite the efforts of Berman (1980), Hyder (1984) and Sabatier (1986; 1991), the
influence of the top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy remains strong.15 The 
enduring attraction of such approaches reflects the fact that they represent sharply 
contrasting interpretations of where within a political system the ultimate control over 
policy resides, and more importantly, ought to reside. It is suggested herein that 
together the two approaches provide complementary insights into policy 
implementation. The failure to recognise this fact, and the absence of a conceptual 
framework whereby the key concerns of each approach can be integrated, has 
hindered the development of implementation theory. Implementation studies have 
generally failed to stress the mutual importance of the tasks of co-ordination of actors 
and motivation of those same actors. To this extent, the policy implementation 
literature has been limited in its theoretical development.
A recent chapter by L.J. O’Toole (1993) usefully addresses the ÎÎThits of the 
traditional policy implementation literature. He accepts that the methodological 
sophistication of implementation research has advanced in the last two decades: while 
early writings tended to consist of single case studies, or a very small set of cases, 
more recently there have been efforts to initiate comparative, longitudinal and larger- 
N studies to test propositions developed in the literature.16 Efforts to incorporate the 
insights of the so-called top-down’ and ’bottom-up' approaches to implementation 
(e.g. Sabatier 1991) are cited as another indicator of increasing methodological 
finesse. And yet, O'Toole is still searching for 'a more mature scholarship on policy 
implementation':
While descriptive work has progressed significantly and 
methodological sophistication has aided the tasks of theoreticians, 
there is as yet little agreement on a theory of implementation, even 
within relatively restrictive classes of cases. Top-down and bottom-up 
differences persist among analysts, and a great deal of what passes for 
conventional wisdom among scholars about policy implementation has 
a proverbial character. Therefore, the study of policy implementation 
stands in need of additional assistance in rendering theoretically
15 Goggin, Bowman, Lester and O’Toole should also be mentioned here for their attempt to move 
implementation theory toward a 'third generation'. The objective of‘third generation' research is to be 
more 'scientific', 'to shed new light on implementation behavior by explaining why that behavior varies 
across time, across policies, and across units of government and by predicting the type of 
implementation behavior that is likely to occur in the future' (1990: 171). The authors provide a 
'Communications Model of Intergovernmental Policy Implementation' whereby 'communications theory 
offers a means of synthesizing the "top-down" and "bottom-up" approaches that dominate (and divide) 
the implementation literature... The model uses communications theory as the glue that holds the pieces 
together Messages, their senders, and the messages' recipients are the critical ingredients. Decoding 
these messages and absorbing them into agency routine is what implementation is all about' (ibid.: 33- 
40).
16 See Goggin (1986) and Goggin, Bowman, Lester and O’Toole (1990) for accounts of such 'second 
generation' research.
sensible the important issues that are the subjects of investigation
(1993: 28).
O'Toole turns to the literature of rational choice and game theory for possible 
theoretical assistance.17 He sets out some of the challenges facing any effort to apply 
formal rational-choice models to arenas of multi-organisational policy 
implementation, but his methodological suggestions as to how the complexity and 
uncertainty of real implementation settings could be reduced in order to facilitate 
modelling are not of concern here. .
Like O’Toole, the approach adopted herein accepts that the study of policy 
implementation stands in need of additional assistance to move beyond the top-down 
versus bottom-up dichotomy. Unlike O’Toole, however, the 'uncertaint^factors' he 
identifies do not constitute a constraint to be simplified before a model can be 
developed. Rather, the persistence of the combined factors of endemic uncertainty 
and policy/institutional complexity (when combined with the assumption of bounded 
rationality) mean than implementation can be conceived as a process of incomplete 
contracting. It is suggested below that the model of incomplete contracting builds 
upon the implementation perspective reviewed in this chapter and provides an 
opportunity for conceptual advancement in the study of policy implementation. The 
following section therefore sets out the model of incomplete contracting, emphasising 
its relevance to the body of implementation literature reviewed in Sections 2.3 and 
2.4.
2.5 The Model of Policy Implementation as Incomplete Contracting
The remainder of this chapter elaborates the model of policy implementation 
as incomplete contracting, indicating both the theoretical background from which it is 
developed and its key features. The starting point of the model is the exchange-based
17 Abell (1990) provides a collection of the key texts in the development of rational choice theory. In 
general, rational choice theory presents an actor-driven methodology placing explanatory weight on the 
preferences of actors, their ability to order these preferences, and their motivation to pursue courses of 
action satisfying such preferences (see Riker 1990: 172; Shepsle 1989). Assumptions regarding the 
motivations of actors are made 'in order to predict how, generally, they will behave in certain social 
situations, usually assumptions of egoistic maximisation' (Dowding 1994b: 106-107). Marsh (1994) 
criticises rational choice theory, emphasising structural determinants of action, while Tsebelis (1990: 18- 
51) provides a spirited defence in the face of such critiques. Rational choice theory is of interest in this 
context to the extent that this research makes the methodological assumption that opportunistic 
behaviour is significant, although not denying the importance of the structure in which actors find 
themselves to the shaping their motives. It should be emphasised, however, that the 'nearly omniscient 
Homo economicus' (Simon quoted in Williamson 1993: 10) who populates some formulations of 
rational choice theory is not considered herein, as the assumption of bounded rationality set out in 
chapter 1 confirms. For an account of'game theory1 from a political science perspective, see Ordeshook 
(1986, 1992).
conceptualisation of power highlighted in the introductory chapter and explored in 
Section 2.2 above. It was suggested therein that power-dependence relationships 
characterise the interaction between the European Commission, national and sub­
national actors in the field of EC regional policy. DG XVTs relatively small size and 
the fact that it does not directly implement its own policies means that it is dependent 
upon national and sub-national actors for expertise, field information, knowledge 
resources and the supply of projects which it can co-finance in order to utilise its 
budget. In turn, national and sub-national actors depend upon the European for 
financial resources and guidance as to how such finances can be claimed. To 
paraphrase Parri (1989), such interdependence implies that governance no longer 
involves the simple deployment of central authority through decrees and enforcement. 
Rather, the conceptualisation of power employed herein teaches that contemporary 
governance structures often involve complex exchange relationships: the 'voluntary 
transfer of resources between actors on the basis of at least some kind of reciprocity', 
to repeat Macneil's observation (1990: 152).
Neither the top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation 
examined in Section 2.3, nor the later models examined in Section 2.4 capture the 
significance and extent of such exchange relationships. The top-down approach 
places the main focus of analysis on the ex-ante legal and political structuring of the 
implementation process (i.e. before a policy decision is taken) by top-level actors. In 
contrast, the bottom-up approach places the main focus of analysis on the ex-post 
motivations of local level actors, given the discretion such actors invariably enjoy in 
the execution of policy decisions. While both approaches provide key insights into the 
nature of the implementation problem, a more complete understanding demands 
recognition of the fact that policy decisions establish an ongoing exchange 
relationship between interdependent actors: the process of bargaining cannot be 
concentrated in the ex-ante preparation of a policy decision, nor can it be 
concentrated in the ex-post execution phase. The exchange of resources continues 
across both phases. The primary methodological innovation presented by the model o f 
policy implementation as incomplete contracting is thus a shift in the unit o f analysis 
to the exchange itself encompassing both conceptual 'phases'.
The conceptual parentage of the incomplete contracting model lies in the 
realm of economic neo-institutionalism. This body of literature is introduced briefly 
in Section 2.5.1 to present the general background of the model. More specifically, 
the branch of that literature specialising in the analysis of transaction costs' is 
particularly instructive. Transaction costs analysis, pioneered by Ronald Coase and 
advanced by Oliver Williamson, focuses on the costs of organising an exchange. A 
central contention of transaction costs analysis is that exchange relationships are
invariably governed by a contract, irrespective of whether such contracts possess any 
formal, legal status. Section 2.5.2 illustrates the relevance of transaction costs 
analysis for students of policy-making and stresses the potential usefulness of the 
contracting approach when applied to policy implementation. Repeating the 
assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism set out in the introductory 
chapter, Section 2.5.3 suggests that contracts can rarely ever be completely specified 
in advance. This section also sketches the dimensions of the exchange which, 
according to the model, determine the form of the contract and which therefore have 
a direct effect on the governance structures established to facilitate its preparation and 
enforcement. In this context, relational contracting is examined in Section 2.5.4 as a 
potential response to contractual incompleteness. The importance of trust among 
contracting partners is also emphasised in this section before the chapterconcludes 
with a reprise of the main arguments presented herein and a summary of the model of 
policy implementation as incomplete contracting. It is to the model's general 
background in economic neo-institutionalism that this chapter now turns.
2.5.1 Economic Neo-Institutionalism: The Significance o f Governance Structures
The growing strength of the institutionalist paradigm in recent decades is a 
widely recognised phenomenon. As Jan-Erik Lane notes, however, the new 
institutionalism comes in two veiy different versions, the first one originating in 
organisation theory and the second one emerging within the new institutional 
economics' (1993: 166).18 Although both the major interpretations within neo­
institutionalism agree that 'institutions do matter1, the sociological version views 
institutions as more than the simple sum of their parts (a holistic version), while the 
economic version views institutions as rational responses to individual interests and 
their aggregation into collective action (an atomistic version) (ibid.: 166-168). As 
suggested above, the economic version's contractual perspective on exchange 
relationships is particularly instructive in this context. The model of policy 
implementation as incomplete contracting therefore draws on a key approach in the 
field of economic neo-institutionalism.
18 Dowding (1994b: 107) attributes to March and Olsen (1984; 1989) the credit for introducing into 
political science the term 'new institutionalism'. March and Olsen suggest that the importance of social 
context or the motives of individual actors cannot be denied, but insist on a more autonomous role in 
theoretical political science for political institutions. Such institutions are more than just simple mirrors 
of social forces (1984: 739). While their version of new institutionalism is neither a theory nor a 
coherent critique of one, they conclude that "the organization of political life makes a difference' (1984: 
747,1989: 1). Shepsle (1989) provides an account of the potential lessons of a neo-institutionalist 
approach influenced more by the discipline of economics, while Dowding (1994b) presents a particularly 
useful analysis of the compatibility of rational choice theory and new institutionalism.
Instead of treating institutions as given, the neo-institutionalist approach in 
economics attempts to endogenise what has traditionally been regarded as exogenous 
(Lane 1993: 176). In other words, neo-classical economics had tended to devote very 
little attention to institutions. Even the firm, as an institution which might have been 
expected to attract the attention of economists, was treated largely as 'a black box that 
produces optimal choices automatically as a function of any given environment' (Moe 
1984: 740). However, in the last two decades or so, many economists have 
acknowledged the importance of institutional arrangements in economic processes: 
'the study of economic institutions has witness«! a renaissance' (Williamson 1985: 
15). The increasing concern of economists with institutions has been expertly 
documented and analysed for the purposes of political scientists by Moe (1984), while 
more recently, Furubotn and Richter (1993) have assessed progress in th5“field. The 
fundamental distinction in this literature is that between markets and hierarchical 
forms of organisation as different means of co-ordination. This well-known 
distinction is worth exploring briefly in order to clarify the concept of 'governance 
structures' utilised throughout this study.
The importance of co-ordinating a multiplicity of actors has long been 
recognised as a key economic task.19 Scharpf points out that markets and hierarchies 
were long regarded as the two 'standard forms of institutionalized co-ordination': in 
other words, co-ordination among political, social and economic actors could be 
achieved through exchanges governed by pre-established prices in anonymous 
markets, or through the unilateral decisions of hierarchically superior authority (1993: 
9). Markets and hierarchies are thus standard forms of governance structure. At this 
point, the precise meaning of this term can be provided. As Schneiberg and 
Hollingsworth convincingly suggest, 'governance' is a frequently-used concept, but 
little effort appears to be devoted to specifying just what it means:
As a first approximation, we define economic governance as the set of 
practices whereby interdependent economic actors (producers, 
suppliers, distributors, labor, and state agencies) voluntarily coordinate 
and/or hierarchically control their activities and interactions ...
19 Adam Smith's classic example of the pin factory is frequently used to illustrate the potential benefits 
of specialisation and co-operation, and the corresponding need for co-ordination: 'Smith described how 
in his time (the late eighteenth century) the various stages of pin manufacturing were carried out by 
different people, each of whom specialized in a single task • pulling the wire, straightening it, cutting h 
to appropriate lengths, sharpening the point, attaching the head, and packaging the finished product - 
and how the resulting volume of output was many times greater than it would have been if each person 
involved had done all the stages alone. The crucial point, however, is that such specialization requires 
co-ordination' (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 25). Should such co-ordination be provided through the 
market, or by integrating all these tasks within a single, hierarchical organisation? Similarly, in the case 
of EC regional development policy, the partnership principle implies recognition of the fact that the 
numerous actors performing economic development tasks in the regional economy require co-ordination 
to avoid duplication of effort and to realise the benefits of co-operation.
'Governance structures' are the institutional devices through which 
economic actors organize these practices and manage inter- 
organizational relations. The study of governance represents an attempt 
to understand the motives, dynamics, and conditions that lead to the 
'choice' of a particular governance structure from a range of possible 
institutional forms (1991:201).
Amongst economists, the market has generally been viewed as the most efficient of 
governance structures, its perceived advantage being that the economic activities of 
widely dispersed people (entirely unaware of each other’s existence) could be co­
ordinated, with price serving as the key mechanism in the co-ordination. However, as 
Milgrom and Roberts have recently reminded us, if markets can perform so well, why 
then do we so often see the price system supplanted, with economic activity-organised 
within and among formal, hierarchical structures using explicit planning and 
directives? More simply, why are there firms? (1992: 28). These fundamental 
questions were first posed by Ronald Coase (1937; 1960), and form the starting-point 
of the transaction costs approach within economic neo-institutionalism. This 
approach helps us to recognise the nature and importance of contracting, and should 
now be introduced.
2.5.2 Transaction Costs Analysis and the Contracting Approach
In his path-breaking 1937 article, Coase questioned why the firm existed as an 
organisational form in the specialised exchange economy. Moe later paraphrased 
Coase's central problematic when he asked 'why do economic agents in real economic 
contexts tend to arrange themselves hierarchically and co-ordinate their decisions via 
central authority rather than relying upon voluntary exchange and the automatic co­
ordination provided by the market?' (1984: 742). As Moe suggests, Coase's own 
answer - that hierarchy may often be more efficient than the market - is not surprising. 
However, the way in which Coase arrived at the answer was more important. He 
pointed out that 'real-world production processes of any complexity generally involve 
many transactions among owners of capital, labor, land, specialised knowledge, and 
other inputs’ (ibid.: 742). Such transactions, usually exchanges of resources, involve 
costs. It is the relative cost associated with different institutional arrangements for 
carrying out transactions that bears the central explanatory weight of the transaction 
costs approach.
According to Coase, the costs of carrying out transactions - 'transaction costs' - 
differ according to the nature of the transaction and the way in which it is organised. 
Were all production to be carried out solely through market mechanisms, there would 
be two general sources of transactions costs. Firstly, an economic actor seeking
involvement in the production process would incur the costs of gathering and 
evaluating information regarding prices relevant to each stage of the process. 
Secondly, costs would be incurred 'in preparing for, negotiating, and concluding 
separate contractual agreements for each transaction’ involved in the process of 
production (Moe 1984: 742; Coase 1937). Following Coase's' analysis, the general 
tendency for rational actors is then to adopt the form of organisation that economises 
on transaction costs. Thus, transactions tend to occur in the market when doing so is 
most efficient, and are otherwise brought within the firm or some other form of 
organisation when doing so minimises the costs of carrying them out (Milgrom & 
Roberts 1992: 28). This basic idea forms the foundation of the transaction costs 
approach. In the words of Oliver Williamson, the transactions costs approach (to the 
economic institutions of capitalism) maintains that these institutions have the main 
purpose and effect of economizing on transaction costs' (quoted in Lane 1993: 177).20
The precise nature and origin of transaction costs was not fully addressed in 
Coase's original framework. He simply noted that transaction costs are incurred in 
order 10 discover who it is that one wishes to deal with, to inform people that one 
wishes to deal and on what terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to 
draw up the contract, to undertake the inspection needed to make sure that the terms 
of the contract are being observed, and so on' (Coase 1960: 15). Even at such a 
general level, however, the conceptual link with policy analysis is clear. As Majone 
suggests, 'a natural classification of transaction costs consistent with Coase's notion 
can be obtained from the different stages of the policy-making process: problem 
definition, agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, evaluation. Different 
transaction costs arise at the different stages since neither the nature of the task nor 
the set of policy actors remain constant throughout the process' (1994: 5).2] As 
suggested in Section 2.2 above, contemporary policy-making involves a variety of 
non-state actors in each of these tasks. Ongoing exchange relationships are therefore
20 It should be noted that Williamson acknowledges that there can be no absolute measure of transaction 
costs. Hence, 'it is the difference between rather than the absolute magnitude of transaction costs that 
matters' (1985: 22). Different costs are involved when economic activity is organised within markets 
and hierarchies: 'whereas market transactions involve exchange between autonomous economic entities
... hierarchical transactions are ones for which a single administrative entity spans both sides of the 
transaction (and) some form of subordination prevails' (Williamson 1975: xi). Williamson's work 
therefore focuses on the costs associated with completing transactions under different organisational 
arrangements (1975, 1985; 1993).
21 Twight applies transaction costs analysis to the wider political context of general forms of co­
ordinated action, and concludes that ‘transaction costs often determine political outcomes. To define 
them is to understand their pivotal role, for in a political context transaction costs denote most of the 
costs of multi-person political 'exchange* - more precisely, the costs of reaching and enforcing political 
agreements regarding the role and scope of government. Political transaction costs thus include 
information costs, organization costs, agency costs and other costs that exist in a political situation 
because of the fact that individuals strive to act collectively (1994: 190).
established within the policy area. What is the nature of the governance structures 
which best facilitate the exchange?
It has been suggested until now that exchanges (both economic and political) 
involve a variety of costs, and that these costs influence the governance structures 
facilitating that exchange. This is a simple but potentially useful idea. But what is the 
precise nature of such costs? Given Coase's failure to address this question more fully, 
much of the research in the economics of organisations has been devoted to giving 
substance and content to the basic idea of transaction costs. Where exactly do they 
come from, and what is their nature? The work of Oliver Williamson (1985), and later 
that of Paul Milgrom and John Roberts, seeks to answer this question. For the 
purposes of this study, Milgrom and Roberts' assertion that transaction costs are best 
summarised as the costs of co-ordination and motivation is particularly u55ful (1992: 
29). This assertion is of tremendous relevance both to the preceding analysis of top- 
down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation, and to the model of 
incomplete contracting, and therefore warrants careful attention.
Milgrom and Roberts suggest that the main tasks of economic organisation are 
essentially twofold: to co-ordinate the actions of various, dispersed, individual actors 
so that they form a coherent plan, and to motivate the actors in accordance with the 
plan (1992: 49). However, a key problem in achieving effective co-ordination is that 
the information needed to determine the best uses of resources is not freely available 
to everyone: information is highly localised and dispersed. The costs associated with 
co-ordination are therefore those of planning and bargaining in order to decide what 
should be done. There are two potential responses to the requirement to co-ordinate. 
Either transmit all the relevant information to a vast central computer or planner;22 or 
adopt a more decentralised system that involves less information transmission and, 
therefore leaves at least some of the calculations and decisions about economic 
activity to those with whom the relevant information resides (ibid.: 26). According to 
Milgrom and Roberts, most forms of economic organisation involve some degree of 
decentralisation and hence discretion is widespread. Motivation costs, such as the 
costs of measuring performance, providing incentives and enforcing the plan 
therefore become significant. The link here with implementation analysis, where 
decisions require the involvement of actors from a number of organisations but are 
not self-executing, is obvious.
Recalling the dichotomy between top-down and bottom-up approaches to 
policy implementation, the top-down emphasis on co-ordination and the bottom-up
22 The apparent absurdity of this suggestion similarly lies at the heart of Hjem and Porter's 'Lonely 
Organisation Syndrome' (1993: 249) considered in the preceding analysis.
emphasis on motivation should be re-considered in light of the fact that both tasks are 
central to any form of organisation:
Motivation questions arise because individuals have their own 
private interests, which are rarely perfectly aligned with the 
interests of other individuals, with the groups to which the 
individuals belong, or with society as a whole. The co-ordination 
problem is to determine what things should be done, how they 
should be accomplished, and who should do what. At the 
organizational level, the problem is also to determine who makes 
decisions and with what information,* and how to arrange 
communications systems to ensure that the needed information is 
available. The motivation problem is to ensure that the various 
individuals involved in these processes willingly do their parts in_ 
the whole undertaking, both reporting information accurately to 
allow the right plan to be devised and acting as they are supposed 
to act to carry out the plan (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 126).
In other words, according to economic organisation theory the tasks of co-ordination 
and motivation are not separable. Co-ordination without motivation leads to top- 
heavy forms of organisation and inefficiency due to the scarce feedback of required 
information. Motivation without co-ordination leads to unfocused forms of 
organisation, and inefficiency due to the failure to exploit the benefits of 
specialisation and co-ordinated action. In terms of the policy implementation debate, 
the top-down versus bottom-up dichotomy can therefore be seen as a false dichotomy. 
What is required is a framework that addresses the importance of both (ex-ante) co­
ordination and (ex-post) motivation.
The simultaneous importance of co-ordination and motivation is most clearly 
expressed in the focus on contracting, which forms a central plank of economic new 
institutionalism and the transaction costs approach. As explained in the introductory 
chapter, this body of literature suggests that exchange relationships (in their 
economic, political, or 'territorial political' forms) are invariably governed by a 
contract. Given the wide range of possible exchange relationships, Hart and 
HolmstrOm point out that 'contract' is a flexible concept:
Any trade - as a quid pro quo - must be mediated by some form of 
contract, whether it be explicit or implicit ... In recent years, 
economists have become much more interested in long-term 
relationships where a considerable amount of time may elapse 
between the quid and the quo. In these circumstances, a contract 
becomes an essential part of the trading relationship (1987: 71).
It has already been suggested that contracts do not require formal, legal status to be 
considered as such. Rather, economic neo-institutionalism simply suggests that the 
agreement to exchanges resources can be conceptualised as a contract. Governance 
structures (whether markets, hierarchies, or anything between) can thus be 
conceptualised as different contractual responses to the problem of economic 
organisation, that is to the tasks of co-ordination and motivation.
According to the contracting approach to economic organisation, contracts 
facilitate the task of co-ordination. Actors enter into contractual relationships in order 
to benefit from their exchange. Moreover, if it were possible to draw up a perfectly 
complete contract, the task of motivation would likewise be accomplished.27 
Motivation is only a problem because partners to a contract usually have their own 
private interests and these are not always aligned with the interests of otfièr partners 
to the contract. This misalignment of interests is a recognised phenomenon in the 
bottom-up approach to implementation and explains why partners to a contract do not 
always act as they are supposed to do in order to meet the terms of the contract. 
However, were it possible to detail a complete contract in advance, this would specify 
what every partner is supposed to do under every possible circumstance. Enforcement 
would become a matter of simple monitoring.
As suggested in the introductory chapter, however, complete contracts are 
impossible to prepare under real world conditions where actors are boundedly rational 
and behave opportunistically. Bearing in mind these assumptions on human 
behaviour, the above discussion of transaction costs can usefully be applied to the 
phenomenon of contracting. The costs associated with any form of contractual 
arrangement can be very high. Hart and Holmstrom list the following four headings 
under which the costs of contracting are significant:
(i) the cost to each party of anticipating the various eventualities that may occur 
during the life of the relationship;
(ii) the cost of deciding, and reaching an agreement about, how' to deal with such 
eventualities;
23 One line of research on contracts has been the prominent area of work on 'principal-agent' theory.
The principal-agent literature is concerned with how one individual, the principal (say an employer), can 
design a compensation system (a contract) which motivates another individual, (his agent say the 
employee), to act in the principal's interests... Since, in general, the pay-offs to the agent will differ from 
those to the principal, the agent will not in general take the action which the principal would like him to 
take, or that they would contract for in the presence of perfect information... The principal-agent 
problem is, then, the central problem of economic incentives' (Stiglitz 1987: 966-967). Hart and 
Holmstrdm suggest that 'agency relationships are ubiquitous in economic life. Wherever there are gains 
to specialization there is likely to arise a relationship in which agents act on behalf of a principal, because 
of comparative advantage' (1987: 75).This theoretical contribution has been widely adopted in political 
science. For example, see Braun (1993) for an application of the principal-agent concept to the field of 
science policy, where the author argues that the importance of third parties (client groups) is often 
neglected in principal-agent theory
(iii) the cost of writing a contract in a sufficiently clear and unambiguous way that 
the terms of the contract can be enforced; and,
(iv) the legal cost of enforcement (1987: 132).
Such costs are vital in all long-term contracts, and their existence means that 
contractual agreements are usually only incomplete. Even in short-term contracts, 
however, these costs will all be significant, although those coming under headings (i) 
and (iii) will be significantly reduced since the future is relatively more predictable.24 
Due to the presence of such transaction costs, which are greater in long-term 
contracts, ’the contracts people write will be incomplete in important respects. The 
parties will quite rationally leave out many contingencies, taking the point of view 
that it is better to wait and see what happens than try to cover a large number of 
unlikely eventualities. Less rationally, the parties will leave other contingencies that 
they simply do not anticipate. Instead of writing very long-term contracts the parties 
will write limited-term contracts, with the intention of re-negotiating these when they 
come to an end' (Hart & Holmstrdm 1987: 132). In real world situations, such 
incomplete contracts are far more common than complete contracts. It is to the 
common phenomenon of incomplete contracting that this chapter now turns.
2.5.3 The Nature o f the Incomplete Contract
Transaction costs of ex-ante and ex-post types are usefully 
distinguished. The first are the costs of drafting, negotiating, and 
safeguarding an agreement. This can be done with a great deal of care, 
in which case a complex document is drafted in which numerous 
contingencies are recognized, and appropriate adaptations by the 
parties are stipulated and agreed to in advance. Or the document can 
be very incomplete, the gaps to be filled in by the parties as the 
contingencies arise. Rather, therefore, than contemplate all 
conceivable bridge crossings in advance, which is a very ambitious 
undertaking, only actual bridge-crossing choices are addressed as 
events unfold (Williamson 1985: 20).
'Well cross that bridge when we come to it' is a common maxim in day-to-day 
usage in the English language. In many ways, it captures succinctly the logic of 
incomplete contracting. Even in everyday situations, the time and effort required to 
plan ahead prohibits detailed agreements on what to do under every possible 
circumstance. ’We’ll cross that bridge when we come to it' testifies to the bounded
24 Hart and Holmstrdm add that 'it is also worth emphasising that, when we talk about the cost of a 
long-term contract, we are presumably referring to the cost of a "good" long-term contract There is 
rarely significant cost or difficulty in writing some long-term contract' (1987: 132).
rationality of individuals in the face of uncertain conditions. The maxim also suggests 
that "bridges will be crossed' only if  necessary. It makes little sense to try to anticipate 
all possible contingencies, as the likelihood is that many will never arise. In the words 
of Williamson quoted above, ’only actual bridge-crossing choices are addressed as 
events unfold'. Initial agreements to co-ordinate actions are therefore incomplete in 
key respects. This is the essence of incomplete contracting.
Hart and Holmstrdm have provided a useful review of the emerging ideas on 
incomplete contracting in the discipline of economics. They point out that to date, the 
vast majority of theoretical work on contracts has been concerned with complete 
contracts. However, the realisation that it is 'usually impossible to lay down each 
party's obligations completely and unambiguously in advance' has focused attention 
on the extent to which actual contracts are incomplete in key regp&cts. This 
'incompleteness raises new and difficult questions about how the behaviour of the 
contracting parties is determined' (1987: 148). The authors add that, unfortunately 
incomplete contracts represent a more recent methodological trend in contract 
research, and as such their discussion *has not advanced very far yet' and is 
'correspondingly more tentative in nature' (ibid.: 73). Nevertheless, the incomplete 
contracting approach is more than just a new descriptive tool. It provides some key 
insights on how the dimensions of an exchange relationship shape the nature of the 
incomplete contract and hence the governance structures established to facilitate that 
exchange.
A key concept in the model of incomplete contracting is that of bounded 
rationality, as examined in chapter 1. At this stage, it is worth re-emphasising what 
would be involved in reaching and enacting a complete contract, and why bounded 
rationality makes this unlikely. Milgrom and Roberts (1992), echoing Hart and 
Holmstrdm (1987), provide a useful summary of the key requirements of contractual 
completeness. Firstly, the parties to a contract must each foresee all the relevant 
contingencies that might be important to them in the course of the contract and to 
which they might want to make adaptations. Moreover, they must be able to describe 
these contingencies accurately so that they can unambiguously determine before the 
fact just what possibilities are being discussed. They must also be able to know after 
the fact which of the particular circumstances they considered beforehand has now 
actually occurred' (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 127). Secondly, ’they must be willing 
and able to determine and agree upon an efficient course of action for each possible 
contingency' (ibid.: 127). Bounded rationality means that both these requirements are 
highly unlikely to be met. Thirdly, 'once they have entered the contract, they must be 
happy to abide by its terms'. This third requirement of complete contracting has two 
main elements: 'the parties must not mutually desire to re-negotiate the contract later',
otherwise, the anticipation that they will re-negotiate may deprive the original 
agreement of its credibility and may prevent it from guiding behavior as it should'; 
and, 'each party must be able to determine freely whether the contract's terms are 
being met, and, if they are being violated, each must be willing to enforce the agreed 
performance’ (ibid.: 127). In other words, the perfectly fashioned complete contract 
would require hyper-rationality.
In short, the bounded rationality of real actors means that not all possible 
'bridge-crossings' can be detailed in advance. In complex exchange relationships, it is 
inevitable that contingencies will arise that have not been planned for. When this 
occurs, partners to the exchange must find ways to adapt. Under such circumstances, 
it is not just bounded rationality but also the opportunistic behaviour of actors that 
renders contracts incomplete. The inevitability of adaptations to the contract means 
that opportunistic behaviour is a possibility, and hence the task of motivation 
becomes that of reducing the likelihood of such behaviour. In agreeing to co-ordinate 
their action, actors must therefore recognise that 'what can actually be accomplished 
is constrained by individuals' self-interested behavior and then designing the most 
efficient plans that recognise these incentive constraints [emphasis in original]' 
(Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 129). There is an obvious link here with Elmore's 
prescriptive strategy for policy implementation known as *backward mapping' (1979). 
He suggests that if the motivations of lower-level actors were incorporated into policy 
design, then policy would be more likely to be implemented successfully. However, 
while Elmore emphasised the importance of recognising 'incentive constraints' at the 
policy formulation stage, he did not devote the same attention to the importance of 
co-ordination and the relevance of central objectives.
The model of incomplete contracting is particularly appropriate for 
understanding the process of policy implementation. Majone points out that an agreed 
set of constraints, both objective and self-imposed ones, constitute the rules of the 
'policy game'. However, 'the rules are never completely known when the game starts. 
This is because at the time a policy is initiated it is impossible to know all the 
relevant limiting factors, and it is often difficult even to tell beforehand which of the 
assumed constraints will actually be binding. As the policy moves from decision to 
implementation, previously hidden constraints will emerge, forcing more or less 
radical changes. This iterative process of discovering constraints and modifying goals 
or strategies accordingly is the essence of policy implementation' (1993c: 14). In other 
words, the uncertainty surrounding the implementation process, combined with the 
bounded rationality of policy-makers, suggests that policy may be usefully viewed as 
an incomplete contract. Bargaining (in the form of the exchange of resources)
continues throughout the process and is not restricted to either the ex-ante phase of 
agreeing a policy decision, or the ex-post phase of executing that decision.
To summarise the argument so far, the potential utility of the incomplete 
contracting model as a tool with which to approach the study of policy 
implementation has been demonstrated. The contracting approach provides an elegant 
means by which to link the concerns of co-ordination and programming on the one 
hand, with those of motivation and adaptation on the other. Recalling the assumptions 
of bounded rationality and opportunism, it has been suggested that the costs of co­
ordination and motivation render real-world contracts incomplete in key respects. 
This incompleteness means that the exchange of resources continues in both the co­
ordination and motivation phases of co-ordinated action. However, what are the 
specific features of the exchange between actors that are relevant to implementation 
analysis? In conceptual terms, what are the features of this model which allow us to 
move beyond description to explain the way in which the exchange is organised and 
hence to understand the nature of governance structures under an implementation 
setting?
To answer these questions, the model again focuses at the level of the 
exchange. The way in which an exchange relationship is best organised reflects three 
key dimensions of the exchange. The three key dimensions central to the analytical 
model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting are as follows:
(i) The asset specificity of the resources exchanged by each participant;
(ii) The level of complexity and uncertainty concerning what performance is
required;
(iii) The frequency of exchange and the duration of the exchange relationship.
Drawn from Williamson (1985: 52-63) and Milgrom and Roberts (1992: 30-33), these 
dimensions of the exchange should be examined in turn.
(i) Asset Specificity The key dimension of exchange highlighted by the model 
of incomplete contracting is the extent to which the resources brought to an exchange 
by individual participants are specific to that exchange. Williamson suggests that this 
is the most critical dimension of any exchange (1985: 30). What is the nature of the 
investment that an actor must make, and can this investment be employed elsewhere? 
The answer to this question reveals the extent to which actors are locked into 
exchange relationships and goes some way to explaining how the relationship is 
organised.
The significance of asset specificity is best illustrated by example. When an 
individual goes to a shop in a large city to buy a loaf of bread, the asset specificity of
the resources brought to the exchange is close to zero. That individual can take his/her 
money elsewhere to buy the bread, while the shopkeeper presumably has a large 
number of customers. This simple 'spot contract', where goods (or services) are 
exchanged 'on the spot' (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 131), can be contrasted with more 
complex exchanges. Hart uses the example of transactions between electricity 
generating plants and mine-mouth coal suppliers (1987: 753). The nature of the 
investments made in this latter example are much more asset specific. When the coal 
mine is at the mercy of a single user, the investments made by the owners of the coal 
mine lose their value if the buyer moves away. The model suggests that the 
vulnerability of the investment will be reflected in the contractual arrangements 
governing the exchange relationship. In short, the less specific the nature of the 
investment, then the less crucial the transaction. The model of incomplete "Contracting 
therefore suggests that different governance structures will reflect varying levels of 
asset specificity.
Williamson explains that there are different types of asset specificity and that 
these relate to the nature of the assets invested in an exchange. Human assets (such as 
experience or expertise), physical assets ( such as buildings) or locational assets (such 
as access to localised information) may all be more or less specific to a given 
exchange relationship. The lesser the ability to deploy such resources elsewhere, then 
the greater the likelihood that the actor exchanging the resource will seek a 
contractual arrangement that guarantees some stability and hence a return to its 
investment. The model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting therefore 
stresses that the importance of asset specificity should be recognised. When a 
participant in an exchange makes a large, specific investment, it will seek to 
safeguard that investment. Crucially then, the specific identity of the participants in 
the exchange is important (Williamson 1985: 55-56). In other words, the continuity o f 
the relationship is valued and participants will not want to jeopardise the exchange. 
This essential point is re-iterated below in the discussion of the importance of trust, 
but at this stage the explication proceeds by turning to the second key dimension of 
the exchange.
(ii) Complexity/Uncertainty As suggested above in the discussion of 
contractual incompleteness, the complexity of designing agreements, combined with 
the uncertainty about the conditions that will prevail when the agreement is being 
executed, mean that it is extremely difficult to establish from the outset how each 
participant should react under every contingency. A clear link can be drawn here with 
the policy implementation literature. As O’Toole explains, uncertainty is often a 
feature of multi-organisational implementation. The actors participating in such 
arenas face 'substantial, potentially devastating, uncertainty from numerous sources',
for example, lack of knowledge of other participants' policy preferences, the number 
of actors involved in the implementation setting, the structure of dependence among 
the actors, and the difficulty of monitoring and enforcement in such settings (1993: 
40-42). To this list may be added the fallibility of the causal theory underlying policy 
choices: taking the example of regional policy, should expenditure for development 
be directed towards infrastructure software or infrastructure hardware? Moreover, 
over the course of a multi-annual programme, the policy environment may be altered. 
Rather than attempting to address this complexity and uncertainty at the outset, the 
model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting suggests that participants 
will simply agree the means by which to respond to contingencies if and when they 
emerge. The nature of this agreement to 'cross that bridge when we come to it', is 
more relevant than the detailed ex-ante specification of individual perfoTThance and 
monitoring of that performance. This aspect of the model teaches us to look for 
instances of relational contracting, a concept considered below after the third key 
dimension of the exchange has been introduced.
(iii) Frequency Duration The importance of the frequency of exchange and 
duration of the exchange relationship were hinted at in the example of a 'spot contract' 
presented above. Frequency and duration of exchange are practically zero under spot 
contracts. Williamson gives the example of 'purchasing local spirits from a 
shopkeeper in a remote area of a foreign country one expects never again to visit or 
refer to his friends’ (1985: 72). The point to note is that very few exchanges have such 
a totally isolated character. As exchanges occur more frequently over a longer 
duration, the more likely it is that some specialised contractual arrangement will be 
devised to facilitate the exchange. This may take the form of a legally enforceable 
contract, or it may simply take the form of shared trust. The model emphasises that 
participants engaged in exchange relationships of long duration who interact 
frequently, and for whom the continuity o f the relationship itself is valued, will seek 
to reduce the need for costly contracting arrangements.
Together, questions of asset specificity, complexity/uncertainty, and 
frequency/duration highlight the key dimensions of the exchange. The model of 
policy implementation as incomplete contracting illuminates these dimensions in 
order to explain the nature of the exchange relationships created in the context of 
policy implementation. Before providing a concise summary of the model and its 
potential utility, two further aspects should be introduced briefly: the strategy of 
relational contracting as a response to contractual incompleteness; and, the pivotal 
role played by the creation and nurturing of a sense of trust between participants in a 
process of incomplete contracting.
2.5.4 Relational Contracting and the Importance of Trust
This short sub-section concludes the presentation of the model of policy 
implementation as incomplete contracting by pointing to three further aspects of the 
model which possess notable explanatory strength. These are as follows: the 
widespread phenomenon of relational contracting as a response to contractual 
incompleteness; the importance of trust and shared beliefs under incomplete 
contracts; and, the likelihood that some third party, or 'special purpose institution', 
will be established to facilitate exchanges under contractual incompleteness. The way 
in which the European Commission is able to shape these aspects goes a long way to 
determining its role in fashioning the governance of the contractual agreement. These 
useful concepts should be examined in turn to complete the modeI“ of policy 
implementation as incomplete contracting.
Firstly, we may ask the question 'what sort of contractual arrangements are 
designed in response to incomplete contracts'? Milgrom and Roberts suggest that 
actors recognise their own bounded rationality and often simply structure the best 
contracts they can. Of particular relevance for the study of policy implementation is 
the relational contract, 'which does not attempt the impossible task of complete 
contracting but instead settles for an agreement that frames the relationship. The 
parties do not agree on detailed plans of action but on goals and objectives, on general 
provisions that are broadly applicable, on the criteria to be used in deciding what to 
do when unforeseen contingencies arise, on who has what power to act and the 
bounds limiting the range of actions that can be taken, and on dispute resolution 
mechanisms to be used if disagreements do occur' (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 131). 
This is the clearest recognition so far of the fact that it is impossible to concentrate all 
the relevant bargaining at the ex-ante co-ordination phase. In terms of the policy 
implementation literature, it confirms the bottom-up suggestion that bargaining 
cannot be limited to the initial stages of policy-making such as problem definition, 
agenda-setting and policy formulation. Actors recognise this fact at the outset and, de 
facto, realise that the solution of a complete contract is too costly and simply 
impossible in practical terms. Participants therefore agree on processes, procedures, 
and who makes decisions when unanticipated events occur, but they do not agree on 
detailed actions. This process of relational contracting serves to structure a 
relationship and set common expectations' that facilitate decision-making in the 
execution phase (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 132; Williamson 1985: 71-72).
The second aspect of the model that should be noted at this stage, the 
importance of trust, is closely related to that of relational contracting. Oliver 
Williamson's entire approach to the study of contracting was in direct contrast to the
legal centralism of what he termed the 'mechanism design' literature. This literature, 
mirroring key ideas in the top-down approach to policy implementation, focused on 
the ex-ante phase of contracting (incentive alignment) and assumed that any ex-post 
disputes could simply be referred to courts (Williamson 1985: xii). This reliance on 
legal remedies fails to recognise a key feature of contracting: when actors in an 
exchange relationship have invested large, specific resources, there is a pressure to 
sustain ongoing relations. Recourse to legal remedies in the event of disputes would 
endanger the very relationship which participants seek to preserve. Under 
circumstances of contractual incompleteness, trust and 'shared beliefs about the spirit 
of the agreement are essential to the maintenance of co-operation' (Majone 1993c: 
15). As Mutti has suggested, the existence of trust means that it is often 'unnecessary' 
to resort to excessive formalization and detailed specification of the fnles of the 
exchange', and therefore makes the entire process of political exchange potentially 
more elastic, dynamic and wider1 (1990: 210). Trust is particularly useful in 
facilitating co-operation and reducing the costs of transaction, and the model of 
policy implementation as incomplete contracting developed herein therefore proposes 
that analysis should focus on the extent to which it emerges.
Finally, it should be noted that the model of incomplete contracting points to 
the likelihood of the emergence of'third parties', not directly involved in the exchange 
relationship at the outset, to facilitate co-operation and reduce transaction costs. In the 
wider literature of economic neo-institutionalism, North has noted the general 
tendency of parties to a contract extending over time to leave to a third party the 
resolution of disputes that may arise during the course of that contract, given the 
costliness of trying to anticipate ex-ante the course of action to be adopted in every 
eventuality (1990: 52). Milgrom and Roberts likewise emphasise that 'special purpose 
institutions' can be tailored to the particular circumstances of the exchange 
relationship. 'Generally, when similar transactions occur frequently over a long period 
of time involving some of the same parties, the one who interacts repeatedly may find 
it valuable to design and introduce low-cost routines to manage the transaction' (1992: 
31). The role of special purpose institutions is a particularly useful aspect of the 
model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting. As shown in the case 
study of ERDF implementation in Western Scotland, it is one aspect of the model 
which helps to account for the emergence and development of'independent' executive 
bodies in complex exchange relationships.
At this stage, the outline of the model of policy implementation as incomplete 
contracting has been presented fully, and in some depth. The final section of this 
chapter recaps the background of the model and summarises its specific features,
before subsequent chapters examine the extent to which the case study of ERDF 
implementation in Western Scotland confirms the accuracy and utility of the model.
2.6 Reprise and Summary
This chapter has presented a comprehensive literature review in order to set 
out the theoretical background of the study. Most importantly, it has elaborated the 
model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting. As explained in the 
introductory chapter, the ’goodness of fit' of this model, to borrow a term from 
statistics, will be ’tested’ in the case study of Western Scotland presented below. 
However, the introductory chapter also cautioned that models cannot be expected to 
highlight all the relevant features of a given situation. As Rhodes points dDt, 'models 
in the social sciences are never wholly satisfactory. They are more or less useful’ 
(1980: 312). The incomplete contracting model does not seek to uncover and explain 
all the factors relevant to policy implementation, but it is suggested herein that the 
model is a useful contribution to the study of policy implementation. Before 
summarising the key features of this model, a short reprise of the essential concepts 
and arguments introduced in this chapter should be provided.
Section 2.2 began by illustrating the complexity of contemporary governance 
structures, emphasising the dependence of the European Commission on external 
actors for policy relevant information and expertise. In addition, the European 
Commission is a relatively small organisation and must rely on external actors for the 
implementation of EC policies. The dependence of the European Commission on 
external actors is recognised in the growing literature on lobbying at the EC level, and 
in that on regulation, but implementation research has generally failed to address the 
significance of such factors for the execution of EC policies. At the same time, 
however, external actors are often dependent on the European Commission for 
financial resources, policy decisions and guidance as to how to meet Commission 
requirements. Such interdependence, involving territorial as well as functional 
interests, is best summed up for the purposes of this study in Parri’s conceptualisation 
o f’territorial political exchange'(1989; 1990). This exchange-based conceptualisation 
ofpower provides the starting point for the model developed later in the chapter.
The relevance of the territorial political exchange concept to the specific case 
of the implementation of ERDF actions was also noted in Section 2.2. It was 
suggested that information lies at the heart of the relationship between sub-national 
actors and the European Commission, not least because of the small size of the latter. 
Local actors can mobilise resources such as expertise, field information and 
knowledge, in order that these may be exchanged with the European Commission in
return for some input into the decision-making and implementation process. Recent 
innovations such as partnership and programming in the field of EC regional policy 
have provided access for the European Commission behind the outer-shell of the 
member states, and opened channels for information flow between DG XVI and 
actors in the regions themselves. Moreover, as sub-national actors present the lists of 
projects which DG XVI co-finances, they now expect to be involved in the 
negotiation of programmes.
As Hanf and O'Toole emphasise more generally, 'virtually any recent effort to 
understand how .programmes operate’ musr" therefore confront the multi- 
organizational character of action... There are very few social problems that can still 
be dealt with, let alone solved, within or by one or a few organizations working alone' 
(1992: 165). The significance of this widespread interdependence is best Slimmed up 
in O'Toole's assertion, quoted above, that the notion of the 'omniscient, 
omnicompetent and omnipotent state' is now severely outdated (1993: 52). 
Nevertheless, as Goggin et al. point out, it would be wrong to assume that this 
necessarily implies that public actors can be caricatured as 'impotent, bumbling, and 
inept bureaucracy' (1990: 74). Public actors may find themselves in situations of 
interdependence, but they still seek to shape policy outputs in their desired directions. 
The policy implementation perspective was introduced in Section 2.3 to illustrate the 
many hurdles a policy decision must clear before intended output becomes output 
achieved.
Pressman and Wildavsky's classic study of implementation was highlighted to 
indicate the sheer difficulty of policy implementation. The authors emphasised that the 
'complexity of joint action' as a result of the many 'clearance points' through which 
policy decisions must pass, as well as the fallibility of the causal theories upon which 
policies are based mean that there may be significant gaps between intended output 
and output achieved within a suitable time frame (1973). By the mid-1970s, any 
notion that policy implementation involved the straightforward execution of policy 
intent had been shattered. On the contrary, Bardach noted, extremely pessimistically, 
that 'even the most robust policy - one that is well designed to survive the 
implementation process - will go awry. The classic symptoms of underperformance, 
delay, and escalating costs are bound to appear* (1977: 5). An early wave of studies of 
implementation at that time became known as the top-down approach. Focusing on the 
importance of clear policy objectives, ex-ante bargaining, and the legal and political 
structuring of the implementation process to enhance compliance by implemented and 
target groups, this early approach was later criticised as overly rationalist and 
managerialist. Top-down studies focused on the task of co-ordinating actors in line 
with central objectives, neglecting the importance of opportunistic behaviour after
policy decisions had been taken, and hence downplaying the significance of the 
motivations of lower level actors. This approach to the study of policy implementation 
was increasingly challenged.
Barrett and Fudge argued in the early 1980s that 'much of the existing 
literature tends to take a "managerial" perspective; the problems of implementation 
are defined in terms of co-ordination, control or obtaining "compliance" with policy. 
Such a policy-centred or "top-down" view of the process treats implementers as 
"agents" for policy-makers and tends to play down issues such as power relations, 
conflicting interests and value systems between individuals and agencies responsible 
for making policy and those responsible for taking action' (1981: 4). An alternative, 
bottom-up approach emerged out of such criticisms. Bottom-up approaches argued 
that bargaining cannot be concentrated in the ex-ante stage of reaching a policy 
decision (recognised in the recursive model of policy presented in the introductory' 
chapter of this study). In short, the inevitability of discretion for 'street level 
bureaucrats' meant that the policy adoption/formulation phase could not be 
distinguished clearly from policy implementation. Bottom-up approaches therefore 
proposed a methodological innovation, shifting the level of analysis to the 
motivations of actors at the local level. How do such actors experience policy 
decisions 'at the coal-face’, involved in the day-to-day sense in implementation 
structures (and policy networks)? Do these actors pursue primarily the rationale of the 
policy programme, or an organisational rationale?
As Thrasher and Dunkerley argue, the top-down approach concentrated 
overwhelmingly on formal, structural characteristics and was thus 'unable to grasp the 
interactions, motivations and attitudes of those actually involved in the 
implementation' (1982: 350). The bottom-up versus top-down dichotomy therefore 
reverberated with the themes of older debates in political science: rational analysis 
versus incrementalism and 'muddling through'; scientific management versus 
organisational development; and top-down compliance versus grass roots control 
(Berman 1980: 205-6). Section 2.4 noted the normative implications of much of this 
debate and sketched three attempts to move beyond the dichotomy. However, simply 
lengthening the time-fhune of the analysis is not a particularly useful strategy 
(Sabatier 1986). In this case, attention shifts from the implementation of policy 
decisions per se - the relation between intended output and output achieved within a 
suitable time frame - to policy change over longer time periods. Despite these 
attempts, implementation research remains in need of a conceptual 'boost', to provide 
a means by which the legitimate concerns of both the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches can be integrated. OToole (1993) suggests that any conceptual 
advancement will be difficult to achieve given the uncertainty and complexity of
contemporary implementation settings. The model developed herein incorporates 
these dimensions and seeks to build upon the main concerns of both the top-down and 
bottom-up approaches without resorting to a much extended time frame.
As noted above, the exchange-based conceptualisation of power provides the 
starting point for the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting. The 
importance of exchange has long been recognised in the bottom-up approach where 
implementation has been viewed in terms of 'an exchange network of implementers', 
that is, 'individuals operating outside the boundaries of their own organisation in a 
process of resource exchange' (Thrasher 1983: 388). However, it should be 
emphasised that such exchanges do not simply take place at the street level' after a 
policy decision has been taken. Exchanges occur throughout both the policy adoption 
and policy execution phases. That is, bargaining cannot be concentrated irTthe ex-ante 
phase of preparing a policy decision (as top-down approaches imply), but nor can it 
be concentrated in the ex-post phase of executing that decision. Section 2.5 develops 
a model focusing at the level o f the exchange, which recognises the importance of 
bargaining throughout both 'phases'.
Milgrom and Roberts observation regarding the main tasks of any form of 
economic (and by extension political) organisation should be repeated. They suggest 
that these tasks are essentially twofold: to co-ordinate the actions of various, 
dispersed, individual actors so that they form a coherent plan, and to motivate the 
actors in accordance with the plan (1992: 49). The literature of economic neo­
institutionalism, and the transaction costs approach in particular, suggests that there 
are a number of costs associated with both these tasks. The key features of the 
transaction costs approach were outlined in Section 2.5.2. The feature of this 
approach most relevant to this study is the focus on the transaction (where goods or 
services are transferred from one person or organisation to another, usually by 
exchange) as the basic unit of analysis. Ronald Coase and Oliver Williamson have 
developed the approach to provide a 'refined and sophisticated theory of why, where, 
and when the "visible hand" of informal or formal-bureaucratic modes of governance 
supplement and/or replace the "invisible hand" of autonomous contracting and the 
market' (Schneiberg & Hollingsworth 1991: 200). Of less relevance to this study is the 
assertion that transaction cost economising is the central force driving changes in 
governance structures. In the case of political arrangements, this is clearly not 
appropriate as a series of contested objectives are regularly pursued through one 
policy: it is often the case that alternative governance structures could be arranged to 
reduce the costs of political transactions, but more expensive arrangements (in 
transaction cost terms) are maintained to provide a symbolic gloss to political action.
It is suggested in Section 2.S.2 that transaction cost analysis can provide 
fruitful lessons for policy analysts. In any situation of political exchange, including 
the territorial political exchange analysed in Section 2.2 above, the simple act of 
organising that exchange involves a variety of costs Majone suggests that, by 
simplification, we can group all transaction costs under three broad categories: 'search 
and information costs, bargaining and decision costs, policing, enforcement and 
measurement costs' (1994: 6 ). In short, these are the costs of co-ordination and 
motivation. In terms of the policy implementation literature, exchange of resources 
across the stages, of problem definition, agenda-setting, policy formulation and 
execution are costly to organise. In the language of economic neo-institutionalism, 
actors recognise their mutual interests and agree to modify their actions across these 
phases in ways that are mutually beneficial, distributing both the costs and the 
benefits between themselves. Such broad agreements are conceptualised as contracts.
It is at this point that the assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism 
outlined in the introductory chapter play a significant role in the development of the 
model. As Williamson suggests, the 'main ramification of bounded rationality, for 
purposes of studying economic organisation, is that all complex contracts are 
unavoidably incomplete. Gaps, errors, omissions, etc. therefore appear in all complex 
contracts, especially those of a long term kind [emphasis in original]' (Williamson 
1993: 110). Limited foresight, imprecise language, the costs of calculating responses, 
and the costs of writing down plans all mean that actors do not attempt the impossible 
task of preparing complete contracts. Rather, they prepare contracts which are 
incomplete in some key respects. Parties to the contract can thus exploit loopholes to 
gain an advantage over one another (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 138). Hart suggests 
that the rudimentary state of knowledge in the area means that writing on contractual 
incompleteness is 'inevitably quite speculative in nature' (1987: 752). Nevertheless, the 
incomplete contracting model provides some key insights. The next stage in the 
development of the model is to outline the nature of the incomplete contract, that is 
the nature of the agreement between contracting partners.
Retaining the focus at the level of the exchange (ex-ante and ex-post), three 
key dimensions of the exchange shape the way in which that exchange is organised 
(i.e. the contract). Firstly, the greater the asset specificity of the resources invested by 
participants in the exchange relationship, the greater the likelihood that they will try to 
ensure the relationship is continued. In other words, the continuity of the contractual 
relationship is itself valued. Secondly, the level of complexity and uncertainty 
concerning what performance is required by each actor determines the extent to which 
monitoring arrangements are vital and the extent to which actors will leave gaps in the 
contract to be filled in as contingencies emerge. Thirdly, the greater the frequency of
exchange and the longer the duration of the exchange relationship, then the more 
likely it is that specialised contractual arrangements will be devised. Analysis of these 
three dimensions provides an explanation of the way in which contractual responses 
are organised.
The final sub-section of this chapter points out three particularly relevant 
aspects of the contractual arrangement (i.e. the implementation structure) which the 
model highlights. Firstly, relational contracting, as a common response to incomplete 
contracting, was noted. This suggests that the initial agreement to co-ordinate actions 
does not specify each actor's required performance under all contingencies in advance; 
rather, a relational contract is an agreement to frame the broad relationship, setting out 
broad goals and objectives, and criteria on what to do when unforeseen contingencies 
arise. The second aspect highlighted, the importance of trust, is obviously closely 
related. Trust and shared beliefs about the nature of the agreement reduce the costs of 
contracting and mean that it is easier to leave some things to chance’ rather than 
specifying in advance required actions. Finally, the model highlights the importance of 
special purpose institutions, designed specifically to facilitate exchanges. As these 
emerge and develop expertise in the detailed nature of the exchange, contracting 
becomes more effective. However, if any one partner in the exchange captures the 
special purpose institution, trust may be destroyed and contracting becomes costly. 
These then are the key insights provided by the model of policy implementation as 
incomplete contracting.
As suggested in the introductory chapter of this study, the model of 
incomplete contracting has already been used in a limited manner to consider the 
horizontal process of negotiation between Community member states in EC policy­
making. Garrett explains the delegation of authority to the European court ’in terms of 
the monitoring and incomplete contracting problems confronting EC members' (1992: 
557; Garrett & Weingast 1991). 'Conventional analyses of cooperation tend to assume 
both that members of a community will, ex ante, agree on an exhaustive set of rules to 
govern all their future interactions and that compliance with and transgressions of 
these rules will be transparent. Both assumptions, however, are often unwarranted’ 
(ibid.: 557). In general terms, Garrett suggests that the EC legal system mitigates the 
incomplete contracting problems facing Community member states: 'it is always 
extremely costly, if not impossible, for actors to make exhaustive agreements that 
anticipate every dispute that may arise between them. Rather than attempting to do 
this, parties inevitably make agreements that only sketch the broad "rules of the 
game" and then delegate the authority to apply and adapt these rules to specific cases’ 
(ibid.: 557). Garrett suggests that this is exactly what took place when the Council of 
Ministers sketched the broad outlines of the Single Market in the Single European
Act, but left a great deal of discretion in the interpretation of the Act to the European 
Court of Justice. The model of incomplete contracting is therefore not new in the 
context of approaches to the study of EC policy-making, but when applied to the 
analysis of policy implementation in the EC, it provides considerable insight.
The remainder of this study seeks to demonstrate the applicability and utility 
of the model, by presenting an in-depth study of the implementation of ERDF actions. 
Chapters 3 and 4 present an analysis of the ERDF (in the context of contemporary 
theories) as it emerged and evolved at the European level between the early 1970s 
and the late 1980s. The ability of the European Commission to involve sub-national 
actors directly in exchange relationships in this policy field, and the nature of the 
exchanges taking place in this period, is a key focus of these chapters. Chapters 5, 6 
and 7 then turn to the regional level and present a case study of the exchange there 
through a focus on the dimensions of asset specificity, complexity/uncertainty and 
frequency/duration. The light shed on the process of relational contracting, the 
emergence of trust, and the development of a special purpose institution there 
confirms the utility of the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting. 
It is to the nature of early exchanges in the field of EC regional policy, which have 
strongly conditioned later developments, that the study now turns.
Chapter 3. The Historical Development of the ERDF to 1988 in the Context of 
General Theories of EC Policy-Making and Implementation
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the history and evolution of the European Regional 
Development Fund in the period until 1988 in the wider context of general theories of 
European Community policy-making and implementation. More specifically, it analyses 
the European Commission's ability to shape the operation of the Fund according to its 
own priorities: to what extent did the original Fund Regulation, and its successive 
amendments, provide the European Commission with the tools to fashion regional 
economic development contracts with actors in the Community's disadvantaged regions9 
In other words, to what extent did early legal provisions enable the European 
Commission to engage with national and sub-national actors in a relationship of 
territorial political exchange in the field of Community regional policy? What was the 
nature of the governance structures established in this period to facilitate the 
disbursement of funds? In answering these questions, the chapter provides an analysis of 
the development of the ERDF that is essential for an understanding of the case study of 
Western Scotland presented in subsequent chapters.
The main contention of the analysis presented in this chapter is that the historical 
instant in which the ERDF was set up, and the functions it was expected to serve at that 
time, have conditioned the evolution of the Fund as a policy instrument. As Cawson 
forcefully argues, the 'logic' of any policy (or its raison d’être) can only be understood by 
examining in detail its historical development (1992). In itself, this may seem a mundane, 
and in many ways self-evident, statement However, when the ambiguity of the original 
objectives of the ERDF are borne in mind, the contention becomes more challenging.
The ambiguity surrounding the creation of the ERDF has been summarised most 
clearly by Buck, who suggested that the Fund had *the capacity to fill two roles:
(i) the promotion of regional development, and/or
(ii) the provision of a channel for rebates to certain Member States for contributions 
to the EECs budget considered to be excessive' (1982: 25-26).
For the purposes of conceptual clarity and brevity, these will hereafter be termed the 
development function and the compensatory function of the ERDF. The key to 
understanding the evolution of the Fund is that its 'real' objectives have always been
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highly contested: whether the ERDF has been expected to fulfil primarily a development 
or a compensatory' function has been a source of conflict between the European 
Commission and member state governments since its creation.
Superficially, it may seem obvious that the Fund is designed to correct regional 
imbalances. Giving evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, however, Buck has also suggested that it is a 'heroic assumption’ to take it 
for given that the Fund is intended to influence the regional allocation of resources in 
Europe’ (1981: 30). His subsequent adoption of the 'and/or' conjunction (quoted above) is 
more instructive, as it draws attention to the possible existence of a 'garbage can' scenario 
(Cohen, March & Olsen 1972; 1976) in the case of the ERDF.1 In other words, a highly 
ambiguous policy environment may be created by the meshing together of different 
issues and objectives. This is an accurate description of the ERDF, which has been 
expected to fulfil both a development function and a compensatory function since its 
creation, although different participants in the Community regional policy process have 
attached different weight to each of these potential functions. In addition, the balance of 
importance has shifted over time from the purely compensatory function to a greater 
acceptance of the development function of the Fund. It should also be noted that, even if 
central governments in recipient member states have generally viewed the ERDF as a 
'channel for rebates', and have therefore sought to maximise receipts while minimising 
the necessary administrative effort and hence the transaction costs of doing so, the 
symbolic importance of the Fund in regional development terms is an additional benefit.
As well as illustrating the tension between the Fund's potential development and 
compensatory functions, the chapter suggests that the operational directorates of 
Directorate-General XVI (Regional Policies) of the European Commission have 
consistently sought to re-direct the ERDF from a naked channel for rebates to the positive 
purposes of regional development. Although DG XVI has actively and consistently 
sought to increase the involvement of regional and local actors in the formulation and 
implementation of regional development programmes, the operational directorates with 
responsibility for promoting and overseeing such programmes are primarily interested in 
regional economic planning. The mobilisation of regional actors with a view to 
restructuring the territorial distribution of power within the member states is not a central
1 The 'garbage can model' developed by Cohen, March and Olsen rqects the characterisation of the policy 
process as a series of neatly self-contained issues, each with its own rationally determined solution, in favour 
of a more descriptively realistic account highlighting the chaotic dements often found in policy-making 
arenas (Lane 1993: 56). The model attempts to understand problem-solving and conflict resolution under 
conditions of ambiguity, that is, where objectives are unclear, means are imperfectly understood, and actors 
appear and disappear from the stage (Cohen, March & Olsen 1976: 26).
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objective of DG XVI. The powers and involvement of regional actors are therefore of 
interest to DG XVI only to the extent that these affect the delivery of European-funded 
regional development programmes.
This historical analysis also presents empirical information on two technical 
aspects of the ERDF that are particularly relevant in the subsequent case study of 
Western Scotland, and which should therefore be highlighted at the outset. These 
technical aspects are 'additionality' and 'software' measures. It will be shown below that 
these are linked and that, in the UK, both are directly relevant to the extent Jo which 
central government there^has been able to treat the ERDF simply as a compensatory 
mechanism to the benefit of the Treasury. These technical aspects are considered in the 
context of a wider examination of the evolution of the Fund.
Section 3.3 presents an analysis of the chronological stages in the evolution of the 
ERDF. From the emergence of the Fund, through the 1979 amendments and the 
Commission proposals for reform in the early 1980s, to the 1988 Regulations, the tension 
between the potential functions of the ERDF as primarily a tool for regional development 
or as a simple channel for rebates has been apparent. The Structural Fund reforms of 
1988 are commonly viewed as the point at which the balance of importance swung 
further to the development function of the ERDF than at any other time in its history. In a 
general period of expansion of the competencies of the EC, the financial resources 
devoted to the Funds were not only doubled but the rules governing their operation were 
re-written according to a common overall philosophy embodying a set of Community 
'principles'.2 The principles upon which the 1988 reforms were based were primarily 
fourfold:
(i) Concentration: the principle that the allocation of the Structural Funds and loan 
instruments of the European Community should be concentrated in favour of the 
most disadvantaged regions, focusing the development effort in those priority 
regions experiencing the greatest difficulties;
(ii) Programming, the principle that assistance should be disbursed and managed 
through multi-annual programmes for eligible regions, rather than an individual 
project-based system;
(iii) Partnership, the principle that the European Commission, the member state 
government concerned, and competent authorities at the national and regional
2 See the European Commission's own Guide to the Reform o f the Community's Structural Funds (1989), or 
Mellors and Copperthwaite (1990: S6-S8) for a summary of these principles.
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level should consult as a partnership in the preparation, financing, monitoring and 
assessment of programmes, all in the pursuit of a common goal;
(iv) Additionality, the principle that European grants should be additional to (and not 
a substitute for) national assistance to target regions.
Other principles were also central to the reforms. For example, co-ordination and 
monitoring and assessment of actions were both of importance. The former refers to the 
principle that the respective Structural Funds should complement each other by focusing 
jointly on priority objectives, and that these should be consistent with member states' 
economic policies. The latter refers to the principle that a rigorous approach to the 
administration of the funds should lead to improved utilisation of resources. These will 
be considered in greater depth in chapter 4, and are referred to in the-case study of 
Western Scotland, but the four most important principles were undoubtedly those set out 
above.3
It should be emphasised at this point, however, that these principles did not 
emerge in 1988 like some deus ex machina. Rather, it is suggested in this chapter that 
these guiding principles have informed European Commission attempts to reform the 
ERDF since its earliest years. This is not simple teleology: although not always referred 
to using the same terminology (for example, the term partnership seems to have emerged 
in the context of the ERDF only in 19834), these principles for reform have been 
promoted by the Commission in the evolution of the ERDF over many years. Although 
progress towards acceptance of the principles was piecemeal and laborious, as far as the 
Commission was concerned, the objectives of the latter have been constant. The extent to 
which these principles have been accepted and put into effect has determined the 
Commission's ability to direct the ERDF away from the purely compensatory function 
towards a fully-fledged development function. The analysis presented below therefore 
focuses on Commission advances since 1975 on these key principles, and hence, more 
generally, on the European Commission's control over the deployment of ERDF 
resources.
As well as providing an analysis of the evolution of the ERDF that is essential for 
subsequent chapters, this chapter also places the large body of secondary literature on the 
ERDF in the context of wider theories of EC policy-making and implementation. Early
3 The European Commission itself refers to the four general principles' of the reform as concentration, 
programming, partnership and additionality (1993c).
4 In a 1983 document entitled Increasing the Effectiveness of the Structural Funds', the Commission argued 
that the Member States must accept the Community as a partner in structural initiatives' (Laffan 1989:47).
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theories of EC policy-making were dominated by the 'neofunctionalist approach' and the 
diametrically opposed critique constituted by 'intergovemmentalism'. These were 
essentially attempts to develop theories of integration between nation-states in western 
Europe. Policy-making accounts were later derived from these approaches, showing how 
the development of any policy was related to the emergence (or absence) of supranational 
authority in Community institutions. As such, they attempted to explain bargaining at the 
European level and the role of the European Commission therein. To use the terminology 
employed in the introductory chapter, these approaches focused primarily on horizontal 
negotiations between member states at the European level and paid little attention to the 
question of vertical power relations within EC member states. Although out-dated in 
many respects (as is suggested in chapter 4), the approaches of neofunctionalism and 
intergovemmentalism are nevertheless presented briefly in Section 3.2. Not-only would a 
study of EC policy-making seem naked without some reference to them, but a 
consideration of the two approaches also allows the secondary writing on the emergence 
and history of the ERDF to be placed in some theoretical context.
As explained above, Section 33 provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
emergence and development of the ERDF. Each sub-section of this analysis, 
corresponding to a key stage in the evolution of the Fund, therefore concludes with a 
summary of contemporary accounts of policy developments. Although very few of these 
accounts refer specifically to the debate between neofunctionalism and 
intergovemmentalism over European integration, this debate informed practically all the 
political interpretations of the ERDF in that the tension between supranational and 
intergovernmental styles of policy-making was invariably to the fore.
With regard to studies of the implementation stage of the European regional 
policy process, the general paucity of EC implementation studies is reflected in the 
scarce attention paid to the Vertical' process of deploying ERDF resources within 
member states. In Lewis and Wallace's edited collection of case studies entitled Policies 
into Practice: National and International Case Studies in Implementation (1984), the 
authors identified a gap in the implementation literature in that there were few studies of 
implementation across different policy sectors and no studies across states.'Policies into 
Practice' was a contribution to the bridging of this gap, but since then no substantial body 
of literature has been built up to allow systematic analysis of the implementation of EC 
policies within member states. Krislov, Ehlermann and Weiler (1986) and Siedentopf and 
Ziller (1988) have provided general legalistic accounts of 'non-compliance' with 
Community law, but the gap identified by Lewis and Wallace remains largely unfilled.
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Those few accounts that do consider the ERDF from an implementation perspective are 
examined in Section 3.4.
Before turning to the detailed analysis of the ERDF, the primary research sources 
utilised in this chapter should be acknowledged. The years 1975 to 1988 constitute the 
main period under concern in this chapter, and as such, the chapter has not drawn directly 
on interview sources. Nevertheless, other empirical sources have been plundered. 
Official publications of the European Communities (communications setting out 
guidelines and proposals for reform, as well as European Commission guides and 
reports) are used to supplement the large body of secondary literature. In addition, the 
reports dealing with the ERDF prepared since 1977 by the UK House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities provide excellent information on the evolution 
of the Fund and have been drawn on heavily for the purposes of this chapter. The reports 
reproduce not only the written and oral testimonies of politicians, but also those of 
European Commission officials, central government civil servants and employees of 
local agencies involved in the implementation of ERDF actions. As such, the Select 
Committee reports warrant special mention as they provide an invaluable source of 
information for an account of the evolution of the Fund. The following analysis, 
constructed on the basis of these sources, therefore sets out the historical policy context 
within which to place the case study presented in later chapters. It is to the early attempts 
to conceptualise EC policy-making that this chapter now turns.
3.2 Early Theories of EC Policy-Making
Early approaches to the study of policy-making at the EC level were developed 
primarily from the perspective of international relations, and theories of regional 
integration in particular. A recent review paper by Caporaso and Keeler (1993) provides 
a useful stocktaking of theories of regional integration as applied to the European 
Community. An influential early approach, the lessons of which continue to filter through 
to much of present-day theorising on European integration and EC policy-making, was 
that of neofunctionalism. The basic contours of the neofunctionalist approach are well- 
known, and need only be sketched briefly here as a context for the remainder of the 
chapter.
Neofunctionalism was essentially a process-oriented approach seeking to explain 
the integration of states in western Europe.5 Hoffmann has suggested that, as a grand
5 The prefix 'neo' confirmed recognition of the earlier theory of international integration outlined by David 
Mitrany and known as functionalism', whereby, *by isolating those responsibilities that could best be carried
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theory of 'European integration' (implicitly attributed to Jean Monnet and explicitly to 
Ernst Haas), neofunctionalism 'performed much better as an initial goad than as a 
permanent explanation' (1983: 29). While earlier theories of integration had focused on 
the flow of goods, services, people and communications across countries as key 
explanatory variables (Deutsch 1957), Haas placed a greater explanatory burden on 
institutions and attitudes. The neofunctionalist approach argued that the staking of the 
claims and demands of group interests directly at Community institutions implied a 
transfer of group loyalties to the supranational level. Hence, governments, interest 
groups, bureaucracies and eventually broader political elites would pursue their goals at a 
supranational level and so this level would progressively grow to resemble the domestic 
political constellation: 'a new political community, super-imposed over pre-existing ones' 
would therefore emerge through the gradual transfer of demands, loyaltierand action by 
political elites to the European level (Haas 1958: 16).
According to the neofunctionalist approach, the two key mechanisms by which 
the process of supranational integration was inexorably driven were 'spillover1 and 'issue 
linkage'. The former implied a continually expanding mandate for the European level 
authority as its competencies spilled over from one sector to another functionally linked 
sector: for example, after the initial decision was taken to set up a common energy policy 
in coal production, the need to co-operate would automatically spill over into other 
sectors such as nuclear energy production (Andersen 1993). The latter mechanism of 
linking issues meant that bargaining could be envisaged as a Variable sum game' in the 
sense that not all the gains made by one actor were necessarily balanced by the 
identifiable and equal losses of another (Webb 1983: 17-18). Losses made by one actor in 
decisions over issue X, for example, could be balanced for the same actor by gains as a 
result of more favourable decisions over issue Y. Neofunctionalism suggested that the 
European Commission had a central role to play in pinpointing such potential gains 
through issue linkage.
This brief presentation of the neofunctionalist approach to the understanding of 
policy-making in the EC has thus far been general and located in the realm of 
international relations and integration theory. As Andersen has more recently shown, 
however, neofunctionalism did not simply present a deterministic model of integration, 
but also showed how policy evolution was closely related to the development of 
supranational authority at the European level and hence to the relative strength of the 
different institutions which constitute the EC decision-making system:
out internationally, and building upon them, progress toward integration would be continuous with ultimate 
transmutation into new dynamic types of governmental forms’ (Krislov, Ehlermann & Weiler 1986: 7).
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Leaving aside the idea of historical necessity, the neofunctional 
perspective also contained a scheme for more concrete analysis of policy 
sectors. In this sense, it represented a pluralist model of international 
politics. The model accepted that states could be complex actors, as well 
as taking into account the role of non-state actors. Of the latter type of 
actor, the most important was considered to be the Commission (1993: 
135).
In putting the policy dimension to the centre of analysis and sketching how this 
might be handled in theoretical terms, Webb (1983) identified neofunctionalism and 
intergovemmentalism as the two major, diametrically opposed frameworks which had 
been used, either directly or implicitly, as the basis of general political interpretations of 
the EC to that time. She therefore provided an early analysis of the relevance of general 
integration theory to more detailed, policy-oriented analysis. Webb highlighted the 
fundamentally pluralistic view of society underpinning neofunctionalism, with its 
implication that the staking of claims and demands in return for exchanges of political 
loyalties reinforced the authority of the system as a whole' (ibid.; 17). For 
neofunctionalist analysis, such patterns of political activity were directly transferable to 
the European setting. The key to understanding policy-making at the European level lay 
in the fact that the resolution of competing claims took place in a way that not only 
facilitated issue linkage and hence variable sum bargaining, but also resulted in a policy 
outcome with an expanded mandate for the European Commission: 'thus, as is well 
known, neofunctionalists pin-pointed the Council-Commission dialogue as the central 
innovative feature of the policy process in the Community, and saw the Commission as 
the mediator and principal source of ideas for securing agreement amongst the national 
positions'(ibid.: 18).
In the case of European regional policy and regional politics, this pluralistic 
account would also envisage a strong role for sub-national actors. The creation of the 
ERDF witnessed the re-emergence of the vague aspiration of a TEurope of the Regions', 
considered in the introductory chapter of this study. Although not constituting a separate 
theory of integration in Europe, and still less a theory of EC policy-making, the notion of 
a 'Europe of the Regions' lurks in the background of many early accounts of the ERDF. 
This reflects the optimism of many at that time that direct and meaningful contacts 
between the European Commission and regional actors could be realised in this policy 
field. The encouragement of regional mobilisation and the development of supranational 
authority would go hand-in-hand. For example, MacFarquhar suggested that, the ultimate
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aim of the strategy would be a Europe des Régions in which the national 
gradually withered away making possible the development of a strong European 
government and the elimination of the national tier of bureaucracy' (1978: 23). It is not 
suggested here that they are synonymous, but the 'Europe of the Regions’ notion can be 
considered as a specific variant of the neofunctionalist approach. The pluralistic bias of 
the 'Europe of Regions' notion, the strong role it foresees for the European Commission, 
and its prediction of the eventual dissolution of member state central bureaucracies (as 
regional elites transfer their loyalty to the European level) show strong similarities with 
the neofunctionalist approach. The practice of the ERDF in the early years, as shown 
below, soon dented such aspirations.
Many studies of the integration process, and of EC policy-making, in the 
’Eurosclerosis’ years of the 1970s and early 1980s rejected neofiinctionalism in favour of 
an 'intergovemmentalist' approach. Lacking coherence as a theoretical framework, 
intergovemmentalism is best understood with reference to neofiinctionalism in order to 
emphasise what it is not. While neofiinctionalism was a process-oriented approach, 
intergovemmentalism presented an equilibrium approach to political interaction. In other 
words, intergovemmentalism tended to present static interpretations, focusing on 
bargains between member state governments instead of questioning how the bargaining 
scenario was shaped in the first place.6 Intergovemmentalism assumed that the domestic 
interests of the member states were simply transferred to the European level. Institutions 
at that level were understood to adapt effortlessly to these interests, and therefore 
remained external to the explanatory framework. Instead, outcomes were explained 
purely in terms of intergovernmental bargaining.
Webb also considered the intergovemmentalist approach from an explicitly 
policy-oriented perspective, using metaphors to illustrate the central differences between 
the two basic approaches. While neofunctionalists typically preferred the so-called 
'cobweb' image of Community policy-making to stress the importance of interlocking and 
binding mutual interests at all levels, intergovemmentalism typically relied upon the 
'billiard ball' metaphor (1983: 17-27). In the latter, member states were envisaged as 
hard-shelled, separate entities coming together to resolve policy matters at the 
intergovernmental apex of the Community structure. European level decision-making 
was portrayed as a zero-sum game, with a 'gladiatorial image' of policy-making where
6 Keohane and Hoffmann have suggested more recently that the two approaches are complementary since, 
'although the process of European policy-making is supranational, all this negotiation and coalition-building 
takes place within the context of agreements between governments... Our argument is that successful 
spillover requires prior programmatic agreement among governments, expressed in an intergovernmental 
bargain! (1991a: 17).
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member state representatives joust in intergovernmental fora to defend their domestic 
interests. Such a framework, in which the importance of the member states' governments 
is institutionalised in the explicitly intergovernmental machinery of the European 
Council and Council of Ministers, assigned an extremely limited role to the European 
Commission. It identified the role of the state as gatekeeper and prime actor at the 
European level as a constraint on the Commission's ability to shift allegiances towards 
itself and thereby expand its mandate (Hoffmann 1966).
Despite early enthusiasm, accounts of the emergence and early development of 
the ERDF, have largely favoured an intergovernmental framework to characterise the EC 
regional policy process. Such accounts relied on three broad sets of evidence to support 
the claim that the dominant approach in the field has been intergovernmental: firstly, the 
reasons behind the emergence of the ERDF, and the secondary importance of the 
development function therein; secondly, the historical details of the setting up of the 
ERDF, when the Fund was cut down from the Commission's ambitious initial proposals 
to a mere mechanism for budgetary redistribution reflecting dominant member state 
interests with little Commission input; and thirdly, the stuttering and faltering manner in 
which the policy developed in the years from its creation in 1975 to the late 1980s. The 
first two sets of evidence concern horizontal negotiations between member states and are 
considered in the following section 3.3.1. The third set of evidence focuses on the 
attempts of the Commission to carve out a greater role in the vertical process of spending 
those resources nominally devoted to regional development. The rest of the chapter 
focuses on this vertical process and the evolution of the ERDF from 1975 until the 1988 
Structural Fund reforms. The focus adopted herein is on European Commission advances 
over these years on the key principles of concentration, programming, partnership and 
additionality, and hence on the Commission's ability to enhance its control more 
generally over the operation of the ERDF.
3 J  The Laborious Construction of a Community-Level Regional Policy
3.3.1 The Emergence o f the Regional Fund
An understanding of why a regional fund at the Community level emerged in the 
first place is instructive in exposing the logic of EC regional policy. That regional policy 
emerged veTy much as a latecomer' among Community policies devised since the Treaty 
of Rome was signed is something of a truism in the literature (Clout, Blacksell, King & 
Pinder 1989: 192; Scott & Mansell 1993). Despite the Preamble to the Treaty of Rome,
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which stated that the member states were 'anxious to strengthen the unity of their 
economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences 
existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions', 
there was no provision for a common regional policy, although Vanhove and Klaassen 
have drawn attention to the 'implicit references' to such a policy (1987: 382). It is often 
suggested that the reason for the initial absence of an EC-level regional policy lies in the 
fact that the founders of the Community expected economic growth in the 1950s and 
1960s, resulting from the gains of completing a common market, to reduce regional 
disparities automatically (Porro 1980: 112). In fact, little headway was made in these 
years in reducing disparities between the Community's regions in terms of income, 
productivity or employment rates (Pinder 1983). McCrone's observation that regional 
disparities naturally accompany economic development (1969) implies that policies to 
address such disparities only emerge when the problem becomes politicised. However,
'the existence of regional disparities in the Community has never in itself been a 
sufficient reason for the development of a Common Regional Policy' (Martins & Mawson 
1980: 29). This sub-section therefore seeks to show that the member states adopted a 
regional policy in the early 1970s as a roundabout means of addressing budgetary 
contributions, and not primarily to address regional economic disparities.
Following the enlargements of the early 1970s, there emerged the highly sensitive 
question of 'who benefits?' from the major instruments of the Community budget. It was . 
evident that the largest element of the EC budget, the Common Agricultural Policy pricéVnTT' 
support framework, had little to offer the UK while a regional policy would appeal to alli,/  
of the newcomers^ Pinder 1983: 18; Shackleton 1991: 95). The simultaneous decision to 
introduce moves towards Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) was also significant.
The final communiqué of the Paris Summit meeting of October 1972, the first at which 
the prime ministers of the new member states were present, spoke of correcting the 
structural and regional imbalances which might affect the realisation o f Economic and 
Monetary Union' [emphasis added] (House of Lords 1981: vii). The goal of EMU 
necessitated convergence of member states' economies and in public expenditure 
patterns. A Community level redistribution mechanism between member states was 
therefore required, and the decision was taken at the Paris Summit to analyse the extent 
of regional disparities throughout the Community and to set up a fund by the end of 1973.
The responsibility for overseeing the preparation of the report and the establishment of 
the fund was given to George Thomson, Commissioner for Regional Policy. The new 
regional fund would provide a communautaire gloss to budgetary redistribution between
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the member states. As Ingram and Mann point out, governments often choose roundabout 
means to address problems that they do not wish to address directly (1980: 20).
From the outset then, the ERDF was designed to compensate member states 
(primarily the UK) for contributions to the Community budget. Moreover, it has also 
been suggested that EC regional policy was motivated by the economics of 
'compensational logic' in the sense that a member state may be compensated for the 
economic costs of Community membership. For example, a member state may be 
compensated for the loss of control over instruments of economic policy such as the 
levying of customs duties, currency flexibility, industrial subsidies and other measures 
which could otherwise have been used to protect the interests of its own domestic 
economy (Holland 1976; Martins & Mawson 1980: 51; Mellors & Copperthwaite 1990: 
23). In this way, Community regional policy was conceived as a secondary or 'marginal' 
policy, tacked on to temper the negative spatial implications of major initiatives such as 
the customs union, monetary union, competition policy or other 'central' policies. Even 
the Commissioner for Regional Policy in the late 1970s accepted many of the criticisms 
levelled at the ERDF when he acknowledged that it was simply 'an accompanying 
measure', developed to cope with the detrimental effects of the main Community policies 
(quoted in Mawson, Martins & Gibney 1985: 20). In short, regional policy was very 
clearly a secondary policy in terms of both its economic justification and the political 
weight attached to it. Its potential development function was not what persuaded member 
states at the Paris Summit to set up the ERDF.
The emergence of a policy issue may nevertheless create the opportunity for other 
issues to be considered simultaneously, so that different issues may be dumped into what 
becomes a common 'garbage can' (Cohen, March & Olsen 1976). In contrast to the 
openly minimalist interests of the member states' governments in compensation, the 
European Commission argued at that time for the promotion of the political and 
economic cohesion of the Community. The Report on the Regional Problems in the 
Enlarged Community (commonly known as the Thomson Report) presented in 1973 
summarised this view well:
No Community could maintain itself nor have a meaning for the peoples 
which belong to it so long as some have very different standards of living 
and have cause to doubt the common will of all to help each Member to 
better the conditions of its people (European Commission 1973: 7).
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Despite the communautaire tones of the Thomson Repod and its emphasis on the moral 
obligations of the member states to address regional disparities, the actual task of 
creating a regional development fund acceptable to all member states proved far from 
straightforward. From the presentation of the Thomson Report inj^73 until November 
1974, fourteen different funding arrangements were proposed by the European 
Commission and individual governments. The deadlock was only broken when Italy and 
Ireland - the new Labour government of the UK was too busy with its commitment to re­
negotiate the British terms of entry to become deeply involved in the regional policy 
debate at this stage - threatened to pull out of the Summit meeting of December 1974 if 
agreement was not reached immediately (Pinder 1983: 18).
_  Disagreement between the member state governments arose over three key issues: 
the dgfiflition o£regions eligible for assistance; the size of the fund;' and~the allocation 
mechanism. Over each of these issues there was a'refreat from the ambitious proposals of 
■—the'Thomson Report with the enforcement of the lowest common denominator interests 
of the member states, thereby leading to fierce criticism of the fund eventually 
established. With regard to the definition of regions, the Thomson Report had faced the 
difficult task of producing a standardised survey of regional disparities in the EC by 
bringing together diverse sets of data submitted by the member state governments. 
Ultimately however, the only politically acceptable solution was to take as a basis those 
areas already defined by member state governments for the purposes of their own 
domestic regional policies. In financial terms, Thomson's proposal envisaged a fund of 
£900 million to be allocated by the Commission during the period 1974-76. West 
Germany, as the major net contributor, objected to this figure and advocated a slimmed 
down ERDF of £250 million for the same period. After almost a year of stalemate and 
wrangling, a compromise was reached in December 1974 when the figure of £540 
million was agreed for the period 1975-78 (Mawson et al. 1985: 25). Moreover, it was 
originally envisaged that the Commission would have the major role in the allocation of 
the Fund. The member state governments objected to this proposal as well and in the end 
it was simply agreed to share the Fund among the Nine member states according to a 
fixed quota system.
The European Commission's ability at that time to create a Community regional 
policy embodying a positive development function was severely limited When the House 
of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities first reported on the new 
European Regional Development Fund in 1977, it therefore concluded that 'all the 
evidence received suggested that the Community had a Regional Fund but did not have a 
coherent and comprehensive regional policy1 (1977: 11). Before turning to examine the
t
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provisions of the new Fund Regulation in greater detail, however, contemporary accounts 
of the emergence of the Fund can be summarised.
There are several early descriptive accounts of the emergence of the Fundi
These accounts generally support the view that the compensatory function of the ERDF 
was dominant at the creation of the Fund: van Doom regretted that 'one is almost forced 
to accept the idea that the establishment of a Regional Development Fund is not so much 
an instrument to deal with regional disparities as a means to cope with national 
disparities regarding contributions from and payments to the Community budget' (1975: 
400). Despite the primacy of the compensatory function, however, the European 
Commission's intention to promote development objectives was nevertheless identified 
es (1974) before the ERDF was even established. The relationship between the 
European Commission and sub-national units of government was therefore of interest 
and deserved research according to Rhodes, because of the importanceSt would have for 
the administration of the Fund./However, the idea of a 'Europe of Regions' was clearly 
non-starter1 as the European Commission was, from the start, interested in regional 
political arrangements only to the extent that they would influence the development 1 
function of the Fund (1974: 112)j As the following sub-section shows, however, the 
provisions of the 1975 Fund Regulation did not facilitate, direct contact between the 
European Commission and sub-national units of government.
3.3.2 The 1975 ERDF Regulation
The European Regional Development Fund was established in March 1975 under 
Regulation (EEC) 724/75, eighteen years after the signing of the Treaty of Rome. The 
objective of the new instrument was set out in Article 1 of the Regulation where it was 
stated that the Fund was 'intended to correct the principal regional imbalances within the 
Community resulting in particular from agricultural preponderance, industrial change and 
structural unemployment'.7 To this stated objective, the Heads of State and Government 
of the member states meeting at the Paris conference on 10 December 1974 had set an 
allocation of 1,300 million units of account (approximately £500 million) for the three 
year trial period 1975 to 1977. The Fund therefore constituted only a very small 
proportion of the amount spent by member states on their own domestic regional
7 O.J. No. L 73,21 March 1975
1975; Romus 1975; van Doom 1975). Lind and FlocktonTÎ97fr) provide a particularly
usëfïil history of the first Commission attempts to promote a common regional policy.
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policies, with one estimate suggesting that, even on the most generous of calculations, 
Fund commitments to the UK were well below 10% of domestic expenditure in this field 
(House of Lords 1977: 10).8 In addition, at the same conference in December 1974, the 
decision was taken to establish a quota system for the distribution of these resources 
among member states, ostensibly to ensure that those countries with the most severe 
regional problems (the UK, Italy and the Republic of Ireland) were net beneficiaries from 
the Fund. This quota system, established against the advice of the Thomson Report, 
shaped the operation of the Fundin its early years.
The original Thomson Report of 1973 had stressed that there must be standards 
to ensure that the means available to the Fund are used in a manner quite independent of 
any criterion of juste retour, and which reflect the size and urgency of the regional 
problems facing the Community. The acceptance of this principle will be an important 
test of Community solidarity' (European Commission 1973: 12). The Fund eventually 
established, however, was based firmly on the principle of the juste retour through the 
quota system. These quotas were subsequently-set out in Article 2—of the Fund 
Regulation.9 As a result, only three countries (the UK, Italy and the Republic of Ireland) 
obtained a net benefit from the Fund. The fact that every member state received 
something from the Fund resulted in the anomalous situation that all of the ERDF aid 
going to Germany was spent in areas that were wealthier than any part of the UK (House 
of Lords 1981: 94). Article 2 of the new Regulation therefore testified to the role of the 
Fund as a transfer mechanism between member states. George Thomson himself, the 
Commissioner with responsibility for Regional Policy, dismissed the quota system as 'a 
great handicap to trying to use the Fund for a positive purpose’ (House of Lords 1977: 
84). As such, the quota system did not allow for a real concentration of resources and 
was the most obvious indication of the Fund's compensatory function.
With regard to the actual deployment of the ERDF resources, the preference of 
the European Commission for 'industry' over 'infrastructure' projects, which in later years 
was to become a key issue of dispute with the UK government, was apparent from the 
outset. Article 4 of the Regulation stipulated that the Fund could contribute to the 
financing of investment projects exceeding 50,000 units of account in both 'industrial'
8 Moreover, a proposal to index the sum devoted to the Fund in order to avoid the erosive effects of
inflation had been resisted by the German government. As a resuh, it was calculated that the real value of the 
funds disposed by the Community over the first triennium were reduced by around 50% through inflation 
(House of Lords 1977:69,97). — —  —  ______
9 The allocations per member state were as follows: Italy 40.0%, United Kingdom 28.0%; France 15.0%; 
Federal Republic of Germany 6.4%; Ireland 6.0%; Netherlands 1.7%; Belgium 1.5%; Denmark 1.3%; and 
Luxembourg 0.1%.-
107
and 'infrastructure' categories. While the Commission would contribute up to 50% of the 
cost of projects aiding 'industrial, handicraft, or service activities', the rate of support for 
infrastructure investments could not exceed 30%. Moreover, a requirement was 
established that assistance to infrastructure investments had to show a 'direct link' with 
the development of industrial activities.10 A ceiling of 70% was imposed on the amount 
of ERDF allocated to infrastructure projects in the Community as a whole, reflecting the 
European Commission's belief that major infrastructure projects were generally of less 
importance in the conversion of regional economies and would no doubt have gone ahead 
with or without ERDF assistance. *
The principle of additionality - the requirement that European grants should be 
additional to (and not a substitute for) national aid to target regions - has been the most 
fiercely contested of all the principles underpinning Community regional policy. As such, 
the extent to which the European Commission has been able to secure the additionality of 
expenditure has been the most obvious indicator of its level of general control over the 
European regional policy process. Although the principle of additionality was not written 
into the text of the original Fund Regulation, it played a 'central role in the theology of 
Community financial expenditure' from the beginning (Laffan 1989: 47). The declaratory 
preface to the 1975 ERDF Regulation therefore stated that, the Fund's assistance should 
not lead Member States to reduce their own regional development efforts but should 
complement those efforts'. In reality, the Fund was used in its early years primarily as a 
reimbursement to member state governments for expenditure that had already been 
incurred, with no obvious increase in the resources devoted to regional development.
In the very first year of the Fund's operation, the Danish government explained its 
apparent failure to increase expenditure on regional policies by promising that if it had 
not received its ERDF allocations, the amount it had actually spent on regional policies 
would have been reduced (European Commission 1976a: 16). According to Buck, the 
European Commission's acceptance of this line of argument meant that the Danish 
device became the standard tactic for Member States wishing to pocket all R[egional] 
D[evelopment] F[und] proceeds and reduce their public borrowing requirements' (1981: 
32). The UK government position was made clear in September 1975 when two press 
releases were issued explaining the government's interpretation of additionality. A clear 
understanding of the intricacies of additionality is absolutely essential for the subsequent 
chapters of this study, and hence some attention should be given to explaining the nature 
of the additionality that operated according to the UK government. To do so, the
10 Infrastructure projects qualifying for assistance included not only industrial estates and advance factory 
buildings but also roads and other transport facilities, port facilities, and water and energy supply networks
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following considers additionality firstly with respect to industrial investments and then 
with respect to infrastructure investments, a crucial distinction that must be emphasised.
With regard to investments in industry, the Department of Industry clearly stated 
in evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities that 
individual companies 'get no direct benefit from the Fund' (House of Lords 1981: 5). By 
contrast, the UK government made use of the provisions of Article 4.2(a) of the 
Regulation allowing central governments to retain receipts passed from the Commission 
as partial repayment of state aids. Adopting an argument similar to that outlined by the 
Danish government, the Department of Industry suggested that a system of 'global 
additionality' operated so that the receipts accrue to the Treasury in the first instance but 
those receipts are taken into account when settling the level of regional expenditure on 
the industrial side' (House of Lords 1977: 32). Hence, in setting the level •nf expenditure 
under the UK's own 'Regional Development Grant’ or ’Regional Selective Assistance’ 
schemes (see chapter 5), Treasury and Department of Industry ministers would anticipate 
the level of ERDF resources to be received as reimbursement for projects under these 
schemes, and would therefore set the level of expenditure on such schemes higher than it 
would otherwise have been. Moreover, as ERDF grants were not passed on to individual 
companies, central government had to rely on the benevolence of companies in receipt of 
domestic industrial incentives in allowing their projects to be submitted to the European 
Commission for the benefit of central government. A Department of Industry press 
release on the subject of additionality explained this position in September 1975:
The level of public investment in regional development as a whole, which 
is settled year by year, will in future be determined taking accounts of 
funds received from the Community - receipts from the Fund must go to 
the Government rather than to the promoters of individual projects (House 
of Lords 1977: 94).
In this way, global additionality was deemed to be built into the regional policy 
expenditure system on the industrial side. The lack of transparency in this process, 
however, was a keylssue at the heart of the problem, as Lord Roberthall noted in 1981:
The outside world has really to take ministers’ words for it, has it not, 
because no one else will know whether, in the discussions between the 
Department [of Industry] and the Treasury, the Treasury jacked it up a bit 
because they knew they were going to get some regional assistance, or in 
their mind notched it down a bit less because they would get something 
there (quoted in Preston 1983: 23).
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With regard to investments in infrastructure, the procedure of global additionality 
was equally as obscure, but with an element of direct financial benefit accruing to the 
public agency undertaking an investment, through savings on interest payments in the 
first year of the project. Infrastructure project sponsors included port and rail authorities, 
water boards, nationalised energy suppliers and development agencies, but the 
overwhelming majority of such projects were sponsored by local authorities. Global 
additionality was deemed to exist with respect to local authority capital expenditure. It is 
therefore essential to distinguish between a local authority's capital and revenue accounts.
A local authority’s power to spend on capital investment (for instance, 
infrastructure provision such as buildings or serviced industrial sites) is set by its level of 
'capital spending consents', determined by central government. Local ^ authorities in 
Scotland are required by statute to obtain the Secretary of State for Scotland's consent 
before incurring a liability to meet a capital expense.11 The granting of this consent does 
not involve a transfer of money, but rather sets a ceiling on the capital expenditure which 
the local authority is allowed to spend. The local authority will then borrow, either from 
the Public Works Loan Board (a government agency which raises funds for lending to 
public authorities) or in the money market (Martlew 1984:4), up to this ceiling to finance 
capital investments. Under the financial planning system introduced in 1977 all local 
authorities prepare a financial plan of their proposed capital expenditure over the next 
five years, largely determined by planned infrastructure provision. These plans are 
considered by the Secretary of State for Scotland who then decides upon the level of 
borrowing each local authority should be allowed in order to finance capital 
expenditure.12 Just as central government claimed to anticipate ERDF receipts for 
industrial investment projects in setting expenditure for domestic industrial assistance 
schemes, so the logic of global additionality was applied to ERDF infrastructure projects 
with the claim that the capital expenditure ceilings of local authorities were set higher 
than they would otherwise have been.
There was, nevertheless, a key difference in the treatment of grants between 
infrastructure and industrial projects. Whereas ERDF receipts for industrial projects were 
not transferred to individual companies, ERDF receipts in respect of infrastructure were 
passed on to individual local authorities. The key point to note, however, is that there
11 The Secretary of State for Scotland is the Cabinet Minister with responsibility for The Scottish Office, a 
central government department described in greater detail in chapter 5 alongside ail the 'partners' involved in 
the implementation of ERDF programmes in Western Scotland.
12 This task is performed by the Minister at the Department of Environment for local authorities in England, 
and the Secretary of State for Wales for local authorities there.
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was no corresponding rise in the capital expenditure ceiling o f the authority. In other 
words, any grants for capital expenditure schemes which a local authority received from 
the European Commission could not be treated as capital receipts. The practical problem 
this presented for many local authorities was that they were not able to spend the grants 
they had been allocated from the ERDF as they had already spent up to their pre-set 
capital expenditure ceilings. According to government officials at that time, the failure of 
ERDF grants to confer automatic increases in the capital spending ceilings of public 
authorities was justified by the need to restrain public expenditure generally (House of 
Lords 1977: 39).
An element of direct financial benefit did, nevertheless, accrue to individual local 
authorities in receipt of ERDF through savings on interest payments. As the ERDF 
receipts in respect of infrastructure were actually passed to the authorities undertaking 
the eligible projects, these authorities were able to reduce their borrowing requirements. 
Although receipt of the grant did not allow additional projects to be undertaken, it did 
allow the authority to reduce the borrowing requirements to finance the same level of 
activity, and hence loan repayments were reduced. As is shown in chapter 5, this small 
financial benefit was often used by local authorities to finance the salaries of a few 
economic development officers, but its benefit should not be exaggerated. The benefits 
of the reduction in interest repayments accrued to the local authority only for the period 
between the receipt of the ERDF grant and the subsequent adjustment made to the local 
authority's block grant from central government in the following financial year. One 
element in the calculation of the central government grant to each local authority was 
based on the resources of the authority, so that the Treasury 'clawed back' the benefit of 
the authority's reduced loan charges by subsequently reducing its Hate Support Grant' 
(see Chorley 1986: 28). The government position on ERDF part-financed infrastructure 
projects was therefore set out in a Department of the Environment press release as early 
as September 1975 which stated:
In present circumstances ... the Government would not feel able to 
authorise individual local authorities to undertake additional projects 
because of the availability of assistance from the Fund. The Government's 
intention was that the monies received from the Fund should be passed to 
the authority responsible for the project, and used to reduce the cost to the 
authority, and so the amount which had to be borrowed to finance i t ... the 
unused borrowing authority should not be used for any other scheme 
(House of Lords 1977: 94-95).
i l l
The clear dissatisfaction of local authorities in eligible regions with regard to the 
operation of 'non-additionality' could rarely be coherently expressed at the Community 
level. With regard to early forms of partnership, or even direct contact between the 
European Commission and regional actors, the ERDF was again a pale shadow of a 
proactive regional policy. One regional development agency from the UK which did visit 
Brussels to discuss the ERDF with the Directorate-General for Regional Policy in the 
early years found that 'officials were most anxious to encourage regional inputs in an 
attempt to broaden their own understanding of the problems facing the region' (House of 
Lords 1977: 92). Despite the apparent hunger of DG XVI for information on regional 
development problems and opportunities, the UK government's procedures ensured that 
central government remained firmly in control of the ERDF process.
The European Commission was required to consult two intergovernmental 
^management committees dealing with ERDF issues. Individual projects were formally 
approved by a Fund Management Committee, set up under the Fund Regulation, which 
met in Brussels three times a year under the chair of the European Commission but was 
composed of two representatives from each member state. It discussed batches of 
projects, whether they should receive assistance and at what grant rate (i.e. the 
percentage of Fund contribution VThe Fund Management Committee was complemented 
by the consultative Regional Policy Committee!} Such a Committee had been advocated 
for many years by the European Commission and was finally set up under Council 
Decision (75/185/EEC) at the same time as the creation of the ERDF. Like the Fund
r  ■ ■ ■
Management Committee, the Regional Policy Committee comprised two representatives 
from each member state (invariably senior civil servants with responsibility for regional 
policy) and the European Commission. Unlike the Fund Management Committee, 
however, it elected its chair from among the governmental representatives. The chief 
tasks of the Regional Policy Committee were to examine at the request of the Council o r^  
the Commission, or on its own initiative problems relating to regional development, the 
progress made or to be made towards solving them and regional policy measures needed 
to further the achievement of the Community’s regional objectives'.13 In other words, it 
sought to discuss the overall framework of regional policy and the co-ordination of 
government actions. Its mandate was therefore wide: on its own initiative or on the 
demand of the Council or the Commission, it could study any question related to regional 
development in the Community. However, the Committee's primary role was to facilitate 
exchange of experience (Wilson 1980: 17). While the Fund Management Committee was
^Article 2 of Council Decision 75/185/EEC of 18 March 1975 creating a Regional Policy Committee, O.J.
No. L 73 of 21 March 1975 r — _ _
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an overtly intergovernmental forum in which resources were divided up according to pre­
set national quotas, the Commission had higher hopes for the Regional Policy 
Committee, viewing it as 'a constructive forum for concertation, and for moving towards 
a convergence of national approaches - crabwise rather than by overarching plans' 
(Wallace 1977:158).
In reality, decisions at the Community level regarding which projects would 
receive assistance under the ERDF left very little discretion for the European 
Commission. Application for ERDF assistance was a fragmented process handled largely 
by the member states. Three times a year government departments14 in the UK prepared 
lists of eligible projects. These were co-ordinated by the Department of Industry, where 
an informal rationing system existed between the nations of the Kingdom, and lists of 
infrastructure and investment projects were then sent to the European Commission. Only 
a few more projects than that allowed by the UK quota were submitted, thereby ensuring 
that government departments remained the 'principal arbiters' (House of Lords 1981: xii) 
of which projects would receive ERDF assistance. The Fund Management Committee 
then allocated funds strictly according to national quotas.
The Commission, with limited staff resources, had the task of simply rubber- 
stamping thousands of individual project applications every year. As the Head of the 
ERDF Operations Division in Directorate-General XVI told a conference in Bradford in 
1985, 'it might not always be appreciated that the staff which is responsible for 
processing 5,000 applications annually only comprises seven 'A' officials' (Kinch 1986: 
31). These executive grade officials would almost never visit a development region or 
see firsthand a regional policy project implemented. Likewise, groups of politicians or 
officials from a development region visiting the Commission in Brussels had to be 
extremely small in number, with discussions tightly focused on specific projects. DG 
XVI officials at that time were heavily dependent on national governments for 
information and local actors were only marginally involved.
One of the early Commission proposals which did survive and make its way into 
the 1975 Regulation was that for the preparation of Regional Development Programmes 
(RDPs), although the first round of programmes was not submitted to the Commission 
until three years after the Regulation. The actual task of specifying what the programmes 
should look like fell to the Regional Policy Committee, which adopted guidelines for the
14 The Department of Industry prepared the list of eligible industrial projects in England while the 
Department of the Environment prepared the list of eligible infrastructure projects there. In Scotland, the 
Secretary of State for Scotland was responsible for both lists.
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outline of RDPs in October 1975, setting out a common format for all member states.15 
In short, the RDP for any region was expected to 'indicate the objectives and the means 
for developing the region* (European Commission 1976b: 7). Early evidence had 
suggested that the paucity of information flowing from the regions to Brussels and back 
again' made worse the absence of a coherent regional policy’ (House of Lords 1977: 12). 
The hope was that RDPs would allow the development of a more comprehensive regional 
policy by bringing together the Commission, national governments and regional bodies in 
the preparation of regional economic objectives and priorities. The programmes would 
therefore be submitted to the European Commission and the management committees to 
inform the process of project selection. The major objective underlying the creation of 
the RDPs was to supply the Commission with a coherent overall perspective on the 
regional imbalances within the Community, thereby creating the possibilities for a better 
allocation of ERDF assistance’ (Martins & Mawson 1982b: 231).
In the event the first RDPs submitted to the European Commission were widely 
criticised for their obscurity and lack of detail. The Court of Auditors suggested that they 
were 'generally too vague to be of any practical use for the selection of projects' (1980: 
120). Martins and Mawson highlighted the vagueness of the UK's RDP, which had been 
prepared by central government with little input from regional and local actors. In their 
evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities, the 
authors also pointed to the difficulty that the United Kingdom had faced in preparing the 
document, as a result of a 'centralized and fragmented approach to expenditure planning, 
particularly in respect of infrastructure' (1982a: 59). The House of Lords Select 
Committee itself had earlier criticised the Commission's 'desiTe to secure a standardised 
Community-wide approach via the mechanism of the RDPs outline (analysis, objectives, 
measures, resources and implementation)', since this reflected 'a somewhat naive view 
that it is possible to impose a rational normative method of regional planning on Member 
States' (1981: 122). Despite the Lords' scepticism, the Commission was finally able to 
impose such a system in 1988. Given the primacy of the compensatory function in the 
early years of the ERDF, however, the clash of objectives made such rational planning 
techniques appear absurd.
The ERDF as it was eventually created, following a period of high expectation, 
was subject to severe criticism. The Fund was viewed by many as no more than a 'quid
15 These Regional Development Programmes should include five chapters as follows: (i) an economic and 
social analysis highlighting obstacles to the potential for development in the regions; (ii) development 
objectives, (iii) the measures to be adopted; (iv) financial resources, by type of expenditure and source of 
revenue; and (v) a timetable of implementation arrangements (Commission 1976b; cf. Vanhove and Klaassen 
1987: 407-408)
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pro quo for irreducible spending on agriculture and a convenient machinery for 
channelling transfer payments between member countries' (MacLennan 1981: 25). 
/Although it was primarily a convoluted administrative mechanism for achieving the 
objective of budgetary redistribution between the member states, the ERDF nevertheless 
served the Additional symbolic function for the European Commission of creating the 
A'psychological effect' that 'Brussels' was 'doing something' for the depressed regional 
economies of the Community (House of Lords 1981: 91). The Commission's insistence,* 
even from the earliest days, in demanding acknowledgement of its support through V 
publicity posters and flags at the sites of assisted projects is easier to understand in this ( 
context. The House of Lords Select Committee itself concluded in its 1981 report that 
V there was 'a good deal of charade in the whole of the regional policy', adding 
significantly, however, that, 'in politics charades are not only often useftrh but are often j 
absolutely essential' (ibid.: 41).
The first academic accounts of the operation of the ERDF were likewise highly 
sceptical with regard to its capacity to perform an active regional development function 
(Wallace 1977; Armstrong 1978; Hull 1979). Wallace identified the two main elements 
in the European Commission's early strategy to influence regional development 
expenditure. Firstly,"die Commission sought to express preferences_on the nature and 
location of projects, concentrating expenditure in the most disadvantaged regions.
■y Secondly, the Commission hoped to encourage member state governments to provide 
resources additional to that which they would otherwise have provided in development 
regions, The Commission failed to make headway with the member state governments on 
either of these principles in the early years. In effect, from the beginning, the ERDF was 
used to supplement national measures rather than to elaborate a supranational 
Community regional policy. Moreover, the decision to abandon the principle of 
concentration in favour of national quotas carried wide implications, as 'once a "carve- 
up" had been built into the R[egional] Development] F[und], the potential for the 
Commission to play an active role became open to question' (Wallace 1977: 154). It is to 
the first attempts to amend the Fund that the analysis now turns.
3.3.3 The 1979 Fund Amendments
The European Commission itself accepted many of the criticisms levelled at the 
ERDF, and Community regional policy more generally, in the years following the 1975 
Regulation. The requirement that the ERDF Regulation should be reassessed before 
January 1980 provided the opportunity for the Commission to, suggest alterations to the
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Fund (Martins & Mawson 198&>46). The subsequent Regulation amendments were 
published in 1979.16 Two developments in particular should be noted: the introduction of 
a non-quota section, which represented an early advance for the Commission on the
—  ' V f
principle of concentration; and moves toward strengthening co-ordination through the 
principle of programming.
The^um-quota section agreed by the Council of Ministers in  Fehruary 1979--has 
been described as the first ’germ of an independent policy1 for the European Commission 
in the area of regional development (House of Lords 1981: xxv). The non-quota section 
was a separate section of the Fund, allocated 5% of the ERDF resources.17 The broad 
objective of this separate section was to permit more direct Commission involvement in 
the formulation of regional policy initiatives. For the first time, it allowed the 
Commission some flexibility in operations. Eligible regions were selected according to 
Community criteria and ceilings were raised for the level of contribution from the ERDF 
towards project costs. In addition, there was no pre-determined division of resources 
among the member states. The Commission was thereby able to formulate limited 
responses to specific problems of regional decline, usually problems of regionally 
focused sectoral decline. For example, early non-quota operations were directed towards j 
regions experiencing closures in the steel industry and decline in the shipbuilding I 
industry (as well as problems in the context of Community enlargement).18 These, 
initiatives were selected by the Commission. Another feature of the non-quota section 
was that support was provided under programmes of expenditure, thereby reducing the 
likelihood of financing unconnected projects. In other words, each programme was 
expected to be an 'integrated package of investment projects' (Mawson et al. 1985: 31).
The significance of the advances made under the introduction of the non-quota 
section, from the Commission's point of view, should not be exaggerated. There are two 
main reasons why this is the case. Firstly, the non-quota section constituted only 5% of 
the ERDF. As Meny explained at that time, if it remained at the 5% level, rather than 
constituting a truly Community regional policy, it would represent simply a 'fire brigade' 
operation called in to deal with the consequences of regionally based sectoral decline 
(1982: 385). Secondly, the programmes of expenditure suggested by the European 
Commission under the non-quota section had to be approved by the Council of Ministers
16 The documents comprising the 1979 amendments are summarised by Martins and Mawson (1980: 55)
17 This amounted to approximately £45 million annually. The Commission had originally proposed a non­
quota section of 13% of the Fund, but this had proved unacceptable to the member states.
18 The first and second series of non-quota measures, addressing enlargement, steel areas, shipbuilding 
areas, border areas, energy supply, and textile areas, were summarised by the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities (1984: xv, xviii)
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on the basis of unanimity. European Parliament calls that the Council should vote on 
non-quota section programmes under a system of weighted majorities were ignored, as 
approval of the programmes involved considerable levels of political bargaining and 
compromise between the member states.
With regard to the principle of co-ordination of economic policies, the 
Commission proposed the preparation of a comprehensive Community-wide system of 
analysis to inform policy formulation. The objective of the Periodic Reports', as they 
became known, was described by Mathijsen, then Director-General of DG XVI, in the 
following terms:
To be able to determine which effects which policies are going to have on 
economic integration it was proposed to adopt as a first concrete measure 
of economic policy the establishment of a comprehensive system of 
analysis and policy formulation. The aim is to assess the regional 
economies of the Community as a whole and of their respective 
development; it covers all the regions and should be as exhaustive as 
possible. Such an analysis is indispensable for diagnosing and remedying 
regional problems (1983:181-182).
In an attempt to impose a rational approach to policy development, the intention was that 
the reports should provide the basis for more specific programmes of support for each 
region. The lack of comparable regional statistics across the member states was a 
considerable draw-back for the European Commission in its attempts to develop a more 
rational, technocratic approach to policy formulation.
The revised Fund Regulation also increased the role of the Regional Development 
Programmes. As the vast majority of the Fund continued to be distributed under the quota 
section, the primary task of the ERDF in fact remained that of supporting national 
regional policy initiatives. The European Commission and the Regional Policy 
Committee could, however, seek to improve the co-ordination of national policies. The 
Regional Development Programmes (RDPs) were the key instrument to this end. The 
Commission was expected to examine the programmes in view of Community objectives 
and thereby to determine the priorities for assistance from the Fund. Member states 
would then up-date the programmes annually, with the intention that the Commission 
would use them as the principle means for evaluating applications to the Fund (Wilson 
1980: 14). In reality, however, member states continued to attach little importance to the 
documents and submitted programmes general enough to leave themselves wide room for
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manoeuvre. As Meny suggested, 'it is very easy to pretend that an individual project falls 
within a development programmes whose outlines are ill-defined' (1982: 384).
Contemporary writing on the amendments to the ERDF Regulation largely 
dismissed them as mere tinkering around the edges. Martins and Mawson wrote that the 
changes were simply 'marginal adjustments rather than a major step forward into the 
development of an effective Community Regional Policy’, and hence, 'in the short run the 
Qommunity] Rfegional] P[olicy] will continue to be cosmetic in its character and 
functions' (1980: 49, 55). John Wilson, an official in DG XVI at that time, called for the 
replacement of the financing of individual projects by a system of programming 
involving 'contracts between national governments and the Community institutions'. The 
incomplete nature of any regional development agreement was acknowledged when he 
suggested that contracts would be 'binding but not completely rigid: possibilities for 
altering programmes would be required' (1980: 26). He recognised, however, that this 
would imply major changes in the Fund and greater discretion for the Commission, and 
hence that it would be resisted. Nevertheless, with hindsight, Wilson's explicit use of the 
term 'contracting' can be seen as a foretaste of the Commission's 1981 proposals for 
further reform.
3.3.4 Commission Proposals for ERDF Reform 1981-S3 )
As a result of the failure to address the fundamental problems of the ERDF in 
1979, disillusionment with the Fund remained deep. One commentator suggested that 'the 
present procedure whereby the Fund Management Committee and the Regional Policy 
Committee effectively rubber stamp the payment of pre-determined quotas of aid by 
processing many thousands of project applications which have already been approved 
and often started by Member States, with no additional aid discemibly accruing to any 
individual project, is now nowhere defended, least of all by those involved in the process' 
(MacLennan 1982: 40). Under the provisions of the Fund Regulation, however, another 
review of the operation of the ERDF was required during 1981. To this end, new 
proposals were brought forward by the European Commission in the form of a 
communication setting out new regional policy guidelines and priorities in July and a 
subsequent draft regulation in October of that year. The 'Giolitti proposals', as they were 
known after the Regional Policy Commissioner of the time, called for an overhaul of the 
system for distributing ERDF aid. The European Commission's guidelines (1981a) and 
draft regulation (1981b) essentially presented four key proposals:
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(i) The Fund should be concentrated geographically to a far greater extent on those 
regions suffering serious structural problems, thereby excluding Belgium, 
Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, mainland France, Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands from support under the quota section of the ERDF (draft Articles 
4 and 6);
(ii) the non-quota section of the Fund, devoted to programmes of specific Community 
interest, should increase from 5% to 20% of the Fund (draft Articles 4 and 27);
(iii) 'Integrated Development Operations' combining various sources of Community 
finance should be introduced, following examples already initiated in Belfast and 
Naples, with a view to a greater element of additionality and better co-ordination 
of Community funds and policies with relation to regional development (draft 
Article 29);
(iv) a substantial shift over a three year period away from the financing of individual
projects to development programmes, i.e. 'programme contracts', in selected 
regions over a three year period (draft Articles 7 to 11). —
The proposals represented an attempt by the Commission to strengthen the 
principles of concentration, additionality and co-ordination. Programming would also be 
strengthened in two ways: firstly, enhanced Regional Development Programmes would 
be drawn up in close consultation with the regional and local actors involved in 
implementing the Fund assistance; secondly, programmes submitted for Fund support 
should take the form of a programme contract, prepared jointly by the national 
governments and local authorities concerned. In other words, the principle of 
programming should be strengthened in conjunction with a real process of 'partnership' 
between all the actors involved. The Commission deemed these principles necessary to 
redirect the ERDF from a purely compensatory role to a genuine development role. As 
such, the proposals sparked a long debate among member state governments, and the 
Council of Ministers’ refusal to accept them lasted for more than two years. That the 
greatest difficulties arose in the Council of Ministers negotiations over proposals (i) and
(ii) as sketched above (the principle of concentration of resources) supports the 
contention that many member states viewed the ERDF as primarily a compensatory 
mechanism (House of Lords 1984: 2). The argument that the resources were limited and 
should therefore be concentrated on the regions of greatest need to produce the greatest 
impact carried little weight. Eventually, the European Commission was obliged to 
prepare a reworked set of proposals in November 1983. Before analysing the reworked 
proposals which ultimately provided the basis for agreement in the Council of Ministers, 
the debate surrounding the 1981 'Giolitti proposals' should be highlighted.
As suggested above, the principle of concentration proved the major 'sticking 
point' between 1981 and 1983, but of greater interest from an implementation perspective
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was the proposal for ’programme contracts'. The promotion of the principle of 
programming by the European Commission was a response to the lack of effective 
control it enjoyed under the system of individual project financing. The Commission had 
argued that it ran the risk of being 'swamped by individual project applications' as the 
ERDF expanded, unless there was significant change and simplification of the 
administrative procedure' (House of Lords 1982: xiv). It therefore proposed a system of 
programmes which would take the form of a 'contract' with the member state concerned. 
Article 8.3 of the draft Regulation set out the information the Commission would look 
for in a programme before giving it the status of a' contract:
7(i) expected results, where possible in quantified form;
(ii) measures to be taken to achieve these results, together with the implémentation 
schedule;
(iii) plan for financing the programme, making a distinction between Community, 
national and regional sources of finance;
(iv) designation of the authorities or agencies responsible for implementing the 
programme and the actions within it;
(v) essential ancillary measures that are taken by the Member State in question and 
do not benefit from Community financing;
(vi) information showing that Community aid will result in additional financing and, 
consequently, additional practical measures to promote development of the region 
covered by the programme contract;
(vii) steps relating to the measures envisaged to protect the environment in the regions 
concerned;
(viii) arrangements to publicise the provision of Fund assistance, the purpose being to 
inform potential beneficiaries and the various sections of the economy of the 
opportunities afforded by the programme and of the role played by the 
Community (European Commission 1981b: draft Article 8.3).
The member state concerned should draw up a programme according to these 
guidelines, 'in close association with the authorities concerned', and then submit this to 
the European Commission. The latter would then assess the proposed programme for 
consistency with the Regional Development Programmes and in respect of 'its 
contribution to attainment of the Community’s regional objectives and priorities' (ibid.: 
draft Article 9.3). If the Commission considered that the programme could receive 
assistance from the Fund, it would inform the member state, adding its own observations 
on the programme. The document itself would be finalised by the common consent of the 
European Commission and the member state. Draft Article 9.4 explained that 'a 
programme which becomes in this way the subject of an agreement between the
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Commission and the Member State is considered to be, under the terms of the present 
regulation, a programme contract'. It was further suggested that, following a three-year 
transition period, all quota-section aid would be allocated through programme contracts.
The UK government agreed that programme contracts would reduce the 
administrative burden on the European Commission, but only by transferring the burden 
to member state governments (House of Lords 1982: 1, 12). Furthermore, one Department 
of Industry official pointed out that the formal, legalistic flavour of the word 'contract' 
alarmed member states:
We find it difficult to see how the principle of a legal contract can apply in 
these circumstances, particularly, for example, when one of the parties to the 
contract has to undertake to implement a three-year programme when the 
other party to the contract, that is, the Commission, does not have tRe power 
to guarantee more than a year's funds for the programme in advance. This 
feeling is widespread in other Member States, also, and our impression is that 
the Commission is tending to move away from the notion of a legal contract 
between the Member States towards something - an arrangement, an 
agreement, if you like - that would be more appropriate to the uncertainties of 
Community funding (House of Lords 1981:12 ).
A Department of Environment official continued by highlighting the tension between the 
objective of programming and the UK's 'real' objective:
I would like to add, on programme contracts, that the Commission's proposals 
are not at all clear as they stand, and there are, for example, a number of very 
onerous information requirements in the proposals as they are drafted. What 
concerns us is how far these requirements, and the ability of the Commission 
and other Member States to keep insisting on their fulfilment, will prevent us 
from achieving our main objective o f securing returns to the United Kingdom 
from the Fund [emphasis added] (House of Lords 1981:12).
These statements have been reproduced in full because, although the contractual 
requirements proved too demanding for the member state governments at that time, the 
'Community Support Frameworks' agreed after the 1988 Structural Fund reforms 
(examined in the following chapter) bear a striking resemblance to the 'programme 
contract' proposal.
The proposal to 'promote experimentally' a co-ordinated use of Community 
financial instruments for structural purposes within the framework of Integrated 
Development Operations (IDOs) should also be noted. On 21 March 1979, the 
Commission had adopted a number of guidelines for integrated operations, designed to
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combine the use of ERDF, European Social Fund and EAGGF Guidance Section 
resources with other Community financial instruments (such as European Investment 
Bank and European Coal and Steel Community loans) in specific regions.19 In the words 
of the Commission, such operations comprised 'a co-ordinated package of public and 
private measures and investments' with the following characteristics:
(i) they relate to a limited geographical area suffering from particularly serious 
problems associated in particular with under-development or with industrial or 
urban decline and likely to affect the region in question;
(ii) the Community, through the combined use of various structural financial
instruments, and the national and local authorities in Member States, contribute in 
close association to their implementation (European Commission 1981b: draft 
Article 29). _
To this end, experimental IDOs had been set up in the cities of Belfast and 
Naples, and each was run by a steering committee comprising relevant Commission, 
national, regional and local interests. The Giolitti proposals suggested that these 
operations should be extended to other regions, but that 'due to the complex issues 
involved in putting them into practice, [they] should be launched in a relatively limited 
number1 (European Commission 1981b: 8).20 It has been suggested that the IDOs 
constituted the first attempt by the Community to consult in advance with national and 
regional interests how the range of Community resources may be deployed in areas 
which are both seriously disadvantaged but of a size and situation which makes them 
natural centres for development' (MacLennan 1981: 26).
As negotiations on these proposals unfolded in the Council of Ministers in 1982, 
the points of disagreement 'closely mirrored the discussions of EC regional policy 
throughout the 1970s' (Wallace 1983: 96). After almost two years of stalemate in Council 
on the proposals, the European Council meeting at Stuttgart in June 1983 made a call for 
the European Commission to review the effectiveness of the Community's Structural 
Funds. As a first step, the European Commission withdrew its October 1981 proposals 
for review of the ERDF, and published new proposals in November 1983 (European 
Commission 1983). Mathijsen has described the Commission's interpretation of the 
Stuttgart Summit request in the following terms:
19 Bulletin EC 3-1979, point 2.1.57
20 The Commission also proposed that, to facilitate the implementation of such complex operations, a 10% 
premium should be payable towards the costs of measures located within the framework of an IDO In other 
words, a project funded within an IDO should receive a 10% higher contribution from the Community funds 
than individual projects outwith such frameworks.
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I would like to point out what motivated the Commission to modify its 
Regulation - because we have a Regulation that works, most people are 
more or less satisfied with the way it works, but we wanted to modify it.
So why did the Commission want to modify the existing Regulation? I 
think the answer is that we found after the more or less famous Stuttgart 
European Council meeting when the Commission was asked to examine 
the possibilities of enforcing a greater efficiency of the various structural 
funds, the Commission interpreted this greater efficiency as Community 
efficiency, not just efficiency in a bookkeeping way or from an 
administrative point of view, but how*to give it greater Community 
efficiency, how to make sure that the funds we were administering were 
being used to further Community objectives.... we thought we should give 
it a more Community outlook, a more Community function (House of 
Lords 1984: 136). -
It would be mistaken to view the November 1983 proposals as a major back-down 
by the European Commission on all the principles underlying the 1981 package. Rather, 
the second package of review proposals 'can be seen as a skilful re-drafting of the 
Commission's underlying objectives' (Mawson & Gibney 1984: 47). Mawson et al. have 
elsewhere indicated that the revised proposal was primarily an attempt to overcome the 
contentious issue of concentration (1985: 42). The proposals put forward by the 
Commission in November 1983, four months after the Stuttgart summit meeting, 
therefore represented a continuation of the original Giolitti proposals in several key ways. 
The proposal to retain, and provide a formal legal basis for Integrated Development 
Operations remained. The new emphasis on mobilising indigenous economic potential 
was reaffirmed. Similarly, the commitment to strengthening programming procedures 
remained, although all reference to 'programme contracts' was dropped. The term 
'contract' had alarmed the UK and other member state governments, and had therefore 
been dropped by the Commission. As suggested above, however, the de facto contractual 
nature of the system of programming ultimately introduced resembles the original 1981 
proposals.
The area in which the second set of proposals did represent a back-down by the 
European Commission was over the principle of concentration. Following the stalemate 
of the previous two years, it was proposed that all member states would, after all, receive 
a share of the Fund. However, the distinction between the quota section and the non­
quota section of the Fund should be abandoned. Rigid national quotas were to be 
replaced with flexible quota ranges, so-called 'quantitative guidelines'. In effect, the
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Commission proposed that each member state should receive a flexible ERDF quota 
allocation, indicating the upper and lower limits to the amount to be allocated. The 
ability of member states to reach their maximum allocation would depend upon the 
extent to which they submitted programmes and projects in conformity with the 
Commission’s regional development objectives. The average ERDF allocations would, 
however, remain approximately the same as the original fixed quotas.21 It should be 
noted, however, that the sum of the lower limits amounted to over 80% of total ERDF 
resources, thereby constraining the margin of flexibility for the European Commission
The debate surrounding the two sets o f  proposals submitted by the European 
Commission reveals the underlying fault structure of the regional policy edifice 
laboriously constructed over the preceding years. The Commission sought to increase its 
discretion over the deployment of resources by promoting the key principles highlighted 
at the start of this chapter. As shown above, this proposed re-direction of the ERDF to 
regional development purposes would have threatened member states' ability to control 
the operation of the ERDF process simply as a mechanism for redistribution. The 
Commission's own desire to move the Fund from this compensatory function was 
apparent in the guidelines it had submitted in July 1981, when it stated that the 
Commission considers that the moment has come for the Fund to pass from work of a 
mainly book-keeping nature to that of conceiving, promoting and programming, that is to 
say a more active role' (European Commission 1981b: 5).
Contemporary accounts reflect the tension between the potential passive and 
active roles for the European Commission in the ERDF process. Mawson et al., in their 
comprehensive account of the development of the ERDF, wrote of the Commission 
proposals for reform of the early 1980s that:
From the perspective of the Commission the main objective was to alter 
the ERDF in such a way that the Commission's regional responsibilities 
were to evolve from those of a financing body to those more clearly 
identified with a European-wide regional development agency. In other 
words the object was to break away from the tight national control of the 
policy towards a genuine supra-national European programme of action 
(1985: 37).
21 In order of the highest allocation to the lowest, the lower limits and upper limits (in terms of percentage 
share of the ERDF) proposed by the European Commission in 1983 were as follows: Italy 30.17 to 42.S9; 
United Kingdom 20.23 - 28.56, Greece 11.05 - 15.60; France 10.44 - 14.74, Ireland 5.05 - 7.13, Germany 
3.55 - 4.81; Netherlands 0.95 • 1.34; Belgium 0.85 - 1.20; Denmark 0.81 - 1.14; Luxembouig 0.06 - 0.08 
(European Commission 1983).
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Underlying both sets of proposals presented by the European Commission in these years 
was the desire to carve out an active role for itself in the process.
Helen Wallace sought to place this tension between the European Commission 
and member state governments over the operation of the ERDF in the context of wider 
theories of EC policy-making. She suggested that the ERDF reflected 'a fairly typical 
pattern of Community policy-making: a familiar tussle between the member governments 
and the Commission over whose influencejshould predominate; the encapsulation of 
crucial stages of decision in the Council of Ministers and frequently with adjudication by 
the European Council; and a set of detailed rules and modalities which fell far short of 
common policy and consisted rather of a modest increment to national regional policies 
with the locus of operation remaining fairly firmly in the control of national governments' 
(1983: 96). Consequently, T?y no stretch of the theorist's imagination cotifti the story of 
the ERDF vindicate the approach of the functionalist or neofunctionalist' (ibid.: 97). 
National civil servants and ministers had remained central to the whole process. There 
had been practically no scope for the involvement of non-governmental lobbies, whether 
regional lobbies or other pressure groups, although they had tried hard to exert their 
influence (see Butt Philip 1982).
Nevertheless, Wallace also suggested that a starkly intergovernmental 
interpretation of the ERDF would provide a similarly misleading account of the way in 
which the Fund had evolved. The role of the Commission throughout the evolution of the 
ERDF was far from negligible. A simple focus on the successive back-downs of the 
European Commission over the principles would fall into the intergovemmentalist trap of 
failing to look at either the longer term process, or the Commission's dogged promotion 
of the key principles at every opportunity for reform. On the contrary, 'as the 
propagandist of a more ambitious approach it has succeeded cumulatively and 
incrementally in wringing from member governments more extensive commitments to 
some responsibility for the EC over regional policy than they would have readily 
conceded' (1983: 96-97). This interpretation accords with the analysis presented by 
Mawson et ah, and already mentioned above, that the November 1983 proposals did not 
represent a major back-down by the European Commission over the original Giolitti 
proposals. Rather, they argue that 'far from presenting before Council a set of 
conciliatory proposals which responded to previous criticisms, the second round with 
some reservations tended to heighten many of the issues that had surfaced previously' 
(1985: 50). The following sub-section therefore considers the new Fund Regulation as it 
was eventually accepted.
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3.3.5 The 1984 ERDF Regulation
The new Regulation was agreed at the Foreign Affairs Council22 on 18-19 June 
1984 and came into effect on 1 January 1985. Mawson et al. have attributed the relatively 
quick acceptance of the new Regulation, after such a long stalemate, to the fact that 
imminent European Parliament elections offered the prospect of a fresh parliamentary 
lobby (1985: 52). There was therefore an incentive to reach a rapid conclusion following 
almost three years of negotiations. It should also be noted that, although the 1984 
Regulation closely, resembled the CommissionV'November 1983 proposals, there were 
some differences. The following analyses the advances made by the European 
Commission on the principles of concentration, programming and co-ordination, as well 
as with respect to the balance between infrastructure and industrial pftrjects and the 
emphasis given to indigenous development strategies. The extent to which the 1984 
Regulation represented a 'major revision of EC regional policy’, as suggested by 
Armstrong (1985: 319), is therefore examined by considering the evolution of several of 
these key principles.
By the mid 1980s, the ERDF was distributing funds each year seven times the 
valuejn cash^of terms of the amount distributed in the first three years of its existence 
(House of Lords 1984: xii). It was still widely suggested, however, as it had been since 
the creation of the Fund, that the modest sums devoted to the ERDF were unlikely to 
have any significant impact on regional performance levels unless the resources were 
concentrated in the most disadvantaged regions. With regard to the principle of the 
concentration of resources, however, the new Regulation represented only a minor 
advance on previous practice. It abolished the erstwhile distinction between the quota 
and non-quota sections of the ERDF, replacing the system of fixed quotas with a system 
of 'indicative ranges' along the lines suggested in the November 1983 proposals. For 
example, the UK’s indicative quota range was set at 21.42% to 28.56% of the Fund.23 The 
ranges indicated for each member state applied to the total amounts to be allocated over a
22 The absence of a specific Council of Ministers for ministers with responsibility for regional policy testifies 
to the fact that the development function of the ERDF was of secondary importance (cf. House of Lords 
1984: xxxv).
23 The indicative quota ranges set by the 1984 ERDF Regulation varied slightly from the 1983 Commission 
proposals. Agreed under the French Presidency of the Council in May 1984, the lower and upper limits (in 
terms of percentage share of the ERDF) were as follows: Italy 31.94 to 42.59, United Kingdom 21.42 to 
28.56; Greece 12.35 to 15.74; France 11.05 to 14.74; Ireland 5.64 to 6.83; Germany 3.76 to 4.81; 
Netherlands 1.00 to 1.34; Belgium 0.90 to 1.20; Denmark 0.51 to 0.67, Luxembourg 0.06 to 0.08 (Mawson 
et al. 1985: 52). Comparison with footnote 31 above reveals that the lower limits for eight of the then ten 
member states were raised (the exceptions being Denmark and Luxembourg), and that only the upper limits 
for Ireland and Denmark were reduced with respect to the Commission's November 1983 proposals
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three year period, so that it was possible for a member state to receive an allocation 
outwith these ranges in any one year (Croxford, Wise & Chalkley 1987: 28). The ability 
of any member state to take up resources would depend on that state's ability to submit 
eligible projects and programmes. The sum of the minimum allocations which would be 
reached at the end of the three year period, however, totalled around 88% of the ERDF, 
leaving only 12% to be spent at the discretion of the European Commission. It was 
nevertheless noteworthy that the total of all the upper limits of the quota ranges was 
greater than 100% of the Fund, so that, if it was over-subscribed, the Commission would 
decide on which expenditure should receive priority.
The new Regulation provided for a greater degree of programme financing than in 
the past, but the principle of programming had been diluted with respect to the November
1983 proposals. As Mawson et al. point out, the preamble to the 1984 Regulation 
emphasised the experimental nature of such measures when it stated that 'whereas to 
improve the impact of ERDF assistance: it is necessary to ensure, on a trial basis, that 
part of the Fund's resources are used in the form of programmes [emphasis added]' (1985: 
53). Moreover, the original proposal to distribute 40% of ERDF aid in the form of 
programmes within five years was replaced with the less optimistic target of 'at least 
20%' of the Fund being spent through programmes by the end of 1987. In giving evidence 
to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities in 1984, Pierre 
Mathijsen stated with confidence that additionality would be easier to ensure in the 
framework of a programme than under a system of individual project financing, although 
the precise reasons why this should be the case were not made clear (House of Lords 
1984: 141). According to Redmond and Barrett, irrespective of the implications with 
respect to additionality, the main driving force' behind the Commission's desired shift to 
programme financing was basically 'the Commission's view that programmes are a better 
means of co-ordinating the use of its limited resources in a more rational and cost- 
effective way' (1988: 20). Although project financing was retained as the normal mode 
for deploying resources, programme financing was promoted in three forms under the
1984 ERDF Regulation: Community Programmes (CPs); National Programmes o f 
Community Interest (NPCIs); and Integrated Development Operations (IDOs). These are 
of considerable relevance to the case study of Western Scotland and should be considered 
in turn.
In many respects, Community Programmes represented a continuation of the 
programmes introduced under the previous non-quota section of the ERDF. Although the 
non-quota section as such ceased to exist, the European Commission would allocate a 
proportion of each member state's indicative quota in the form of Community
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Programmes. These were defined under Article 7 of the new Regulation as 'series of 
consistent multiannual measures directly serving Community objectives and the 
implementation of Community policies'. Such programmes would be initiated by the 
European Commission, would normally concern regions in more than one member state, 
and need not be limited to the regions eligible under the domestic regional policies of the 
member states. As De Witte pointed out at that time, the 'Community character' of such 
programmes was 'reinforced by one major change with regard to the non-quota actions: 
the framework of these programmes has no longer to be adopted in the Council by a 
unanimous vote, but by a qualified majority' (1986: 426). In essence, CPs therefore 
facilitated a continuing Commission involvement in the preparation of programmes to 
address regionally focused sectoral problems. The first two Community Programmes, 
announced in 1986, were (STAR^ (Special Telecommunication ActiofTfor Regional 
Development) and 'Valoren' (Valorisation of Endogenous Energy Potential). Later CPs 
promoted by the European Commission focused on regionally based sectoral decline, as a 
direct follow-on from early non-quota section programmes: Henaval' financed the same 
types of operation as the non-quota programme for regions suffering decline in the 
shipbuilding industry, while 'Resided continued assistance for regions experiencing heavy 
decline in the steel industry (Redmond & Barrett 1988: 26).
National Programmes, o f Community Interest, introduced under the 1984 
Regulation, were to be prepared by national governments in collaboration with regional 
actors. They would therefore be determined by national priorities and, unlike Community 
Programmes, would be restricted to the areas eligible under domestic regional policy. 
However, NPCIs would have to reflect measures of significant 'Community interest', 
although this concept was 'relatively ill-defined in the Commission's proposals' (Mawson 
& Gibney 1984: 47). As with the previous project financing system, the initiative rested 
with the member state, which was, however, expected to formulate a coherent investment 
programme. De Witte summarised the intention that lay behind NPCIs:
The distinguishing feature of these programmes, compared to the existing 
system, is therefore, not that they allow for more Commission discretion, but 
that they are formulated in more global terms. Indirectly, one hopes of course, 
that the gradual substitution of individual projects with more comprehensive 
programmes will increase Community control on the use of the Fund and 
attenuate some of the shortcomings of the old system such as the lack of co­
ordination, additionality and visibility (1986:427).
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The reality of National Programmes of Community Interest, as shown in the analysis of 
the NPCI for Glasgow in chapter 5, was far more prosaic. As Redmond and Barrett 
suggested, 'some early applicants took the view that NPCIs were simply collections of 
loosely related projects which would have been submitted individually under the 
previous ERDF regulation' (1988: 21).
The third type of programme promoted under the 1984 ERDF Regulation, 
Integrated Development Operations, were described in the previous sub-section. Having 
previously existed with no formal legislative basis within the ERDF Regulation, IDOs 
were provided a basis under Article 34 of the new Regulation. This same Article also 
stated that 'investments and measures ... which form part of an integrated development 
approach may be accorded a priority treatment'. The difference between Community 
Programmes and Integrated Development Operations was summarised'dearly by De 
Witte in terms of internal Commission politics. Under IDOs there was a joint use of the 
Community's Structural Funds: the European Social Fund, administered by Directorate- 
General V (Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs), and the Guidance 
Section of the Agricultural Fund, administered by Directorate-General VI (Agriculture) 
as well as the ERDF. These Directorates-General might therefore have 'objected against 
the forced grouping of all interventions in a "Community Programme" under the 
Regional Fund' and hence against conceding a degree of de facto control to DG XVI 
(1986:432). As Redmond and Barrett have pointed out, however, the integrated approach 
increasingly became the European Commission's favoured technique of intervention in 
regional economic development, to the extent that Article 130D of the Single European 
Act ultimately required amendments to the Structural Funds (ERDF, ESF and EAGGF) in 
order to 'co-ordinate their activities between themselves and with the operations of the 
existing financial instruments' (1988: 27). This further integration of the various 
Structural Funds is examined in chapter 4, but some consideration should first be given to 
the other main aspects of the 1984 Regulation.24
24 The creation of the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes (IMPs) should be noted at this point. At the 
European Council meeting in Dublin in December 1984, Greece threatened a veto of Community 
enlargement (to indude Spain and Portugal) unless it received some financial compensation for the perceived 
economic threat the accession of these southern European countries would bring. At the subsequent 
European Council meeting in Brussels in March 1985 the IMP initiative was agreed to compensate Greece, 
Italy and France, the countries most likely to experience the economic consequences of the new enlargement 
of the EC. Although not of direct concern for this study, it should be noted that the IMPs represented a 
further development of the integrated approach as they were intended to combine the resources of all the 
Structural Funds within integrated programmes (De Witte 1986: 435-436; Buresti & Marciani 1991; Bianchi 
& Grote 1991)
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These three forms of programming should not be confused with the Regional 
Development Programmes (RDPs). In particular, although they were both submitted by 
the member states, NPCIs and RDPs were designed to serve different purposes. The 
RDPs, according to Article 2 of the 1984 Regulation, were still to be drawn up by each 
member state 'as an overall outline of its regional policy' (De Witte 1986: 427). They 
were then to be submitted to the European Commission and the Regional Policy 
Committee for the purposes of policy co-ordination. To this same end, the role of the 
Periodic Reports on the economic situation of the regions across the Community was re­
affirmed. The three forms of programming outlined above were, by contrast, intended as 
coherent sets of regional development actions addressing the principal economic 
problems of given areas.
With regard to the participation of local and regional authoritiéT in the ERDF 
policy process, such actors had long supported efforts by the European Commission to 
strengthen their involvement. Mawson and Gibney explained the underlying reasons for 
this 'enthusiasm' of local actors to participate in the formulation and administration of 
regional policy:
In recent years local authorities have developed considerable expertise in 
various aspects of infrastructure and local economic planning and 
certainly possess the local knowledge and administrative capacity to 
prepare specific types of programme ... Within local authority circles there 
is a view that given this experience, a more direct relationship with 
Brussels through the programme approach and measures such as those 
designed to foster indigenous development potential, would provide the 
opportunity to develop policies more specifically tailored to the needs of 
individual areas than dependent on "broad-brush" national regional 
policies as at present (1985: 137).
Despite this desire to be involved, and the European Commission's support for their 
involvement, the 1984 Regulation provided veTy little scope for advance on previous 
practice. De Witte lists some of the many 'exhortations to the Member States to allow for 
wider participation of regional and local authorities’, but concludes that 'no concrete 
guarantees for such involvement were given through the ERDF Regulation' (1986: 430). 
Not only would the Regional Policy Committee and the ERDF Fund Management 
Committee continue to consist of member state representatives, but there was also 'some 
diminution of the role of local authorities in programme elaboration, in response to 
pressure on the part of certain Member States vis-à-vis the involvement of local 
authorities in the process' (Mawson & Gibney 1984: 52).
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There were two further, related aspects of the 1984 Regulation that should be 
highlighted. Firstly, there was a commitment to promote 'productive investments’ as well 
as basic infrastructure. Secondly, there was a commitment to support measures aimed at 
the promotion of 'indigenous development'. Both of these approaches featured in earlier 
Commission programmes under the non-quota section and were to be given higher 
profile through the new forms of programming. When the Director-General of DG XVI 
(Mathijsen) spoke of his frequent disagreement with the 'philosophy of the Member 
States’ regarding regional development policy, he outlined the Commission's new 
approach to regional development (House of Lords 1984: 142). The conceptual 
distinction between 'policy core' and 'policy periphery' highlighted in the introductory 
chapter is helpful in this instance. Since the early 1980s, as the Commission's role in the 
process gradually increased, there has been a considerable difference in approaches with 
regard to the 'periphery' of European regional development policy. While the European 
Commission increasingly sought to promote 'productive investments’ at the expense of 
basic infrastructure, and endogenous development as opposed to the attraction of inward 
investment, member states (and foremost among them the UK) sought to maintain the 
focus of earlier approaches. The Commission argued that the provision of software at the 
local level, such as business advisory services, would promote development from within 
the local economy. The UK central government continued to use the ERDF to support 
centrally-driven "hardware provision', with the apparent aim of influencing the location of 
growth activities. There was therefore considerable conflict over the nature of the policy 
periphery, as shown below in the case study of Western Scotland.
The European Commission's preference for 'industrial' over 'infrastructure' 
projects at the time of the 1975 ERDF regulation has already been noted. The ceiling of 
70% of ERDF resources going to infrastructure projects in the Community as a whole 
was an early concession by the member state governments to the European Commission’s 
belief that infrastructure projects were generally of less importance in the conversion of 
all but the severely structurally underdeveloped regional economies, and would no doubt 
have gone ahead anyway without ERDF assistance if they were particularly necessary.25 
Despite the 70% ceiling on infrastructure expenditure, however, the annual report on the 
ERDF for 1982 revealed the continuing bias in favour of infrastructure within the 
member states, with 87% of ERDF resources spent on such projects and only 13% on 
industrial investment projects. In 1983 the proportion devoted to infrastructure projects
25 Moreover, as Williams, Williams and Hasiam point out, infrastructural improvements are likely to have 
'complex two-way effects' as they make it easier for strong economies to export to weaker regional 
economies as well as vice versa (1991. 338).
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rose further to 89% (House of Lords 1984: x). In the light of experience', therefore, the 
requirement to devote ERDF resources to industrial development was reduced in the
1984 Regulation, with Article 35 simply requiring that *the Member States, in submitting 
their applications, and the Commission, in administering the ERDF, shall endeavour to 
ensure that an appropriate proportion (if possible 30%) of the Fund's resources is 
allocated to investments in industry, the crafts and the services sector’ (Comfort 1988: 
542).
Several authors claimed that DG XVI was influenced by the changing emphasis in 
regional development literature in those years'(De Witte 1986: 429). According to 
Mawson et al., 'in advocating the support of measures to encourage indigenous 
development potential, the Commission regarded itself as being in the forefront of 
developing new approaches to regional development, at a time wRen traditional 
infrastructure measures such as road-building and advance factory construction were 
becoming less effective, with little mobile industry available to attract to declining areas' 
(1985: 40-41). These claims seem to be substantiated by Mathijsen’s evidence to the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities (House of Lords 1984: 
142). Not only was it the case that foreign investors in a disadvantaged region were 
usually the first to close down their operations and pull out during an economic 
recession, but in the early 1980s there were simply more regions actively seeking to 
attract a decreasing pool of potential inward investment (cf. Clout et al. 1989: 201; 
Roberts, 1989; Wadley 1986). Ensuring that the ERDF actually financed software 
measures was more difficult than securing a mere commitment to do so in the 
Regulation.
Comfort has explained the reasons why it proved difficult to reach a level of 30% 
of the Fund's total resources for allocation to so-called 'productive investments'. Firstly, 
the application procedure for infrastructure projects was generally less demanding. 
Secondly, during an economic recession and periods of low growth there were less 
suitable industrial projects that could be submitted. Thirdly, assistance to industrial 
projects often has to be decided on and disbursed very quickly if a project is to go ahead 
(1988: 542). Moreover, national and regional actors responsible for the implementation 
of development strategies in the Community's most seriously disadvantaged and 
structurally underdeveloped regions argued convincingly that a basic level of 
infrastructure provision was a prerequisite for modernisation of their regional economies. 
However, this line of argument could not be used by all member states as it was not the 
case that all development regions were structurally underdeveloped and lacking in basic 
infrastructure:
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Even for Member States with a long industrial tradition and a well- 
developed policy of aid to industrial investment in less-favoured regions, 
it has proved easier in many cases to submit applications for infrastructure 
projects. In the UK, for example, 72.4% of ERDF receipts went to 
infrastructure even though national regional policy is conceived 
exclusively in terms of the development of industry and services, while no 
special criteria exist for favouring infrastructural improvements in the so- 
called Assisted Areas (Comfort 1988: 543).
Despite the apparent difficulties, and despite the fact that those industrial investments 
which did take place primarily reimbursed member state governments for their domestic 
industrial incentive schemes, the Commission continued to pursue a higher priority for 
'productive investment'. The Commission's non-quota programmes, and the later 
Community Programmes, sought to give a greater weight to such investment by 
subsidising the provision of services to small businesses, such as advice on marketing or 
technology transfer (Comfort 1988: 543; Redmond & Barrett 1988: 23).
A closely linked aspect of the 1984 regulation was the emphasis on 'internally 
generated development'. In the early 1980s, regional development policy from below was 
increasingly replacing policy from above, as the emphasis shifted from trying to attract 
inward investment to promoting the development of the local business base from within. 
This shift in emphasis was attractive to the European Commission for the obvious reason 
that it did not want to see a competitive over-bidding between the Community's regions 
for scarce inward investment that might simply be displaced from other regions of the 
Community. In other words, the European Commission placed increasing emphasis on 
the need to stimulate new economic development within problem regions, avoiding 
simple transfers of development activity from one region to another (Croxford, Wise & 
Chalkley 1987: 30). Articles 15 and 16 of the 1984 ERDF Regulation therefore 
constituted a separate chapter on 'measures to exploit the potential for internally 
generated development of regions'. Thereby, small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) 
should be provided with facilities 'enabling them to expand their activities and to obtain 
access to new technology', as well as to 'facilitate their access to the capital market'. The 
reasons for the opposition of the UK central government to such 'Article 15 measures' are 
addressed in the case study of Western Scotland.
This analysis of the provisions of the 1984 Regulation has provided an essential 
analysis of the issues, principles and points of conflict between the European 
Commission and the member states which re-emerged in the wake of the subsequent 
Structural Fund reforms and shaped the implementation of programmes in the late 1980s
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and early 1990s. Contemporary accounts of the 1984 Regulation and its subsequent 
operation maintained the largely pessimistic tone that characterised the majority of early 
academic accounts of the ERDF. Wise and Croxford, for example, suggested that the 
ERDF remained ’an essentially "cosmetic" policy instrument', camouflaging the lack of 
serious Community effort to reduce regional inequalities' (1988: 164). Basing their 
assessment on four sets of evidence (the small size of the ERDF in terms of the overall 
Community budget; the lack of additionality; the failure to concentrate scarce resources; 
and the continued scattering of assistance across unconnected projects as opposed to the 
deployment of co-ordinated development strategies), they concluded that the ERDF was 
simply a token gesture', a product of the EC's intergovernmental political system (ibid.: 
172). Mawson et al. likewise argued that the development of an active regional policy at 
the Community level had to be 'interpreted within the context of the e^&lution of the 
Community as a whole and in particular in terms of the internal decision making process, 
or "Community method" by which conflicts between member states are resolved' (1985: 
20). This largely intergovernmental account conflicts with their own evidence to the 
extent that they also emphasise the Commission’s refusal to back-down completely over 
many of the key principles it sought to apply to the operation of the Fund (ibid.: 50). The 
choice of emphasis might as well have been on the incremental changes wrung from the 
member state governments over the years, to paraphrase Wallace (1983: 96-97). 
However, Mawson et al. rightly point to the fact that the implementation of those 
'institutional or policy innovations' which were wrung from the member states is as 
important as their acceptance in the first instance:
...The nature of the relations between the national governments and 
Community institutions is such that the successful implementation of the 
innovations depends on the consent and commitment of the very member 
states whose behaviour the innovations are supposed to regulate in the 
first place. This clearly presents a formidable obstacle to fundamental 
policy changes (1985: 57).
The key theme of the vast literature on policy implementation reviewed in chapter
2 above is that focusing on legislative changes, at the neglect of focusing on the way in 
which those changes are interpreted by the actors who actually implement policy, 
exaggerates the extent to which legislative change alters actions. Chapter 3 has so far 
analysed the evolution of the ERDF up to the late 1980s in terms of general approaches 
to EC policy-making. Before examining the fundamental changes ushered in by the 
Structural Fund reforms, when the European Commission succeeded in strengthening its
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long-cherished principles of concentration, programming, partnership and additionality 
(at least in terms of the Regulations), some consideration should be given to those early 
studies that placed specific emphasis on the implementation of ERDF actions.
3.4 Studies of the Implementation of ERDF Actions: Top-Down Programming or 
Bottom-Up Adaptation?
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, there are very few general accounts 
of policy implementation in the EC. One legal-administrative study of the 
implementation of Community policies has drawn attention to this gap in the literature:
Although most political analysis of intra-Community processes has tended 
to focus on policy-making, we feel that the post-decisional phase has been 
unjustifiably neglected. We would suggest that the question of 
implementation and application of policy, once adopted, is no less 
important, and that any erosion of the acquis through non-implementation 
or wrongful application is as dangerous to the Community as the failures of 
the decision-making process itself (Krislov, Ehlermann & Weiler 1986: 5).
The authors provide an account of 'compliance (and non-compliance) with, and 
enforcement of, transnational law' (ibid.: 59-88). The 'non-compliance paradox' is 
identified as the phenomenon of 'the growing incidence of non-compliance despite the 
overall control which the Member States exercise over the decision-making process' 
(ibid.: 77). General explanations for this paradox are sought not just in the obvious fact 
that the European Commission rarely implements Community policy, but also in the fact 
that directives have become too detailed, that experts co-opted in the policy formulation 
stage pay more attention to the technical than the political aspects of various proposals, 
that the preparatory phase of policy-making is overly secretive, and that directives may 
simply be technically faulted. Added to these is the fact that a proposal may simply have 
been accepted as part of a package deal in the Council of Ministers, with little intention 
by the member state involved of devoting the necessary commitment to implement the 
policy.
The large comparative study edited by Siedentopf and Ziller (1988) similarly 
focuses on compliance (and non-compliance) with seventeen EC directives. As they are 
binding in terms of the result to be achieved but leave to the member state concerned the 
choice of the method and form by which to achieve those results, directives, as a form of 
Community law, are 'a new kind of act of legislation without clear precedents in the legal
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systems of the Member States' (ibid: 8). Like the study conducted by Krislov, Ehlermann 
and Weiler (1986), the project led by Siedentopf and Ziller focuses primarily on 
observance of Community law and hence on the legal apparatus within member states.
Policy analyses focusing on the political aspects of the implementation of EC 
policy remain rare. Two early studies of the implementation of EC policies emphasise 
the existence of more than one policy-making level. Feld's analysis of the implementation 
of the Common Agricultural Policy provided an early reference to two-tier policy- 
making' in a Community context and the importance of multilevel interaction between 
European-level institutions, national governments and organised interests (1979: 336). 
Laffan's analysis of the implementation of European Social Fund actions similarly 
focused on policy linkages (’networks') between different policy-making levels and hence 
on the importance of communication, forms of control and evaluation mechanisms 
(1983). The latter study concluded that legalistic accounts of hierarchical authority failed 
to capture the subtlety of the political process of policy implementation in the EC, yet the 
implementation of EC policies remains a marginal concern in the policy implementation 
literature.
An early attempt to study the politics surrounding the implementation of ERDF 
actions in the UK, as opposed to interactions at a supranational level, was made in a PhD 
dissertation by Christopher Preston in 1984. He presented a comparison of the 
implementation process in Scotland, England and Northern Ireland between 1975 and 
1981 and sought to address the multi-tier dimension of political implementation by 
analysing the role of sub-state actors. The study adopted a bottom-up approach to 
emphasise the implementation of ERDF actions as a process of bargaining between 
conflicting interests. Preston argued that six constraints determined actual behaviour in 
the implementation of EC regional policy:
(i) the initial definition of implementation stressed technical and administrative 
constraints and failed to recognise that the problems had their roots in the larger 
policy process in which there was no agreement on policy goals;
(ii) the implementation structure was composed of complex, multi-organisational 
linkages;
(iii) the policy was modified, at times substantially, by the conflicts of interest and 
bargaining between the affected parties at all levels of government;
(iv) the outcome of such bargaining hinged on the pre-existing distribution of power, 
most notably the pre-eminence of national governments both domestically and at 
the supranational level; however,
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(v) the distribution of power is not static, the Commission is itself a political actor 
maintaining principles and interests different from the existing balance of 
national interests, and consequently national perceptions and positions can be 
redefined; but,
(vi) in seeking to redefine national perceptions and positions the Commission has to 
balance: (a) its own initiatives with the interests, and its need for the agreement, 
of member states; and (b) uniformity of policy with legitimate national and 
subcentral variations (Preston 1984:25-39).
Constraints (i), (ii) and (iii) as set out above constitute a useful set of early 
observations on the implementation of the ERDF. The lack of agreement on policy goals 
has been stressed anew in this chapter with the focus on the ambiguity' surrounding 
whether the ERDF served primarily a development function or a compensatory function 
in the early years of its operation. Moreover, the nature of the policy field itself 
determines the need for 'multi-organisational linkages’ and hence opens the potential for 
opportunistic behaviour and conflicts of interest in the implementation phase. Constraints
(iv), (v) and (vi), however, reflect Preston's choice of central research question. This was 
framed in terms of the somewhat obvious argument that 'implementation of the Fund has 
been constrained by the unwillingness of central government to relinquish control of 
regional policy to the EC (1984: i). His general conclusion was therefore that European 
regional policy had 'remained an intergovernmental rather than a supranational policy 
with limited opportunities for the Community institutions to establish direct links with 
regional interests', and hence that reform of the ERDF required fundamental change in 
the balance of political power away from national governments to Community 
institutions (ibid.: i-ii). This broad-brush conclusion reflected contemporary accounts of 
the ERDF as lying near the intergovernmental end on a perceived continuum between 
supranational and intergovernmental styles of policy-making, and by extension, policy 
implementation.
Another attempt to use the policy implementation literature to assess the 
utilisation of Structural Fund expenditure within a member state was the chapter in 
'Policies into Practice' by Coates and Wallace devoted to European Funds and Tiow they 
are spent in the UK' (1984). The introductory chapter to the book set out Hyde^s 
'evolutionary model', considered in chapter 2 above, with the intention that all subsequent 
chapters would use this model. In fact, Coates and Wallace primarily described the 
interdepartmental division of responsibilities within UK central government and looked 
at all three Structural Funds as well as the Common Agricultural Policy Price Guarantee 
Section. The decision to spread the analysis so widely across these separate policy
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Instruments reflects the difficulty of accessing data on the treatment of Community 
expenditure within the member states. Moreover, the fact that Community expenditure 
on regional development was often used simply to replace domestic expenditure that 
would have taken place anyway meant that no 'sensible appraisal' could be made of the 
delivery of Community regional policies nor of their 'cost-effectiveness or impact on 
economic development': if the process results in the 'status quo ante’ then it is nothing but 
a 'convoluted rigmarole' (1984: 177-8). It is accepted herein that the apparent reluctance 
of many member states to respect the principle of additionality is a constraint on the 
operation of the ERDF. However, this constraint has been acknowledged in the analytical 
framework (in chapter 4) by examining the extent to which the European Commission 
has been able to pursue the principle of additionality since 1975. By contrast, Coates and 
Wallace's suggestion that the lack of additionality and the level of*5rganisational 
complexity inhibits analysis is somewhat defeatist (1984: 177-8).
The complexity of the implementation structures for Structural Funds policy not 
only inhibited academic analysis, but also presented practical difficulties for local actors 
involved in that structure. Preston and Hogg, in their work on Integrated Development 
Operations policy (1988; 1990), adopt the perspective of local authorities and identify the 
confusion surrounding the implementation of IDO programmes. One senior government 
official interviewed by the authors suggested that IDO policy was like 'a beast coming out 
of the mist', while Preston and Hogg themselves added that the general outline of an EDO 
is clear, but it is only as the mist disperses that one might see the detail' (1990: 29). The 
major theme of their research on IDO policy was therefore that there were fundamental 
problems inherent in the implementation of such policy that had not been fully 
understood at the policy formulation stage. A key assumption of this study, however, is 
that such uncertainty is inherent in all regional development programmes, and has added 
significance as a result of the bounded rationality of real actors.
One final study of the implementation of the ERDF that should be noted is 
Rhodes' analysis of the ERDF in his survey of European policy-making, implementation 
and 'subcentral' levels of government (1986).26 He identified five major characteristics of 
the implementation of EC policies in general in which such subcentral governments are 
involved:
26 For Rhodes, 'subcentral government' includes the wide variety of governmental and political organisations 
(not just regional and local governments) 'within the accepted boundaries of the state which are not central 
political institutions located in the capital city' (1986: 2).
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(i) The EC employs programmed strategies of implementation which, along with a 
well-developed legal system, seek to ensure uniform and precise implementation 
and a high degree of compliance with specific tasks.
(ii) There are marked variations between policy areas both in terms of policy content 
(for example, regulatory versus distributional policies), in terms of politicisation 
(e.g. routine versus controversial policies), and in terms of hierarchical 
complexity (e.g. hierarchy versus multi-organisational arrangements).
(iii) EC implementation strategies do not reflect this variety and the Commission is 
caught on the homs of a dilemma: programmed strategies translate its intentions 
into practice at the cost of unresponsiveness to local conditions and uneven and 
slow implementation, whereas adaptive strategies generate considerable slippage 
from initial objectives. In both cases, EC policy goals are partially realised at 
best.
(iv) The EC remains dependent on national governments for implementation with 
limited capacity either to monitor policy implementation or to deploy 
sanctions/incentives to gain compliance.
(v) Until such time as the national governments are prepared to countenance 
decentralisation (and hence erosion of their bargaining positions) the EC will be 
unable to develop its own implementation structures based on direct links with 
subcentral government and, in search of uniformity, its policies will have the 
unintended consequence of fostering centralisation within member states (Rhodes 
1986: 54-55).
The challenge of implementation for the European Commission is therefore that, 
as Berman pointed out, there is no universally best way to implement policy' (1980: 206). 
Routinised, regulatory policies may demand programmed implementation while 
distributive policies demand greater flexibility, 'and yet flexibility increases the 
possibility of slippage by giving national governments greater opportunities to subvert 
EC aims’ (Rhodes 1986: 55). In order to adopt adaptive implementation strategies, the 
European Commission would need to overcome the fear of substantial slippage in policy 
goals, and consequently the following would be required:
(i) an improved monitoring system (possibly with the use of inspecting task forces 
whose remit extends beyond audit to the 'merits' of particular projects);
(ii) the development of incentive systems (for example, the allocation of a greater 
proportion of funds to the pool sections of Funds, thereby enabling the 
Commission to ’reward’ governments for selecting projects congruent with EC 
goals);
(iii) ensuring that the switch to 'programmes’ from 'project' approvals as the basis for 
fund distribution occurs in fact as well as in regulations, thereby enabling the 
Commission to select projects congruent with EC aims (Rhodes 1986: 55).
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Rhodes' analysis, based on Berman's distinction between programmed and 
adaptive strategies, provides a particularly useful early account of policy implementation 
in the EC involving sub-state actors. The study might have emphasised, however, that a 
given policy may evolve over time from a routinised, hierarchically organised policy to 
involve both a higher degree of controversy and a widening of participatory 
arrangements. The following chapter of this study' suggests that just such an evolution 
can be identified in the case of the ERDF. It is also suggested in the following chapter 
that Rhodes' prescriptions for improved monitoring systems, developed incentives and a 
switch to programmes have all been realised ifi the context of the ERDF. However, 
'slippage from initial objectives’ continues to occur.
Following the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting, it can 
be argued that partial realisation of EC policy goals may be all that can'Be realistically 
expected: the perfectly-fashioned, rationally-constructed regional development
programme that allows easy implementation does not exist. Multi-annual development 
contracts must allow for a degree of uncertainty and responsiveness to local conditions. 
In other words, programmed strategies must also be adaptive and vice-versa. While a 
programmed strategy without the possibility of subsequent adaptation would not 
guarantee the compliance or motivation of local actors, an adaptive strategy without prior 
programming would run the risk of unco-ordinated chaos. The European Commission 
may seek to programme a strategy in order to enhance its control over policy 
implementation, but its need for access to information on local conditions necessitates 
flexibility. Subsequent chapters examine the dependence of the European Commission 
on external actors for the provision of such resources and the extent to which uncertainty 
and the need to allow a degree of flexibility shape the structures through which the ERDF 
is delivered. Crucially, however, the analysis provided below also considers the 
development of ’special purpose institutions' and the extent to which the frequency and 
duration of the relationship between the European Commission and external actors 
allows a sense of trust to evolve. Early studies of the implementation of ERDF actions 
neglected such dimensions of the implementation relationship. This is understandable, 
however, given the limited role played by both the European Commission and sub­
national actors in the implementation of ERDF actions between 1975 and 1988, which, 
as this chapter has shown, was largely dominated by member state central governments.
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3.5 Reprise and Summary
This chapter has provided a comprehensive account of the evolution of the ERDF 
in the period up to 1988 in order to expose the logic of EC regional policy. In doing so, it 
has detailed the historical development of the Fund, focusing on attempts by the 
European Commission to increase its role in the financing of ERDF actions. It has been 
suggested that the key to understanding the evolution of the ERDF lies in recognising the 
fact that its real objectives have always been highly contested. While member state 
governments viewed the Fund primarily as a budgetary redistribution mechanism, the 
European Commission (DG XVI) sought to re-shape the operation of the ERDF 
throughout the late 1970s and early 1980s in order to address the objectives of regional 
economic development. The reluctance of member states to loosen their grip on the 
operation of the Fund in these early years led Mény to conclude that EC regional policy 
constituted a policy process 'nationalised in the extreme’ (1982:377).
It has been shown in this chapter that the ERDF experienced a difficult birth and 
that it was initially expected to fulfil a compensatory function with respect to member 
state contributions to the Community budget. A protracted and difficult debate between 
the demandeurs (the UK, Ireland and Italy) and the chief paymaster (Germany) in the 
early 1970s ultimately resulted in the creation of a weak device for financial 
redistribution in 1975 (Wallace 1977: 144). The underlying logic of the ERDF was made 
extremely clear by the German Chancellor Schmidt, who said of the new fund at the 
outset that, although it was ’clothed in a pair of bathing trunks with ’’regional policy" 
painted on them', it was still merely a mechanism for redistributing finance between 
member states (quoted in Bulmer & Paterson 1987: 202). The main contention of the 
analysis presented above is that this initial political compromise conditioned the 
evolution of the ERDF as a policy instrument, limiting the extent to which the European 
Commission was able to fine-tune the instrument to promote regional economic 
development objectives.
Nevertheless, as March and Olsen remind us, 'programs adopted as a simple 
political compromise ... become endowed with separate meaning and force by having an 
agency established to deal with them' (1989: 18). DG XVI consistently and doggedly 
sought to promote the four principles of concentration of resources, programming, 
partnership, and additionality in order to move away from arguments of juste retour and 
focus the ERDF on its stated development function. Although progress on these 
principles up to 1988 was piecemeal, a gradual shift was identified away from the purely 
compensatory function of the ERDF of the early years. The ERDF of the mid-1980s can
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best be summarised as a complex political instrument involving highly contested 
objectives and illustrating characteristics of the 'garbage can' scenario identified by 
Cohen, March and Olsen (1972; 1976).
This evolution of the ERDF was considered against the backdrop of contemporary 
theorising on EC policy-making. The neofunctionalist and intergovemmentalist 
approaches, which may simply be conceptualised as opposite ends of a range of possible 
contracting arrangements between the member states according to the neo-institutionalist 
analysis presented in chapter 2, were set out briefly in Section 3.2. Following the 
disillusionment of the early years, when it became apparent that regional actors remained 
marginal even in the regional policy field, it was widely argued that 
intergovemmentalism was the dominant policy-making style in this policy field. Very 
little theoretical significance was assigned to supranational or regionafbodies in the 
European regional policy process. By contrast, the member states' central governments 
were deemed practically omnipotent through intergovernmental mechanisms in this field 
Those few studies which examined the ERDF specifically from an implementation 
perspective (Coates & Wallace 1984; Preston 1984; Rhodes 1986) similarly concluded 
that the execution of ERDF actions left little room for discretion for European 
Commission or sub-national actors.
The early legal provisions of the ERDF Regulation did not enable the European 
Commission to engage directly in a process of territorial political exchange with sub­
national actors. The role of local and regional actors in the formulation and 
implementation of ERDF actions was minimal. Grants were distributed on an individual 
project-by-project basis, with the UK central government simply substituting EC 
expenditure for domestic expenditure, so that there was some confusion in the early years 
of the Fund as to whether project sponsors should even be informed that their projects 
had been submitted for support (Coates & Wallace 1984: 174). Those governance 
structures which were established to facilitate the disbursement of funds (most obviously 
the Fund Management Committee and the Regional Policy Committee which both met in 
Brussels) were dominated by member state governments. According to one development 
agency in the UK receiving ERDF assistance at that time, 'under the present arrangement 
it is the Government that decides which projects should be forwarded to Brussels, that 
sits with other Governments on the committees which decide the projects that will be 
accepted, and is responsible for implementing the assisted projects' (House of Lords 
1977: 92). Hence, the increased involvement of sub-national actors analysed in 
subsequent chapters is a radical departure from early practice.
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Examination of the less formal aspects of the implementation of ERDF actions 
similarly confirms the dependence of the European Commission on central government 
in the UK in this period. DG XVTs small size (as explained above, a mere seven 'A' grade 
officials were processing 5,000 project applications annually by the mid-1980s) and the 
low political salience of the Fund at that time meant that the European Commission was 
starved of resources in the process of territorial political exchange in which it engaged 
with central government actors. Although the Commission was hungry for local 
information and expertise, and was therefore anxious to extend participation in the 
exchange relationship to sub-national actors for téchnocratic reasons, central government 
was relatively successful in performing its role as gatekeeper (Hoffmann 1966). While 
the UK central government undoubtedly sought to secure a share of ERDF resources, this 
share was guaranteed by a quota system. Moreover, the Department of Industry submitted 
no more projects than required in order to draw down the UK's quota, thereby 
constraining the Commission's ability to express any preference between projects. This 
lent weight to the accusation that the Fund was not taken seriously in regional 
development terms and was simply a cosmetic screen behind which the main objective of 
budgetary compensation was pursued.
Two technical aspects of the Fund's operation, an understanding of which is 
essential for the case study of Western Scotland, were also explained in this chapter. The 
first is the introduction in the early 1980s of'software measures’. While the ERDF had 
concentrated on infrastructure projects in its first few years, from the early 1980s the 
European Commission sought to promote a shift in the 'periphery' of regional 
development policy. In most member states of the EC at that time, domestic 
responsibility for regional policy was decentralised to regional and local actors, and the 
instruments of regional development policy shifted from the centrally-driven provision of 
infrastructure ('development hardware') to locally-driven attempts to improve regional 
innovation and competitiveness through a variety of supply-side measures ('development 
software'). The European Commission itself was at the forefront in promoting this shift in 
the policy periphery, in particular through so-called Article 15 measures under the 1984 
ERDF Regulation. In the UK, however, the shift in policy from ’hardware' to 'software' 
provision was resisted by central government in the context of the ERDF as it reduced its 
capacity to treat the Fund simply as a compensatory mechanism. The reason for this lies 
in the fact that when software measures are undertaken by local authorities, they are 
generally financed out of revenue accounts and are therefore more difficult for central 
government to control directly in the short term. This brings us to the second technical 
aspect of the ERDFs operation explained above, the complexities of additionality.
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It is difficult to exaggerate the importance of additionality (the principle that 
ERDF resources should be additional to, and not a substitute for, domestic resources in 
target regions) in the operation of the Fund in the UK. The UK's disregard for this 
principle in the early years of the Fund, alongside other member state central 
governments, was emphasised above. Chapter 4 shows how the tension between the 
European Commission and the UK central government over this issue has developed in 
recent years, while the case study emphasises the importance of non-additionality in 
shaping the ultimate form of the regional development contract in Western Scotland. The 
UK government’s system of global additionalitywhereby central ministries claimed to 
anticipate expected ERDF receipts and incorporate these in public spending totals that 
were thus higher than they would otherwise have been, was also explained. In addition, it 
was shown that ERDF grants in receipt of infrastructure projects were passed on to local 
actors, but that the actors could not spend the resources as pre-set capital spending 
ceilings were not raised accordingly. The only benefit to local actors was therefore a 
short term saving on interest repayments. By contrast, ERDF grants in receipt of industry 
projects were not passed on to the project sponsors. Software measures, which would 
have been financed out of the revenue accounts of local actors, were simply vetoed by 
central government. One senior official in Western Scotland at that time therefore 
concluded that the lack of additionality takes the fun away' from the ERDF, reducing the 
process to an expensive job creation programme for paper shufflers; it is apparently seen 
by the Treasury as this; a very cumbersome way of re-possessing money paid to the EC' 
(Chorley 1986: 33).
Central government officials in the early 1980s similarly expressed the opinion 
that the ERDF was a very cumbersome means by which to organise budgetary 
compensation. In terms of the analysis presented in chapter 2, the transaction costs of 
early governance structures were particularly high given the 'real' objective of the ERDF. 
In examining a senior civil servant in the Department of Industry, the House of Lords 
Select Committee on the European Communities suggested that the Fund was little more 
than a Tx>ok-keeping exercise' with little impact on regional economic development, and 
that 'straight cash transfers to national governments' would be a simpler method of 
achieving the same objective. To conclude this chapter, the response of the civil servant 
is quoted below in full as it captures perfectly the raison d ’être of the ERDF and the 
symbolic function it served for the member state governments and the European 
Commission at that time:
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I am bound to say, my Lord Chairman, that such an approach would be 
simpler. It would reduce the whole exercise, if one may so put it, to a 
single exchange of cheques between Member States within the 
Community; but I frankly do not think that such an arrangement, whatever 
its administrative simplicity, would really commend itself either to our 
partners in the Community or to the Community itself since it would not 
really give a Community policy or a Community image to the whole of the 
operations of the Fund. I think this is important in the sense that the 
Community wishes itself to be seen as having a policy and exerting 
influence which goes beyond that of a mere taker in or disburser of funds 
to remedy disparities, or help remedy disparities, between the levels of 
prosperity in Member States (House ofLords 1981: 13-14).
The transaction costs of organising and distributing the ERDF were indeed high, and 
consequently the suggestion that a simple issuing of cheques to national governments 
would be more efficient was regularly raised by UK ministers and central government 
officials throughout the 1980s. Since the late 1980s, however, implementation 
arrangements for the ERDF have evolved considerably. The post-1988 procedure bears a 
striking resemblance to the contracting proposal made by the European Commission in 
1981 and rejected at that time as an unfeasible, rigid and expensive approach. It is to the 
evolution of the ERDF since the reform of the Structural Fund Regulations in 1988 that 
this study now turns.
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Chapter 4. The ERDF Since 1988: Policy Evolution and New 
Theoretical Contributions
This chapter analyses the fundamental revision of the European Regional 
Development Fund in 1988, against the background of new theoretical contributions in 
this field. The primary aim of the chapter is to examine the extent to which the 1988 
reforms at last provided the European Commission with the tools, at least according to 
the terms of the Regulations, to fashion regional economic development contracts with 
actors in the Community's disadvantaged regions. As such, this chapter complements 
chapter 3. The previous chapter has shown how the principles o^concentration, 
programming, partnership and additionality guided DG XVI's attempts to re-direct the 
ERDF from a purely compensatory function to a development function since the 
establishment of the Fund. In 1988, during a period of optimism and expanding 
competencies for the European Commission, these principles were made explicit and 
given a firm footing in the revised Regulations. The analytical overview of the 1988 
changes provided by this chapter continues to focus on the European level, before 
subsequent chapters examine in greater depth the implications of these changes for the 
implementation of ERDF programmes at the regional level. An appreciation of the 
enhanced role of the European Commission, in terms of the Regulations, is indispensable 
for the analysis presented of the Commission's ability to shape the implementation of 
ERDF programmes in Western Scotland.
In 1988, alongside the European Social Fund and the Guidance Section of the 
EAGGF, the ERDF underwent the most radical overhaul of its operation since the 
establishment of the Fund in 1975. The indisputable fact that the 1988 Regulations 
allowed the European Commission greater discretion than had previously been the case 
over the deployment of vastly increased Structural Fund resources, has led to a profusion 
of academic studies of the Structural Funds in recent years, as shown in Section 4.4 
below. Many studies focus on the impact of changes in the Structural Funds policy 
process upon the 'territorial restructuring' of member states.1 Such studies generally 
examine the implications of Structural Fund changes for the process of régionalisation 
within Community member states (often irrespective of the fact that such policy is only 
one of a number of potential influences on territorial restructuring'). Leonardi's study,
1 BaJme and Jouve (1993), Gentle (1993), Ioakimidis (1993), Jacinto (1993) and Laffan (1993a) adopt such 
a perspective.
4.1 Introduction
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focusing on changes in the structure of sub-national governments in Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal and Spain as a result of the Structural Fund reforms (1992), is typical in 
that it views the Structural Fund reforms from a regional perspective, questioning the 
extent to which regional actors are now able to participate in this policy field and the 
implications such participation carries for the territorial distribution of power within the 
member states. There is no corresponding focus in the literature on the implications of 
the changes for the Commission's ability to shape Structural Fund programmes.
As suggested in the introductory chapter of this thesis, only the studies by Deeken 
(1994) and Hooghe (1993) approach the question of the Structural Funds reform 
explicitly from a European Commission perspective. However, neither of these studies 
questions the extent to which the Commission itself is able to guide the new 
implementation arrangements and achieve its own regional economic objectives through 
the implementation structures which have been set up. As suggested in the introduction, 
this research therefore swims against the tide of current research on the Structural Funds 
by explicitly adopting the perspective of the European Commission. The following 
analysis of the 1988 reforms focuses on the extent to which the new Regulations finally 
provided the Commission with the tools necessary to operate a Community regional 
policy meeting the Funds’ stated objectives. Chapters 5,6  and 7 then look at the extent to 
which these tools effectively allowed the Commission to shape the day-to-day 
implementation of ERDF programmes at the regional level.
The research which comes closest to examining the extent to which the European 
Commission is able to shape the post-1988 developments to achieve its own objectives in 
the UK is JhaLby Gary Marks (1992; 1993). Marks' conceptualisation of the practice of 
structural policy as the leading edge of a system of'multilevel governance' is increasingly 
referred to in the wider literature on European public policy (see From & Stava 1993; 
Fuchs 1994). Much of the emphasis of Mark's research is reiterated herein. Firstly, he 
stresses that the practice of structural policy is distinct from the dynamics of budgetary 
exptnsioojmd-should be examined as such (1993: 399). Secondly, he points out that the 
1988 reforms were justified in terms of 'administrative efficiency and economic 
rationality, and to enforce the principle of additionality', and were therefore informed 
more by technocratic concerns than by conscious constitutional design (1992: 211). 
Thirdly, thejrinciples of programming, partnership, additionality (and concentration) on 
which the 1988 reforms were based provide tbs Commission with~a potentially 'wide 
latitude in formulating and.Jmplemcnting policy' (1993: 395). Fourthly, the reforms 
'extend the EÇ!s-administrative reach into the regions and into individual programs in the 
regions' (1992: 212). This study shares Marks' observations on all four points. It is
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suggested that Marks' research is a particularly useful contribution to the study of EC 
structural policy. However, his wider conclusions regarding the role of the European 
Commission in ERDF programme implementation in the UK are disputed herein.
It is suggested in Section 4.4 of this chapter that Marks' conceptualisation of 
structural policy implementation in the UK over-estimates the capacity of the European 
Commission to shape the implementation of ERDF programmes. The primary weakness 
in Marks' research is that he does not present a significant amount of detailed data on any 
given region to illustrate his general claim that 'when one lifts the lid on the practice of 
structural policy, it is clear that the Commission Tias played a vital role in designing the 
institutional framework. Within that framework, the Commission is the key actor in the 
process of policy making and implementation' (1993: 399). This gap testifies to the fact 
that it is extremely difficult to access data on programme implementatiorïTor any region 
in the UK. The data Marks does present on 'subnational government and transnational 
networks' does not provide the analysis of the 'practice' of structural policy that he 
himself calls for. Instead, the main evidence Marks provides for the conceptualisation of 
structural policy as multilevel governance (except the general analysis of the reforms in 
the Regulations at the European level) is the apparent back-down by the UK central 
government after a confrontation with the European Commission where funds earmarked 
for the UK under the RECHAR Community Initiative were frozen for 18 months in a 
dispute over additionality. It is suggested in Section 4.4 below that the weight of the 
wider conclusions Marks draws from the implementation of Structural Fund programmes 
in the UK cannot be bome by the evidence he presents. The chapter therefore presents 
two sets of evidence showing how Marks' account generally over-estimates the role of the 
European Commission: firstly, on the 1993 're-reform' of the Regulations, when many of 
the tasks granted to the Commission in 1988 were 're-nationalised'; and secondly, on the 
way in which the apparent back-down by the UK government over RECHAR was never 
fully implemented.
The aims of this chapter are threefold. The first aim is to present a detailed 
analysis of the 1988 Structural Fund reforms. This analysis considers the extent to which 
the key principles of concentration, programming, partnership and additionality were 
strengthened in 1988. Secondly, the reforms are placed against the background of the 
changing nature of theorising about European Community policy-making, and the 
development of more rigorous approaches than those of the early neofunctionalist and 
intergovemmentalist approaches presented in chapter 3. Finally, this chapter challenges 
Marks' conceptualisation of the Structural Funds implementation process in the UK as 
premature, since it overstates the role of the European Commission. More generally, the
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chapter seeks to show that the aims the European Commission sought to achieve through 
the Structural Fund reforms were principally technocratic, and geared towards their 
interpretation of effective regional planning. Following from this, it is suggested that the 
strengthening of programming has been a central means by which DG XVI sought to 
pursue the development function of the Fund, and that partnership was a necessary 
innovation to provide DG XVI with policy relevant information. The 1988 Regulations 
thus established a complex process of territorial political exchange involving sub- 
national actors in the field of EC regional policy.
The remainder of chapter 4 is organised in five sections. Section 4.2 provides a 
short background to the 1988 reforms which emphasises the fact that the European 
Commission sought to finally direct the ERDF to its stated economic development 
objectives. Section 43 analyses the extent to which this was realised by Reusing on the 
detailed provisions for the principles of concentration, programming, partnership and 
additionality. The significance of the Community Initiatives is also addressed in this 
section. Section 4.4 then places the 1988 reforms in the context of recent theoretical 
contributions and presents in greater depth Marks' approach of 'multilevel governance'. 
This section also considers some of the provisions of the 1993 'reform of the reformed 
Regulations' to illustrate the extent to which member state governments were able to 
'claw back' several of the tasks that had been allocated to the European Commission in 
1988. In a similar vein, Section 4.5 examines the conflict between the UK government 
and the European Commission over additionality in the context of the RECHAR dispute 
This dispute provides a central source of evidence for the 'multilevel governance' 
approach, by showing how the European Commission apparently forced a back-down by 
the UK government over the issue of additionality. However, as is demonstrated in 
section 4.5, even in the case of the RECHAR dispute the ability of the member state 
government to renege on prior commitments should not be under-estimated. Section 4.6 
draws general conclusions from this analysis before turning to the systematic analysis of 
the day-to-day implementation of ERDF programmes in the region of Western Scotland. 
It is to the background of the 1988 reforms that this chapter now turns.
4.2 The Background to the 1988 Reforms
A senior official in the European Commission recently confirmed what many 
academic analysts had long argued: that, until the Single European Act (SEA) and the 
commitment to 'cohesion' in the Treaties governing the European Community, the role of
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the European Commission in regional development policy was primarily cosmetic.2 In 
reality the ERDF was used to support national regional policies and hence to address 
regional disparities within member states, rather than to reduce Community-wide 
regional disparities. This gave a de facto control over, the ERDF to the member states, 
reducing the European Commission’s role to the symbolic one of 'selling itself at a local 
level. Even if the ERDF did not allow an autonomous role in regional development 
policy for the European Commission, it allowed the latter to increase its visibility at the 
local level in Europe through European flags and poster publicity at the site of nominally 
assisted projects. According to the same official, this 'flag syndrome' assumed lesser 
importance following the Structural Fund reforms in 1988 when new arrangements were 
introduced which allowed the European Commission to pass from a mere disburser of 
funds to a 'partner' with national, regional and local actors in pursuit of thncommon goal 
of regional economic development. In terms of the analysis presented in chapter 3, the 
reforms of 1988 represent the point at which the balance of importance between the 
potential development and compensatory functions of the ERDF swung further to the 
former than at any other time in the history of the Fund. This section sketches the 
background to the approval of these new arrangements before the following section 
analyses their specific form.
The timing of the radical overhaul of the Structural Funds as a whole (ERDF, ESF 
and EAGGF Guidance Section), coming in 1988 on the heels of both the Single Market 
programme and Community enlargement to include Spain and Portugal, is instructive. As 
the European Commission itself has acknowledged, the timing of the reform of the Funds 
was not simply 'fortuitous' (European Commission 1989: 9). The 'relaunch' of the EC 
during Jacques Delors' first presidency of the European Commission is a well recognised 
phenomenon (Keohane & Hoffmann 1991b; Ross 1995). Also in the mid-1980s, a semi­
official report entitled Efficiency, Stability and Equity was produced by a group chaired 
by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, previously a senior Commission official, at the behest of 
the European Commission. The group had been asked to investigate the economic 
consequences of the decision taken in 1985 to enlarge the Community to include Spain 
and Portugal and to create a market without internal frontiers by the year 1992' (Cutler, 
Haslam, Williams & Williams 1989: 77). Their report concluded that simple faith in the
2 Dr Achilleas Mitsos, a Director in the European Commission (formerly with the Directorate-General for 
the Co-ordination of Structural Policies) made these points in a seminar presentation at the European 
University Institute in Florence on 8 March 1994. The ideas and opinions expressed in the presentation 
(which reflected personal views rather than the official Commission position) were summarised in an 
unpublished paper by Dr Mitsos entitled The Community's Redistributive and Development Role in the 
post-Maastricht Era'.
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mechanisms of market liberalisation would not be enough to guarantee the realisation of 
economic growth smoothly throughout the Community's territory:
There are serious risks of aggravated regional imbalance in the course 
of market liberalisation. This is because different economic processes 
will be at work as markets integrate, some tending towards 
convergence, others towards divergence. Neither dogmatic optimism 
nor fatalistic pessimism is warranted in these respects. Opportunities 
for convergence will be increased, but adequate accompanying 
measures are required to speed adjustment in the structurally weak 
regions and countries, and counter tendencies towards divergence 
(Padoa-Schioppa 1987:4).
The Commission, in retrospect, accounted for the 1988 reform oFthe Structural 
Funds by pointing out that the accession of Spain and Portugal in 1986 had widened the 
gap between the Community's richest and poorest regions to a level that was unacceptably 
large in preparing for the Single Market (European Commission 1992a: 7). The implied 
direct chain between realisation of an 'unacceptably large' gap in regional economic 
performance and the Structural Fund reforms somewhat obscures the political bargaining 
carried out in 1987 and 1988. McCrone's observation that disparities usually exist long 
before their recognition as a political problem (1969: 13), cited in earlier chapters of this 
study, is again highly instructive. In reality, significant splits emerged over the distributive 
implications of what had been agreed under the Single European Act. The testimony of a 
senior Commission official that, 'without the Structural Funds five members would have 
had severe doubts about signing up for the Single European Act' is particularly relevant 
(Audit Commission 1991a: 12).3 At the Brussels European Council meeting on 11-13 
February 1988 it was therefore agreed to double the Structural Funds budget in real terms 
from ECU 7 billion in 1987 to ECU 14 billion in 1993. By 1992 Community structural 
spending would therefore reach 27% of the Community budget compared with 47% in 
1987. This increase in the overall Structural Fund budget amounted to ECU 60.3 billion
(in 1989 prices) for the 1989-199Tperiodr---------
As Marks suggests, however, 'determining the size of the budget does not 
determine the manner in which it is spent' (1993: 395). At the time of the SEA itself, the 
need to increase the effectiveness of the Structural Funds had been recognised at the 
same time as the need to increase the amount devoted to such expenditure with the
3 See Marks (1992), Hooghe and Keating (1994) and McAleavey (1994) for analyses of why the 
expenditure allocated to the Structural Funds has increased so greatly in recent years.
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explicit reference in Article 130A of the Act to the promotion of 'overall harmonious 
development' and the strengthening of'economic and social cohesion'. Article llQELof 
the Single European Act therefore required amendments to the three Structural Funds 
through a framework regulation in order to 'co-ordinate their activities between 
themselves and with the operations of the existing financiallnstruments . It was in this 
context that the Commission was invited to present to the Council comprehensive 
proposals for the reform of the Structural Funds.
The European Commission presented to the member states in 1987 a set of 
ambitious proposals for the reform of the Structural Funds.4 As Hooghe and Keating have 
suggested, the European Commission was 'in a strong position to define the cohesion 
problem and lay down the rules for a cohesion policy', given its power of putting 
proposals before the Council of Ministers (1994: 374). Moreover, 'cohesioTT was a rather 
ill-defined term and allowed a number of interpretations. The Commission itself later 
argued that, although the principle of solidarity between member states had been implicit 
in the EEC Treaty, the Single Act provided explicit recognition of this and therefore gave 
a political imperative for comprehensive reform of the Funds (European Commission 
1989: 10). While the European Commission's earlier proposals for refonn of the Funds 
(in particular the 1983 proposals for reform of the ERDF Regulation examined in chapter 
3) had met strong opposition, the 1988 proposals were more openly accepted by many 
members states. Hooghe and Keating attribute this 'favourable constellation of conditions' 
to strong leadership from the European Commission, demands from peripheral member 
states, the willingness of potential donors to accept the Funds as 'the price to be paid' for 
the Single Market programme, the emphasis on a social counterbalance to the free 
market promoted by the Delors Commission, and the need to mobilise support for the 
Single Market in disadvantaged as well as prosperous regions (1994). The specific form 
of the Regulations emerging from this particular constellation of conditions should now 
be considered.
43  The 1988 Structural Fund Reforms
The Brussels European Council of 11-13 February 1988, as well as agreeing to a 
doubling of overall Structural Fund resources, endorsed the general principles outlined in 
the 1987 Commission draft Regulation. The Structural Fund reforms were subsequently
4 Draft Regulation on the Tasks o f the Structural Funds and their Effectiveness and on Co-ordination o f 
Operations between them and with Operations under the E1B and other Financial Instruments, Com(87) 
376/2/final
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flesbed-out^dunng 1988 through three main Regulations which came into effect on 1 
,^ anuaryJ989,)known as the Tramework', Horizontal’ and Implementing' Regulations. 
These changes should be explained in terms of the key principles promoted by the 
European Commission.
As highlighted at the start of this chapter, the four basic principles were clearly 
enshrined in the reforms. Although these were the underlying principles promoted by the 
European Commission throughout the evolution of the ERDF, they were strengthened 
under the 1988 reforms and explicitly set out in a variety of Community documents. The 
importance attached by the European Commission to the four principles can be gauged 
from the fact that the four 'annual reports' on the implementation of the reform of the 
Structural Funds prepared since 1991 each devote significant space to evaluating the 
basic principles of the reform.5 Of course the other principles referred to iTTthe preceding 
analysis (co-ordination of instruments and monitoring/assessment) were also important 
elements of the 1988 reform and will be considered in the case study which follows. 
Nevertheless, the four main principles of concentration, programming, partnership and 
additionality remain at the centre of analysis and each should be considered in turn 
Before analysing advances on the principle of concentration, it should be noted that much 
of the information which follows is drawn from the European Commission's own Guide 
to the Reform o f the Community's Structural Funds (1989), widely known simply as the 
Vade-Mecum.
4.3.1 Concentration
The principle of concentration suggests that the allocation of the StructuraJFunds 
and loan instruments of the European Conraiumty shottld be concentrated in favour, of 
the most disadvantaged regions, focusing the development effort in those priority regions 
experiencing the greatest difficulties. The obvious logic here is that as much economic 
development as possible should be generated in those regions in which it is most needed. 
Concentration therefore took the form of the elaboration of five priority 'Objectives' set 
out in the reformed Regulations as follows: economic adjustment in less-developed 
regions; conversion of regions suffering industrial decline; amelioration of long-term 
unemployment; integration of young people into the labour market; and development in 
rural areas. Figure 4.1 summarises these Objectives. In essence, the Objectives
5 Article 16 of the Horizontal Regulation required an annual report on the implementation of the reform. At 
the time of writing there have been four such annual reports (European Commission 1990, 1992d; 1993e; 
1994b).
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constituted 'explicit priorities for the overall distribution of the structural budget' (Marks 
1992: 206). The ERDF addressed three of the Objectives (1, 2 and 5b), but not in 
isolation as ESF and EAGGF resources were also utilised. It should also be noted that up 
to 80% of ERDF resources were to be devoted to the most seriously disadvantaged 
(Objective 1) regions. The Objectives were therefore designed to facilitate a 
concentration of financial instruments which had, with the exception of Integrated 
Development Operations and Integrated Mediterranean Programmes, operated separately 
until that time.
Figure 4.1': The Priority Objectives of the 1988 Structural Fund Reforms
Objective 1 Promoting the development and adjustment
of the regions whose development is lagging 
behind (i.e. where per capita GDP is less 
than, or close to, 75% of the EC average).
Objective 2 Converting the regions, frontier regions or
parts of regions (including employment 
areas
and urban communities) seriously affected 
by
industrial decline.
Objective 3 Combating long-term unemployment
(i.e. assisting those above the age of 25, 
unemployed for more than 12 months).
Objective 4 Facilitating the occupational integration of
young people (i.e. job-seekers below the age 
of 25).
And with a view to the reform o f the 
Common Agricultural Policy:
Objective 5a Adapting production, processing and
marketing structures in agriculture and 
forestry.
Objective 5b Promoting the development of rural areas.
EC Instruments Employed
ERDF, ESF, EAGGF, 
EIB loans & ECSC loans.
ERDF, ESF, 
EIB loans & ECSC loans.
ESF, EIB loans & 
ECSC loans.
ESF, EIB loans & 
ECSC loans.
EAGGF.
EAGGF, ERDF, ESF & 
EIB loans.
Source: European Commission ( 1989) Guide to the Reform o f the Community's Structural Funds 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities)
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The spatial area covered by regions under each Objective was determined 
according to the NUTS statistical framework (Nomenclature des Unités Territoriales 
Statistiques). The NUTS system hijltinrii rffMiihril by Eurostat (the Statistical Office 
of the European Communities) in co-operation with other units in the European 
Commission in order 'to provide a single, uniform breakdown of territorial units for the 
production of Community regional statistics' (Eurostat 1989: 3). In effect, the system 
represents an effort to impose a technocratic definition of regions for the purposes of 
collecting data. The system employs a three level hierarchical classification: the 
nomenclature subdivides each member state into a number of level I regions, each of 
which are then subdivided into a number of level II regions, which are in turn subdivided 
into a series of level m regions. The aim is to allow a comparison of regional economies 
across the Community in terms of their economic performance. The NUTSTiomenclature 
therefore divides the entire Community territory into 66 regions at level 1, 176 at level II 
and 829 at level HI. The key to understanding the NUTS system is that, for practical 
reasons relating to data availability and the implementation of regional policy, the 
nomenclature must be based on the institutional (i.e. administrative) divisions in use by 
the member states for their own purposes of data collection at a sub-state level.6 Eurostat 
does not have the immense resources that would be required to re-constitute a database 
of regional economic information drawn up along new territorial lines. It should be noted 
that the unavoidable but convenient reliance on national territorial divisions results in 
some anomalies, so that each NUTS level contains regions which differ greatly, as 
Eurostat itself explains, in terms of 'area, population, economic weight or administrative 
powers' (1989:4).
These regions provide the basis for the eligibility criteria for the priority 
Objectives of the Structural Funds in receipt of ERDF resources. Objectives 1 regions are 
defined as NUTS level II regions whose 'per capita GDP measured in terms of purchasing 
power parity is less than 75% of the Community average, and other regions whose per 
capita GDP is close to that of regions under 75% and whose inclusion is justified by 
special circumstances'. Eligibility for Objective 1 status was decided in the Council and 
eligible regions were actually listed in the Framework Regulation. An indicative 
allocation of the breakdown of ERDF assistance under Objective 1 was therefore made 
among seven of the twelve member states as follows: 16.2% to the whole of Greece;
6 At the sub-state level in the UK, the eleven NUTS Level I regions correspond to the domestic Standard 
Planning Regions. These are disaggregated into 35 NUTS Level II regions, which are actually clusters of 
local authority counties (local authority 'regional councils' in Scotland) grouped solely for Community 
statistical purposes. Individual authorities themselves constitute the 65 NUTS Level 111 regions.
155
5.4% to the whole of Ireland; 17.5% to the whole of Portugal; 32.6 % to large parts of 
Spain; 24.5% to southern Italy; 2.1% to France for the Overseas Departments and 
Corsica; and, 1.7% to the United Kingdom for Northern Ireland (European Commission 
1989: 18). The allocations to France and the United Kingdom were those covered by the 
'special circumstances' proviso in the eligibility criteria.7 Objective 1 regions and 
countries were given highest priority, reflected in the fact that by 1992 the assistance 
directed towards them would be doubled in real terms compared to the 1987 
commitments. The structurally underdeveloped regions were therefore set to receive 
more than ECU 9 billion of the ECU 14 billioif available by 1993, around 65% of the 
total Funds.
More relevant for this research are the eligibility criteria and the indicative 
breakdown of expenditure for Objective 2 regions. The region of Western Scotland 
which is the focus of chapters 5, 6 and 7 is eligible under Objective 2 of the Funds. The 
Framework Regulation did not list the eligible regions, as it did for the more politically 
sensitive issue of Objective 1 regions, but Article 9 set out instead two sets of designation 
criteria. As Wishlade (1993) has observed, the first set were essentially quantitative while 
the second set were more qualitative.
The areas referred to .... must represent or belong to a NUTS level III
territorial unit that satisfies all the following criteria:
(a) the average rate of unemployment recorded over the last three 
years must have been above the Community average;
(b) the percentage share of industrial employment in total must have 
equalled or exceeded the Community average in any reference year 
from 1975 onwards;
(c) there must have been an observable fall in industrial employment 
compared with the reference year chosen in accordance with point 
(b) (European Commission 1989:65).
These criteria were supplemented by three further eligibility criteria of a more flexible 
nature:
7 Corsica and Northern Ireland were two 'regions' which qualified for Objective 1 eligibility, despite the fact 
that GDP per head in each region was above the 75% threshold Both were included on the demand of 
France and the UK at the February ] 988 Brussels European Council, for political reasons. In the case of 
Northern Ireland, the only Objective 1 region in the UK at that time, it would have been highly sensitive to 
designate the whole of the Republic of Ireland Objective 1 while incorporating the northern Irish economy 
under another Objective The island of Ireland would therefore have been divided into different Objective 
regions, with varying grant rates on either side of the border.
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adjacent areas satisfying (a) to (c) above; 
j  urban communities with an unemployment rate at least 50 percent 
/  above the Community average which have recorded a substantial 
/  fall in industrial employment;
other areas which have recorded substantial job losses over the 
past three years or are experiencing or are threatened with such 
losses in industrial sectors which are vital to their economic 
development, with a consequent worsening of unemployment in 
those areas (ibid.: 65).
The final point in particular was an attempt to allow for an element of uncertainty: the 
eligibility criteria should be flexible enough to allow resources to be allocated to those 
regions expected to experience concentrated job loss in specific industrial sectors.
It was stipulated in the Regulations that the Commission woulthdraw up the 
initial draft list of eligible regions. These criteria therefore provided the basis for an 
initial Commission list which was then negotiated with the member states. The final list 
of 60 regions eligible under Objective 2 was announced in March 1989. As Wishlade has 
acknowledged, 'it is a measure of the controversy surrounding Objective 2 designation 
that coverage is some 16.7 percent of the total Community population', while 'the ceiling 
provided for in the Framework Regulation ... was set at 15 per cent of the population 
after the designation of Objective 1 areas' (1993: 6). Cheshire, Camagni, De Gaudemar 
and Cuadrado Roura (1991) have quoted the Commissioner for Regional Policy (Bruce 
Millan) saying of the designation of eligible regions at the time that the division of the 
criteria into two categories - a set of basic statistical criteria and a separate group of 
optional criteria which were less precisely defined - had made for a complex process of 
selection' (1991: 294). In fact, interview sources have revealed that the final selection of 
eligible Objective 2 areas was negotiated between the Commission and the member 
states on the basis of initial proposals of some 900 regiojis receiv^djjom the latter.8
As they were eligible in their entirety under Objective U Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal received no Objective 2 resources. Table 4.1 shows the indicative breakdown of 
Objective 2 resources announced in December 1989 for the remaining member states.
8 Official in Unit for Co-ordination of Evaluation, DG XVI; Brussels, 4 October 1993.
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Table 4.1: Allocation of ERDF Objective 2 Resources by Member State
Total Share (MECU) % Share
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Spain
France
Italy
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
United Kingdom
576
514
179
15
56.8
1,158.6
145
22.4
249.7
5%
0.8%
8.6%
19.7%
17.6%
6.1%
0.5%
1.9%
39.7%
Total 2,916.5 100%
Source European Commission (1990) Annual Report on the Implementation o f the Re form of the 
Structural Funds (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities)
The United Kingdom, with significant concentrations of regionally based 
industrial decline, was the major beneficiary under Objective 2, and was set to receive 
almost 40% of the ERDF resources set aside for this purpose. It should be noted, 
however, that this was not all new money, since the allocations included existing 
commitments for multi-annual programmes begun under the previous ERDF Regulation 
such as NPCIs or IDOs (Audit Commission 1991b: 7). The significance of this overlap is 
addressed in chapter 5, as Western Scotland was still covered by an Integrated 
Development Operation at the time the allocation to the new Objectives was determined.
The sixty regions which were ultimately assigned Objective 2 eligibility were an 
extremely diverse group in terms of their size and population, but shared the 
characteristic of sustained industrial unemployment. As such, the European Commission 
had succeeded to an extent in promoting the principle of concentration. For many years, 
the Commission had sought to enforce a distinction between regions of 'serious structural 
underdevelopment' and those suffering from 'current and serious problems of industrial 
decline' (Stuart Wabe 1986: 28). Nevertheless, concentration remained a highly sensitive 
principle for the member states, given the implications of concentrating resources in 
fewer regions (and hence fewer member states). The fact that the authority to take 
decisions on eligibility for Objective 1 status (up to 80% of the ERDF resources) was
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/>retained by the Council of Ministers testifies to this sensitivity. Wishlade has pointed out 
thaPtirea designation for Structural Fund purposes has attracted widespread negative 
comment', as the whole process has been criticized for being subject to a high degree of 
political influence from Member States seeking a juste retour and other parties wanting 
to maintain the status quo of Community regional policy support' (1994: 80). Even if an 
element of the 'carve-up' approach did remain, the advances made by the European 
Commission on the other key principles were more radical. Resource allocation between 
regions does not directly determine the way in which these resources are allocated -within 
regions. For the first time, three months after the Hst of eligible regions was made public, 
the member states had to submit full development plans.
4.3.2 Programming —
The 1988 Structural Fund reforms finally saw the replacement of the project-by- 
project system of financing by multi-annual programmes of expenditure of three or five 
years depending on the priority Objective. The principle of programming represents an 
attempt by the European Commission to impose a 'rational' system of development 
planning for the.allocaUon of lesources withinj’egions. The Vade-Mecum describes the 
shift to programming in the following terms:
The reform of the Structural Funds involves a switch from a project-based 
to a programme-based approach. This new approach should make it 
possible to give Community -actkm the necessary depth and width, while 
at the same time allowing greater flexibility. Community operations that 
are spread over a number of years, with joint action by the Funds, the EIB 
and the other financial instruments, will be better able to respond to 
changing economic and social realities. Programming should facilitate:
(i) some degree of decentralization of the management of Community 
assistance, itself encouraged by the partnership arrangements;
(ii) predictability of Community assistance, which will stimulate 
investment;
(iii) improved assessment of Community assistance;
(iv) better administration of applications for assistance.
Programming will also make it possible to take a coherent overall 
medium-term view of the operations to be mounted in pursuit of each 
priority objective and to establish a framework for the co-ordination of 
these operations (European Commission 1989:21).
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LafFan uses the distinction between 'categorical' federal grants and block grants in 
the United States to illustrate the significance of the shift from project financing to 
programming in the reform of the Structural Funds. Categorical grants, in other words 
financial 'allocations made for projects in a very precise manner', had earlier been 
replaced to a large extent by block grants in the United States 'because it was found that 
the fonner could not be adapted to local needs, were difficult to control and placed a 
heavy burden on the administrative system' (1989: 44). According to Laffan, the 
'categorical' nature of EC structural funding in the 1980s led to similar problems:
Structural fund legislation is extremely rigid in character. Ambiguities and 
inconsistencies are often apparent because EC law is the result of a 
process of bargaining and negotiations in the Council of Ministers. The 
interpretation of legal texts is a constant challenge for the Commission as 
it strives to make the funds sensitive to local needs. EC administrative 
arrangements encounter severe management problems - procedures are 
frequently cumbersome, time-consuming and intricate (ibid.: 44).
The programme approach adopted in_ 1989 renders EC Structural Fund grants 
more like block grants than categorical grants. The essence of programmes, according to 
an internal Commission working party, was that they should involve a 'series of 
consistent multi-annual measures' (ibid.: 45). In short, the Commission sought to institute 
a process .of contracting with individual regions, whereby all partnerscould agree on a set 
of development objectives, goals and targets for àie area instead of financing a series of 
unrelated individual projects. To this end, a three, stage planning procedure, widely 
known by the French term programmai ion was ultimately introduced in 1988.9 The first 
stage involved the submission of a Regional and Social Conversion Plan by the relevant 
national authorities. The European Commission then responded with the publication of a 
Community Support Framework (CSF). The third stage involved the implementation of 
Operational Programmes, turning the CSF into concrete measures in the eligible region. 
All stages should be carried out in partnership with all competent European, national, 
regional and local authorities. The nature of the documents prepared at each stage will be 
examined in greater detail in the case study which follows, but the stages themselves 
should be briefly described in turn at this point.
Stage one involved the preparation of multi-annual Regional and Social 
Conversion Plans by the member states, or by the competent national, regional or other
9 Dr Achilleas Mitsos (see Section 4.2 of this chapter) pointed out that although 'planning' was in many 
respects a forbidden word', the term programmation was generally interpreted simply to mean 'planning'.
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authorities designated by them. The plans covered the five year period from 1989 to the 
end of 1993 for Objective 1 and Objective 5b regions, but only three years (1989 to 1991) 
for Objective 2 regions which, if they retained eligibility at the end of this three year 
period, would then need to submit new plans to cover the two-year period 1991-1992. 
The logic behind this differentiation was that a review of eligibility for Objective 2 
regions would increase the flexibility of such support, and would allow funding to be 
directed to areas suffering unforeseen industrial decline.10 The plans submitted by the 
member states should contain the following information:
1. an economic and social analysis of the plan area, defining and describing the 
eligible region;
2. a description of the envisaged development strategy, the method and means of its 
implementation, and an indication of national and regional financing, and 
Community operations already under way;
3. the development priorities to be financed;
4. an estimate of the total funding required, broken down by structural instrument 
(Funds, EIB, other instruments) (European Commission 1989: 28).
Moreover, Article 2 of the Implementing Regulation called for information on the 
national, regional, local, or other authorities with responsibility for implementing the 
plan to be included in the plan submission. It is highly instructive at this point to refer 
back to Section 3.3.4 of the preceding chapter which outlined the Commission's 
requirements for programming as set out in the early 1980s (European Commission 
1981b). Although the Commission was not successful at that time in gaining widespread 
acceptance of the principle of programming, the similarity between the 1981 proposals 
and the 1989 Regulations demonstrate that persistence was ultimately rewarded. When 
the 'constellation of conditions’ (Hooghe & Keating 1994) was more favourable, the 
Commission used its power of proposal to push the principle of programming.
The requirement that these plans should be submitted only three months after the 
publication of the list of eligible areas obviously constrained the extent to which they 
could constitute exhaustive surveys of the regional development requirements of given 
regions. In other words, time constraints meant that they could not even approximate to
10 In practice, the Commission simply decided, after lobbying by the regions concerned, to extend the 
original list for the further two-year period (European Commission 1991a: 9). The Third Annual Report on 
the Implementation o f the Reform o f the Structural Funds explained that, 'on 30 April 1991 the Commission 
decided, in view of the inevitable delays in getting programmes started in 1989 and the need to ensure a 
certain continuity, to maintain the list of 60 eligible regions for two years' (European Commission 1993e:
38). The Objective 2 regions were nevertheless required to submit new development plans for the 1992- 
1993 period
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mplete contracts'. As the Commission itself also explained, the preparation of the 
plans was the responsibility of the member states (acting in partnership with regional 
actors according to the terms of the Regulations). By its own admission, 'the Commission 
played no part' in the preparation of the Regional and Social Conversion Plans (European
Stage two involved the determination of the priorities for action by the European 
Commission through Community Support Frameworks (CSFs), elaborated in close 
association with member states and with the competent national, regional, local or other 
authorities designated by them. In the words of the European Commission:
The CSFs are the Commission's response to the needs spelt out in the 
plans. They map out the broad lines of the measures to be taken jointly by 
the Member States and the Community and provide the reference 
framework for the applications for assistance submitted to the 
Commission by the Member States (1989: 30).
Each CSF was adopted by a formal Commission decision in agreement with the member 
state concerned and after consultation with the appropriate committee. Three advisory 
committees were to assist the European Commission in implementing the reform of the 
Structural Funds. Of most relevance here is the Advisory Committee on the Development 
and Conversion o f the Regions, composed of national civil servants, which replaced the 
Regional Policy Committee (while the old Fund Management Committee was scrapped). 
The new advisory committee's main task was to deliver opinions on matters referred to it 
by the European Commission: the drawing up and revision of the list of areas eligible in 
connection with Objective 2; the periodic report on the social and economic situation and 
development of the regions of the Community; the broad guidelines for regional policy; 
any matter relating generally to regional development at the Community level; as well as 
draft decisions concerning the CSFs drawn up for Objective 1 and Objective 2 regions.11
The language of contracting was particularly evident in the Commission's 
explanation of what a Community Support Framework actually represented:
11 The meetings of the Committee on the Development and Conversion of the Regions and the opinions 
delivered are listed in the annual reports on the ERDF drawn up in accordance with Article 25 of Regulation 
(EEC) No. 4253/88 (e.g. European Commission 199Id; 1993d). The other two committees are 'the 
Committee referred to in Article 124 of the EEC Treaty' which delivers opinions on draft Commission 
decisions relating to the guidelines for action in connection with the ESF, and the 'Committee on 
Agricultural Structures and Rural development' delivering opinions on draft Commission decisions relating 
to Objective 5a and 5b actions
Commission 1990: 25).
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It is the most tangible expression of partnership in that it represents a joint
decision and reciprocal commitment:
(i) a political commitment on the part of the Commission since its 
decision is a declaration of intent addressed to the Member State 
concerned and published in the Official Journal of the European 
Communities;
(ii) a commitment on the part of the Member States to abide by a 
consistent framework for all their individual applications for 
assistance (European Commission 1989:30).
Although CSFs were not explicitly labelled - 'contracts’ as such, the essence o f 
programming lies in the governance o f the exchange relationships implied by the 'joint 
decision and reciprocal commitment'. In particular, the CSF constitutes a contract 
whereby the European Commission exchanges the guarantee of multi-armual structural 
funding for the commitment by national authorities to allocate the resources within a 
framework, into the design of which the Commission has made some input.
The influence of French planning ideas in the development of the CSF approach 
was noted in Hooghe's explanation of the ultimate 'success' of the integrated CSF 
approach in terms of gaining acceptance within the European Commission in the late 
1980s (1993). De Rynck also recognises the French influence in the Commission's 
acceptance of regional contracts at that time (1994). The civil servant leading the UK 
negotiating team in Brussels on the new Regulations was openly hostile to the influence 
of French planning ideas when he rejected CSFs as a 'new layer of bureaucratic planning
which in our view would result in the Commission imposing its own preferences on 
Member States' planning priorities' (House of Lords 1988: 115). When it was put to him 
that he may have difficulty in winning that argument, he replied that this is a concept 
dear to the President of the Commission's heart but we will continue to do battle, having 
been in the vanguard of this fight. Virtually all Member States, even the French with their 
predilection for planning, are seeing the light' (ibid.: 115). Despite UK civil service 
hostility, the Commission proposals were accepted.
It is worth examining the form a Community Support Framework should 
take. Each CSF should include information under the following five headings:
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(i) a statement of the priorities for action in relation to:
(a) the principle of consistency with the economic and social
policies of the Member State and region concerned;
(b) the economic prospects of the region concerned;
(c) the expected knock-on effects and synergies;
(d) consistency with other Community policies (for example, 
the internal market, the environment, competition, 
research, agricultural policy etc.).
(ii) an outline of the forms of assistance;
(iii) an indicative financing plan specifying the financial allocation 
envisaged for the various forms of assistance and their duration, 
including those of the Funds, the EIB and the other financial 
instruments participating.
This plan, denominated in ECUs, should take into account 
expected available resources, the additionality requirement and the 
need tocombine grants and loans in the most effective manner 
possible, due regard being had in particular to the capacity of the 
investment to generate revenue.
(iv) information on the means available for any studies or technical 
assistance operations necessary' for the preparation, 
implementation or adaptation of the measures concerned;
(v) indication of the procedures for implementing the CSF, and 
especially monitoring and assessment procedures, together with 
any more general particulars relating to the organization of the 
partnership (European Commission 1989: 30-31).
The European Commission, for its part, was obliged to approve a CSELnoJater 
thaijjsix months, after receiving the regional development , plan, irrespective of whether 
the proposed duration of the latter was three or five years. An attempt was nevertheless 
made to build an element of flexibility into this planning process when it was 
acknowledged that 'any CSFjnay be revised in agreement with all the parties concerned 
(Commission and Member State and/or authority designated by the latter) to take account 
of results achieved and the conditions under which it is being implemented' (ibid.: 31). 
The process of preparing such contracts in the case of Western Scotland is examined in 
chapter 5, while chapter 7 considers the extent to which the built-in flexibility is used 
opportunistically by member state actors to subvert the contract’s original aims.
Stage three of the planning procedure constituted the operational stage, and was 
again based on a partnership between the Commission and the member states concerned 
and/or the competent authorities designated by the latter. The third stage essentially 
amounted to the eventual execution of the Community Support Framework, usually 
through an Operational Programme, comprising 'a series of consistent multi-annual
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measures', which identified the measures tO-be£jnded in accordance with the appropriate 
objectives, the scope of the measures, the proposed beneficiaries and provides an 
estimate of costs’ (Nugent 1991: 2). It should be noted that the Operational Programmes 
do not detail all the projects to be supported and, in this respect, they do not resemble 
categorical grants (Laffan 1989). Individual projects are selected by the ’partnership’ 
meeting at the regional level. The exact process by which this occurs is examined in 
chapter 7.
It is worth emphasising at this point that the ultimate stage in the implementation^ 
of a programme takes the form of individual projects submitted within the CSF 
framework. Although the individual measures undertaken must relate to the priorities 
laid dowfi in the CSF and confirmed in the Operational Programme, the actual measures 
themselves constitute the ultimate stage of the process. This may seem-obvious, but 
much of the current literature on the Structural Funds tends to overlook the fact that the 
European Commission is still obliged to co-finance projects brought forward by national, 
regional and local actors. The CSFs constitute a financial commitment by the. European 
Commission to support regional development in an eligible region, but the final form that 
support takes is ultimately shaped by the nature of the projects submitted within the CSF 
framework. Although the CSF influences the sort of projects that are likely to be 
submitted, the implementation of the CSF itself still amounts to the sum of the individual 
measures which constitute an Operational Programme. Marks has suggested that, 'in 
contrast t6 project grants, which are straightforward financial transfers to member states 
for schemes they would prob^Wy undertake in any case, programs allow ihe iiinds 
themselves to shape policy' (1992: 209). This is exactly what needs to be assessed 
throughlTBetafled analysis of implementation at the regional level, and cannot simply be 
stated. For the European Commission, bargaining does not conclude with the agreement 
of the regional development contract.
A fourth stage, although actually intended to be a continuing process, was the 
monitoring and joint assessment of the programming procedure by the European 
Commission and the member states. As the Vade-Mecum explained, 'it is also important 
to know how Community money is spent and whether it has been spent correctly. The 
machinery for monitoring and assessing Community structural action will be effective 
only if the partnership arrangements function satisfactorily' (European Commission 1989: 
22). A decentralisation of the monitoring system to regional level committees in the 
framework of partnership was therefore instituted. An element of flexibility was thereby 
sought as provisions were made for the amendment of CSFs and Operational 
Programmes in the light of changing economic circumstances. To this extent, the
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CSF/Operational Programme could not state in advance all the measures to be supported, 
and hence constituted an incomplete contract. Amendments to the contract could be 
made by the regional level implementing committees.
Although the Audit Commission refeTTed to ’a complex web of committees 
emerging’ (1991b: 11), the basic pattern was of a two-tier system of committee meetings 
at the regional level. CSF Monitoring Committees, chaired by central government in the 
UK, co-ordinate the broad implementation of the CSF. These Committees (examined in 
chapter 6) meet around two or three times a year and comprise central government, local 
and regional 'partners' as well as European Commission representatives. At the lower 
level of the two-tier committee structure, Operational Programmes are implemented by 
Programme Monitoring Committees. These are again chaired by central government in 
the UK and comprise representatives from all elements of the partnership The division 
of responsibilities between these two committee tiers is one focus of chapter 6.
The Second Annual Report on the Implementation o f the Reform o f the Structural 
Funds concluded that there is no doubt that the programming approach is one of the 
major achievements of the reform' (European Commission 1992d: 19). However, 
'assessment has revealed certain factors which affect the quality of programming:
the first is undoubtedly the need to base the strategic development 
of a region on discussions with all those involved in its economy. This 
approach ensures both that the strategy is soundly based and that it is 
implemented successfully;
the second concerns estimating the time required for this strategic 
approach based on consensus to be put into practice. It is clear that when 
the reform was first implemented only those regions with experience of 
programming were able to draw up measures based on a development 
strategy acceptable to local agents.
However, although pre-existing programming in certain member states is 
undoubtedly an advantage, it can also restrict the scope for Community 
assistance to the extent that the measures have already been defined 
between the regions and the central government, without the 
Commission's intervention' (ibid.: 19).
These are precisely the issues addressed below in the case study of programming in 
Western Scotland. At this stage, however, some attention should be devoted to the 
implications of the principle of partnership.
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4.3.3 Partnership
As Deeken notes, the principle of partnership has figured prominently in the 
European Commission's view of the ERDF since the Fund's creation. The First Annual 
Report on the European Regional Development Fund stated in 1976 that 'Community 
regional policy is by its nature a partnership between the Community and its Member 
States, and with the former at the present stage the junior partner [emphasis added]' 
(quoted in Deeken 1993: 12). The 'more equal partnership' anticipated by the European 
Commission (1976a: 26) evolved as the size of the ERDF relative to domestic regional 
policy expenditures increased dramatically over the next decade, but the partnership was 
also extended beyond the outer-shell of the member state to include regional and local 
actors. As suggested in chapter 1, the principle of partnership was formally-defined in the 
Framework Regulation as 'close consultations ... between the Commission, the Member 
State concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter at national, 
regional, local or other level, with each acting as a partner, within the framework of its 
responsibilities and powers, in the pursuit of a common goal'. The importance of the 
jjrmciple to the European Commission was reaffirmed in the introduction to each of the
'Partnership' is an important innovation introduced by the reform. It means 
the close involvement of regional and local bodies with the Commission and 
national authorities in planning and implementing development measures in 
their areas. On the basis of the QSF, all the parties concerned in the 
partnership will develop programmes and projects which will turn the 
priorities identified in the CSF into actions on the ground (European 
Commission 1991b: 6).
The Commission's guide to the reform of the Structural Funds suggested that 
partnership is the key principle underlying the reform of the Funds in that it determines 
the implementation of the other principles' (European Commission 1989: 14). The Vade- 
Mecum added that partnership mirrors the principle of subsidiarity, and, as such, the 
precise nature of partnership arrangements will depend on the institutional structures and 
traditions of each member state. Consequently, partnership will 'necessarily take many 
forms' (ibid.: 15). Practical applications of the partnership principle should, nevertheless, 
include the involvement of all relevant actors in the preparation of the development 
plans, in the negotiation of the Community Support Frameworks, in the implementation
/
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of Operational Programmes and in the monitoring and assessment of the measures 
undertaken.
The importance placed on the principle of partnership by the European 
Commission as a demonstration of 'subsidiarity in action' was underlined in a speech 
made by the then European Commissioner for Regional Policies (Bruce Millan) in 1989:
... In practice there should be an increasingly three-cornered partnership 
between Commission, national Governments, and regional and local 
authorities, in which there is mutual respect for each other’s policy 
priorities, but equally a common search for joint fields of action. I think it 
would be fair to say that this new partnership is one of the more concrete 
examples of how the principle of subsidiarity can be put effectively into 
practice (Millan 1989: 7).
In similar fashion, the language of suDSiaiarity was usually employed in official 
Commission documents dealing with the subject of partnership: it was frequently 
suggested that the principles of partnership and subsidiarity went hand-in-hand As the 
Director-General of DG XVI explained, the ffoal of subsidiarity is to permit each level of 
political or administrative responsibility to carry out the tasks for which it is best suited. 
In the case of regional development, this means that responsibility for implementation of 
the Community Support Frameworks is shared between local, regional, national and 
Community authorities. Each of these can and should concentrate on its own 
responsibilities, and so enhance the overall efficiency of the system' (Landaburu 1990: 
99).
In effect, the partnership principle , is designed jo_ supply the European 
Commission 3adib information on regional development problems and possibilities, direct 
from the regional and local actors closest to the regional economy. The Vade-Mecum 
explained that the partnership arrangements should ... lead to some decentralization of 
the Community's structural action, enabling it to be geared more closely to realities in the 
field, both in assessing needs and in implementing measures’ (European Commission 
1989: 15). However, partnership was not designed solely to facilitate information 
transfer. As the discussion of economic neo-institutionalism in chapter 2 illustrated, co­
ordination of actors to prepare a coherent plan is only one aspect of the policy 
implementation equation. Partners must then be motivated to act according to the terms 
of the plan. The partnership principle was also designed for this latter purpose.
It is common to hear of the importance of increasing 'a sense of ownership' of the 
regional development programme among regional and local actors involved in the
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implementation of Structural Fund measures.12 An evaluation of the CSF for North 
Western England made clear the importance of motivation, pointing out that 'it is clear 
that without national, regional and programme level ownership, the CSF can degenerate 
to a fund administration exercise’ (Watson, Tomkins & Knox 1991: 10). The aim of 
increasing ownership was to motivate the partners to stick by the spirit of the contract. 
The importance of ownership and motivation was made clear by Commissioner Millan 
when he emphasised the significance of partnership: 'drawing on knowledge and 
experience which are close to the problems on the ground, not to mention a greater 
commitment to carrying actions through to completion, the Commission can feel more 
confident that its regional assistance is being spent in an effective and efficient wav' 
(1989: 7). The Commission clearly appears to believe that regional actors will have a 
greater commitment to the plan if they are actively involved in its preparation.
The Commission's own review of the reformed Structural Funds' operation, 
Commumty_StauUural Policies: Assessment and Outlook, stressed that the capacity for 
both increased eo-oi^nation and venhanced^jhotivatigA sought through partnership 
depended to a great extent on the national administrative structure in which partnership is 
set:
Effective application of this principle requires the respective tasks of the 
various authorities and bodies involved to be clearly defined and 
appropriate concentration methods and instruments to be implemented. A 
balance must be found between the greater possibilities for co-ordination, 
overview and economies of scale to be found at more centralized levels of 
administration and the greater knowledge of local needs and greater 
flexibility at more decentralized levels... [However] ... the opportunities 
for involving the regional authorities in the definition and implementation 
of Community assistance vary widely according to the institutional 
structures of the Member States (European Commission 1992a: 22).
It should be stressed at this point that, despite the views outlined above on 
subsidiarity and partnership, the European Commission takes no official line on the 
nature of regional government powers. This may seem obvious, but it is worth 
emphasising as it indicates the primacy of the Commission’s concern through the ERDF 
with regional economic development, as opposed to regional political mobilisation. 
When Commissioner Millan was repeatedly asked for his views on local government 
reform in England a press conference in London in 1991, he agreed that splitting up
12 In all the interviews conducted with those DG XVI officials with desk officer responsibilities for particular 
regions, the officials spoke of increasing the 'sense of ownership' of the programme among the regional and 
local partners involved in its implementation.
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regional entities into smaller areas makes life difficult in terms of regional policy and co­
operation but emphasised: that would be a general principle I would have which would 
apply elsewhere, not only in the UK, but as I have to keep saying to people, how 
individual member states decide their administrative arrangements below central f 
government is a matter for them. It is not for the Commission. We have to work with 
whatever is there ... on devolution, again, there is no Commission view on regional 
devolution in the UK... It would be quite wrong for us to have an official view1 (European 
Commission 1991a: 10). The neutral stance taken by Commission officials to territorial / 
powerjelations was similarly emphasised in interviews conducted for this research *? ! 
This is not to deny that Commission pressure for the establishment of partnership 
arrangements may have some impact on territorial restructuring’ (see the references at 
the beginning of this chapter). Rather, the primacy of economic development objectives 
for Commission action should be emphasised.
It should also be noted that the partnership, according to the European. 
Commission, should be extended to include the various 'economic and social partners'.
As the Fourth Annual Report on the Implementation o f the Reform o f the Structural 
Funds points out, the Commission has constantly reiterated its desire to involve the social 
partners closely in the programming process (1994b: 79). In particular, the European 
Commission sought the involvement of trade union representatives in the partnership 
process. Membership of regional level partnerships, however, is determined by the 
relevant member state government and many have been reluctant to increase the 
involvement of trade union actors in particular. Hence, much of trade union involvement 
has been at the European level where the Commission has supported a number of 
conferences and exchanges of experience, and has financed studies 'intended to 
strengthen the role of the social partners in the context of structural policies and their 
contribution to regional development and conversion measures' (European Commission 
1994b: 79).14 Despite the eagerness of the Commission, trade union involvement in the 
regional-level committees has been strongly resisted, especially in the UK, while 
European level initiatives provide largely symbolic involvement in structural policy.
<=k 13 President Delors may have disillusioned any hopes of a 'Europe of the Regions' in this field when he 
reminded representatives of all 60 Objective 2 regions gathered tog&her in Brussels in July 1991 of the^  
importance of the dialogue with central governments, pointing out that 'in our view, partnership does noO 
entail short-circuiting or ignoring the national government' (European Commission 1992e: 106).
14 See Branskill (1992) on Scotland and Pillinger (1992) on the North West of England for studies of the 
involvement of trade union representatives in two regions of the UK Albers (1992) provides a wider, 
comparative study of trade unions' regional policies in the EC against the background of the Single Market.
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One final point about the principle of partnership should be noted at this stage, 
and that is its link to the principle of additionality. As the first Annual Report on the 
Implementation o f the Reform o f the Structural Funds explained, the concept of 
partnership derives from the principle of complementarity contained in Article 4 of the 
[Framework] Regulation according to which "Community operations shall be such as to 
complement... national operations". Any assessment of partnership in practice must take 
the Objectives into account and never lose sight of the fact that the Commission has 
acted and will continue to act within the limits laid down by the Member States 
concerned’ (European Commission 1990: 25). The fact that programmes drawn up in 
partnership between the European Commission and member state actors were intended to 
complement the actions of national governments and regional actors within the states 
assumes that European programmes would be additional to the latter. However, as 
suggested in chapter 3, the ERDF in particular has long been treated in a non-additional 
manner by most member states. The new provisions for additionality contained in the 
1988 Regulations sought to change this.
4.3.4 Additionality
The European Commission was aware in the late 1980s that the improvements it 
sought in programming, partnership and the general administration of the Structural 
Funds would have little effect in economic development terms if the Funds themselves 
were not additional at the regional level. However, problems associated with the 
enforcement of additionality had plagued the operation of the ERDF since its creation. A 
large part of the problem was the obscurity of domestic financial procedures and the 
consequent difficulty faced by the European Commission in obtaining information on the 
treatment of Structural Fund resources within the member states expenditure process. 
Against such a background, Article 9 of the 1988 Horizontal Regulation provided the 
strongest commitment yet to the principle of additionality:
In establishing and implementing the Community support frameworks, the 
Commission and the Member States shall ensure that the increase in the 
appropriations for the Funds provided for in Article 12 (2) of Regulation 
(EEC) No. 2052/88 has a genuine additional economic impact in the regions 
concerned and results in at least an equivalent increase in the total volume of 
official or similar (Community and national) structural aid in the Member 
State concerned, taking into account the macro-economic circumstances in 
which the funding takes place.
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It had been a widely held view that a consolidation of the programming principle 
would assist the European Commission in its attempts to enforce the additionality 
requirement (House of Lords 1988: 110). The Commission acknowledged in 1989 that 
'while the additionality arrangements will be appraised on a case-by-case basis when the 
Community Support Frameworks are drawn up, a monitoring system needs to be set up as 
of now to assess the extent to which the Community effort is matched at national level' 
(1989: 21). The documents outlining the CSFs for each member state contained a chapter 
stressing that 'by agreeing to this Community support framework, the Member State also 
confirms its commitment to this legal obligation' provided by Article 9 (European 
Commission 1991b: 156). Enforcing this clause became a key issue for the Commission, 
which had been coming under great pressure from the Court of Auditors of the European 
Communities. The Court stressed that the attainment of true additionality was a 
prerequisite for achieving the increased impact sought by the reform of the Funds, and 
urged that the days when funds were 'reduced to a simple transfer of resources, which 
facilitates the relaxation of budgetary constraints, with positive effects on budgetary 
equilibrium, fiscal pressure or the redeployment of economic and social policies but 
without having any impact on the resources devoted to regional development' should be 
brought to an end (Court of Auditors 1991: 104).
The European Commission therefore sought to render the concept of additionality 
operational, but found itself bogged down in a series of technical disputes with the 
member state governments. In August 1990 the Commission requested that the member 
states should provide the information required to verify additionality (using a standard 
explanatory format) before 30 November 1990. This deadline was not respected as 'most 
of the Member States asked for more time and/or questioned the validity of the 
Commission's request, invoking technical problems relating to the difficulty of providing 
a breakdown of statistical and budgetary data' (European Commission 1992d: 20). The 
Commission then sent further letters in April 1991 asking for a reply by 15 May 1991 and 
proposing bilateral meetings to look at specific problems. The Commission was satisfied 
that Ireland, Portugal and Greece (Objective 1) and Germany and Belgium (Objective 2) 
operated broadly in respect of the principle. Bilateral contacts continued with other 
member states, but the Commission itself concluded that the 'situation cannot be 
regarded as satisfactory' (European Commission 1992d: 20-21). Scharpfs memorable 
dismissal of the Regional Fund as an insignificant programme is illustrative in this case: 
he pointed out that 'the only interesting question is whether European funds will add to, 
or substitute for, national expenditures, but the ability of national dogs to wag the
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European tail is not really in doubt' (1988:251). Nevertheless, the Commission continued 
to seek enforcement of the additionality principle, pointing out in the 1991 that it 
intended 'to continue its efforts to implement this principle of the reform with the active 
collaboration of the Member States within the framework of partnership' (European 
Commission 1993e: 18).
Although verification of the additionality of Structural Fund expenditure in the 
UK was a particular problem given the lack of transparency in the local expenditure- 
setting process there, the European Commission's case against the UK in this respect was 
clear. The Commission's dissatisfaction with the-'UK government are well illustrated by 
the case of West Cumbria, which was accepted as an Objective 2 region in 1989. The 
eligible area essentially covers three local authorities in the far north west of England. 
The domestic setting of local authority spending approvals, however, meant that the 
authorities did not have sufficient capital cover to 'draw down' the European money to 
which they were entitled. In other words, they did not have the necessary capital spending 
approvals to match the Structural Funds they were allocated. This was not simply a 
problem at the margin of their expenditure: it was impossible for the authorities to 
reorganise their expenditure priorities to cover the Structural Fund grants. Therefore, the 
UK central government simply refused to forward the Operational Programme for West 
Cumbria to the European Commission. Eventually, after sustained lobbying, 
supplementary spending approvals were granted for West Cumbrian local authorities and 
the Operational Programme was submitted in 1991. The local MEP expressed the 
opinion that 'it does seem that where ERDF money is allocated the Government should, 
as a matter of policy, allocate additional credit approval on an area by area basis, taking 
each one's particular needs into account, rather than dealing with the problem on a global 
basis after discussion with the local authorities' associations in the "smoke-filled rooms", 
as appears to be the case now' (House of Lords 1992: 176). The RECHAR dispute 
analysed in Section 4.5 below brought this problem to a head in the UK.
In evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities, Commissioner Millan suggested that 'there has always been a moral 
obligation on additionality', even before the actual specific obligation was included in the 
Regulations in 1988 (House of Lords 1992: 90). The Treasury contested the suggestion 
that there had been any form of obligation before 1988, and argued that there is nothing 
in the Community's law that imposes some sort of moral or spiritual obligation on us to 
go further than the text of Article 9 of the Regulation' (ibid.: 105). The Under Secretary 
in the Department of Trade and Industry in charge of the division concerned with 
regional policy explained the Government view that Article 9 did not apply to the UK.
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The UK had not benefited in real terms from an increase in Structural Fund expenditure 
since the actual amount of funds per head of population in the Objective 2 regions had 
fallen;
It says that in establishing and implementing the Community support 
frameworks the Commission and the Member States shall ensure that the 
increase in the appropriations for the Funds as provided in an earlier 
regulation has a genuine additional economic impact in the regions 
concerned and results in at least an equivalent increase in the total volume 
of official or similar (Community and .-national) structural aid in the 
Member States concerned... The contention of the United Kingdom 
Government is that since there is no real increase in Structural Funds 
money to the United Kingdom the remainder of that article does not apply 
in terms of the United Kingdom (House of Lords 1992: 25).
Not surprisingly, Commissioner Millan did not accept this line of argument, 
pointing out that 'even if that were true in overall terms for the United Kingdom, it does 
not avoid the fact that this article in the regulations provides that the additional money 
should have an impact m the regions concerned [emphasis added]' (ibid.: 90). Central 
government's long-standing claim to estimate the total amount of Structural Fund 
assistance to the UK and then add that to the total of public expenditure (e.g. local 
authority borrowing consents) seemed less solid in the light of the West Cumbrian 
example. Millan therefore argued that even if central government could demonstrate 
'global additionality', it would still not be additional expenditure in the regions concerned 
but across the UK as a whole (House of Lords 1992:90).
The impasse between UK central government and the European Commission over 
the principle of additionality was solid. An evaluation of the North East England CSF 
conducted for the European Commission confirmed the tatter's suspicion over the failure 
of the UK government to respect the principle in full: 'in summary, if Structural Funds are 
used to hold down taxation, there will be practically no additional public expenditure at 
national or at regional level. If Structural Funds are used to supplement public 
expenditure, then at national level the majority of the increased public expenditure will 
be additional at the national level. However, it seems very unlikely that all of the increase 
in public expenditure will be additional in the region that the Commission designated for 
the increased expenditure' (PA Cambridge Economic Consultants 1991: 49). In complete 
contrast, the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry, Peter Lilley, presented the UK 
government line in stark terms when he argued that, 'given that there is going to be no
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increase in funds to this country, there is no requirement under this regulation for 
additionality to be demonstrated’ (House of Lords 1992:158).
As suggested above, this confrontation between the European Commission came 
to a head over the RECHAR Community Initiative, which 'brought out the position quite 
starkly' in the words of Commissioner Millan (House of Lords 1992: 91). Before 
considering the RECHAR dispute and the implications of its resolution, however, some 
consideration should be given to explaining what the Community Initiatives actually 
constitute.
4.3.5 Community Initiatives
The importance attached to Community Initiatives was another development to 
emerge form the Structural Fund reforms of 1988 which should be highlighted. The 
Regulations allow 'a delegation of powers by the ÇgunciHo the Commission to allow the 
launching ofprogrammeson,the initiative of the Community' (European Commission 
199le: 53). Before the reform of the Structural Funds^foyt-Gonmuuiity Programme^ 
(considered in chapter 3) had been implemented under (Article 7 qf the 1984 ERDB 
Regulation. The 'STAR', *Valoren', 'Resider' and TlenavaL(jbmmuSity Programtnes-tfere 
both a development upon the previous non-quota section projgipDgies, and the precursors 
of the Community Initiatives. Article TTof the T98F Horizontal regulation enabled the 
Commission to pursue its own programmes, with the intention of complementing the 
measures agreed with the member states in the Community Support Frameworks:
By doing so, the Commission is laying the basis for a genuine Community 
policy since it focuses its initiatives in areas or sectors which it regards as 
paramount or essential for completion of the single market, and of 
particular importance for economic and social cohesion (European 
Commission 1991c: 10).
ECU 5.5 billion, pooled across all three Funds, was set aside for Community 
Initiatives for the 1989-1993 period. Although ECU 1.7 billion was reserved for the 
completion of the four Community Programmes adopted prior to 1989, the remaining 
ECU 3.8 billion allowed the Commission some room for manoeuvre in designing new 
programmes. This placed 9% of the total Structural Funds budget at the Community's 
discretion, to the extent that the Community could decide the priority issues to be 
addressed under this expenditure, outwith the mainstream CSFs. As Preston pointed out 
in relation to specific Commission programmes as early as 1983, 'by funding programmes
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with a sectoral bias for steel, shipbuilding, energy, tourism and Community enlargement 
problems, the Commission hoped to become involved at an early stage in planning 
regional development, thereby increasing the leverage of Community funds and 
facilitating additionality'' (1983: 24).
One interview source suggested that 'there is no such thing' as a purely 
Commission influenced initiative.15 The official went on to explain that Community 
Initiatives are usually drawn up in response to .direct lobbying by local ancf regional 
actors in affected areas  ^By engaging the support of local and regional actors in the 
formulation of initiatives at an early stage, the Commission sought to enhance its position 
vis-à-vis national government and facilitate the implementation of its programmes with 
the support of local actors. Empirical evidence conducted by the author elsewhere 
indicates that the Commission generally looks favourably on lobbying by groups of 
regions articulating a shared interest in a specific development problem across different 
member states (McAleavey 1992; 1993).16 Such evidence supports the claim of the 
European Commission that, 'Community Initiatives are transnational programmes but 
with an equally strong accent on the involvement of regional and local authorities in their 
preparation and implementation' (European Commission 199le: 56). In other words, the 
European Commission sought to pursue the principle of partnership through Community 
Initiatives.
The administrative process for the implementation of Community Initiatives is 
similar to that for the implementation of CSFs, in that it is based firmly on the principle 
of programming. After consultation with representative regional associations, the full 
European Commission approves the guidelines for a specific initiative which is then 
published in the Official Journal o f the European Communities. Member states wishing 
to benefit from such initiatives are invited to submit to the European Commission their 
proposals for eligible regions in line with the criteria specified by the latter, normally 
within a month of the date of publication in the Official Journal. The areas thereafter 
accepted as eligible in the Community list are invited to submit Operational Programmes 
addressing the priorities set out in the initial guidelines. These programmes are approved
15 Senior Executive Officer, European Funds and Co-ordination Division (Programme Management Unit), 
Scottish Office Industry Department; Edinburgh, 16 January 1992.
16 Research shows the role played by the Association of European Border Regions (AEBR) in the 
formulation of the TNTERREG' initiative with the objective of preparing border regions for the opening of 
the Single Market, and the role played by the Association of European Textile Associations (ACTE) in the 
formulation of the 'RETEX' initiative for regions affected by restructuring in the textile industry (McAleavey 
1992). The role of the European association of local and regional authorities in mining areas of the EC in the 
formulation of the RECHAR Initiative for coal mining regions is well documented (Fothergill 1992, 
McAleavey 1993: 97-100)
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by the European Commission and then implemented and monitored under separate 
regional-level Monitoring Committees. It should_be noted that separate programme 
monitoring committees were established for each initiative under which a region was 
eligible, and that^here co,uldiherefore be many committees in any one region.17
Betweenv1989>£fid; 1993<^leven new Community Initiatives were approved. The 
RECHAR initiative for coalmining closure areas, the INTERREG initiative for border 
regions, and the RETEX initiative for regions affected by closures in the textiles sector 
have already been mentioned. The other Community Initiatives, which are summarised in 
the European Commission's own guide (1991c)-as well as a Club de Bruxelles report 
(1993: 77-88), need not be explained here. According to the European Commission’s own 
assessment, the Community Initiatives provide a degree of flexibility, co-operation and j f e  
innovation to structural actions in four main ways: they can encompass measures 
extending beyond national boundaries; they provide a 'genuine Community dimension' 
reflecting Community interests and priorities; 'under the new system of multi-annual 
programming, needs arise during the programme period, which it is not possible to 
foresee at the planning stage and which call for a special effort from the Community'; 
innovative by experimenting with new approaches (European Commission 1993b: 3-4).
One problem, however, was that member states wanted to know as early as possible the 
themes and priorities for development which the Community intended to favour under 
the Community Initiatives. The Green Paper on Community Initiatives of June 1993 had 
the objective of encouraging a wide debate about the priorities. The Community put 
forward a number of options therein, and requested observations before the end of 
September 1993. The Commission acknowledged the confusion that could be caused by a 
plethora of Initiatives, each with its own regional-level Monitoring Committee, and 
therefore accepted the need to focus the Initiatives on five main fields of action: cross- 
border, transnational and inter-regional co-operation and networks; rural development; 
'outermost' regions; employment and development of human resources; and the 
management of industrial change (European Commission 1993b: 14). As shown in 
Section 4.4, this later review of the operation of Community Initiatives reduced 
Commission discretion in the regional policy field.
17 The Commission was well aware of the fact that if intervention took too many forms, the administrative 
burden could be very heavy. The extreme case of the region of Lorraine was cited as an instructive example  ^
in an interview with an official in the Unit for Co-ordination of Evaluation, DG XVI, Brussels, 4 October 
1993. During the course of the first CSF, there were no less than ten separate EC structural programmes for 
the region As well as a pre-reform NPCI and non-quota steel and textile programmes, there were Resider, 
RECHAR and INTERREG Community Initiatives supplementing the regular Operational Programme.
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During the 1989-1993 Structural Fund round, the Community Initiatives gained a 
high political profile in the UK with the prolonged dispute between the European 
Commission and the UK central government over the RECHAR Initiative. This is 
considered below. As well as illustrating the extent to which the UK government was 
able to maintain its own interests despite apparently backing-down to European 
Commission pressure, the 'RECHAR dispute' has been cited by Marks (1993) as evidence 
of'multilevel governance' in the implementation of structural actions in the UK.
4.4 Recent Theoretical Contributions: The Concept of 'Multilevel Governance'
In general terms, the study of policy-making in the European Community has 
benefited in recent years from the application of new theoretical approaches which 
facilitate more rigorous analysis than the grand integration theories of the past considered 
in chapter 3. Approaches drawn from new institutionalism (Bulmer 1994), rational 
choice and game theory (Ward & Edwards 1990), the policy networks literature 
(Peterson 1992), regime theory (Weber & Wiesmeth 1991: 258-259), and theories of 
regulation (Majone 1993a) provide tools for a greater understanding of the individual 
stages and arenas of the Community policy-making process. Moreover, these tools are 
usually applied to disaggregated policy fields than to the Community system as a whole. 
No single theory or methodological approach can capture the complex and dynamic 
process of integration in Europe (Dehousse & Majone 1993). This is not to suggest, 
however, that only descriptive accounts of current developments are possible. The task is 
rather to determine the appropriate tools with which, and the level of analysis at which, 
to approach the stages and mechanisms of policy-making in the EC. Caporaso and Keeler 
(1993) identify a 'new wave' of research, to which they attribute differentiated theoretical 
perspectives applied to disaggregated aspects of the integration process. In summarising 
attempts to conceptualise the overall institutional structure of the EC, they point to a 
growing dissatisfaction with treating institutional outcomes as lying somewhere on an 
intergovernmental-supranational continuum.18
In the field of European regional development policy, recent contributions to the 
literature have reflected this increasing sophistication by utilising a variety of approaches 
from different theoretical traditions. As suggested above, Deeken usesJjie concept of the
18 Notwithstanding this, it would be inaccurate to claim that the tool kit of international relations has been 
completely rejected in the study of EC policy-making. A new and challenging formulation of 
rintergovemmentalism' has been elaborated by Moravcsik (1991; 1993), while Burley and Mattli (1993) have 
recently revised neofunctionalist theory to explain supranational legal integration and the role of the 
European Court of Justice therein.
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’policy entrepreneur1 to trace the European Commission's 'role, tactics, and ull 
success' in the development of regional policy at the European level (1993: j ) ,  «tlluv 
Hooghe (1993) uses the *bureaucratic politics' approach to assess the adaptation of the 
Commission to the 1988 Structural Fund reforms. Smith (1994) and Conzelmann (1994) 
testify to the fashion for adopting a 'policy networks’ approach to the study of European 
regional development policy. Anderson (1991b), as well as adopting a policy networks 
approach to explore the domestic and international consequences of developments in 
European regional policy, sketches three possible scenarios for future governance in this 
field: the maintenance of the status quo; the emergence of a 'Europe of Regions'; and a 
variegated set of outcomes. On the basis of an analysis of the domestic policy networks 
in Britain and Germany within which national and sub-national responses to Community 
policy are embedded, he concludes that a variegated set of outcomes is most likely. 
Under this scenario, reiterated in the recent study by Hooghe and Keating (1994), he 
finds that 'divergences in the gatekeeping capacities among member states become more 
pronounced' (1991b: 446). The tendency of many earlier studies to treat institutional 
arrangements as lying somewhere on an intergovernmental-supranational continuum is 
absent from these studies.
Marks (1992; 1993) is the most widely cited of the authors currently considering 
the 'vertical' procedures for the implementation of Structural Fund expenditure 
programmes within EC member states. It is on the basis of his research in the field of the 
Structural Funds that Marks is cited by Caporaso and Keeler (1993) as one of scholars of 
the 'new wave' most dissatisfied with viewing institutional outcomes on the 
intergovernmental-supranational continuum. Marks makes a number of extremely useful 
points regarding the 1988 reforms which are highlighted in the introduction to this 
chapter. He suggests that the Funds are in the process of being transformed by several 
open-ended, more or less contested innovations, whose consequences are likely to be 
only partly those intended by the makers' (1992: 206). Moreover, 'the reforms have 
created new and untried issues of governance and jurisdiction; they have spawned new 
arenas in which decisionmaking will take place; and they have multiplied the number and 
type of groups that contend for influence over substantive outcomes and, more important, 
for control over the decisionmaking process' (ibid.: 214-215). Neither of these 
suggestions are disputed herein. On the contrary, they very helpfully indicate the new 
interdependencies in the field of European regional policy. However, the wider 
conclusions drawn by Marks regarding the nature of Structural Fund programmes in the 
UK and the role of the European Commission therein, are not borne out by the evidence 
he provides.
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Marks suggests in a study of the 1988 reforms published in 1992 that, ’in short, 
the reforms have set in motion a process of institution building that strengthens the 
Commission; that attempts to technocratize - and in a narrow sense depoliticize - a key  ^
and growing policy area; and that, by creating direct links between the Funds and 
regional political institutions, challenges centralized decisionmaking within member 
states’ (1992: 212). The relatively modest conclusion of the 1992 study is that thp' 
institutional outcome of this process 'cannot be understood as some point along a 
continuum ranging from a loose confederation of strong member states on the one hand 
to a federal Euro-state on the other. Formulations constrained to member states and 
Community institutions miss a critical element of the whole picture: the role of 
subnational governments’ (1992: 222-223). In his major 1993 piece, however, Marks 
made the wider claim that 'beyond and beneath the highly visible politics of member state 
bargaining lies a dimly lit process of institutional formation, and here the Commission 
has played a vital role' (1993: 392). This claim too has been supported in the above 
analysis of the principles underlying the 1988 reforms, but it is suggested herein that 
Marks simply does not provide the data to support his claim that the Commission is the 
f key actor in the process of policy-making and implementation. Moreover, he identifies 'a 
centrifugal process in which decision making is spun away from member states in two 
directions: up to supranational institutions, and down to diverse units of subnational 
government’, which is reminiscent of the Europe of the Regions visionaries he himself 
dismisses as having had little impact on the theory or practice of European integration 
(1993:402).
The primary evidence Marks presents on the ’vertical’ process of implementation 
are upon the apparent (but never fully implemented) back down by the UK government 
after a confrontation with the European Commission over the additionality of RECHAR 
funds. At the most basic of levels, Maries does not give sufficient attention to the fact that 
central government chairs, and has an effective veto over membership of, the 
Committees comprising the regional partnership. This is witnessed in the UK by the 
refusal of central government to allow trade union representatives to participate in the 
process despite the repeated requests of the European Commission. This is only one 
example in which power (the power to determine who participates) has been pulled 
neither up nor down. Numerous examples could be found of the strength of central 
government in this field: for example, the way in which the spirit of the additionality 
requirements is still ignored, or the way in which central government frames the whole 
project selection process within the programming process (see chapter 7). However, it is 
not the aim herein to demonstrate that central government (and not the European
Commission) is 'the main actor1 in the process of regional policy-making and 
implementation in the UK. Given the exchange-based conceptualisation of power 
adopted in this framework, it makes little sense to speak of the single main actor. 
However, it is suggested that Marks overestimates the role of the Commission: the 
disagreement over core objectives among key actors, coupled with the impossibility of 
preparing a 'complete' regional development contract specifying the action to be taken 
under all eventualities renders the bargaining over programmes incomplete. It is the 
strength of central government in the UK in the bargaining process after the programme 
has been agreed, and the opportunism of domestic actors in that process which mean that 
the Commission is still constrained in its ability to shape the ultimate implementation of 
ERDF programmes.
Of course, to a certain extent, the difference of emphasis between Marks and that 
adopted herein represents a recurrent methodological distinction in political science. The 
distinction is that between 'equilibrium models' and the 'process orientation'. While the 
former often provides a snapshot of institutional arrangements and relationships of power 
to explain the role of individual actors in a given decision, it often obscures the process 
by which the actors arrived at those institutional arrangements in the first place. Process' 
models, by contrast, often obscure less but over-emphasise the explanatory power of the 
dynamics of a given process. Specifically, in the case under discussion, Marks essentially 
presents a process model seeking to explain what he perceives as the autonomy of the 
European Commission in regional development policy. He explicitly identifies a 
'centrifugal process in which decision-making powers are spun away from member states' 
upwards towards the Community and down towards sub-national actors. It is therefore 
suggested that Marks places undue explanatory weight on the dynamics of the process 
without actually providing evidence of the specific institutional arrangements and 
decision-making process in any given region. The case study of Western Scotland 
presented below seeks to redress the balance.
4.4.1 The 1993 'Re-reform' o f the Structural Fund Regulations
In his earlier work on the Structural Funds, Marks himself recognises the 
possibility that the European Commission’s enhanced role in this policy field is not 
written in tablets of stone. He identifies three sources of uncertainty over the 
Commission's position. These include future enlargement, the fact that implementation of 
the reforms cannot be taken for granted, and the possibility that member states may claim 
back some of the competencies passed to the European Commission in 1988.
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Consequently, 'despite the recent growth of the Commission's influence in allocating the 
structural budget across priorities and member states, the member states dominate the 
budgetary process as a whole and may claim back the powers they have ceded to the 
Structural Funds. The Funds have gained influence in the allocation process because they 
dispense the budget, but their role is still in flux' (1992: 218-220). In the event, the 
Structural Fund Regulations underwent a 'reform of the reforms' in 1993, noted in passing 
by Marks (1993: 396), which did result in member states claiming back many of the 
functions ceded to the European Commission in 1988. The 1993 re-reforms illustrated 
that the changes,. providing increased discretion for the European Commission over 
funding, were not irreversible.
The importance of trends in the allocation of decision-making power in this field 
should be acknowledged. Coombes has rightly suggested that the 1988 reforms 
intensified 'a trend over several years towards more discretionary use of the funds' for the 
European Commission (1991: 143). Wallace earlier wrote in her criticism of 
intergovemmentalism (1983) of the cumulative nature of the competencies gathered by 
the European Commission in this field over time. However, it would be a grave error to 
fall into the trap of assuming that this accumulation of competencies in the field of 
regional development policy at the Community level is unidirectional. The 1.988 reforms 
necessitated a 'reform of the reforms' after five years. While the original reforms had 
been agreed in a period of optimism and a general expansion of Commission 
competencies during President Delors' first Commission, the Regulations were revised 
again in 1993 during a period of pessimism partly occasioned by the difficult ratification 
of the Maastricht Treaty. Moreover, the Regulations were re-negotiated in 1993 against 
the background of the heightened debate on subsidiarity, with the UK government 
maintaining that this principle implied the return of decision-making competencies to the 
member state level (while the allocation of competencies to sub-state levels was a matter 
for the individual central governments). From a Commission perspective, the Structural 
Regulations fell victim to this new mood as the 1993 Regulations represented 'a retreat to 
a more national style of policy-making' (Hooghe & Keating 1994: 386).
„ The conclusions of-the Edinburgh meeting of the European Council in December
1992 invited the Commission to prepare proposals to revise the Structural Fund 
Regulatior^JIbe^dïnburgh^CCTÎclïïsrons also Stated that the Basic principles of 
concentration, programming, partnership and additionality laid down in 1988 should 
continue to guide the implementation of the Structural Funds.19 The actual text of the
19 Much of the information on the conclusions of the December 1992 Edinburgh Summit presented in the 
following pages was gathered from interviews with Scottish Office officials The European Funds and Co-
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1993 Regulations, however, shows a loosening of the member states' commitment to 
these principles. In order to illustrate the fact that responsibilities transferred to the 
European Commission in the field of regional development policy can be reclaimed by 
the member state governments^ four features of the 1993 Regulations should be 
highlighted. Firstly, with regard to the principle of concentration it was decided that 
member states should draw up the initial list of eligible areas and submit these to the 
European Commission, despite the Commission's recommendation that the 1989' 
arrangements should be maintained. This was a reversal of the 1988 provisions under-, 
which the Commission had drawn up the initial Hist of Objective 2 regions according to 
Article 9.2 of Regulation 2052/88. As before, however, agreement over the final list was 
shared between the Commission and the member states, but this essentially allowed the 
Commission the unenviable task of cutting down lists to meet population ceiling^~Y\ 
requirements.20 Secondly, the principle of programming also fell victim to the mood oK_ 
subsidiarity that surroundedjthe Edinburgh Summit and the British Presidency more 
generally. The conclusions of the Edinburgh Summit called for decision-making 
procedures and theirtransparency to be improved, and for administrative procedures to 
be simplified. At the same time, however, financial control should be strengthened. The 
Commission therefore had to find a balance between respect for the principle of 
subsidiarity and its responsibility to exercise appropriate financial control. The planning 
procedure outlined above was ultimately cut back from three stages to two as the member 
states could submit a Single Programming Document incorporating the Regional and 
Social Conversion Plan and applications for assistance. The Commission still responds, 
but with a single decision incorporating the details previously set out in the Community 
Support Framework and the Operational Programme. Thirdly, with regard to the 
principle ojjxirtnership, the role of member states in designating the partners to be 
involved was emphasised. Finally, following the dispute with the UK government over 
the principle of additionality (see below), requirements were loosened to take into 
account broad macroeconomic factors constraining member state expenditure choices.
ordination Division of the Scottish Office Industry Department worked closely with the London-based 
Cabinet Office in the organisation of the summit.
20 The list of Objective 1 regions is still decided in the Council of Ministers. Under other Objectives, member 
states could submit over-bids, then blame the Commission when the bids for assistance had to be scaled 
down. Objectives 3 and 4 were combined in a new Objective 3, and to its definition were added 'those 
threatened with exclusion from the labour market'. A new Objective 4 was established under the ESF *to 
facilitate workers' adaptation to industrial changes and to changes in production systems' (European 
Commission 1993b). The later introduction of a new Objective 6, relating to sparsity of population and 
designed to allow a share of resources for new Nordic members states, has been noted by Hooghe and 
Keating (1994: 385)
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In all these areas in which the European Commission had gained significant 
competencies in 1988, there has been a marked retreat to a greater involvement of 
member state government with a corresponding reduction in the Commission’s room for 
manoeuvre. This retreat was also notable in the case of the Community Initiatives, as is 
evident in the discussion of the Green Paper in Section 4.3.5 above. The Committee for 
the Community Initiatives was to be set up under the chair of the Commission, but 
comprising representatives of the member states, to oversee the Commission in this 
regard.
Although the time-frame of the case study presented in the chapters which follow 
does not incorporate the post-1993 period, these re-reforms have been noted here for the 
sake of completion, and more importantly to warn against the dangers of placing faith in 
over-deterministic dynamics. If powers in this field were not exactly 'spun back' from the 
EC and subnational actors (downwards and upwards respectively) to the member states, 
it is certainly the case that the dynamic process identified by Marks (1993) stuttered, at 
least temporarily. The following section of the chapter summarises briefly the RECHAR 
dispute and its outcome. Not only does this section provide further evidence of the way in 
which member states retain a significant room for manoeuvre in how to implement 
agreements made with the European Commission, but it also provides highly relevant 
analysis of the problems of additionality and transparency' for the subsequent case study 
of Western Scotland.
4.S The RECHAR Community Initiative and Commission Advances on the
Principle of Additionality
The fact that the extent to which ERDF expenditure in the United Kingdom is 
'additional' to that which would otherwise have been spent in eligible regions has been 
fiercely disputed between the European Commission, central government and local 
authorities since the establishment of the Fund in 1975, is emphasised throughout the 
preceding analysis. Chapter 3 in particular stressed that the ERDF has primarily been 
regarded in UK central government departments as a partial reimbursement on the UK's 
net contribution to the EC budget As such, the receipt of ERDF monies by central 
government has not guaranteed an observable increase in regional policy expenditure in 
the UK's eligible regions. Following the high profile dispute between the European 
Commission (in solid alliance with local authorities) and the UK government over this 
issue, however, new government guidelines apparently brought an end to the problem of 
non-additionality in 1992. It is therefore worthwhile sketching the example of eligible
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authorities in Scotland to show how central government in fact retained control over the 
ERDF expenditure process, despite the 1992 back-down under European Commission 
and local authority pressure. It is suggested that, although the new guidelines increase the 
transparency of the ERDF expenditure process, additionality has not been guaranteed. 
On the contrary, the new problem of subtractionality faced by local authorities since 
1992 is explained. This distinction is of importance for the case study which follows.
The distinction between capital and revenue expenditure in UK domestic 
expenditure arrangements for local authorities, despite finding no equivalent in the 
ERDF, is again relevant here. While central government essentially blocked revenue 
expenditure projects such as indigenous business support schemes (see the opposition to 
Article 15 measures under the 1984 ERDF Regulation), ERDF receipts in respect of 
capital-funded infrastructure projects were indeed passed on by central government to 
local authorities. The key point to note, however, is that there was no corresponding rise 
in the capital expenditure ceiling of the authority. To repeat, the logic of global 
additionality was that expected ERDF receipts had already been incorporated in the pre­
set capital expenditure ceiling. The practical problem this presented for many local 
authorities was that they were not able to spend the grants they had been allocated from 
the ERDF as they had invariably already spent up to their pre-set capital expenditure 
ceilings. Although some financial benefits did accrue to authorities in receipt of ERDF 
through reduced borrowing requirements and hence reduced interest payments, as 
explained by Chorley (1986: 28), central government's stated policy was that receipt of 
ERDF grants should not allow additional projects to be undertaken. In line with the 
perceived need to restrain public expenditure generally, ERDF grants did not confer 
automatic increases in the capital spending ceilings of public authorities.
This UK government interpretation of additionality with respect to local authority 
infrastructure projects was maintained until 1992. Although short-term beneficial 
impacts on revenue accounts brought about by savings on loan charges provided an 
incentive for individual authorities to continue pursuing ERDF support, the Regional 
Fund remained a very blunt tool for regional development purposes. Far from an 
additional policy for the correction of regional imbalances within the EC, the ERDF 
provided a simple reimbursement for capital spending that had already been undertaken, 
thereby allowing central government to reduce public borrowing requirements. At best, 
the ERDF safeguarded domestic levels of expenditure in eligible regions, conceivably 
softening public expenditures cuts in the area of regional policy. The text of Article 9 of 
the 1988 Horizontal Regulation, however, testified to the centrality of the principle of 
additionality to the European Commission strategy of regional development
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The showdown between the European Commission and UK central government 
over additionality emerged in the context of the RECHAR Community Initiative. As a 
policy intended to assist in the economic and social conversion of the coal mining areas 
of the EC, its origins have been examined elsewhere (Fothergill 1992; McAleavey 1992). 
The guidelines approved by the Commission on 17 December 1989 to address the 
problems of coal mining areas were published in January 1990. Member states wishing to 
benefit from RECHAR were required to submit to the Commission their proposals for the 
detailed definition of coal-mining areas in conformity with specified criteria within one 
month of the notice. Given the fact that to satisfy the conditions for eligibility, areas had 
only to show a loss of at least 1,000 coal-mining jobs since January 1984 (or that 
announced job losses would take the total lost over 1,000), there was never any doubt 
that British coal-mining communities stood to gain a great deal from the 300 MECU set 
aside for RECHAR. The areas thereafter accepted in the Community list were invited to 
submit Operational Programmes with the priority of restoring the local environment, 
modernising social infrastructures in mining villages, promoting tourism or providing 
vocational training (European Commission 1991c: 21).
In April 1991 the Commission published the list of the 28 eligible coal-mining 
areas in six EC member states. Twelve of these areas were in the UK. In partnership with 
the relevant authorities (British Coal Enterprise21 as well the local authorities and 
training agencies), central government drew up a series of Operational Programmes 
which were submitted to the European Commission on 26 July 1991. This marked the 
end of the implementation of the RECHAR initiative in the UK for over 18 months. In 
this context, it is simply important to note that the timing of the announcement of the 
RECHAR initiative gave the Commission a weapon in its dispute with the UK 
government over the additionality of ERDF expenditure, at a time when it was seeking 
information from all member states to verify respect of the additionality principle. 
Capital credit approvals for local authority spending in the 1990-91 year had been set in 
October 1989, while the RECHAR initiative was not agreed by the EC until December 
1989. The Commission therefore convincingly argued that it had been impossible for the 
UK government to incorporate expected receipts into the global levels set two months 
before the Initiative had even been announced. The Commission consequently blocked 
the UK's allocation of £120 million under RECHAR on the grounds that the additionality 
principle was not respected. As a result, no money was released and no further progress 
was made for 18 months because of the deadlock over additionality.
21 A body set up in the wake of the miners' strike to support and financially assist the small business sector in 
coal-mining areas of the UK
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During the dispute between UK central government and the European 
Commission, there were cabinet splits and several cabinet documents leaked to the 
British press (McAleavey 1993). The Secretary of State at the Department of the 
Environment, who had paradoxically written in his book, The Challenge o f Europe, that 
'without the principle of "additionality", Community funding will become a farce’ 
(Heseltine 1989: 53) was at the centre of the dispute. A document designed by the 
Environment Secretary to gain the support of the Secretaries of State for Scotland and 
Wales to force a change of opinion within the cabinet upon the ministers at the 
Department of Trade and Industry and the Treasury, was leaked to the press and provided 
an excellent summary of the Commission's position:
The weakness of Treasury arguments is that there is no visible evidence 
that expenditure is necessarily higher than it otherwise would be. Even 
accepting it is, there is no proper mechanism for ensuring it is regional 
expenditure that is higher than it would otherwise be. The Commission 
realised this and are suspicious largely, we believe, because UK practice 
does not make transparent or capable of proof the distribution of 
additional resources.22
It was against this background of leaked documents and cabinet splits that 
meetings continued over several months between the UK central government and the 
European Commission to resolve the impasse and release the frozen funds. In the event, 
the UK government's climb-down was announced by the Trade and Industry Secretary, 
Peter Lilley, in the House of Commons on 17 February 1992. While the existing system 
for controlling public expenditure would remain unchanged, from April 1993 the 
government's spending plans would indicate the European grants separately for each 
spending programme: the government would no longer argue that it incorporates grants 
globally. More importantly, supplementary credit approvals would be approved for any 
authority receiving European grant. In other words, an authority in receipt of an ERDF 
grant to aid capital expenditure would have its capital spending ceiling increased by the 
value of the grant. On this basis the Commissioner for Regional Policy then agreed, after 
18 months of deadlock, to release the funds earmarked for programmes in the UK.
It is important in this context to concentrate on what happened after the apparent 
back-down by the UK government following the dispute. The then Trade and Industry 
Secretary, Peter Lilley, had made his statement in the House of Commons on 17 February 
1992 with the shadow of an impending general election looming large. As the
22 Quoted in The Independent 28 January 1992 p.4.
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government agreed that supplementary spending approvals would be authorised for any 
local authority receiving ERDF assistance, thereby raising its capital ceiling and allowing 
the authority to spend the additional resources, it seemed that the European Commission 
had won the battle for additionality. In reality it had won a battle for the transparency of 
receipts, but at a hidden cost to local authorities in the eligible regions of the UK.
The publication in February 1993 of the government's expenditure plans for 1993- 
94 to 1995-96 confirmed that the principle of ERDF 'additionality' had apparently been 
accepted by central government. Serving Scotland's Needs explained how 'a new free 
standing public expenditure programme has'been established to help meet the 
Government's undertaking to the European Commission that all payments of ERDF grant 
will be transparent and confer additional spending power on grant recipients' (Scottish 
Office 1993b: 41). Not only had a separate, transparent expenditure pool been set up to 
match ERDF receipts, thereby ending the obscure process of global additionality, but it 
was stated that 'in future, all payments of ERDF will confer additional spending power, 
and local authorities' capital programmes will be augmented accordingly' (ibid.: 175). To 
this end, £120 million was set aside in the separate expenditure pool. It was immediately 
apparent to local authorities, however, where the expenditure pool had come from.
In March 1993 the Scottish Office issued formal letters of borrowing consent to 
local authorities to meet capital expenses for the year 1993-94. The basic principle that 
any ERDF grant payment would automatically generate an equivalent amount of 
supplementary capital consent was reaffirmed. Permission was announced for Scottish 
local authorities to spend a total of £553 million in 1993-94 on capital projects, with the 
possibility of spending around a further £75 million from the new £120 million ERDF 
pool. However, controversy surrounded the issue of where the £120 million had been 
found. The Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA) argued that £75 million of 
the £120 million pool had been 'creamed from' local authorities' capital spending totals, 
and hence that they were being asked to compete with other bodies eligible for ERDF 
grants simply to get their own money back (Horsburgh 1993). Strathclyde Regional 
Council explained how the Scottish Office had top-sliced' a substantial proportion of 
local authorities' Roads and Transportation and General Services capital budgets (the 
main programmes which contain projects eligible for ERDF assistance) in order to create 
the separate ERDF pool. Central government thereby maintained the past logic of global 
additionality by slicing out that element which it always claimed was built into capital 
budgets to cover expected ERDF receipts. The cut experienced by local authorities in
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their capital allocations to create this separate pool of expenditure has been labelled 
subtract ionality.2?
The implications of the new phenomenon of subtractionality, where budget 
allocations are top-sliced to create a pool that is subsequently reallocated to bring 
authorities back up to their ex-ante baseline expenditure, were spelled out in a 
Strathclyde Regional Council paper:
In order to achieve the overall levels of capital consent provisionally 
allocated last year, the Council would have to submit applications and 
thereafter claim and receive ERDF payment on approved projects. Since 
the prospects of any particular project being approved for ERDF cannot 
be predicted with absolute confidence, an additional element of 
uncertainty has been introduced to the capital planning process 
(Strathclyde Regional Council 1993: 6).
It is clear that the new procedures demonstrate the transparency of ERDF payments by 
issuing supplementary spending approvals from a distinct budget line. However, they do 
not provide for additionality as ERDF receipts still do not lead to an increase in spending 
in the region over and above that previously planned on relevant types of projects. In the 
past, ERDF assistance conferred no additionality in the sense that no new projects could 
be undertaken by local authorities on receipt of the grant. Now, in the era of 
subtractionality, local authorities' planned capital projects are falling by the wayside in 
the wait for ERDF assistance. The implications of the new expenditure arrangements are 
addressed in greater detail in the case study of Western Scotland.
4.6 Reprise and Summary
The 1988 Structural Fund Regulations radically altered the provisions for the 
implementation of ERDF actions. This chapter has focused on key aspects of the 
changes, against the background of some of the new theoretical contributions that the 
changes have provoked. It should be emphasised, however, that some of the lessons of 
the earlier implementation debate remain instructive in signalling key points of interest. 
In particular, Berman's distinction between 'programmed implementation' and 'adaptive 
implementation' (1980) is particularly instructive for understanding the ERDF process. 
This was already picked up by Rhodes (1986) in his account of implementation and sub-
23 The widespread currency of this term was confirmed in several interviews with senior members of the 
regional partnership in Western Scotland in iate 1993. It also appeared that only £70 million of the separate 
£120 million expenditure pool was sliced from local authorities' capital budgets, the rest coming from the 
budgets of other publicly funded bodies in receipt of ERDF support.
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centrai government, and also by Wallace in her account of 'implementation across 
national boundaries':
The proponents of an international policy, notably the officials of 
international organisations and most strikingly the Commission of the EC, 
will often seek as tight and programmed a strategy as they can secure in 
the hope of leaving as little leeway as possible for discretion and slippage 
to national implemented. Yet to be realistic they have to recognise that 
their cherished policies need to be skewed and to some extent distorted to 
carry along different governments and diverse requirements and often 
contrary interests. This suggests that adaptiveness is often the only 
sensible strategy to pursue (Wallace 1984:142).
As Berman pointed out in his original piece on programmed and adaptive 
implementation, there is no universally best way to implement policy (1980). This point 
was also echoed by Rhodes (see chapter 3) who argued that the European Commission 
fails to reflect the variety of possible implementation strategies and usually seeks to 
employ programmed strategies of implementation which try to ensure uniform and 
precise implementation (1986). In terms of the contracting model, these studies have 
concentrated on the task of co-ordination at the expense of motivation. Nevertheless, they 
recognise that programmed strategies translate Commission intentions into practice at 
the cost of unresponsiveness to local conditions and uneven and slow implementation, 
whereas adaptive strategies would generate considerable slippage from initial objectives. 
Moreover, Rhodes rightly argues that distributive policies (such as the ERDF) demand 
the greater flexibility allowed by adaptive implementation strategies. In order to 
overcome its fear of substantial slippage in policy goals associated with adaptive 
implementation, he suggested that the Commission could, among other options, ensure 
that the switch from project to programme financing as the basis for fund distribution 
was fully accomplished. Rhodes believed that such a shift in the method of financing 
would allow the Commission to select projects congruent with EC aims (1986: 55).
As shown in this chapter, the shift from individual project to programme 
financing has gradually taken place under the Structural Fund Regulations. Individual 
project financing (outwith the framework of a Commission-approved programme) is a 
thing of the past as the Commission now seeks to frame regional development contracts 
with national, regional and local actors. And yet, Rhodes' hypothesis that such a shift in 
the method of financing would allow the Commission to select projects congruent with 
EC aims has yet to be tested. The Commission, following intense negotiations with the
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Department of Trade and Industry, can approve the broad strategy documents (CSFs) for 
eligible regions. However, the actual selection of projects below a fixed expenditure 
ceiling (under which the vast majority of expenditure falls), lies with national and local 
actors operating within a process tightly constrained by central government’s public 
expenditure concerns. An essential point to note in this context is the constraint placed 
upon DG XVTs action by the method of part-financing projects: at present, DG XVI 
cannot fully fund a project of its own in an eligible region. Instead, it must rely upon 
local level actors (or central government) bringing forward projects that match 
Commission aims, The Commission can then contribute to the costs of the project. As 
DG XVI may seek to develop the strategic framework within which these projects are 
brought forward (the CSF), however, the way in which the strategy itself is formed 
influences the Commission's capacity to shape the ultimate form of the contract. In other 
words, the European Commission may seek to influence the spending priorities of central 
government and the local actors, who will try to ensure that a sufficient number of 
suitable projects is submitted in order to 'draw down’ ERDF resources.
The ERDF implementation process necessarily involves elements of both 
programmed and adaptive strategies of implementation, as shown in Section 4.3 above. 
The European Commission, by seeking to develop strategic programmes, tries to impose a 
fairly tightly designed response to the needs of a region, albeit by co-ordinating local 
actors in the preparation of that strategy. Such a strategy of programmed implementation 
is tempered by the fact that the form of intervention is ultimately part-financing of local 
actors' actions and as such, the ultimate deliverers of the policy cannot be excessively 
controlled. Moreover, the 'situational parameters' (Berman 1980) of ERDF policy do not 
lend themselves to the imposition of a fully programmed strategy. The level of uncertainty 
over the validity of the theory underlying the policy, the degree of conflict over the policy 
goals, the opportunistic behaviour of key actors, the instability of the policy environment, 
and the complexity of the multi-level institutional arrangements are all parameters which 
ensure the inclusion of elements of an adaptive implementation strategy. In short, only an 
incomplete contract can be prepared. The possibility that appropriate elements of 
programmed and adaptive implementation strategies may be required simultaneously was 
not given sufficient weight in Berman's original framework.
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the key principles of 
concentration, programming, partnership and additionality, primarily how they have 
evolved at the European level under the impetus of the European Commission. The 
advances made by the Commission on these principles have been driven by a technocratic 
logic. This is seen clearly in the definition of 'regions' employed by the European
191
Commission and in DG XVTs neutrality with respect to the structure of the regional 
administrations it deals with. The strengthening of the key technocratic principles, and 
their relative weakening again in the 1994 re-reform of the Regulations, determine the 
extent to which the European Commission has been able to fashion a system of regional 
development contracting with relevant member state, regional and local actors. Chapter 5 
below illustrates just how such contracts have been drawn up in Western Scotland, before 
chapters 6 and 7 illustrate how bargaining continues even after the preparation of the 
contract.
This chapter has also placed the analysis of the 1988 Structural Fund reforms 
against the background of new theoretical contributions in the field, in particular the work 
of Marks (1992; 1993). It was suggested above that when adopting a dynamic, 
longitudinal perspective, Marks' contribution is extremely useful in highlighting the 
increased role over time for both the European Commission and sub-national actors in the 
ERDF implementation process. Nevertheless, Marks broad conclusion with regard to the 
role of the European Commission is questioned in this chapter. It should be emphasised 
that it is not the intention of this research to provide a snapshot of current implementation 
arrangements in an attempt to refute his more dynamic perspective. However, the 
accuracy of Marks' conclusions in the context of ERDF programmes in the UK is disputed 
for the following reason: the European Commission, despite an impressive increase in its 
role over recent years, cannot be viewed as ’the key actor in the process of policymaking 
and implementation' in the UK (1993: 399). An analysis of the Commission's dependency 
on central government and sub-national actors in both the ex-ante process of preparing the 
development contract, and in the ex-post process of executing the contract, reveals the 
pattern of interdependencies (albeit hinted at in the concept of multilevel governance), 
which implies that the European Commission is only one actor in a complex relationship 
of territorial political exchange. Moreover, the examination of the 1993 're-reform' of the 
Regulations and the ultimate compromise of 'subtractionality’ in the wake of the apparent 
back-down of the UK government over additionality presnted above, both caution against 
the danger of the over-deterministic dynamics implied by the stress multilevel governance 
places on the 'centrifugal process' by which decision-making is spun away from member 
states upwards to supranational institutions and downwards to sub-national actors.
The Secretary of State for Trade and Industry at the heart of the RECHAR dispute, 
Peter Lilley, illustrated the challenge faced by the European Commission in its efforts to 
carve out a greater role in contract preparation and contract enforcement. Like the civil 
servants in his Department before him, he indicated support for a simple cash transfer 
system between member states, addressing the compensatory function of the Structural
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Funds but cutting out 'the bureaucratic chain'. According to Lilley, straightforward 
payment of cheques from richer to poorer member states 'would be a much simpler 
process, though I fear our chances of persuading our partners on the continent that such 
elegant simplicity should be pursued rather than the complex ramifications which some of 
them seem attached to in the present system are quite low1 (House of Lords 1992:155).
This comment illustrates a crucial point. The ERDF, since the strengthening of the 
key principles of the reform, is no longer a simple transfer policy. If it involved a simple 
transfer of 'cheques' between member states, all the necessary bargaining could be 
contained in the ex-ante phase of deciding how much each member state should receive. 
The Commission’s role in implementation would involve the relatively straightforward 
tasks of managerial control and financial auditing. However, the gradual evolution of the 
ERDF towards the strategic development role examined in this chapter has established a 
continuing exchange relationship between the European Commission and domestic actors 
in which bargaining extends across the whole process. The following case study examines 
the bargaining involved in the preparation of the contract, the governance structures in the 
region through which the Commission seeks to shape the implementation of the contract, 
and the extent to which the projects ultimately financed fulfil the terms of the contract. In 
other words, attention now switches to the regional level to assess whether the 
Regulations examined in chapters 3 and 4 provide the Commission with the tools to 
influence this bargaining across the implementation process.
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Chapter 5. ERDF Programming: Partners in the Preparation of the Regional
Development Contract
Time and again various officials connected with the EDA bemoan the 
fact that there was no comprehensive economic development plan for 
the city... Part of the insistence on an economic plan undoubtedly 
stems from a belief that it would do Oakland good to have it. But what 
the EDA people really wanted, though they were only occasionally 
able to verbalize it, was the political control and agreement 
symbolized by the plan. They were too far away and too busy with 
other things to dream of running the city of Oakland. They could not 
even imagine intervening on a constant and effective basis. No, their 
one devout wish was that the city would organize itself and present the 
EDA with a list of priorities that would include a series of well- 
worked out projects that it could implement (Pressman & Wildavsky 
1973: 140).
We give more money in Structural Funds than we receive in return. It 
is our money. The government will decide how the money is spent, 
and that is that (Leigh, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for 
Industry and Consumer Affairs quoted in House of Commons 
Parliamentary Debates 1991: col. 264).
5.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the experience of ERDF programming in Western 
Scotland. As such, it is the first of three chapters constituting an in-depth case study 
of the implementation of ERDF actions at the regional level. The aim of this case 
study is to test the applicability of the model of policy implementation as incomplete 
contracting developed in chapter 2. Does the information presented in this case study 
suggest that the model provides an accurate description of the process of policy 
implementation? More importantly, what aspects of the process does the model 
highlight, and does the model provide useful analytical insights? Each chapter of this 
case study, examining a key phase in the implementation process, therefore addresses 
a set of questions derived from the model and designed to assess its accuracy and 
utility. This first chapter of the case study deals with initial attempts to co-ordinate a 
diverse group of partners in the preparation of the regional development contract.
Following the incomplete contracting model, ERDF programmes are 
conceptualised herein as contracts among the partnership. Chapter 2 emphasised that 
contracts do not require to be written down or enjoy legal status in order to be 
considered as such. In the case of ERDF programmes, written documents stating the 
intention of all partners to co-ordinate their actions have indeed existed for the last
decade. However, the strength of the concept of contracting is that it also highlights 
less obvious, unwritten or implicit dimensions such as trust and shared beliefs. 
Therefore, although the term 'contract' is used in this chapter to refer to the specific 
documents prepared by the national, regional and European actors in partnership, it 
also refers to the wider agreement of the actors simply to recognise their mutual 
interests and to modify their behaviour in ways that are mutually beneficial, to repeat 
Maj one's observation on the nature of contracting (1994: 13). As suggested in chapter
4, the essence of programming in the case of the ERDF lies in agreeing contractual 
responses to the 'joint decision and reciprocal commitment' called for by the European 
Commission (1989: 30).
More generally, this chapter suggests that given the continuing importance of 
the Fund’s compensatory function, the UK central government has not always been 
willing to recognise its interest in co-ordinated action with the European Commission 
and a multiplicity of sub-national actors in this policy field. The quotations 
introducing this chapter hint at the tension surrounding ERDF programming in the 
UK. Pressman and Wildavsky's early observation on the desire of Economic 
Development Administration (EDA) officials in Washington to be supplied with a 
rational development strategy drawn up by local actors in California is mirrored two 
decades later in the desire of the European Commission to be presented with such a 
development framework from regional and local actors in regions eligible for 
Structural Fund support. Extremely limited in its ability to fund projects on its own in 
eligible regions, the Commission sought to introduce a system of development 
programming whereby it could have a greater influence on spending priorities than it 
enjoyed under the previous system of rubber-stamping thousands of individual 
projects annually. However, the accompanying quotation above from the 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Industry and Consumer Affairs, although 
an exaggerated statement of government policy on the Structural Funds, illustrates the 
difficulty faced by the European Commission in seeking to shape the implementation 
of ERDF programmes in the UK. The way in which this tension was manifested in 
practice is revealed in this examination of the programming process in Western 
Scotland between 1984 and 1994.
There has been very little academic analysis of how ERDF programming 
requirements have actually been met in the UK. At best, there have been general 
statements of the way in which UK central government has tried to avoid compliance 
with the principle. Anderson, for example, states that 'although the development- 
programme requirement created new responsibilities for Whitehall civil servants, they 
were able to strip it of any legal or policy status’, adding that one civil servant in the 
Department of the Environment claimed that the development programme 'is
recognized essentially as a contrivance... It is supposed to be a strategic document, 
but it is really rather more of a shopping list’ (1992: 74-75). A more detailed analysis 
of the specific nature of programming is called for to examine the extent to which this 
statement is accurate, and if indeed it is, how central government is able to strip the 
requirement of significance.
As suggested in the preceding chapters, ERDF programming sets up an on­
going, complex exchange relationship between the European Commission, the
member state, and regional and local actors. Chapters 3 and 4 illustrated how the 
evolution of the ERDF from a simple transfer mechanism to an active development 
policy has resulted in a greater degree of interdependence between these actors. The 
European Commission is, of course, unable to prepare and implement ERDF 
programmes on its own. DG XVI is neither omniscient, nor does it claim to be. 
Rather, it recognises that the information required to prepare a coherent development 
plan for any given region is dispersed. As shown below, DG XVI simply does not 
have the necessary information or staff resources to hand. Its reliance on member 
states in the past, and increasingly on regional and local actors, to provide the 
information required to prepare a co-ordinated development plan means that a variety 
of actors with a range of strategic objectives are introduced into the programming 
procedure.
Both top-down and bottom-up approaches to policy implementation have
some descriptive power in illustrating the nature of the interdependence between
actors in the implementation of ERDF programmes. However, the top-down approach 
to implementation on its own clearly cannot provide an explanation of the process by 
which ERDF actions are implemented, if such an approach is understood to imply a 
strong central authority directing activities so as to ensure the compliance of lower 
level actors. The simple fact that there is a high degree of interdependence, however, 
does not in itself warrant the adoption of a bottom-up approach to policy 
implementation in the case of the ERDF. The apparent discretion enjoyed by local 
actors according to the terms of the 1988 Regulations should not be over-estimated. 
Firstly, this discretion is tightly constrained by the 'rules of the game'. In particular, 
the practice of non-additionality (and more recently 'subtractionality') by central 
government shapes the entire process. Secondly, present participants in the 
implementation arrangements should not be taken as given. UK central government 
plays an active role in determining just what constitutes the partnership. Thirdly, the 
UK central government is clearly capable of indirectly altering the goals and 
strategies of local level actors through its ability to affect the institutional structure in 
which they operate. A dramatic example of this in Scotland is the current 
reorganisation of local government whereby the two-tier system is being abolished
and the number of authorities is being cut. While stressing the interdependence of 
actors then and the access of sub-national actors to local information, this chapter also 
recognises the extent to which such actors are constrained in their actions.
As the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting prescribes, 
this chapter addresses the nature of the exchange between interdependent actors by- 
looking at several of the key dimensions o f that exchange. Not only does the 
following analysis describe the contents of the regional development programme, 
how it is prepared, and how an attempt is made to build flexibility into the process, it 
also addresses the following five sets of questions on the nature of the exchange in 
order to understand the relationship between the partners.
1. What does each partner contribute to the exchange? Starting from the most 
simple level of identifying who the partners are, the analysis then identifies their 
strategic objectives and considers the resources that each devotes to the exchange.
2. How does the partnership change and evolve? What accounts for the growth 
in the number of partners, and how are the strategic objectives of new partners 
incorporated in the contract? In the analytical terms set out in chapter 2, what is the 
level of asset specificity of the resources brought by each partner to the exchange?
3. To what extent is the information required to prepare the programme 
dispersed, and how does the European Commission seek to ensure that the 
partnership supplies all the information relevant to the preparation o f a co-ordinated 
development plan? A recent legal study of implementation in the EC found a positive 
link between 'the preparation of Community law and its application: the more 
intensive the preparation and the more those who have to apply it are included in the 
creation of the Community rule, the less problems there will be during its application' 
(Ciavarini Azzi 1988: 191). The programming procedure introduced in the late 1980s 
was intended to provide just such a means by which to co-ordinate the actions of the 
various dispersed actors with a potential role in regional development planning. In the 
case of regional development policy, the variety of factors with a potential impact on 
regional economic performance (infrastructure, site provision, capital investment, 
innovation, technological change, human resources etc.) means that a particularly 
wide spectrum of actors must be involved in the partnership. However, does the 
involvement of a greater number of actors increase the likelihood that competing 
objectives are introduced into the programming procedure?
4. To what extent does the uncertainty and complexity surrounding the exchange 
result in a contract that is incomplete? In what ways is the contract incomplete? A 
key aspect of programming highlighted by the model of incomplete contracting is the 
manner and extent of flexibility built into programmes, as a result of the bounded 
rationality of actors. Earlier analysis of Commission proposals pointed to the possible 
lack of flexibility in contractual agreements when regional development programmes 
might stretch over a number of years. Armstrong in particular warned against the 
dangers of inflexibility. While he understood the reasoning behind the Commission's 
desire for a programme approach (as a strategy' for co-ordination and ’a means of 
increasing EC involvement in decisions on the manner in which ERDF assistance is 
given'), he urged caution since 'in the complex and fast-changing world of regional 
assistance now developing, it is doubly important that Member States and regional 
and local authorities retain the major control of the detailed decisions on the manner 
in which ERDF assistance is given, and that the EC does not get too entangled' (1985: 
338-340). In essence, although he did not use the terms, Armstrong emphasised the 
need for an adaptive element to complement programmed implementation. Although 
ERDF programming has now existed for over a decade, no attempt has yet been made 
to analyse the extent to which programmed and adaptive strategies can be pursued 
simultaneously at the regional level.
5. Has the European Commission succeeded over time in promoting its own 
priorities for development as the exchange relationship has matured? In other words, 
do the priorities set out in the contractual agreements indicate a strengthened role for 
DG XVI in the co-ordination of regional development actions? Civil servants working 
for UK government departments have complained about the very substantial 
administrative effort' required to meet the administrative requirements of the Brussels 
mind' (House of Lords 1988: 16), given that the regional development planning 
promoted by the European Commission finds no counterpart in the UK. The 
piecemeal fashion in which economic development is approached in the UK is far 
from the elaboration of priorities and the strategic approach sought by DG XVI. 
Indeed, Mawson, Martins and Gibney point out that 'in administrative and 
professional terms there was a certain amount of scepticism ... about the validity of 
the rational normative approach to economic development based on the concept of 
preparing a regional plan which contained: analysis, objectives, financial measures, 
final schedules, and also evaluation' (1985: 48-49). How then have public officials at 
central and local levels in the UK met 'the requirements of the Brussels mind'? Has 
the ability of such actors to pursue a 'rational normative approach' been enhanced over 
the last decade? In short, has 'the Brussels mind' triumphed in the preparation of
regional development contracts in the UK, and, if so, how is this reflected in the 
priorities for development?
These five sets of questions, drawn from the incomplete contracting model, 
are addressed throughout this chapter. By considering these questions, we thereby 
focus on the bargaining involved in the preparation of the regional development 
contract. As emphasised in the introductory chapter, policy emerges across many 
inter-related 'stages’ of the Structural Funds process. The policy implications of the 
European-level changes in the ERDF Regulations examined in chapters 3 and 4 can 
only be appreciated by examining in depth the exchange relationship in a specific 
region.
The remainder of this chapter is organised in five sections. Section 5.2 
provides some elementary background information on the process and extent of 
regional economic decline in Western Scotland, without which the analysis of policy 
responses makes little sense. Section 53 introduces the key partners in the 
programming process and assesses the extent to which each is involved in the 
Western Scotland partnership. Section 5.4 then provides a detailed analysis of the 
programmes prepared in Western Scotland over the last decade. Section 5.5 analyses 
the extent to which the shift over time in the balance of expenditure away from 
capital-financed infrastructure towards revenue-financed business support indicates 
the enhanced capacity of the European Commission to shape the contractual 
agreement. This section therefore also looks at the balance between these spending 
priorities in the more recent programmes agreed for Western Scotland. The 
concluding Section 5.6 provides a reprise and summary of the findings of this 
chapter, by returning to the questions outlined above. It is to the extent and nature of 
economic decline in the case study region that the chapter now turns.
5.2 Regional Economic Decline in Western Scotland1
Before providing some background data on the regional economy of Western 
Scotland, it is first necessary to explain what constitutes that administrative region. 
The present Western Scotland (Objective 2) development programme is based largely 
on the boundaries of Scotland’s largest local authority, Strathclyde Regional Council. 
The region is geographically located at the north western periphery of the European 
Union (see Map 5.1). The first programme of ERDF expenditure (as opposed to
1 For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that the region under focus constitutes west central 
Scotland, and not the Objective 1 region of the Highlands and Islands or the Objective Sb region of 
Dumfries and Galloway. The current Objective 2 programme in west central Scotland is nevertheless 
called the 'Western Scotland Programme' and it is to this area that the term is applied herein.
individual project assistance) to be implemented in the west of Scotland was the 
Glasgow National Programme of Community Interest (NPCI), approved by the 
European Commission on 12 December 1985. This programme was centred on 
Glasgow, essentially the area covered by the City of Glasgow District Council. The 
financially larger Integrated Development Operation approved three years later was 
expanded to cover most of the region of Strathclyde.2 In 1993, the West of Scotland 
Objective 2 area had a population of 2.3 million, 45% of the total for Scotland, 
reflecting Strathclyde's anomalous size relative to Scotland as a whole.
The Western Scotland programme covers a differentiated area embracing 
'isolated rural areas, free-standing communities dependent on declining coal and steel 
industries, new towns with modem, expanding industries and the multi-faceted 
economic and urban problems apparent through the continuous built-up area of the 
Clydeside conurbation - perhaps a greater range of types of area than any other local 
authority in Britain' (Roger Tym & Partners 1984: 5). However, the region is most 
noted for the heavy industry which long dominated the economy and society of 
Western Scotland. The decline of heavy industry left a pattern of economic and urban 
problems throughout the urbanised areas of the region, notably in the built-up area 
centred on Glasgow and running along the valley of the River Clyde from Paisley and 
Dumbarton in the west to Motherwell and Airdrie in the east. The geographical 
location of Glasgow as a sea port on Scotland's west coast had earlier allowed the city 
to grow rapidly through trade (in tobacco then cotton) with imperial markets to 
become the commercial centre of Scotland after the Act of Union with England in the 
early 18th century. However, by the late 19th century and the decline of the cotton 
trade following the American civil war, the heavy industries for which west central 
Scotland was to become renowned had taken root. The discovery of extensive coal 
and iron ore deposits along the River Clyde led to the emergence of the Glasgow city- 
region as a cradle of industrial development. The period from the 1870s to the First 
World War is generally regarded as the region's period of greatest prosperity with 
expansion in steel-making, textile production and locomotive manufacture, but most 
notably in shipbuilding and marine engineering. Boasting its title as The Second City 
of the Empire', Glasgow was the centre of a thriving region which rated within the 
first six in Europe in terms of productivity and population in this period (Checkland 
1981; Keating 1988). The narrowness of this industrial base and its subsequent 
decline, however, have been the dominant influences on the development of the 
economy in west central Scotland.
2 The IDO did not cover all of the Strathclyde Regional Council area, since it excluded those rural parts 
of the region falling within the operational area of Highland Enterprise (see below). Moreover, it 
included the Sanquhar area of Dumfries and Galloway (Pieda pic 1993. I).
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Its long industrial heritage indelibly marked the post-war development of west 
central Scotland. The vulnerability of the industrial economy to the recession of the 
1930s had been apparent, only to be masked again by the immediate post-war boom in 
industrial production. Stôhr has highlighted the economic problems of areas dependent 
on heavy industry, pointing out that 'especially urgent restructuring problems are 
usually encountered in "old" industrial areas. Their structural conditions mostly go 
back to the first industrialization wave based on mass production of standardized 
commodities and on what is termed Taylorist or Fordist production technology, 
making maximum use of economies of scale* (1990: 7). The consequent domination of 
heavy industrial economies by a small number of large firms hindered economic 
diversification, to the extent that when such areas began to experience decline, the 
economic impact was very often highly concentrated in the specific area.
By the late 1950s the first signs of terminal decline in the economy of west 
central Scotland were appearing, but it is the period since the early 1970s which have 
received most scholarly attention. A general phase of 'de-industrialisation of 
unprecedented intensity and generality' in the traditional industrial regions of the UK 
has been dated from that time:
The most significant effect has been the extensive restructuring of 
capital across almost every sector of industry, through the 
rationalisation of capacity and the divestment and closure of plants. In 
many cases this 'slimming down' and dévalorisation of domestic 
industrial capital has been accompanied by an acceleration in the 
multinationalisation and internationalisation of production as firms 
have switched activity overseas in search of higher profits, lower costs 
and new markets ... the cost has been a massive reduction in 
employment, a decline of more than two million jobs (or 28%) since 
1976 (Martin 1989:29-30).
In west central Scotland, the impact of deindustrialisation was particularly severe as 
heavy job losses followed from the decline in the traditionally dominant heavy 
industries upon which the strength of the area had been based at the beginning of the 
century.
Table 5.1: Decline in Key Manufacturing Industries in Strathclyde (1976-1986)
Number of Jobs Lost 
1976-1986
Percentage Reduction 
in Employment
Metal Manufacturing 15,000 50%
Vehicle Production 17,500 56%
Shipbuilding 13,200 44%
Textiles 12,700 . 44%
Mechanical Engineering 34,400 53%
Source Industry Department for Scotland/Strathclyde Regional Council (1987) Strathclyde IDO
Programme Submission (Edinburgh: The Scottish Office)
The 1987 submission to the European Commission for a programme of 
assistance in regional economic conversion revealed the scale of the de­
industrialisation process in Strathclyde. Table 5.1 illustrates the scale of decline in key 
sectors of manufacturing industry in Strathclyde between 1976 and 1986. According to 
the figures of Strathclyde Regional Council, in the decade to 1987 approximately
165.000 manufacturing jobs were lost in Strathclyde - a fall of 48%, compared with a 
fall of 31% in Scotland, and 28% in the UK as a whole (Industry Department for 
Scotland/Strathclyde Regional Council 1987: 43). Manufacturing industries' share of 
total employment in Western Scotland fell from around 42% in the late 1960s to 18% 
in 1991, while, in common with many other traditional industrial regions, the service 
sector's share in total employment increased correspondingly to 62% in 1981 and 
again to 71% in 1991 (The Scottish Office/Strathclyde European Partnership 1994: 4, 
79).
Despite the rise in service sector jobs, net employment in the region has 
declined. The net loss in the number of jobs across the region is striking. In 1981,
895.000 people were employed in the region. By 1991 this figure had fallen to 850,000 
[with a forecast of further reductions to 780,000 by 2001] (ibid.: 4, 79). The erstwhile 
locational advantage of the region had become a disadvantage in the post-war years as 
the focus of sea trade had shifted to the east, from the Commonwealth to Europe, 
thereby rendering Strathclyde a 'peripheral' region of Europe. The development of the 
North Sea oil fields in the 1970s brought little direct benefit to Strathclyde, in much 
the same way as the manufacture of'newer* products such as cars and light engineering 
in general had previously passed the region by. The result has been consistently high 
rates of unemployment, the worst effects of which were felt between 1981 and 1988 in 
the region. Total unemployment rates stayed between 17% and 19.5% during that
period, while male unemployment reached 25% in 1986. To an extent these figures 
disguise the severity of the problem. Not only were the numerous changes by the 
Conservative Government in this period to the means for calculating unemployment 
figures widely greeted with scepticism, but unemployment black-spots exist behind 
the regional figure. Pockets of unemployment of over 60% were experienced in the 
worst hit communities in the region (Russell 1992: 1-2).
In summary, the regional economy of west central Scotland has been 
characterised by a stark decline in numbers in employment, a shift to the service 
sector, and the 'suburbanisation' of employment (Lever & Mather 1986: 2). One 
consequence of the phenomenon of suburbanisation has been the accumulation of 
large amounts of derelict land in urban areas. The 1994 development plan for the 
region submitted to the European Commission showed the scale of this environmental 
problem, pointing to 5,700 hectares of vacant and derelict land in the area, 40% of 
which had been left untreated since before 1981 (The Scottish Office/Strathclyde 
European Partnership 1994:4). More generally, Lever and Mather suggest that what is 
most startling about the post-war changes is not that they have altered the character of 
the city of Glasgow and its economic hinterland, but the speed at which the changes 
have taken place (1986: 1). The result of this rate of change has been to make the 
problems of structural transition particularly acute: 'it is perhaps because Glasgow, and 
the whole of the West Central Scotland conurbation, has experienced more acute 
economic and environmental problems than any other British • or indeed European - 
city that it has become a laboratory for experimental urban policy' (ibid.: 1).
The nature of the regional and urban policy initiatives taken within the 
domestic policy framework is summarised in Appendix 2. For the purposes of this 
chapter, it is important simply to note three fundamental points concerning the nature 
of regional policy in the UK in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Firstly, and most 
simply, total levels of domestic expenditure on regional policy (at around £300 
million in 1992-93 excluding urban policy expenditure) are now less than annual EC 
Structural Fund receipts there (around £650 million in 1992). Secondly, the 
approaches of British regional policy and European regional policy are fundamentally 
different. Not only is the spatial focus under British regional policy generally much 
smaller (Appendix 2 details the historic focus on unemployment "black-spots' and the 
recent shift of emphasis to urban areas), but there is no concept there of integrated 
economic development planning. Similarly, it should be noted that British regional 
policy is targeted at the private sector (Regional Selective Assistance and Regional 
Enterprise Grant are paid directly to firms) while the Structural Funds aim 
overwhelmingly to encourage economic planning by the public sector. Thirdly, as 
suggested in earlier chapters of this thesis, many of the changes over the 1980s can be
encapsulated in the notion of a shift to local economic development. Stôhr has 
summarised this shift in regional policy in terms of the following changes: from a 
focus on regional growth to a focus on regional innovation strategies; from centralised 
to decentralised organisational forms; from inter-regional redistribution to the 
mobilisation of regional resources. Policy instruments involving capital, a few large 
manufacturing firms and individual projects have been replaced by programmes 
involving information, numerous small flexible firms and technology services (1989: 
192).3 Bennett and Krebs, who provide an excellent summary of this shift in 
emphasis, stress the need for a multi-faceted approach to local economic development 
and hence the need to co-ordinate a multitude of actors. The combination of top- 
down leadership and financial resources’ with 'bottom-up sensitivity and expertise' 
requires effective partnership arrangements (1991: 6). It is to the partners in the 
European financed development contract for Western Scotland that this analysis now 
turns.
S3 'The Partners': Economic Development Actors in Western Scotland
The post-war commitment of successive governments in the UK to regional 
economic development policy was substantially scaled down during the 1980s, as 
detailed in Appendix 2. In this same period, the absence of a 'régionalisation' of state 
functions, despite significant pressure 'from below1, singled the UK out against the 
dominant trend in western Europe (Crouch & Marquand 1989). The Report of the 
Royal Commission on the Constitution - the so-called Kilbrandon Report - had stated 
in 1973 that "the United Kingdom is the largest unitary state in Europe and among the 
most centralised of the major industrial countries of the world' (1973: 87). The well- 
documented failure of the subsequent devolution bills in Parliament led to the 
downfall of the Labour government in 1979 and the return of the Conservatives to 
government, ironically marking the beginning of a period of further centralisation and 
local expenditure controls within the UK. However, it is not within the scope of this 
research to speculate on the potential implications of greater decentralisation or a 
separate Scottish legislature on policies for economic development or wider relations 
with the European Union.4 By contrast, as stated above, the purpose of this case study 
is to test the applicability and utility of the model of policy implementation as 
incomplete contracting.
3 Benington and Geddes (1992) link this shift to the 'neo-liberal hegemony' in the broader economic 
agenda of the time, with its focus on private sector led local initiatives and partnerships to improve local 
labour market conditions.
4 See Bachtler, Downes and Yuill (1993) or Brunskill (1992) for examples of such speculation
The reasons for selecting Western Scotland as the case study region were set 
out in the introductory chapter. Although not guiding the selection of Western 
Scotland (not least because the perspective adopted in this research is that of the 
European Commission and not the regional actors), the set of institutions involved in 
the implementation of ERDF programmes there should now be sketched. This section 
introduces the key participants in the partnership process, although all 140 or so 
obviously cannot be considered. An introduction to the key 'partners', and an 
examination of how they have 'geared themselves up' for the ERDF process, is 
essential to the subsequent analysis of their efforts to prepare a coherent regional 
development contract between themselves. The Scottish Office Industry Department, 
Directorate-General XVI of the European Commission itself, the local authorities, the 
Scottish Enterprise Network and some of the other public sector partners to the 
contract are therefore introduced in the remainder of this section. As suggested by the 
model of incomplete contracting, the maintenance of the relationship itself is valued 
by participants, even if a key feature of the partnership is change as new actors 
emerge, as public bodies are privatised and lose eligibility, or as shifts in programme 
priorities bring in new actors. Over time, the number of partners has increased 
dramatically. A central actor from the outset has obviously been central government 
in the form of the Scottish Office.
5.3.1 The Scottish Office Industry Department
While it was emphasised in the introductory chapter that the Scottish trinity of 
separate identity, institutions and interests is of marginal concern to this study, the 
existence and operation of the Scottish Office can only be understood in such a 
context. The creation of the Scottish Office in 1885 and its subsequent development 
have been considered elsewhere (Keating & Midwinter 1983; Kellas 1984).5 The 
office was set up as a 'concession to Scottish sentiment', just as the Welsh Office was 
set up as a concession to Welsh sentiment (Hanham 1969): in other words, the UK 
territorial ministries 'are there because Scotland and Wales are there' (Kellas & 
Madgwick 1982: 11). According to Kellas (1991b), full integration of Scotland into 
the English public administration system is effectively blocked by the separate 
national system of Scots law, education, religion and local government, all of which 
pre-date the 1707 Act of Union and are guaranteed by that Union. Administration in 
Scotland is therefore principally the responsibility of the Scottish Office, headed by
5 The Scottish Office pre-dates the other two territorial ministries in the UK by several decades: the 
Welsh Office was established in 1964 and the Northern Ireland Office in 1972. The Scottish Office was 
based initially in London, until its move to Edinburgh in 1939 at a time when the competencies of the 
Secretary of the State for Scotland were expanded.
the Secretary of State for Scotland who by tradition sits in the Cabinet. However, the 
territorially specific remit of the Secretary of State for Scotland complicates his role 
as the head of a department of central government. His job as a Cabinet minister 
subject to the convention of collective responsibility is notoriously difficult to 
decipher.6 Nevertheless, it should be emphasised that despite administrative 
devolution, the Scottish Office remains an integral part of central government 
responsible to Westminster government.7
The departments of the Scottish Office in Edinburgh allow the Secretary of 
State for Scotland responsibility in a variety of fields which would be the 
responsibility of several functional departments in England. The Scottish Office 
currently comprises five departments: The Scottish Office Agriculture and Fisheries 
Department, The Scottish Office Environment Department, responsible for housing, 
local government issues and other environmental services; The Scottish Office Home 
and Health Department, responsible for police, prisons, criminal justice, fire services 
and the National Health Service; The Scottish Office Education Department; and The 
Scottish Office Industry Department. In addition there is also a Central Services Unit 
responsible for personnel and finance.8 Keating and Midwinter point out that 'some 
observers have commented that, by bringing together a wide range of functions under 
a single Minister, the Scottish Office is able to take a more 'corporate' view of policy 
and administration and to achieve a greater degree of co-ordination than is possible in 
England' (1983: 16). Indeed, it is suggested below that programming is made more 
difficult in England by the fact that the Department of Trade and Industry 
(responsible for ERDF projects financed from revenue expenditure) and the 
Department of the Environment (responsible for ERDF projects financed from capital 
expenditure) have often disagreed about the balance between capital and revenue- 
financed projects there.
The most relevant of the five departments of the Scottish Office for this 
analysis of the ERDF is the Scottish Office Industry Department (SODD), the 
department responsible for the development of enterprise in Scotland' (Departments 
of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Forestry Commission 1993: 35). An
6 The extent to which the Secretary of State exercises autonomy from Westminster in the policy fields 
dealt with by the Scottish Office is a matter of considerable debate Key contributions to this debate, 
which need not concern us here, can be found in Keating and Midwinter (1983: 18-24), Kell as and 
Madgwick (1982), and Keating and Carter (1987).
7 Rhodes argues that because it is 'more than just another department of central government', the 
Scottish Office has a quasi-intermediate status between local and central government and can be 
considered under his definition of'sub-central government' (1986: 38). In terms of the analysis presented 
herein, Rhodes' qualification of the status of the Scottish Office is disputed. The Scottish Office shares 
the Department of Trade and Industry line on all issues (such as additionality) which are contested with 
the European Commission and sub-national actors.
8 With around 10,000 civil servants, the Scottish Office is comparable in terms of number of staff to the 
Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, or the European Commission.
expansion of Scottish Office tasks in the industrial field occurred in the 1960s, largely 
in response to concern at the performance of the Scottish economy and the need to 
improve physical and economic planning. The Scottish Development Department 
(SDD) was set up within the Scottish Office in 1962 to bring together major 
environmental, planning and local government responsibilities.9 In 1973 the Scottish 
Economic Planning Department (SEPD) was set up by the Heath Government and 
took over the economic responsibilities of the SDD. In 1975 the SEPD was further 
expanded when it took responsibility for the newly-created Scottish Development 
Agency (see below). The change of name in *1983 from the Scottish Economic 
Planning Department to the Industry Department for Scotland (IDS) was designed to 
emphasise the Thatcher Government's rejection of planning' (Keating 1988: 35). The 
Industry Department in turn was renamed the Scottish Office Industry Department in 
January 1991. Among the Departments' main tasks, those currently of most relevance 
to the ERDF are:
• directly, or through sponsored bodies (Scottish Enterprise) to provide financial 
aid and/or advisory support for competitive firms, entrepreneurship, inward 
investment, export and training;
• to ensure that the markets in land and capital meet the needs of new or 
expanding enterprise;
• to support urban regeneration, development in rural areas and tourism through 
the Scottish Tourist Board, Scottish Enterprise and Highlands and Islands 
Enterprise and to supervise the work of those bodies and the New Town 
Development Corporations;
• to secure the building and the maintenance of the trunk road system, to allocate 
resources for local authority roads and transport systems; and,
• to co-ordinate Scottish Office interest in EC matters not otherwise allocated and 
to secure assistance to appropriate areas from European Structural Funds 
(Departments of the Secretary of State for Scotland and the Forestry 
Commission 1993: 35).
The overarching aim of the SOID under the Conservative Government has 
been to enhance the role of private enterprise in the economy’ (ibid.: 34). As such, it 
oversees the Scottish aspects of regional policies both in a UK and an EC context. 
Given the weight of such issues in contemporary Scottish political debate, SOID is 
'the most politically significant and sensitive of all Scottish Office departments', 
despite the fact that it is the smallest of the five with around 300 civil servants (Moore 
& Booth 1989:24).
Since the creation of the ERDF in 1975, there had been an understanding in 
the UK that Scotland should receive a predetermined proportion of the Funds,
9 This was the model later followed in England with the creation of the giant Department of the 
Environment (Keating & Midwinter 1983: IS).
estimated as around one quarter of the eligible sum for the UK (House of Lords 1981: 
xii). While the lead department in dealing with the Commission on ERDF issues was 
the Department of Industry (now the Department of Trade and Industry), the Scottish 
Economic Planning Department was responsible for eliciting and administering 
applications. Indeed, it has been suggested that the SEPD was quick to perceive the 
potential of the ERDF for Scotland. It issued the necessary ’green light' circular in 
1975 allowing local authorities to apply for ERDF aid earlier than the Department of 
the Environment did to English local authorities, to the resentment of local authorities 
in English Assisted Areas (Leitch 1989: 18). Keating and Midwinter suggested in the 
early years of the ERDF that, as a result of the 'multi-functional nature of the Scottish 
Office and close links with local authorities and firms, it is able very rapidly to 
produce lists of schemes' (1983: 91). In respect of the implementation of European 
structural policies, the administrative demands of increased programming have 
necessitated an increased level of resources within the Scottish Office.
Interview sources have indicated that the European Funds Division was set up 
within the Industry Department for Scotland in 1987, after the approval of the 
National Programme of Community Interest for Glasgow but during the application 
process for an Integrated Development Operation for Strathclyde. The number of 
Scottish Office staff involved in the implementation of ERDF actions increased from 
five to seven at the time of the 1984 ERDF Regulation (House of Lords 1984: 24) and 
again to 23 after the reform of the Structural Funds in 1988.10 The report of the House 
of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities examining the 1988 
reforms confirmed this trend when it expressed concern that 'in the Scottish Office, 
staff costs in administering programmes have roughly trebled since the reform of the 
Structural Funds as opposed to the costs of administering projects before the reform' 
(1992: 21). This number was to increase yet again following a six-month internal 
review in 1990 of the Scottish Office’s involvement in European work. This review, 
organised by the European Funds Division and the Central Research Unit, revealed 
that although the Agriculture and Fisheries Department and the Industry Department 
were most involved in European-related work, they were by no means unique in this 
respect.11 Of the 117 Scottish Office divisions surveyed, a total of 89 had some degree 
of involvement in European policy areas. Around 20% of staff were involved in
10 interview with Senior Executive Officer, European Funds and Co-ordination Division (Programme 
Management Unit), Scottish Office Industry Department; Edinburgh, 9 January 1992.
11 Interestingly, Gowans suggests that 'without exception' in 1984, the Scottish Office officials in 
Edinburgh and UK Permanent Representation officials in Brussels he interviewed believed that there 
was no need for a co-ordinating unit within the Scottish Office, whether located in Edinburgh or 
Brussels (1984: 73). The Scottish Office's own staff newspaper Scoop!, Issues No. 9 and No 10 of 
September and December 1991 respectively provide details of the internal review of European activities 
and the creation of the European Central Support Unit
European related work. A decision was therefore taken to set up a central focal point 
for this work, the European Central Support Unit, to organise seminars for staff, 
promote contacts and encourage secondments of Scottish Office staff to European 
institutions. This unit operates within the renamed European Funds and Co­
ordination Division.
The European Funds and Co-ordination Division (EFC) has the general tasks 
of co-ordinating Scottish Office interest in those EC matters not otherwise allocated 
(to Whitehall ministries) and securing assistance from the European Structural Funds. 
The Division's three main objectives are specified as follows:
• to ensure the maximum benefit for Scotland from the European Structural 
Funds;
• to help ensure that EC policy takes full account of distinctive Scottish 
features, and that the Scottish Office takes full account of the EC dimension in 
devising and executing its own policies;
• to consider any implications for Scotland of the amendments to the European 
Treaties agreed at the European Council in December 1991, particularly in 
relation to the Committee of the Regions.12
To these ends the Division consists of six Branches and has a staff 
complement of around 30. Three of these branches are primarily policy-oriented: one 
implementing the aforementioned European review; one on general Structural Funds 
policy such as the review of regulations; and one on Community Initiatives and the 
European Social Fund. The other three branches form what is known as the 
Programme Management Unit. These three latter branches are therefore of greater 
interest for this research: one branch deals with financial estimates and auditing; one 
deals with the management and monitoring of programmes in the Objective 2 region 
of Eastern Scotland; and one deals with the management of programmes in Scottish 
rural areas. Interestingly, no branch exists exclusively for the Objective 2 region of 
Western Scotland, given the existence of the independent Programme Executive there 
(analysed in chapter 6). One Higher Executive Officer acts as the regular liaison with 
the Programme Executive, spending around half her time in the Scottish Office in 
Edinburgh and the other half with the Executive in Glasgow. The three branches in 
the Programme Management Unit are grouped together under a Grade 6 (Senior 
Principal) civil servant and all come together under a Grade 5 (Assistant Secretary) 
official.13 The Grade 5 chairs all the CSF Monitoring Committees in Scotland and is 
in regular contact with his opposite number in the Department of Trade and Industry
12 'Introductory Staff Development and Training Strategy for EFC Division', unpublished Scottish Office 
document, February 1993, typescript, p. 1.
13 See Drewry and Butcher (1988: 63-67) on the structure of grades in the UK civil service.
(DTI) in England, who is the lead civil servant for the implementation of the ERDF in 
the UK.
Evidence regarding the relationship between EFC Division in the Scottish 
Office and government departments in England is extremely difficult to gather given 
the sensitive political nature of such questions.14 Gowans provides a sanitised inside 
account of the Scottish Office role in promoting Scottish interests in Europe through 
central government channels, emphasising the opaque process of the 'inter-Whitehall 
letter' as a vehicle for resolving inter-departmental disputes (1984: 67). In general, it 
can be stated that the intensity of Scottish Office contacts with the DTI, the lead 
department on ERDF issues, varies according to the stage of the implementation 
process. Regular inter-departmental meetings took place during the negotiation of the 
Regulations in 1988 (and again during their re-negotiation in 1992). Meetings are also 
convened with the DTI, the Treasury, the Department of Transport, the Department of 
Employment (on ESF matters), the other territorial ministries, and the Department of 
the Environment (responsible for local government and land use planning in England) 
to discuss the government line on the preparation of development plans and 
programmes. While the Scottish Office undertook the preparation of the plans for 
Scottish regions in 1989, the co-ordination of the plans for the UK as a whole was 
undertaken by the DTI. The suggestion by one Welsh Office official that the DTI 
really just provided a 'post office' service for the territorial ministries, passing 
programmes on to the office of the UK Permanent Representative in Brussels for 
submission to the Commission (House of Lords 1988: 18) seems to underestimate the 
DTI role. Indeed, Keating suggests that the increased political saliency of the 
Structural Funds in recent years has led to a tendency to UK-wide uniformity:
(I)ronically, the reform, intended to provide a greater regional 
input, has produced greater uniformity within the UK than existed 
before. The lead role of the Department of Trade and Industry has 
been strengthened and all UK Community Support Frameworks must 
be drawn up within strict Whitehall and Treasury guidelines, leaving 
little room for local experimentation' (1994:235-236).
While the respective roles of the Department of the Environment and the DTI 
in regional planning have long been an area of contention, and hence Keating's 
observation is particularly apt for the relationship between the two, such tensions are 
largely avoided in Scotland given the Scottish Office's multi-functional territorial
14 A lightweight inside account of the general process of Cabinet Office co-ordination of European 
issues is provided by Bender (1991). Preston (1984) describes the participation of Scottish Office civil 
servants in the Fund Management and Regional Policy Committees which existed at that time. Keating 
and Waters (1985) and Keating (1994) provide general accounts of the wider representation of Scottish 
interests at the European level.
remit. Identification of points of conflict between the Scottish Office and the DTI 
regarding programme implementation (i.e. after the allocation of resources to each 
regional programme) is extremely difficult given the secrecy of the inter-departmental 
meetings. Moreover, as suggested above, on all the major points of contention 
between central government and the European Commission, publicly the Scottish 
Office is obviously in complete agreement with the DTI. The role of the Scottish 
Office's EFC Division in chairing meetings and generally co-ordinating Structural 
Fund activity in Scotland is examined in greater detail below. Attention now turns to 
the European Commission, for whom the costs of programming have also entailed an 
increase in the internal resources devoted to the implementation of Structural Funds 
programmes.
5.3.2 The European Commission: Directorate-GeneralXVI
Since the introduction of the principles of programming and partnership in 
ERDF actions in Western Scotland, the European Commission must be considered as 
a partner in the European-funded development contract for the region. More 
specifically, the Directorate-General for Regional Policy (DG XVI) has played a key 
role and its general organisation should be sketched in this section. Given the paucity 
of studies of DG XVI as an organisation, this sketch draws heavily on the work of 
Hooghe (1993) as well as interviews and the internal guide des services for that 
Directorate-General. DG XVI is the key actor at the European level with a direct 
involvement in regional development planning. As Hooghe has pointed out, the 
Commission administration can most accurately be characterised as a 'confederation 
of DGs than as a unified civil service’, and within that system DG XVI is the 'informal 
heavyweight in the Structural Funds realm’ (1993:5,23).'5
The existence of a Directorate-General for Regional Policy pre-dates the 
existence of the ERDF. Regional policy issues were originally the responsibility of 
one small division of the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, 
which was essentially a study and planning unit (Lind & Flockton 1970: 38). 
Increasing interest in regional policy in the European Commission during the 1960s 
led to a series of reports and culminated in the establishment of a Directorate-General 
for Regional Policy (DG XVI) in 1968, following the merger of the executives of the
15 After the 1988 Structural Fund reforms, DG XVI was given the chef de file  role over Objectives 1, 2 
and 5b, while DG V (Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs) took the lead over the ESF 
funded Objectives 3 and 4. A member of the Cabinet of the Regional Policy Commissioner (interviewed 
on 25 November 1994) identified a certain 'frustration' among DG V officials who were required to 
follow the DG XVI policy lead in Monitoring Committee meetings for Objective 2 programmes in the 
UK. This was confirmed (in an interview on the same date) by a Desk Officer in DG V with 
responsibility for UK programmes
three original Communities (Von der Groeben 1969: 2). Regional policy was then 
separated from general economic policy when Lord Thomson became the first 
Commissioner solely responsible for regional policy in 1973. In these early years DG 
XVI was made up of just two directorates: co-ordination, programmes and studies on 
the one hand, and financial operations on the other. Although the number of 
personnel in DG XVI approximately tripled around the time of the 1984 ERDF 
Regulation, with the introduction of early forms of programming and indicative 
allocation ranges, the structure of the DG remained substantially unchanged.16 In 
October 1986, when Eneko Landaburu became the new Director General, DG XVI 
was divided into three directorates: guidelines and priorities; programmes and 
integrated operations; and project finance. In addition, a horizontal unit for financial 
management and co-ordination was directly responsible to the Director General.
More radical organisational changes were prompted by the 1988 Structural 
Fund reforms.17 In evidence to the House of Lords Select Committee on the European 
Communities at that time, Department of the Environment Officials expressed the 
opinion that a strengthening of the programming principle might entail 'considerable 
staff savings' for the European Commission. By contrast, when the Select Committee 
had reported on the ERDF in 1984, Pierre Mathijsen (then Director General of DG 
XVI) had doubted that staff could simply be transferred from project appraisal to 
programmes as different skills were involved Even if that were not the case, 
Commission officials appearing before the Select Committee in 1988 suggested that 
the required increase in monitoring alone meant that simple redeployment of staff 
would be inadequate (House of Lords 1988: 13). Hooghe has found that, in the event, 
total staff numbers did not increase despite the doubling of the funds and the 
increased workload involved in programming and Community Initiatives (1993: 19). 
Subsequent staff shortages were dealt with largely by secondment of regional and 
national civil servants, who accounted for 30% of A grade staff in DG XVI early in 
1993, a figure four times higher than that in 1989. This provided DG XVI with the 
greater expertise needed to operate the system of programming, as did the moves to 
attract more economists and less engineers, and the flattening of the hierarchical
16 Assistant to Director General (responsible for regional policy advice), DG XVI; Brussels, 20 March 
1992.
17 It should be emphasised that the Directorate-General for the Co-ordination of Structural Policies (DG 
XXII), established in 1986 and abolished in 1992, played only a marginal role in the implementation of 
programmes. Hooghe (1993) provides a useful account of the rise and fall of DG XXII which 
demonstrates both the influence of French planning ideas in the 1988 Structural Fund reforms and the 
political weight of DG XVI in the internal Commission politics surrounding structural policies. DG 
XXII was weak by comparison. Department of Employment officials in the UK suggested that it was 
simply 'an organisation searching for a role', while Department of the Environment officials detected a 
'power battle' as early as 1988 between DG XXII and the larger, more established Directorates-General, 
i.e. DG V, DG VI, DG XVI (House of Lords 1988: 14). Hooghe (1993) maps DG XXffs gradual 
decline until its abolition in December 1992.
structure of the DG through the expansion in the number of senior posts by 60% 
(ibid.: 20).
In 1989 DG XVI was re-organised. Five directorates were set up, with three 
corresponding to the priority Objectives set out under the Structural Fund reforms. 
Two directorates became responsible for Objective 1 expenditure: Directorate B was 
responsible for Greece, Ireland, Northern Ireland and Portugal; Directorate C was 
responsible for Spain, France and Italy. Objective 2, Objective 5b and ECSC 
conversion measures for all member states were grouped together in Directorate D. 
These three operational Directorates were flanlced by two 'horizontal* directorates. 
Directorate A constituted an internal policy think tank’, while Directorate E dealt 
with practical issues such as financial control, relations with other Community 
institutions and publicity. In addition, a unit for the co-ordination of actions was 
established to report directly to the Director General.
Hooghe has emphasised the desire of DG XVTs senior management to keep 
units 'multinational', that is to avoid 'national capture' of any unit (1993: 20). On the 
one hand, there was a need to appoint desk-officers with responsibility’ for regions 
within a given member state who appreciate the policy styles and understand the 
policy environment in that state (or at an even more basic level are able to speak the 
language). On the other, there was a reluctance to staff units completely with 
nationals of the states with which they were dealing. In general terms, Directorates A 
and E (the non-implementation Directorates) are the most 'multi-national'. In the case 
of the UK, however, language is generally less of a barrier to a non-national desk- 
officer than in the case of Greece. In fact, the desk-officer within Directorate D (the 
Directorate of concern in this study) responsible for Scottish Objective 2 programmes 
is Dutch, the Head of Unit for most of the period in concern was Greek (and was 
replaced in 1993 by an Italian), while the Director is English. It should be stressed 
that the Dutch desk-officer in particular, who visits Scotland almost monthly and is in 
daily contact with partners there, has worked on Scottish ERDF projects and 
programmes since the early 1980s. Interviews suggest that this continuity has allowed 
a level of trust to be built up between many local actors in Western Scotland and the 
European Commission representative for Scottish Objective 2 regions.18
Some consideration should now be given to the relevant regional and local 
actors involved in EC regional economic development policy in Scotland. Local 
authorities have traditionally absorbed the majority of ERDF resources there.
18 At the time of writing, DG XVI is currently re-organising its internal organisational structure again. 
Directorates will be organised along national lines in future rather than according to Objectives. This can 
be interpreted as a further re-nationalisation of European regional policy relative to the 1989 situation, 
since national interests will be institutionalised for the first time in the form of separate Directorates 
within DG XVI.
5.3.3 The Local Authorities
Since 1975 Scotland has had a two-tier system of local government by virtue of 
the Local Government (Scotland) Act of 1973. This Act reduced the number of 
authorities to the present system of nine regional councils, 53 district councils and 
three single-tier all-purpose authorities for the islands of Orkney, Shetland and the 
Western Isles. The debate surrounding the Wheatley Commission (the 1966-1969 
Royal Commission on Local Government in'Scotland) which preceded the re­
organisation has been thoroughly covered elsewhere (Keating 1988: 35-43). What is 
important to note in this context is the division of responsibilities between the two 
levels of local government on the Scottish mainland. This division is reflected in the 
implementation of ERDF projects. Regional council responsibilities directly relevant 
to economic development (and hence ERDF purposes) include the following: roads, 
public transport, water supply and sewerage, industrial development (through business 
support schemes), vocational training (regional council financed Further Education 
Colleges received ESF support), and, more indirectly, strategic land use planning. 
District council responsibilities most relevant to the ERDF include the provision of 
industrial sites and premises, environmental improvements, the provision of facilities 
for tourists, waste management, and local development plan approvals. Since the issue 
of the 'green light' circular (noted above) from the Scottish Office to the local 
authorities shortly after their creation in 1975, local authorities in Scotland have been 
recipients of ERDF aid.
It should be emphasised that the period addressed herein coincides with a 
period in which central-local government relations in the UK have experienced a 
period of 'extreme turbulence' (Keating 1988: 91). As Brunskill suggests, *to 
understand the UK's approach to "partnership", it is first necessary to understand the 
political environment in the UK during the 1980s, as that decade 'marked the end of 
consensus politics' (1992: 6). Although the UK is a unitary state in which the principle 
of parliamentary sovereignty allows central government theoretically unlimited 
powers, the tradition of local self-government there had long been respected (Keating 
1988: 31). Post-war developments such as central government's acceptance of 
responsibility for economic management, the growth of the welfare state, and the 
domination of local election campaigns by national party issues blurred the erstwhile 
distinction between central and local government affairs in the UK, as elsewhere in 
Europe (ibid.: 31-32). Duncan and Goodwin (1988) date the current wave of tension to 
the mid-1970s, and the economic depression following the oil crisis of 1973. 
Reductions in public spending became a sine qua non of controlling inflation and
containing real wage levels, and hence tighter controls on local government 
expenditure were introduced. The election of the Conservative government in 1979 
saw such controls progressively tightened, as well as further restraints on local 
government competencies through reducing the public provision of home ownership, 
the privatisation and deregulation of services, and the promotion of compulsory 
competitive tendering for services. The stated rationale for such legislation was 
generally that it would improve local government through improved accountability', 
service delivery, consumer choice and value for money (Carmichael 1992). It is the 
tightening of spending controls that is of more relevance to this study.
A great weakness of the local government reform in Scotland in the mid- 
1970s, according to Keating, was the failure to consider local government finance, 
'which was to prove the major issue of contention and the pretext for a drastic 
weakening of local government in the following decade’ (1988: 42). The details of the 
successive pieces of legislation reducing the financial autonomy of local government 
in the 1980s and early 1990s need not be explored here (see Midwinter 1980; Butcher, 
Law, Leach & Mullard 1990; Gibson 1992; John 1994a). It is sufficient to note that 
local autonomy under both categories of local government expenditure (capital and 
revenue) was significantly reduced. Controls on revenue expenditure (spending on 
consumables such as staff costs and materials), financed through a mixture of Revenue 
Support Grant (previously Rate Support Grant), business rates, charges on user 
services, and Council Tax (previously domestic rates and then the Poll Tax) have been 
extremely high profile political issues in the UK over the last decade. Similarly, 
however, controls on capital expenditure (spending on the creation of fixed assets) 
through central government's ability to set capital allocation ceilings, as explained in 
chapter 3, have also continued over this period. Against this austere background, and 
despite central government's operation of a strict policy of non-additionality as 
explained in chapters 3 and 4 above, local authorities sought to attract ERDF resources 
in order to reduce their borrowing requirements and hence benefit in their revenue 
accounts through savings in loan charges. As Keating suggests, the benefit is not in 
proportion to the publicity given to them [EC funds] or to widespread beliefs in a pot 
of gold waiting in Brussels for any Scots enterprising enough to go and retrieve it; but, 
at a time of severe fiscal pressure, authorities must squeeze the last penny out of any 
source available'(1988:182).
Strathclyde Regional Council, covering almost half the population of Scotland 
and without doubt the most important local authority in political terms there, has 
actively pursued ERDF funding since its creation. From the outset, the newly created 
Regional Council outlined its two main strategic objectives as the maximisation of 
employment and the eradication of multiple deprivation. These were set out in a
document entitled "Regional Report' in 1976, within which the European dimension to 
the objectives was also made explicit: *the Council will endeavour to ensure that 
Strathclyde receives the maximum assistance from other sources including the 
European Community’ (quoted in Leitch 1989: 15). At a glance, the Council's early 
endeavour seems to have been rewarded, since between 1975 and 1983 Strathclyde 
Regional Council received 44.2% of the ERDF awards for infrastructure projects in 
Scotland (Gowans 1984:48).
In the early years of the ERDF, the Roads Department within the Council 
prepared and submitted ERDF project applications. This situation changed in 1980 
with the creation of the Chief Executive's Department, an amalgamation of the former 
departments of Administration and Policy Planning The new Economic Policy Group 
in the Chief Executive's Department played an increasing role in the ERDF process. 
The administration of EEC applications by Strathclyde Regional Council is now 
structured within the Chief Executive's Department, which provides the major 
initiation and policy input using its links to Brussels.19 This Department prepares 
project applications and comments to Council Committees on European issues. 
Individual departments within the Council, most notably Roads and Water and 
Sewerage, continue to draft their own applications with advice from the Chief 
Executive's Department. According to one Council employee, this has had a 
centralising effect within the organisation: the pursuit of European funding has led to 
the emergence of a small group of staff within the Chief Executive's Department who 
have acquired a substantial body of expertise, built up over several years, on the 
workings of these funds. This has been more than useful for the department, and, 
ultimately, for the Chief Executive himself. This has provided an additional source of 
power over other departments, specifically to the already present hierarchical power, 
has been added sapiental power' (Leitch 1989: 54). As shown below, this increase in 
expertise was won through effort over a period of many years trying to adapt to the 
requirements of the programming principle.
Map 5.2: Strathclyde Region and Its Districts
Source: The Scottish Office
In terms of its relationships with the district councils in the area of European 
funding, the progressive strengthening of the programming principle has, if anything, 
strengthened Strathclyde Regional Council vis-à-vis the district councils lying within 
its boundaries (see Map 5.2), given the Region's greater role in strategic planning 
within the area. In the case of the Objective 2 programme for Eastern Scotland, one 
group of consultants found underlying tensions in the relationship between 'city 
districts' - i.e. Dundee District Council - and regional councils - Central, Fife, Tayside 
and Lothian Regional Councils (The Tavistock Institute of Human Relations 1991: 
38), that might conceivably be replicated in Western Scotland. In general, however, 
relationships in Western Scotland are made easier by the existence of one large 
regional council (Strathclyde) covering the vast majority of the eligible area. 
Nevertheless, a general tradition of rivalry between Strathclyde Regional Council and 
Glasgow District Council has been noted, despite the fact that both are controlled by 
the Labour Party (Keating & Boyle 1986: 25). Keating notes that 'as the district [the 
City of Glasgow District Council] is larger in population than any Scottish region 
apart from Strathclyde itself, it has never accepted that it should be treated like the 
other eighteen second tier councils in the region and there is some hankering, 
particularly among the older councillors and permanent officials, for a restoration of 
lost powers' (1988: 72). Potential tensions in the area of ERDF funding are assuaged 
by the councils’joint action to attract support to the area in the first place, and by their 
common stance vis-à-vis central government policy on additionality. The post of 
Special Projects Officer in European Affairs created within the Town Clerk's Office of 
Glasgow District Council does not match the resources of the team in the Chief 
Executive's Department of Strathclyde Regional Council, but it is an initiative that has 
been replicated throughout the districts in Strathclyde (and beyond) in recent years.
It is worth emphasising, in line with the continued focus on local economic 
development initiatives, that local authorities are not only involved in the provision of 
'hardware' infrastructure, but also provide a wide array of business support 
infrastructure and services. McQuaid's review of Scottish local government activity in 
this field found that the majority of authorities produce formal local economic 
development statements, usually after local research and consultation with 
government agencies, voluntary organisations, unions and the private sector. The 
business support services provided by local authorities include the following: 
counselling and advice to existing small firms; working with government agencies to 
attract inward investment; supporting trade development centres; financing quality 
improvement schemes for local firms; aiding the introduction of new technology in 
products and production processes; loans and loan guarantees to small firms; 
providing company training; and collaboration in sector initiatives at the local level,
for example, in tourism strategies (1993:106-108). Many of these activities became 
eligible for ERDF support in eligible areas as the European Commission succeeded 
over time in directing expenditure away from hardware infrastructure to business 
support services.
Finally, it should be noted that the potential causes for tensions that may have 
existed between the two tiers of local government in Scotland have been superceded 
by events to a certain extent. At the time of writing, the Conservative Government is 
pushing through its plans to reorganise Scottish local government again and create a 
one tier system. Since the Conservatives controlled no regions and only three of the 53 
district councils in 1991, this is viewed by opposition parties as a cynical move, 
motivated by party concerns (Hayton 1993; Midwinter 1993). In June 1991, the 
Scottish Office issued its first consultation paper on the subject with which, despite 
hostility and the government's failure to win more than a quarter of votes in Scotland 
at the 1992 General Election, it pushed ahead. The Scottish Office intends to have a 
unitary (single-tier) system in operation in mainland Scotland by April 1996. In its 
second consultation paper in October 1992, the Scottish Office confirmed that all of 
the new authorities will be smaller than Strathclyde, and therefore that some joint 
boards will be necessary for certain functions. Concerning the implementation of EC 
structural policy, the document states the following: 'as regards the implementation of 
European Community obligations, the need for any wider groupings will depend on 
the nature of the obligations relating to particular policy areas. In the operation of the 
Structural Funds, the size of the authority is unlikely to affect its ability to obtain 
support for appropriate projects qualifying for EC assistance, although the detailed 
operation of the Monitoring Committees charged with implementation of Community 
spending will need to be revised to take account of the new structure' (Scottish Office 
1992. 65). According to the government, part of the reason why local government in 
Scotland needed reorganisation was the overall reduction in their competencies, and 
the existence of new organisations such as Local Enterprise Companies. It is to these 
organisations (and their 'grandparent' organisation - the Scottish Development Agency) 
that this examination of the partners now turns.
5.3.4 The Scottish Development Agency ' The Scottish Enterprise Network
Although it existed for only a decade and a half, the Scottish Development 
Agency (SDA) became one of the largest regional development agencies in Europe 
and attracted widespread attention (Kirwan 1982; Halkier 1992). The idea of such an 
agency for Scotland had been around since the inter-war years, but it was the electoral 
advance of the Scottish National Party that provoked the Labour Party to promise an
agency in their October 1974 manifesto to be the main instrument for the regeneration 
of the Scottish economy' (Keating & Boyle 1986: 21). The SDA was duly set up in 
Glasgow in 1975, taking over the functions of a few small industrial corporations and 
gaining responsibility for investment in industry in the form of 'money and 
management services; industrial promotion, particularly the encouragement of 
investment from overseas; and, reluctantly, the coordination of major comprehensive 
urban development schemes - which meant, in fact, the Glasgow Eastern Area 
Renewal (GEAR) project’ (ibid.: 21). In fact, SDA strategy came to focus over the 
years on sectoral initiatives as well as area development. The Secretary of State for 
Scotland sponsored the Agency, through the Industry Department for Scotland, and 
many tasks were financed by grants from central government. As well as issuing 
guidelines for SDA actions, the Secretary of State chose the Members of the Agency's 
board, drawn from business, trade unions and local authorities. The Agency's strategy 
therefore became decidedly less interventionist after 1979 and the election of the 
Thatcher government (Moore & Booth 1989: 34). Following the DTrs 'Enterprise 
Initiative' (considered in Appendix 2), a 'fugitive phase' in the SDA's life cycle has 
been identified by Hood, covering the period from 1988 to 1991, when the whole 
concept of the SDA fell into disfavour with the Government as a result of the growing 
emphasis on 'enterprise culture' (quoted in Taggart 1992: 70). This uneasy phase in the 
Agency's life cycle came to an end with the winding up of the SDA in 1991 and the 
launch of Scottish Enterprise.
The result of an idea of the then Chairman of the Scottish Confederation of 
British Industry in 1988, Scottish Enterprise became operational on 1 April 1991, 
combining the functions of the SDA and the Training Agency in Scotland. The 
Training Agency (previously the Manpower Services Commission) had been the 
Government's principal agency for implementing its training policies in Scotland. 
Scottish Enterprise is a public body established under the Enterprise and New Towns 
(Scotland) Act of 1990. It currently contracts out the majority of its functions and 
expenditure to a network of thirteen Local Enterprise Companies (LECs). Outwith the 
Highlands and Islands (covered by Highlands and Islands Enterprise), the Scottish 
Enterprise Network is now the lead body for economic development, training and 
environmental improvement in Scotland' (House of Lords 1992: 186). Scottish 
Enterprise has the following Statutory Aims:
1. 'furthering the development of Scotland's economy, and in that connection, 
helping to provide, maintain and safeguard employment in Scotland;
2. enhancing skills relevant to employment;
3. fostering self-employment;
4. promoting Scotland's industrial efficiency and international competitiveness; and
5. furthering the improvement of the environment’ (ibid.: 186).
The new approach to economic development has four key elements. Firstly, a 
minimisation of bureaucracy. Secondly, the increased involvement of the private 
sector, since Scottish Enterprise's role is to enable rather than to control or displace, 
the private sector* (ibid.: 186). Intervention should only occur when a market failure 
can clearly be identified. Thirdly, the integration of economic development and 
training functions. Fourthly, decentralisation of initiatives not just to the private sector 
but also to the local level (Hood 1990: 66).20 The thirteen LECs currently operate 
within a policy framework set by Scottish Enterprise, although some strategic level 
functions are retained by the latter. LECs are 'free-standing organisations each having 
a separate and distinct contract with Scottish Enterprise... [to] provide local focus and 
knowledge along with a strong commitment to achieve the training, economic 
development and environmental improvement aims they have set for their areas' 
(House of Lords 1992: 187). LECs have the status of companies limited by guarantee, 
but they are non profit-making and their constitution prohibits them from distributing 
any financial surpluses to directors. They draw their resources from Scottish 
Enterprise, which in turn are provided to the latter by the Secretary of State for 
Scotland through grants and loans (although training resources are determined by the 
Department of Employment in London, in consultation with the Secretary of State for 
Scotland). The Secretary of State issues annual strategic guidance to Scottish 
Enterprise and the LECs around the time that SE's budget is notified to them, in time 
to influence the LEC's detailed operational planning for the year ahead. Each LEC 
therefore formulates a strategy for the development of its area in the context of the 
policy framework previously set out, and these take the form of annual business plans. 
The plans are submitted to Scottish Enterprise and form the basis for a contract 
between the two to deliver programmes and projects up to a level of funding approved 
by the national Network.
It is worth highlighting Glasgow Development Agency (GDA) as an example 
of a LEC. GDA is the largest LEC in terms of both staff (numbering 160 in 1992) and 
budget (£62 million in 1991-92). Following the general guidance laid down by 
Scottish Enterprise, the mission statement of GDA states that:
The Glasgow Development Agency will be the principal agent of 
economic development within an alliance of organisations committed to 
making Glasgow one of the great centres of Europe. We are seeking to 
achieve this for the benefit of the people and businesses of Glasgow and
20 The overlap between these elements and the principles of the Structural Fund reforms was keenly 
argued by Scottish Enterprise officials to the European Commission in 1991, when the officials sought 
(successfully) to ensure that the Scottish Enterprise Network should be eligible for Structural Fund 
support, as the SDA had been before 1991.
in that process to establish a new organisation which is generally 
recognised as among the best development organisations anywhere in the 
world (quoted in Taggart 1992: 70).
While the aim to make Glasgow a great European city and the target of becoming one 
of the world's best development organisations are specific to the Glasgow 
Development Agency, three elements of the statement are emphasised by all other 
LECs: the identification of the LEC as the 'principal agent of economic development' 
within the local economy; the focus on partnership with other local organisations that 
have similar or parallel aims to the LEC; and the emphasis on involvement with the 
private as well as the public sector (Taggart 1992: 71-72).
LECs have greater powers than the corresponding bodies in England and 
Wales, the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs). Although TECs are also private- 
sector led, they do not cover economic and environmental development in addition to 
training (McQuaid 1993: 101). At the time of the Scottish Office's 1991 consultation 
paper on local government reorganisation, the government argued that economic 
development should be left exclusively to LECs and removed from local authorities. 
This line of argument was toned down by the time of the second consultation paper 
(ibid.: 102). There is no doubt, however, that the Local Enterprise Companies are now 
the main vehicles for local level economic development in Scotland. The five LECs 
covering the current Objective 2 programme area of Western Scotland (Glasgow 
Development Agency, Lanarkshire Development Agency, Enterprise Ayrshire, 
Renfrewshire Enterprise and Dunbartonshire Enterprise) are in receipt of ERDF 
support for projects covering industrial sites and premises, business development 
schemes, and tourism and environmental schemes (as well as ESF for training). At this 
stage, some of the other partners should be introduced.
5.3.5 Other Partners
In addition to central government, in the form of the Scottish Office Industry 
Department (and the Department of Employment for ESF matters), the European 
Commission, the local authorities, Scottish Enterprise and the five LECs, ERDF 
programming in Western Scotland involves a range of other partners. These cannot all 
be considered in the same detail as the major partners analysed above, but a brief 
sketch of some of the remaining partners is necessary to give an understanding of the 
breadth of the partnership.
In respect of infrastructure provision, a range of public bodies qualified for 
ERDF support from the earliest days of the Fund. In Scotland, bodies providing public 
utilities such as British Telecom, the Scottish Gas Board, and the South o f Scotland
Electricity Board were eligible for ERDF support, often in respect of providing 
supplies to new industrial developments. As shown below, the privatisation of such 
bodies in the course of the 1980s raised doubts about their eligibility for ERDF 
support and caused severe problems in spending the money allocated to the earliest 
programmes in Western Scotland. The British Waterways Board, managing canals and 
river navigations in Scotland, was also eligible, primarily for tourist related schemes, 
as were the Scottish Tourist Board and the network of local area tourist boards for the 
promotion and development of tourism in Scotland more generally.
The provision and maintenance of transport infrastructure is also the 
responsibility of a number of bodies, most of which are eligible for ERDF support. 
ScotRail (the name under which British Rail operates in Scotland) is responsible for 
all matters relating to the operation of the railway system in Scotland and has played a 
major role in the Western Scotland partnership. Partners similarly involved through 
their role in the provision of transport infrastructure include: Clyde Port Authority, 
responsible for the management and operation of commercial ports on the Clyde 
Estuary at Glasgow, Greenock, Hunterston and Ardrossan; and the Civil Aviation 
Authority which manages two major airports (Glasgow and Prestwick) located within 
the programme area.
The Western Scotland partnership also involves several of Scotland's 40 or so 
Enterprise Trusts. These bodies were first established in the early 1980s as 'private 
sector led non-profit making partnerships between the public and private sectors' with 
the purpose of helping people to set up their own businesses by providing free advice 
and support, as well as assisting existing small firms (Hayton 1992: 4). In 1981 the 
first Enterprise Trust in Scotland was established, the Ardrossan, Saltcoats and 
Stevenson Enterprise Trust (ASSET), following the closure of the ICI nylon plant in 
Stevenson. The Trust, which was financially supported by the local authorities in the 
area, the SDA and ICI itself provided a range of business advice services. ASSET, 
along with the sixteen other Enterprise Trusts in the region at the time of the IDO 
submission, are eligible for ERDF support, and are represented under the 'umbrella' 
organisation of Scottish Business in the Community (SCOTB1C). In 1994, around 15 
Enterprise Trusts (often called Economic Development Companies) were involved in 
the programme through the provision of business development schemes, the supply of 
workspaces, environmental projects and training schemes.
Operating in slightly smaller areas with less emphasis on private sector 
leadership, representatives of a range of Area Initiative or Joint Economic Initiatives 
are also members of the partnership. These initiatives are often jointly funded by the 
Regional Council, the appropriate district council, development agencies and the 
private sector through Chambers of Commerce and are usually located in areas
suffering severe deprivation, often within Glasgow's city boundaries. The general 
objective of such organisations is to promote job creation in specific unemployment 
black-spots, addressing a range of social as well as economic development issues. In 
1994 around 15 such initiatives were members of the partnership.
Other partners involved in the Structural Funds implementation process in 
Western Scotland include the following: Voluntary Sector Organisations such as 
conservation trusts or heritage groups, which are organised under the 'umbrella' 
authority of the Scottish Council for Voluntary Organisations; Educational 
Establishments such as the Universities of Strathclyde and Glasgow and the 21 Further 
Education Colleges (run by Strathclyde Regional Council until 1993 when they 
became partners in their own right), which are eligible for Structural Fund support in 
respect of training and research and development projects; finally, the three New Town 
Development Corporations (for Cumbernauld, East Kilbride and Irvine) continue to 
receive ERDF support for environmental improvements and projects providing 
industrial sites and premises, although at the time of the writing these bodies are in the 
process of winding up their functions. The Development Corporations, accountable to 
central government through appointed boards, have played an important role in the 
past in the region's economy by developing green field sites to attract new industrial 
investment, and drawing up plans for the New Towns in an attempt to balance 
industrial, commercial, residential and community service developments (Keating & 
Boyle 1986: 33-37).
These are the actors, alongside the major partners such as central government, 
the local authorities, and the Scottish Enterprise Network/LECs, whose actions must 
be co-ordinated in the preparation of the regional development contract. Given their 
different strategic priorities, varying levels of commitment to the programming 
procedure, and the lack of a pre-existing regional policy-making framework in the UK 
to compare with the CSF structure, the first attempts at preparing a programme to 
satisfy European Commission requirements were highly problematic. A 'range of 
contingencies' affecting co-operativeness between partners and their enthusiasm for 
the ERDF programming process has been identified elsewhere (Tavistock Institute of 
Human Relations 1991: 21). The level of organisational support enjoyed by officials 
involved in the process, the extent to which officials work exclusively or only part- 
time on European funding, and the level of experience they have in the process all 
affect the extent to which the preparation of the contract is a smooth process. The 
grand aim of programming to influence the 'motives, commitment and co-operation' of 
officials (PACEC 1991: 3) can be understood as an attempt to align or co-ordinate the 
objectives of the many participantsjin_the_piocess^The extent to which this has been 
achieved in Western Scotland over the past decade should now be considered.
5.4 Preparing the Contract
Over the course of the last decade, there have in fact been four ERDF 
'contracts’ in west central Scotland: the National Programme o f Community' Interest 
1984-1987 (NPCI) for Glasgow; the Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation 
(IDO) 1988-1992; the Western Scotland Community Support Framework 1993 (CSF); 
and the current Western Scotland Single Programme Document covering the period 
1994-1999. Only the latter two contracts were prepared under the terms of the 1988 
Regulations. The main focus of this analysis is the period up to and including 1993, 
although both the NPCI and the post-1993 programme are also considered. The 
contracts have all followed on from each other, and successive periods have been 
intended to build on the general knowledge base in the region to accumulate a pool of 
experience in Structural Fund matters. The analysis over time allows a consideration 
of the extent to which this has been the case. Moreover, the transition period from 
1992 to 1993 is of particular interest as this was the moment at which the partnership 
moved from the pre-reform arrangements to their first programme under the terms of 
the revised Regulations, and hence had to deal with the European Commission's new 
priorities.
Through all these various forms of programming, the European Commission 
has consistently sought to promote a 'strategic approach' to economic development and 
the use of the Funds. However, not only is the concept of a 'strategy' extremely 
difficult to define, but interviews confirm that local partners have complained that 
they have had very little guidance from DG XVI on just what a strategy should look 
like. Danson and Lloyd suggest that the essence of strategic planning lies in 
'establishing a framework which gives guidance to lower level activities', and that 
'strategic planning also provides a hierarchical management or administrative context 
to the devising, financing and implementation of initiatives concerned with economic 
development and land use planning' (1992: 47). A further element implies integration 
of activities to address the uncertainty in the complex processes and relations in 
economic regeneration' (ibid.: 47). The European Commission's understanding of a 
'strategic approach' was outlined in the early 1980s through their plans for an 
'Integrated Approach'.
Given the changing environment of regional economic development (the shift 
to bottom-up instruments in the policy periphery) and the need to utilise the scarce 
funds which were available to maximise their impact, the European Commission 
outlined the Integrated Approach' to economic development. A Commission working 
group set out its conclusions on the matter in the Commission document COM(86) 
401 fina l’2 (European Commission 1986). The general objectives of the Integrated
Approach were twofold: to bring out the potential for endogenous development' and 
to concentrate financial flows in favour of a region or sectojf. These objectives were 
to be achieved as foUowsTBy providing or reinforcing the basis for partnership 
between the Commission and national, regional and local authorities in the 
development process; by reinforcing the complementarity of Community structural 
interventions with national, regional and local sources of financing and thus 
increasing their efficiency and impact; and by developing multi-annual programming 
to reduce financial and administrative bottlenecks and accelerate development. The 
Integrated Approach 'demands an effort to promote coherence between the different 
realities of aims, actors and policies, the objective being to achieve "integration on the 
ground", i.e. between investments and activities in order to create and exploit to the 
maximum synergies and multiplier effects' (European Commission 1986). Such 
integration should be pursued through a programme framework and an integrated 
financial planning schedule. The Integrated Approach became the preferred 
'Commission formula' for structural interventions and aimed to 'bring about a 
quantum improvement in the quality of public administration (including that provided 
by the services of the Commission) in the development process'. Although the 
Commission admitted that it was not a 'simple recipe', it provided the basis of a 
strategic approach (ibid.: 2-4).
The UK central government's policy on such a 'strategic approach' was 
governed by a desire to 'secure the maximum ERDF entitlement with the minimum 
administrative difficulties' (Mawson & Gibney 1984: 53). For this reason, the legal 
implications of the European Commission's earlier proposal for 'programme contracts' 
had been rejected. By 1984, however, UK civil servants were taking the view that 
loose programmes could simply be a means by which to bundle together a collection 
of vague projects, that might in fact reduce the costs of applying for swathes of 
projects. The Commission view was that programmes should be detailed strategic 
documents since, the more general the programmes were, the less influence and 
control the Commission would have over their implementation.21 The first occasion 
when this tension came to the fore in Western Scotland was when the Regional 
Council applied for (and received) financial aid to conduct a study on the feasibility 
of preparing an Integrated Development Operation for Strathclyde.
5.4.1 1984 Preparatory Study for an Integrated Development Operation
The Preparatory Study for an Integrated Development Operation, submitted to 
the European Commission in the autumn of 1984, represents the first experience of
21 This point was made by several interviewees in DG XVI.
the ERDF programming principle in Western Scotland, and as such, the beginning of 
the direct exchange relationship between the European Commission and local actors 
there in the context of ERDF support (Appendix 3 highlights the key dates in the 
programming of ERDF actions in Western Scotland). The preparatory study itself 
reveals the defining characteristic of that exchange by highlighting exactly what it is 
that is to be exchanged through the regional development contract: regional actors 
provide the local economic information desired by DG XVI, and bring forward their 
projects for co-financing, in exchange for some predictability in the flow of ERDF 
finances. Central government, for its part, allows'the European Commission access to 
local actors in order to guarantee the UK's share of ERDF resources. Given the fact 
that the ERDF is a co-financing instrument, the relationship of dependency between 
the local actors on the one hand, and the European Commission and central 
government on the other, is not only one-way: ERDF resources cannot be drawn down 
(i.e. DG XVI cannot spend its budget) by the UK government (and the benefits to the 
UK Treasury maximised) without sufficient spending by local actors on domestic 
projects which qualify under the EC's criteria. The nature pf this exchange relationship 
set up by the agreement of the regional development contract should now be 
considered in greater depth.
The nature of the exchange was clearly illustrated by the Assistant Director of 
Planning for Cunninghame District Council, a local authority lying within the 
subsequent IDO programme area, when he presented a seminar paper in March 1986 
pointing out what district councils expect to benefit form ERDF programmes 
(Snodgrass 1986). Most obviously, councils expect guaranteed finance, and the higher 
grant rates that were generally available under programmes than for individual 
projects. Although no additional capital consents were issued by the Scottish Office in 
respect of ERDF receipts for capital projects, councils could still save on interest 
repayments.22 Moreover, the guarantee of future ERDF resources for local authorities 
in eligible areas provided a key resource vis-à-vis central government in the allocation 
of capita] expenditure approvals. Although the general trend in capital spending 
allocations was downwards, an ERDF programme would guarantee a certain level of 
capital consents in the area, in the absence of which local authorities would be unable 
to draw down resources (and hence the Treasury would not benefit) as the example of
22 A senior officer in the Chief Executive's Department of Strathclyde Regional Council explained how, 
for large local authorities, savings on interest payments for capital projects could amount to significant 
sums. With an ERDF grant to cover 50% of the costs of a capital project, loan charges could be reduced 
by 50%, so that as grants accumulated, the annual value could become quite significant Savings of 
around £7 million per annum were enjoyed by Strathclyde Regional Council in the mid-1980s. Although 
the Treasury then reclaimed the benefits by reducing the Council's Rate Support Grant in subsequent 
years. Strathclyde Region still benefited by around £3 million per annum. If nothing else, this money 
could be used by the Council to pay the salaries of its economic development officers (Chorley 1986:
28)
the programme for West Cumbria in chapter 4 illustrates. In short, an ERDF 
programme would bring more 'predictability' of financial receipts (Snodgrass 1986).
The speeding up of administrative procedures and the direct involvement of 
the European Commission were perceived as further benefits associated with this 
predictability. A senior official of Strathclyde Regional Council pointed out at the 
same seminar that the most important benefit is the direct participation of DG XVI 
through the new Committee procedures: 'SJtrathclyde] R[egional] C[ouncil] hope this 
will enable the Commission to gain first hand appreciation of our needs, priorities and 
programme development processes - we would like to look forward to this experience 
feeding into the future EC priorities and administrative procedures' (Chorley 1986:
30). It should be noted, however, that such adaptation to administrative processes is 
not a one way process. Of course, the European Commission also wanted to influence 
the development process in the region, and the type of projects brought forward for co­
financing. To do this it needed information on the regional economy and spending 
priorities of local actors. Cunninghame District Council's Assistant Director of 
Planning provided an early illustration of the Commission's hunger for information. In 
the case of tourist projects he found: 'one of the most frustrating aspects of tourist 
related applications is the constant requests for additional information, more statistics, 
sources of information, justification [from DG XVI]' (Snodgrass 1986: 23). The 
preparation of the programme itself, in particular the requests by the Commission for 
clear and quantifiable objectives drawn up on the basis of an analysis of the regional 
economy, further illustrate the nature of the exchange.
In 1983 the European Commission agreed to pay 75% of the costs of a 
preparatory study on the suitability of an IDO for Strathclyde (the other 25% being 
paid by Strathclyde Regional Council). The study was co-ordinated by a Study 
Steering Committee comprising officers of Strathclyde Regional Council (who chaired 
the Committee), Glasgow District Council, the Industry Department for Scotland and 
the Scottish Development Agency. Much of the work was carried out by the 
consultants Roger Tym and Partners in conjunction with the staff of Strathclyde 
Regional Council. The European Commission, which did not participate in the study 
group, was finally presented with a report which served two purposes: firstly, it 
formed an application for the designation of Strathclyde, on the basis of the 
programme detailed in the document, as the location for an EDO to take effect from 1 
January 1985; secondly, it acted as a general introduction to the IDO and a description 
of its contents for dissemination within the proposed programme area. The provision 
of information was central to both these purposes, in the first instance information 
provided to the European Commission, and secondly for distribution within the region 
itself.
The preparatory study constituted an impressive data collection exercise, 
involving a range of regional actors in what appeared to be the preparation of a 
rationally-determined regional development plan. The need for such co-ordination was 
highlighted in the study itself which referred to the 'compartmentalised' nature of the 
different economic activities supported in the region (Roger Tym & Partners 1984: 3). 
The study thus concluded that ’one of the benefits of introducing the IDO is to improve 
co-ordination in policy development and implementation in the area' (ibid.: 46). The 
scope for co-ordination was emphasised in several different aspects of the Programme:
in the coherence of different elements of the Programme in forming an 
appropriate development programme for the area; 
in encouraging co-operation between agencies to make up comprehensive 
programmes of action, and to jointly support individual projects within those 
programmes;
in combining as far as possible contributions from different funding sources to 
individual projects to maximise the impact of Community funds on their 
feasibility and scale (ibid.: 46).
For the purposes of co-ordination, the study suggested, European Commission 
involvement was essential: *by far the most important and valuable improvement in 
coordination to which the IDO can contribute is between the operations of local 
agencies and the European Commission' (ibid.: 47).
As a first step, the European Commission required an analysis of the different 
activities and priorities of the local actors, and an assessment of the development 
needs of the region:
The first task of the Study was to prepare basic reviews of 16 topic 
areas important to the development of the City. These reviews covered 
the main programmes of infrastructure provision, economic 
development and urban development. In each case the reviews 
described issues and problems currently facing the area, the policy 
framework of agency responsibilities and powers intended to deal with 
problems, the current programmes in operation and the role of EC 
finance within them, and the potential for improving or extending 
programmes in future with particular reference to the use of EC funds. 
Additional work was undertaken to compile statistics on the past use of 
EC funds in the area, and to produce a general background of regional 
development trends and policies in the area (Roger Tym & Partners 
1984: 6).
This was exactly the type of data sought by the European Commission in the first 
decade of the Fund’s operation (see chapters 3 and 4 above), but which central 
government departments were reluctant to spend the resources to provide. Strathclyde
Regional Council undertook the task of co-ordinating the study exercise in 1983 and 
1984, but only with the prospect of an IDO eventually being approved for the region.
Strathclyde Regional Council required the participation of a number of bodies 
to compile the necessary information. The agencies involved were basically those 
which had received EC funds in the past in Western Scotland. The Regional and 
District Councils, together with the SDA and the Department of Industry for Scotland 
were the key actors. These bodies also received co-operation from other public 
agencies with responsibility for economic and infrastructure programmes in the city, 
including the Manpower Services Commission, British Rail, the Scottish Gas Board, 
the South of Scotland Electricity Board, British Telecom, Clyde Ports Authority, the 
Scottish Tourist Board and Scottish Sports Council, and the British Airports Authority. 
All these agencies, each of which held relevant data on the regional development 
needs and opportunities of Strathclyde, contributed to the compilation of the study 
report (Roger Tym & Partners 1984: 4). To economise on the costs of preparing the 
report, however, a decision was taken to concentrate the study on Glasgow.
The preparatory study was also clear on the extent to which it was simply a 
’bolting together of the existing organisations' existing spending plans, rather than a 
new strategy: the IDO is not a new development plan for the area: it is intended to 
complement national and local programmes, not cut across them. The themes around 
which the IDO Programme is organised, and which provide one way of integrating the 
Programme are, therefore drawn from existing priorities of agencies responsible for 
the development of the area. Although they are not new, the themes encapsulate recent 
developments in policy approaches, and thus provide a framework for the recent 
changes in economic circumstances and national policies' (Roger Tym & Partners 
1984: 12). The proposed IDO would support two (general) principle objectives, 
unifying a wide range of existing activities in the area: the promotion of indigenous 
economic development; and, measures to deal directly with the social consequences 
and deprivation associated with economic change. Although these objectives were 
deemed to encapsulate changes in the emphasis of local policies which had evolved in 
recent years, it was acknowledged that they were 'an endorsement of existing policies 
rather than a new development strategy for the area’ (ibid.: 47).
Table 5.2: IDO Preparatory Study (1984) Proposed 'Programme Areas'
Proposed Share of Expenditure
Programme Area
Economic Adaptation and Industrial Support 9%
Manpower and Social Development 21%
Infrastructure and Services 64%
Urban Image and Environment 6%
Source Roger Tym & Partners (1984) Integrated Development Operation for Strathclyde: Final Report
Preparatory Study (Glasgow: Roger Tym & Partners)
The submission to the European Commission sought £277 million support for 
four proposed Programme Areas', which would have guaranteed each of the 
organisations involved in the preparation of the study a share of ERDF expenditure. 
The first was for Economic Adaptation and Industrial Support, absorbing a proposed 
9% of the estimated total expenditure, with over 80% going directly to the Industry 
Department for Scotland to support the centrally run Regional Investment Incentives 
and Small Firms Services schemes. Manpower and Social Development would have 
absorbed 21% (from the ESF), going almost equally to the Manpower Services 
Commission and Strathclyde Regional Council. Infrastructure and Services was by far 
the largest proposed Programme Area at 64% of estimated total expenditure, with over 
50% going to Strathclyde Regional Council, and the rest to British Telecom, British 
Rail, the SDA, and Glasgow District Council. The District Council and the SDA also 
stood to gain from the final Programme Area, for Urban Image and Environment, 
expected to absorb 6% of the programme expenditure.
Despite indicating a detailed financial plan, the report emphasised the 
uncertainty of many aspects of the programme, and hence the incomplete nature of the 
proposed contract. As well as co-ordinating action, the IDO would require flexibility: 
the Programme will cover five years, and will be regularly updated to reflect changing 
circumstances and resources' (Roger Tym & Partners 1984: 3). Most obviously, 
changing economic circumstances could have direct implications for the focus of the 
programme. In addition, all partners were learning as the IDO proposal unfolded, 
including the European Commission itself: TDOs are still in their early stages so far as 
the Commission is concerned and are an entirely new concept for Strathclyde. There
are, as yet, no ground rules for the form they should take or evidence of the benefits 
that will accrue' (ibid.: 4). Finally, central government's policy of non-additionality 
made the future financing of local authority projects very uncertain. The study pointed 
out that 'it is important to note that it is not only local actors who determine policy and 
resource flows: real benefits to the area from the EDO depend upon the responses to 
this Report of the UK central government and the European Community . UK 
government could greatly enhance the impact of Community funding in the area by a 
more flexible attitude to spending by local agencies which attract European support' 
(ibid.: 5). For the years after 1985 therefore, the status of projects included in the 
programme were uncertain due to continuing public expenditure constraint: the 
uncertainties it imposes on local authority budgeting, means that expenditure on 
projects commencing after the current or next financial year can never be regarded as 
firmly committed' (ibid.: 16). It was the potential reduction of this uncertainty that 
local authorities sought to secure through the programme: 'it is hoped that the 
implementation of the IDO will lead to a more flexible attitude on the part of the UK 
government to the sanctioning of expenditure on projects partially financed through 
EC funds (ibid.: 47).
Precisely because of these uncertainties, Keating and Boyle (in one of the very 
few academic considerations of the proposal) were highly dismissive of the proposed 
IDO:
The practical content of the proposal is in fact little more than a 
rehearsal of existing uses of Community funds in Glasgow - but 
without reference until the final section to the non-additionality rule - 
and a projection of them into the future. Local authority projects are 
also included but, given the inability of councils to commit themselves 
to major capital expenditures for a five-year advance period, only the 
EC contribution to them is specified, though this contribution will, of 
course, only be forthcoming if the local authorities proceed with the 
projects. Although the IDO is presented as an integrated package, its 
content is more of a shopping list of projects eligible for funding from 
EC sources (1986: 68).
The authors therefore painted a bleak picture of the Commission's ability to promote a 
strategic approach and concluded:
... there is a great deal less to the Glasgow IDO than meets the eye. It 
may have a certain promotional significance for the local authorities 
and for the Community, which is anxious to promote the disbursement 
of its funds... It does not, however amount to a new development plan 
nor, indeed, to the sort of strategic intervention in selected projects 
which would have allowed the Community to target its resources on
items central to its own policy objectives and to gain the maximum
leverage over these (ibid.: 68).
Nevertheless, Strathclyde Regional Council later boasted its success in 
adapting to the European Commission’s requirements for a strategic programming 
approach. A Council publication suggested that 'all outside observers seem agreed that 
Strathclyde's success in persuading European funds to support regional schemes rests 
on two factors: the good relationships that have been built up all along the road to 
Brussels; [and] the expertise of officials in preparing applications. By all accounts, 
they have got the technique of filling in Euro-forms down to a fine art. It's a bit like 
passing examinations: the first essential is to read the question carefully; after that, the 
candidate must know how to answer it clearly using the language and references 
guaranteed to appeal to the examiner' (Strathclyde Regional Council 1987: 4). 
However, this knowledge was hard-earned. After the preparatory study, the 
Government and Strathclyde Regional Council were asked to extend the proposal 
beyond Glasgow to cover most of the region and the IDO was not immediately 
approved. The Industry Department for Scotland claimed that, at a practical level, the 
Commission was unable to achieve both the integration and funding required to make 
the concept a reality. In the interim period, the Commission suggested to the UK 
authorities that elements of the programme proposed by the study could be re­
presented as an NPCI under Articles 10-12 of the 1984 ERDF Regulation.
5.4.2 National Programme o f Community Interest for Glasgow
In general, the prospect of a National Programme of Community Interest was 
widely welcomed by local authorities, as it offered them the substantial benefits of a 
predictable five year package of support and one which commits other organizations 
to provide multi-annual investment’ (Croxford, Wise & Chalkley 1987: 36). The 
'stumbling block' was again that such programmes could prove difficult and expensive 
to devise in the UK, given the lack of experience of national and regional authorities 
in the matter (ibid.: 34). Nevertheless, despite an apparent hostility to programming, 
the UK government was in the forefront of programme financing in that it was the first 
member state (with France) to apply for an NPCI, and made applications for over 20 
NPCIs between 1985 and 1988. In December 1985 the NPCIs for the UK areas of 
Shildon/Newton-Aycliffe/Bishop Auckland, the Mersey Basin and the City of Glasgow 
were the first three to be approved by the European Commission. This earliest form of 
programming, bundling together projects in a loose programme format, reduced the 
costs to central government of applying for support. Under the first ERDF programme 
approved for Western Scotland, the NPCI for the City of Glasgow, the European
Commission allocated £68.2 million to support a proposed £124 million programme 
of infrastructure measures to contribute to the economic development of the city. 
Although Strathclyde Regional Council had intended that the IDO preparatory' study 
would form the basis of an IDO for the whole of Strathclyde, the European 
Commission suggested that an NPCI application should be made requesting solely 
ERDF support and covering Glasgow alone.
The statutory basis for the NPCI had been set out in Council Regulation (EEC) 
No 1787/84 of 19 June 1984. The NPCI was defined at national level and consisted of 
a set of measures to be undertaken over a number of years. This set of measures was to 
be internally consistent and also consistent with national and community objectives. 
ERDF assistance through an NPCI could be awarded only to areas that were aided by 
the member state under its own system of regional aid. The ERDF contribution to the 
financing of an NPCI was determined in the light of the socio-economic situation in 
the area and the types of measures involved in the programme: the standard ERDF 
contribution amounted to 50% of total public expenditure in the programme and this 
could rise to 55% for programmes of particular importance for the area in which they 
were located. In general, to be suitable for ERDF assistance the programme measures 
could concern (jointly or separately) infrastructure investment, and schemes for 
industry, craft industries and services, but the Glasgow NPCI was confined to 
infrastructure investment alone (and hence capital expenditure).
Following the initial failure to secure an IDO, the negotiation of the NPCI was 
conducted almost exclusively by the Industry Department for Scotland with little local 
involvement. The first draft of the NPCI was drawn up by the Scottish Office early in 
1985 and submitted to the European Commission on 15 May that year. The 
programme reflected the priorities and objectives identified in the preparatory study 
conducted during 1984 into the feasibility of an IDO, but while the report had 
established a framework for potential integration of EC and UK funds to meet the 
social development requirements of Strathclyde as well as the economic problems, the 
NPCI focused solely on the infrastructure needs which had been highlighted in 
chapters 6 and 7 of the Study Report. It was envisaged that human resources and social 
development would be tackled by application to the ESF on a project by project basis. 
The programme area was centred on the city of Glasgow, essentially the area covered 
by the City of Glasgow District Council, but some of the measures extended beyond 
the city boundaries since they had a major impact on economic activity in the city 
itself, for example treatment work on water and sewerage plant just outside the city 
boundaries. The area was contained within the Glasgow Travel-to-Work-Area 
(TTWA) and had Development Area status, meaning that firms within the area 
qualified for the highest level of assistance under UK regional policy.
In considering its response to the programme submission in June 1985, the 
European Commission was unhappy at the absence of quantified objectives and the 
lack of co-ordination between the proposed sub-programmes of expenditure. 
Moreover, the Commission expressed to the IDS its concern that there were no 
'software measures' included in the submission, despite DG XVTs call for so-called 
Article 15 measures (see chapter 3). Finally, DG XVI insisted that a local level co­
ordinating body should be established to aid the flow of information between partners 
and provide some flexibility in programme management. Correspondence on these 
issues continued for several months before the application was revised and re­
submitted in September 1985. The Commission Decision of 12 December 1985 
ultimately approved ERDF support of £68.2 million for an NPCI for the City of 
Glasgow totalling £124 million of public expenditure. The programme could part- 
finance eligible expenditure incurred between 1 June 1984 (i.e. it could fund projects 
retrospectively) and 31 December 1987.
The two broad objectives of the NPCI strategy were set out in paragraphs 1.22 
to 1.28 of the Programme submission. These were highly general, as they simply 
sought 'to contribute to economic development: by adding to, or improving on, 
strategic city-wide infrastructure systems such as major regional roads and motor ways 
linking with the trunk network, suburban rail networks, the network of vocational 
training centres; and, by adding to, or improving, infrastructure in particular localities, 
specifically industrial and commercial areas, and localities covered by Area 
Initiatives'. These objectives seem to constitute a simple rationale for public 
infrastructure investment across the city (covering Strathclyde Regional Council 
functions), or in specific localities where the other partners had planned investment. 
The expected expenditure plan guaranteed each partner a 'slice of the cake'. 
Strathclyde Regional Council, as the main provider of infrastructure in the region was 
to be the main recipient of funds, attracting 53% of the total expenditure. The 
proposed shares for other participants (ScotRail 21%; Glasgow District Council 9%; 
South of Scotland Electricity Board 8%; Scottish Development Agency 7%; and 
British Gas 2%) reflected the capital expenditure they had planned in the programme 
area over the eligible period.
The Addendum to the Commission Decision of December 1985 awarding the 
NPCI set out a number of criteria which are of relevance here. In particular, the 
Addendum made provisions for a local level co-ordinating committee and for 
programme flexibility. These linked issues should be considered briefly.
The Addendum stated that 'a Co-ordinating Committee constituted of 
representatives of the Industry Department of Scotland, Strathclyde Regional Council, 
the City of Glasgow District Council, the Scottish Development Agency, the South of
Scotland Electricity Board, the Scottish Gas Board, British Railways and the 
Strathclyde Transport Executive and a representative of the Commission nominated by 
the Directorate-General for Regional Policy is hereby established' (European 
Commission 1985a: point 2). Moreover, it was stated that the Co-ordinating 
Committee shall co-ordinate the choice of measure under the programme and the 
administrative and financial arrangements for implementation of the programme', but 
as shown below, this claim was somewhat optimistic. Nevertheless, for the first time 
the Programme Co-ordinating Committee brought together the six implementing 
bodies of the programme, under the chair of the Industry Department for Scotland and 
with the active participation of European Commission representatives. Strathclyde 
Regional Council's initial reluctance to participate in a committee with executive 
functions to alter the Council's spending priorities was soothed when the Scottish 
Office insisted that the committee had no decision-making function. Similarly, for this 
reason, the committee was comprised of officials and not elected politicians. The 
growth and expansion of the institutional arrangements governing ERDF programming 
in Western Scotland from this small seed are analysed in chapter 6.
The committee sought to introduce some flexibility to programme 
management. The Addendum had therefore set out a number of provisions designed to 
enhance the adaptability of arrangements. Any substantial amendment of the 
programme, however, would require the agreement of the European Commission as 
set out under Article 14 of Regulation 1787/84. Nevertheless, the Commission also 
sought to preclude from the outset categories of expenditure which it did not regard as 
suitable for ERDF support. A separate annex included a list of categories of 
infrastructure specifically excluded from Fund support, covering such items as 
housing, hospitals, educational establishments, fire stations, public administration 
buildings and leisure facilities not connected with tourism. The eligibility of British 
Gas projects was more uncertain. With the likelihood of privatisation surrounding this 
body, and hence the likelihood that it would lose eligibility for ERDF support, the 
following proviso was built into the contract: 'in the event of a decision being taken by 
the UK authorities during the lifetime of the programme to privatise the body 
responsible for the implementation of projects relating to the supply of gas, the 
granting of aid in respect of the said projects shall be suspended as and from the 
announcement of the decision pending detailed examination by the Commission of the 
terms under which the body may be privatised to determine its eligibility for aid under 
Regulation 1787/84' (ibid.: point 10). As shown in chapter 7, the eventual privatisation 
of British Gas caused a number of projects to be dropped from the NPCI.
A general point about the NPCI that should be emphasised is the possibility it 
provided for policy learning prior to the approval of a full Integrated Development
Operation. The Glasgow NPCI was viewed by all partners, including the Scottish 
Office and DG XVI, as a forerunner for an eventual IDO for the whole of 
Strathclyde.23 Several of the participants in the NPCI suggested that participation in 
the ERDF programming process involved a 'steep learning curve’, and that there was 
therefore a benefit to be gained from simply taking part, in terms of the co-operation
between participating authorities, not to mention a closer relationship with
Commission. Chapter 7 considers some of the problems involved in the
implementation of the NPCI (expenditure slippage; eligibility of the partners;
additionality in practice) and the lessons that might therefore have been drawn by 
participants. By the time the IDO was approved, the partners had some two years 
experience of programming. However, the extension of eligibility to new partners and 
the introduction of ESF financing to the contract made programming significantly 
more complex. It is to the IDO itself that the chapter now turns.
5.4.3 Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation
Preston and Hogg (1990) suggest that there were fundamental problems 
involved in the implementation of IDOs which were not fully appreciated at the outset, 
blaming inadequate staffing and limited co-ordinating machinery at the EC level for 
this. As suggested above, the Commission (like the other partners) was learning as it 
proceeded, not least because it was faced with a different administrative structure in 
each of the member states which was the subject of an IDO. This could cause 
frustration among local actors who sought clear guidance on IDO requirements from 
Commission officials. Preston and Hogg quote one local government official in 
England as saying that the IDO concept was like 'a beast coming out of the mist' 
(1990: 29), and add that the general outline of an IDO is clear, but it is only as the 
mist disperses that one might see the detail' (ibid.: 29). Many local government 
officials believed the Commission was not only vague in terms of its requirements, but 
it was at the same time unrealistic in the level of detail it required. Nevertheless, many 
local actors were ultimately prepared to exchange this information for the perceived 
benefits an IDO would bring.
The first point to note about Strathclyde IDO is that more actors participated in 
the preparation of the IDO than had participated in the preparation of the NPCI. This 
reflects the wider geographical coverage of the IDO as well as the wider variety of 
tasks eligible for support. Leitch (1989) suggests that the IDO preparation was a 
further attempt by the Commission to impose a rational decision-making system on
23 See *EEC Boosts £140m Plans for Glasgow' in The Glasgow Herald of 29 November 1985, where 
Strathclyde Regional Council confirmed its expectations that a lull IDO would follow the NPCI.
the local actors in the field of economic development policy. A process of intelligence 
gathering followed by an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the local 
economy, led to the formulation of objectives and priorities for action. Such planning 
would not have taken place in the absence of European support. As the IDS told 
Strathclyde Regional Council by letter in March 1989, the government does not 
believe in regional planning as such' (Leitch 1989: 37). Leitch himself noted that 
'while there may be a consensus concerning the objectives of the IDO, there may be a 
lack of depth to this, with more prominence given to the objectives of the individual 
organisations by the participants concerned in the IDO' (ibid.: 43). Moreover, the 
objectives of the IDO remained very broad in order to ensure agreement among the 
partners. However, this vagueness also facilitated opportunism and the pursuit of 
organisational rather than programme objectives.
Another point to note about the preparation of the IDO is that, even years after 
the possibility of an IDO for Strathclyde was first raised, the agreement of the contract 
required a full year of negotiation (as Appendix 3 shows). Between September 1987 
and October 1988, the European Commission met several times with the Scottish 
Office to seek a tightening of the terms of the contract. A general misunderstanding 
had arisen between the European Commission and UK central government as to what 
precisely constituted an IDO. The UK view was that such contracts were simply 
umbrella documents under which, and following which, the various Structural Fund 
elements would fall into place. One Scottish Office interviewee expressed the opinion 
that those officials involved in the preparation of the programme believed that the IDO 
constituted simply a 'coat without a body'.24 DG XVI, on the other hand, sought a 
tighter specification of the proposed strategy.
Within the European Commission there existed a Technical Group on 
Integrated Approaches' which considered applications for Integrated Development 
Operations. This group comprised officials from a wide range of Commission 
services, including the following: DG II (the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs), DG III (Industry); DG IV (Competition Policy and State Aids); DG 
V (Employment, Industrial Relations and Social Affairs); DG VI (Agriculture); DG 
VII (Transport); DG XI (Environment, Nuclear Safety and Civil Protection); DG Xm 
(Telecommunications, Information Industries and Innovation); DG XIV (Fisheries); 
DG XVI (Regional Policies); DG XVII (Energy); DG XVIII (Credit and Investments); 
DG XIX (Budgets); DG XX (Financial Control); DG XXII (Co-ordination of 
Structural Policies); as well as officials from the Legal Services and the Task Force for 
SMEs. The problems this group identified with the proposed IDO were broadly similar
24 Principal, European Funds and Co-ordination Division (Structural Funds Policy and Plan Writing), 
Scottish Office Industry Department; Edinburgh, 16 January 1992.
to the problems DG XVI had earlier identified with the Glasgow NPCI. Again, there 
was a heavy bias in favour of infrastructure while little attention was paid to software 
measures, with no economic justification for the balance between the two. Similarly, 
the strategy remained ill-defined with poorly substantiated objectives and targets. 
Environmental improvement measures per se were also not acceptable to the 
European Commission, unless they were directly linked to job creation. A four person 
delegation from this group (two from DG V, one from DG XVI and one from DG 
XXD) travelled to Edinburgh early in November 1988 to meet Scottish Office and 
Strathclyde Regional Council officials to discuss the necessary amendments and a 
third draft of the IDO was prepared for submission to the European Commission.
In the end, it was agreed by all participants to submit an IDO for approval that 
consisted of two major elements: an ERDF financed NPCI for Strathclyde and a linked 
ESF programme. Complete integration of the funds in a single programme had proved 
too difficult to achieve, and the compromise of two separate programmes existed 
within the new IDO framework. The IDO was again submitted to the European 
Commission in November 1988. By this stage, it would have been extremely difficult 
for the Commission not to approve the IDO. The original application had been 
received in October 1987 (1984 if the original preparatory study is taken as the starting 
point) and the subsequent detailed and exhaustive discussions with the UK central and 
local authorities created an expectation that the document would be approved without 
delay. Any further delay would have carried the process into 1989, which would have 
meant that the region was then subject to the revised Regulations which were due to 
come into effect on 1 January 1989. This would have meant a new process of 
programme preparation (amidst the frustration of a failed EDO application) according 
to new eligibility criteria and new priorities for support. Against this background, the 
European Commission approved the Strathclyde IDO on 21 December 1988, only ten 
days before the new Regulations came into effect. At that time, the Strathclyde IDO 
was the largest programme of its kind in the EC. The programme covered only the 
Development Areas of Strathclyde Region, that is the parts of the region eligible for 
the highest level of domestic assistance under UK regional policy. This included most 
of the region, except the Travel-to-Work-Areas of Ayr and Girvan, and the rural areas 
of Argyle and Bute which were included in a separate programme for the Highlands. 
The main financial components of the package are summarised in table 5.3.
Table S3: Strathclyde IDO (1988-1992) Financial Package
Award
European Community Instrument
ERDF National Programme of Community Interest £232 million
ESF Programme £42 million
European Investment Bank Loan £80 million
European Coal and Steel Community Loans £24 million
Total £378 million
Source Pieda pic. (1993) Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation: Interim Evaluation
(Edinburgh: Pieda pic ).
The ERDF National Programme o f Community Interest allocated £232 million 
to be spent largely on infrastructure projects in the area. The ESF Programme 
allocated £42 million to be spent on a range of training and recruitment incentive 
schemes. An associated European Investment Bank (EIB) Loan of £80 million was 
designed for road, water, sewerage and public transport projects. EIB loans could be 
used to fund the proportion of projects not grant aided. That is, the 50% of matching 
finance to be provided by local actors could be borrowed at favourable rates from the 
EIB. Further loans of £24 million were available under the European Coal and Steel 
Community Loans scheme. It was intended that these loans would be made available 
through commercial banks to small businesses, but given the inability of DG XVIII 
(Credit and Investments) and intermediaries in the UK to agree contractual 
arrangements, ECSC loans did not ultimately form part of the package of the 
Strathclyde IDO.
The 'strategy' outlined in the programme sought to achieve eight inter-related 
economic development objectives for the Strathclyde economy. Schemes approved 
under the IDO had to relate to at least one of these objectives:
• A focus on growth opportunity industries - to focus development programmes 
and initiatives on industries offering growth potential in the 1992 (Single Market) 
context;
• The Development o f Small and Medium-Stze Enterprises (SMEs) - to encourage 
the formation and subsequent growth of local enterprise,
• The Promotion o f New Technology - to assist local industry to introduce new 
technology in its products and production processes, in particular through better 
links with higher education and research institutions;
• An Expansion o f Inward Investment - to build on successes in attracting and 
expanding inward investment, particularly by attracting overseas companies 
seeking a European base;
• Tourism Development - to develop a vigorous tourism industry for the urban as 
well as rural parts of the area, attracting significantly larger numbers of 
international events and tourists, raising their levels of expenditure in the region;
• External Communications Improvement - to improve external communications to 
help industry meet the challenges and opportunities of the Single Market and to 
reduce the costs of access to the market;
• Development o f the "Metropolitan Heart" - to create a modem metropolitan 
heart building on the established business, tourist and cultural centre of Glasgow 
as a source of growth for the whole region;
• Improvement o f the Area's Image - to replace the area's perceived image as an 
outdated, outmoded industrial region with that of a region with technologically 
progressive industries, strong cultural and environmental attractions and a labour 
force equipped with the skills required for the 1990s (see Pieda pic. 1993: 9-10).
These objectives are considerably more developed than those of the NPCi, and 
to this extent the IDO represented (at least superficially) an advance in terms of 
regional development 'strategy'’. Moreover, on balance the objectives stress industrial 
development more than basic infrastructure. This does not mean that there was an 
explicit sectoral strategy at the regional level. The only ’sector’ mentioned is tourism. 
As explained below, the inclusion of tourism development as an objective reflects the 
fact that this guarantees the district councils in the region a share of expenditure. 
District councils provide tourist related infrastructure and services and hence this 
’sector1 is guaranteed a place in the strategy, notwithstanding the fact that jobs in the 
tourist industry are usually low-paid, seasonal and often part-time. Nevertheless, the 
objectives imply a focus on improving general industrial competitiveness in the 
region, through SME support and technology development. However, the Action 
Programmes through which the IDO strategy was to be delivered remained heavily 
biased in favour of capital-financed infrastructure, and in a way that guaranteed each 
partner a share of resources. Eight Action Programmes (seven ERDF and one ESF) 
were set out in the IDO document:
1. Enterprise, Innovation and Investment - much of the expenditure under this 
Action Programme was expected to be allocated directly to the central 
government’s own Enterprise Initiative, to cover grants and loans for small 
businesses for consultancy, design services etc.
2. Industrial Sites and Premises - this Action Programme sought to provide small 
workshop units, primarily for manufacturing businesses, and would be
undertaken by district councils, ScotRail, the Scottish Development Agency, and 
Strathclyde Regional Council.
3. Tourism Facilities - this Action Programme was designed to support major 
tourism developments with the ability to attract large numbers of people from 
outwith the region, and would largely be undertaken by district councils.
4. Transport and Communication - Strathclyde Regional Council and the New 
Town Development Corporations qualified under this Action Programme for 
road improvement schemes, while the Strathclyde Passenger Transport Executive 
(part of the Regional Council) and ScotRail qualified for rail modernisation and 
extension schemes.
5. Utility Services and Waste Disposal (Underground Services•) - This Action 
Programme essentially supported the Regional Council's water and sewers 
development projects, including schemes to replace sea outfalls to reduce coastal 
pollution and bring beaches to EC standards and water treatment to meet water 
quality standards.
6. Environmental Improvements - various agencies were involved under this Action 
Programme to improve the environment of areas with potential for industrial or 
tourist development.
7. Vocational Training Facilities - This Action Programme was the seventh funded 
by the ERDF, supporting infrastructure and hardware used at vocational training 
centres, and primarily spent by the Regional Council's Further Education 
Colleges.
8. Manpower and Training - This was the Action Programme funded through the 
ESF, to assist training and recruitment incentive schemes run by the Regional 
Council, the Training Agency, Enterprise Trusts and the universities. Four 
categories of measures were proposed under the Action Programme: training in 
business skills; re-training in new technology; training for growth opportunity 
industries; and, recruitment and training incentives.
Table 5.4 shows the proposed share of the total £232 million for each of the 
seven ERDF Action Programmes. As with the NPCI, Transport and Communications 
was expected to receive the single largest share of the programme, reflecting the 
priorities of Strathclyde Regional Council and central government. Only the 
Enterprise, Innovation and Investment Action Programme was to involve primarily 
revenue expenditure, while the others involved overwhelmingly capital expenditure. 
Notably, for this reason, that revenue-based expenditure which was to be admitted was 
to be undertaken primarily by central government itself. In this way, central 
government could ensure that no additional resources were allocated to local actors.
Table 5.4: Strathclyde IDO 1988 Proposed Financial Plan for Action Programmes
Proposed Share of Expenditure
£(% )
ERDF Action Programmes
Enterprise, Innovation and Investment 37,354,000 (16%)
Industrial Sites and Premises 18,100,000 (8%)
Tourism Facilities 17,000,000 (7%)
Transport and Communications 85,350,000 (37%)
Underground Services 57,200,000 (25%)
Environmental Improvements 14,200,000 (6%)
Vocational Training Facilities 2,450,000 (1%)
Source : Pieda pic. (1993) Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation: Interim Evaluation
(Edinburgh: Pieda pic.)
In the case of the IDO, the incomplete nature of the contract between the 
partners was again recognised in the need to allow for uncertainty and hence to build 
some flexibility into the programme. The original IDO proposal set out with some 
clarity the potential sources of uncertainty: 'it is expected that a periodic review of the 
projects and programmes of the Integrated] 0[peration] will be required. Although 
EC financial assistance will be a crucial factor in determining whether projects can 
proceed, progress will also reflect other significant factors. These include:
physical delays in capital projects;
take-up under a number of programmes will depend on demand by private 
firms, voluntary organisations and educational institutions; 
the time required to specify some elements in more detail and to secure inter­
agency co-operation; and
the level of resources available to implementing agencies from non-EC sources 
(Industry Department for Scotland/Strathclyde Regional Council 1987: 85).
Moreover, interview sources within the Strathclyde IDO Programme Executive, set up 
to provide a secretariat to the programme (see chapter 6), have confirmed that over 
50% of projects change their financial profile during the course of implementation due 
to changes in tendering documents or delays in physical projects, for example. Given 
this degree of uncertainty in forecast expenditure, it was proposed that the programme 
should be subject to general review after three years, and that a financial re-phasing or 
adjustment may be appropriate at that time. The Commission Decision approving the
IDO therefore explained that one of the tasks of the Co-ordinating Committee would 
be *to recommend to the Commission modifications to the IDO where it considers this 
necessary in view of the socio-economic situation and the progress made in 
implementing the IDO' (European Commission 1988: 9). As shown in chapter 7, a re- 
phasing of the expenditure profile did indeed occur under the IDO when (as an 
example of the ongoing nature of bargaining in the contractual relationship) resources 
were re-directed away from the Action Programme prioritised by the European 
Commission towards those favoured by central government.
As suggested above, the Strathclyde IDO was approved only days before the 
reformed Regulations came into effect. In fact, the NUTS level ID region of Western 
Scotland had already been declared eligible for Objective 2 status before the approval 
of the IDO. The IDO itself covered the entire Objective 2 area with exception of the 
Travel-to-work-Areas of Ayr and Girvan. By the time of the first meeting of the 
Strathclyde IDO Co-ordinating Committee in Glasgow on 19 May 1989, the new 
Regulations had been in place for almost six months. The Industry Department for 
Scotland informed the Committee that a Regional and Social Conversion Plan for 
Western Scotland had been submitted to the Commission in line with the new three- 
stage planning procedure. Over the next six months, there was extensive negotiation 
between the DTI and the European Commission over the Community Support 
Frameworks for eligible regions in the UK, but the CSF for Western Scotland simply 
reflected the pre-reform IDO strategy. The most significant difficulty was the 
inclusion of Ayr and Girvan25 in the post-reform programming procedure, as the 
geographical extension of the programme therefore brought in new actors, increasing 
the number of district councils and Enterprise Trusts eligible for support under the 
Strathclyde IDO.
As shown in the case of the NPCI, geographical extension and a widening of 
eligible expenditure categories are not the only means by which the partnership is 
changed. The ultimate privatisation of British Gas is mirrored to an extent by the 
example of the Scottish Development Agency under the IDO. The logic behind the 
merging of the SDA with the Training Agency to create the Scottish Enterprise and 
Local Enterprise Companies Network was analysed earlier in this chapter. Following 
extensive discussions between DG XVI officials and the Scottish Office in late 1991 
on the operational rules of LECs, the European Commission agreed that the Scottish 
Enterprise Network should be eligible for Structural Fund support. The Commission 
had sought and received assurance from the UK central government that, in setting the 
public expenditure plans and the budgets of individual LECs for business development
25 These TTWAs had not been included in the original IDO application as they did not qualify for 
Development Area status under UK regional policy.
measures, capital investments and environmental improvement works would be 
increased by the amount of any ERDF grant for the year in question. The Scottish 
Office did not claim to operate a system of global additionality in the case of the 
LECs: budgets were set without reference to anticipated ERDF receipts, so that ERDF 
grants would produce an increase in the relevant LECs budget of the same amount, 
without cuts in the following year's budget. In January 1992 DG XVI officially 
informed the UK Permanent Representation (UKREP) of the decision to agree to the 
eligibility of Scottish Enterprise and the LECs, thereby expanding the partnership 
further. '
Interview sources have revealed that a key meeting took place between senior 
DG XVI officials and Scottish Enterprise executives in Brussels in January' 1992, 
shortly after the Commission's formal acceptance of the eligibility of the Network for 
Structural Fund support. DG XVI expressed the view that Scottish Enterprise in 
particular, but also the LECs, should have a higher profile in programming activities in 
Scotland. Given the strategic function of Scottish Enterprise in the elaboration of a 
medium-term regional development strategy for Scotland, the potential input of the 
Network into the post-1993 plans was significant. The European Commission also 
urged a greater advisory role upon the Network and the LECs in project selection 
through the Monitoring Committees (see chapters 6 and 7). The highly sensitive issue 
of the closure of the British Steel plant at Ravenscraig in Lanarkshire (within the IDO 
area) was also discussed. While the partnership had agreed to attribute special priority 
to projects coming from the Lanarkshire area, local authorities there had not been 
proactive in bringing forward projects. The Scottish Enterprise executives therefore 
undertook to meet the relevant LEC (the Lanarkshire Development Agency) to 
encourage a drive for more and higher quality project submissions from that part of 
the programme area.
The creation of Scottish Enterprise and the LEC Network is highly significant 
in terms of the asset specificity of the resources brought to the exchange relationship 
by the pre-existing partners. The SDA had played little part in ERDF measures given 
the lack of additionality for its projects. Scottish Enterprise, by contrast, sought an 
active role in Structural Fund matters from the outset, as witnessed by the early 
decision to commission a consultant's report on how to maximise their involvement in 
this field (Jones Economics 1991). The eligibility of the Network has been the single 
most significant change in the composition and nature of the partnership since the 
introduction of programming in Western Scotland in 1985. The LECs are now the 
main vehicles for local economic development in Scotland, and, as explained above, 
at the time of the Scottish Office's 1991 consultation document on local government
reorganisation, there was some debate as to whether any local development functions 
should be retained by the local authorities.
LECs attract an increasing share of ERDF resources in Scotland for 
environmental improvement projects and training measures as well as business 
support schemes. As is shown in chapter 6, LECs also play a greater role in the 
institutional structures through which the programmes are delivered. To this extent, 
the asset specificity of the resources brought to the programming relationship by the 
traditional partners (and in particular the local authorities) is reduced. The enhanced 
ability of the European Commission to turn tô other qualified partners for local 
expertise, economic data, programme preparation and most importantly for the supply 
of eligible projects which the Commission can co-finance, reduces its dependence on 
traditional partners. The claim of local authorities to be the only actors which bring 
some form of ’democratic legitimacy' to the partnership, given that they are the only 
eligible bodies to be directly elected, is less convincing in light of the fact that 
political members of the councils are excluded from the programme's committee 
structures which can only be attended by non-elected officials.
The position of the LECs was further strengthened by the long-standing desire 
of DG XVI to re-direct ERDF expenditure away from infrastructure hardware to 
business software. While the Regional Council and other partners could prepare 
business support schemes (were these to be declared suitable by central government), 
the very raison d’être of the LECs was to assist private sector development schemes in 
local areas. The following section illustrates the trend over time towards a higher 
proportion of business support schemes in ERDF programming in Western Scotland.
5.5 The Shift in Strategic Programming Priorities: From 'Infrastructure
Hardware' to 'Business Software'
While the following chapters consider the performance of Strathclyde IDO in 
terms of institutional outputs (chapter 6) and policy outputs (chapter 7), the remainder 
of this chapter examines the two contract preparation periods subsequent to the IDO: 
the 1993 Western Scotland Operational Programme and the post-1993 Plan. The aim 
of this section is to illustrate the growth over time in the percentage of the ERDF 
programme allocated to revenue-financed business software schemes and away from 
infrastructure hardware. It is argued that this shift in the ERDF policy 'periphery' 
indicates the increasing capacity of the European Commission to shape the overall 
priorities of the development programme. The increased role of the Scottish Enterprise 
Network, with its strategic objective of supporting business competitiveness, in the 
preparation of the post-1993 Plan is also significant. As shown in the following 
chapters, however, the continuing ability of the UK central government to use the
flexibility built into the contract to re-direct expenditure away from software measures 
after the approval of the programme illustrates the continuation of bargaining 
throughout the process and hence the incomplete nature of the contract.
The desire of the European Commission to re-direct the actions of the ERDF 
away from the support of basic infrastructure towards internally generated regional 
growth, through SME support in particular, has been emphasised throughout the 
preceding analysis (see chapter 3 in particular). From the European Commission's 
perspective, strategies designed to attract inward investment carry the danger that 
company location may simply be displaced from'elsewhere in the EC. The European 
Commission also maintained that basic infrastructure support was of little economic 
relevance in declining industrial regions: such infrastructure was usually already in 
place in Objective 2 regions of northern member states. Support for road construction 
in particular in Objective 2 areas was increasingly opposed by DG XVI (unless these 
were short access roads necessary to open up new industrial sites) as they were 
generally maintained to be of little value in economic development terms and should 
be financed by the member states in any case. The significance of reducing the 
number of roads supported in the UK was dramatic: in Strathclyde, the Regional 
Council attracted most of its ERDF support for such projects; more importantly, as the 
number of large road projects (in financial terms) is reduced, it becomes more difficult 
to implement the programme as an increased number of smaller projects is required to 
'draw down' support. As shown in table S.5, the UK's reluctance to shift the focus of 
programming away from such infrastructure was striking when compared with the 
other member states eligible for Objective 2 support.
Table 5.5: Percentage of Each Member State's Structural Fund Objective 2 Allocation
by Expenditure Priority (1989-1991)
Be. Dk. FRG Sp. Fr. I t Lux. Ne. UK AU
Priority
Ongoing
Operations
(pre-refonn)
36% 9% 9% 27% 24% 5% 53% 31% 45% 31%
Improving
Business
Competitiveness
53% 72% 52% 36% 43% 62% 47% 50% 19% 35%
Infrastructure for
Economic
Activity
7% 18% 39% 13% 26% 20% — 4% 18% 19%
Tourism 3% — — — — — - 13% 9% 6%
Basic
Infrastructure 2% — — 24% 6% 11% — — 9% 8%
Technical
Assistance - 1% 1% — 1% 2% — 2% — 1%
Source European Commission (1990) Annual Report on the Implementation of the Reform o f the 
Structural Funds (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities).
There are four key points to note about table 5.5. Firstly, and most importantly, 
the exceptionally low share of the UK's allocation devoted to 'improving business 
competitiveness' is striking. At 19% this figure is almost 50% less than the next 
member state (Spain). Denmark, at the other end of the scale, allocated almost 72% to 
such schemes.26 The explanation for this comparatively low figure, referred to above, 
was repeated in several interviews with DG XVI officials. The low share allocated to 
business support (including research and development schemes), while paradoxical in 
light of the fact that UK domestic regional policy is exclusively focused on the private 
sector, is explained by the fact that such schemes are overwhelmingly financed 
through revenue expenditure and cannot be controlled as directly as capital 
expenditure under the UK public expenditure system. The UK central government 
consequently sought to keep a tight lid on the ERDF allocation to business 
development schemes, as had been evident in their earlier refusal to forward Article
26 It should be noted that, despite the fact that the UK allocation to 'improving business competitiveness' 
is almost 50% less than the next lowest, the overall allocation to such expenditure across the Objective 2 
regions of the EC is lower than the second lowest allocation. This reflects the fact that the UK received 
almost 40% of total Objective 2 resources, more than twice the allocation to any other member state.
15 applications under the old 1984 Regulation. A second point to note is that the 45% 
allocated to 'ongoing operations' in the UK was overwhelmingly devoted to 
infrastructure schemes. Pre-reform programmes were prepared under the old priorities: 
as shown in the previous section, over 80% of ERDF resources under the Strathclyde 
IDO were allocated to infrastructure schemes. A third point to note is the general lack 
of importance attached to tourism schemes across the Objective 2 regions of Europe: 
tourism development was included as a priority in the Scottish schemes primarily 
because it guaranteed the district councils a share of expenditure. Finally, the 
opposition of the UK government (although flot alone in the EC) to 'technical 
assistance' (TA) is of relevance. Under the terms of the Regulations, up to 2% of a 
programme's resources could be used to finance seminars, studies, consultancy work, 
computer equipment or even staff costs in order to enhance the technical quality of 
programme management. In the UK, such assistance was long rejected. While the 
government blocked TA under Objective 2 on the grounds that it provided poor ’value 
for money', the fact that such assistance would be exclusively financed through local 
actors' revenue budgets was also of key significance.27
It should be emphasised again that these were proposed allocations to strategic 
priorities. Actual out-turn allocations were significantly different in the case of 
Strathclyde IDO. However, at this stage, the post-IDO contracts should be examined to 
illustrate the increased share of proposed ERDF allocations directed to revenue- 
financed business support and research and development schemes.
5.5.1 The 1993 Western Scotland Operational Programme
As explained above, the reformed Structural Fund Regulations, covering the 
period 1 January 1989 to 31 December 1993, came into effect a matter of days after 
the approval of the Strathclyde IDO. In line with the three-stage planning procedure, a 
Regional and Social Conversion Plan for the Objective 2 area of Western Scotland 
was officially submitted to the European Commission on 30 May 1989 (Scottish 
Office 1989b). Following a period of negotiation between the DTI and the European 
Commission, the latter published the Community Support Frameworks for the 
Objective 2 regions of the UK. The development priorities set out for the region of 
Western Scotland in the CSF simply reflected the eight development objectives and 
Action Programmes of the IDO, which had already been approved to cover the period 
1 January 1988 to 31 December 1992. For the areas covered by the pre-existing IDO,
27 The fact that technical assistance was available under Objectives 3 and 4 shows the contradiction in 
the government’s Value for money* criteria. Objectives 3 and 4 for vocational training are used in the UK 
to support overwhelmingly revenue expenditure, hence the importance of blocking TA under these 
Objectives was lessened from a UK government perspective.
the priorities therefore remained the same. For Ayr and Girvan, however, the new 
Regulations applied: road, rail and inland waterway schemes were only acceptable to 
the extent that they facilitated business development or tourism and that they made 'a 
direct contribution to creation and maintenance of employment and to economic 
development and productive investment1, or were essential to the efficient movement 
of industrial, commercial or tourist traffic. Likewise, drainage and sewerage schemes 
were only acceptable if they were essential to business or tourism development 
(European Commission 1991b: 30). From 1989 then, the programme incorporated two 
distinct areas under which priorities and the eligibility criteria for projects differed.
As explained in chapter 4, it had been the intention of the European 
Commission to review the eligibility of Objective 2 regions after three years. Hence, 
the first CSF only lasted for the period 1989 to 1991. The intention was to create a 
new list of Objective 2 regions for the period 1992-1993, and to undertake a new 
round of programming. In the event, the Commission decided on 20 March 1991 to 
maintain the existing list of Objective 2 areas and continue the CSFs largely 
unchanged. The CSF for Western Scotland for the 1992-1993 period began as follows: 
'while some revisions have been carried out to the Community Support Framework in 
the light of experience of the first phase of operations, there are no major changes to 
the policy objectives or broad priorities as set out in the original document' (European 
Commission 1992b: 1). For 1992 therefore, with regard to the areas covered by the 
IDO, the Commission and the UK authorities agreed to continue the eight Action 
Programmes of the original document as the priorities for action while Ayr and Girvan 
operated under the new priorities. However, between the completion of the IDO on 31 
December 1992, and the introduction of the re-reformed Regulations on 1 January 
1994, the original IDO area was subject to a one year Operational Programme, 
reflecting the priorities which had guided the 1989-1991 actions in the adjacent areas 
of Ayr and Girvan (see Appendix 3). In other words, the partnership already had 
experience of operating the new priorities through the case of Ayr and Girvan.
The six Priorities (or Action Programmes) set out for the 1993 Western 
Scotland Operational Programme were as follows:
Priority 1 Improving facilities for the development ofproductive activities:
primarily the provision, upgrading, or refurbishment of high quality 
industrial sites and premises, workspaces and business centres.
Priority 2 Improvements in road, rail and public transport facilities in order to
facilitate business development and tourism: primarily to provide or 
improve access to industrial sites, business premises and tourism 
attractions.
Priority 3 Assistance for the development o f small and medium-sized enterprises:
provision of business support to SMEs through help with business 
services, management advice, design and marketing, and the 
introduction of new technologies.
Priority 4 Improving the image and attractiveness o f the region: land reclamation
and treatment, landscaping, and environmental improvements.
Priority 5 The development o f tourism: upgrading and modernisation of existing
attractions, development of new attractions, provision of tourist advice 
and information centres, support of promotional activities.
Priority 6 Support for research and development and vocational training:
provision of facilities aimed at extension of new facilities, promotion 
of innovation, and support for product and process development 
(Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation 1993a).
These were precisely the priorities hammered out in 1989 between the European 
Commission and the DTI for all of the Objective 2 areas of the UK, and applied 
uniformly for Eastern Scotland, North-East England, Ayr and Girvan under Western 
Scotland, and the other Objective 2 regions of the UK. Widespread myth among the 
UK Structural Fund partnerships suggests that these Priorities were simply thrashed 
out over a restaurant table in Brussels in a meeting between the UK lead civil servant 
on Structural Fund issues (an Assistant Secretary in the DTI) and the relevant Director 
from DG XVI. Whether or not this is accurate, and it has been confirmed in several 
interviews with both UK central government and European Commission officials, the 
most important aspect of this 'strategic framework’ was the balance of importance that 
was subsequently given to each Priority in terms of the expenditure allocation it 
received.
In late April and May 1989, DG XVI had received eight Regional and Social 
Conversion Plans for UK Objective 2 areas. DG XVI had to meet a six month 
deadline, laid down in Article 10 of Regulation 4253/88, in responding with the 
Community Support Framework. Negotiations therefore continued between European 
Commission and UK government officials over the summer. Interview sources have 
confirmed that the government made an overbid of over 100% more than the 
estimated amounts available for the UK for the years 1989, 1990, and 1991. From a 
Commission perspective, the central aim of the negotiations with UK authorities 
therefore became to scale down the demands in order to match available resources. In 
other words, by making a bid for support well in excess of the resources available, the 
UK government precluded the possibility of any extensive discussion during the six 
month negotiation period of its failure to develop a strategic approach or provide 
quantified objectives and targets. Several Commission officials suggested in 
interviews that the Plans submitted for UK Objective 2 regions were all overly similar
and had simply been edited for each region on a Whitehall word processor with little 
local input.
As expected, the European Commission sought to limit the resources allocated 
to infrastructure measures such as roads, and give a higher priority to direct assistance 
to firms. The entire strategy of the DTI (and the Scottish Office) in the negotiations 
was to limit the allocation of ERDF resources to revenue financed measures and to 
maximise the allocation to those financed through local actors' capital expenditure.28 
Priority 3 (assistance for the development of SMEs) was almost entirely financed 
through revenue expenditure, while the research and development component of 
Priority 6 and the promotional activities (such as advertising) undertaken under 
Priority 4 (tourism) were similarly financed. The Commission's pressure for increased 
resources to Priorities 3 and 6 was therefore fiercely resisted by UK central 
government which sought to maintain its long-held policy of non-additionality.
The House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities found 
evidence of this conflict between UK central government and the European 
Commission over the balance of expenditure between infrastructure and software 
measures. The Commission was firmly of the belief that priority should be given to 
investment directed towards industrial development activities rather than 
infrastructure, while the Government stated repeatedly that capital expenditure on 
infrastructure provides greater 'value for money' than other forms of expenditure under 
the Structural Funds. As the Under Secretary heading the regional policy division in 
DTI told the Lords, the view of the United Kingdom Government which is based on 
"value for money" considerations is that in general capital expenditure on 
infrastructure is likely to prove of greater value for money than other forms of 
expenditure' (1992: 13). As shown in chapter 7, however, the UK civil servants' 
inability to pinpoint exactly what they meant by 'value for money' exasperated 
Commission officials who maintained that the UK government position was based on 
nothing more than an opposition to revenue expenditure projects.
The Scottish Office was at the forefront of the dispute with the European 
Commission over the 'matter of emphasis' given to revenue financed schemes. Scottish 
Office civil servants pointed out to the House of Lords Select Committee that the UK 
government puts 'a greater emphasis on infrastructure expenditure', while the 
Commission possibly put a rather greater emphasis on support for investment by small 
and medium sized enterprises, but it is a matter of balance' (House of Lords 1992: 35). 
This difference in opinion over the weight to be placed on strategic priorities provoked 
lengthy discussions' during the first round of CSF negotiations in 1989. As the
28 Not least because the lead Department, the DTI would need to issue spending cover for revenue 
projects The Department of Environment is responsible for issuing cover for capital projects in 
England
Assistant Secretary in the Scottish Office with responsibility for ERDF actions in 
Scotland told the Select Committee:
In the negotiations in 1989 of the plans that we submitted, which were 
eventually agreed as Community Support Frameworks, I have to say 
that there was a lot of dispute between the Commission on the one 
hand and the Government and Scottish Office together with, I think, 
nearly all its partners in running programmes as we all felt that 
infrastructure was very important in a peripheral region like 
Scotland... The Commission, however, was at that time pressing very 
hard its view that priority should be given to direct investment into 
industrial firms rather than to infrastructure. There was therefore a 
dispute, but at the end of the day, as is common in Community 
business, my Lord Chairman, we reached a compromise which I think 
met our objectives as far as possible on both sides, and we now go 
ahead within the general framework (1992: 35).
The negotiations which had been carried out between the European Commission and 
central government over these issues in 1989 shaped the Operational Programme 
prepared for the Western Scotland Objective 2 region for the transitional year of 1993. 
This was the first year in which the whole of the Western Scotland region was covered 
by the Priorities thrashed out in the 1989 negotiations. The total ERDF allocation by 
strategic Priority for 1993 is set out in Table 5.6.
Table 5.6: Western Scotland 1993 Operational Programme - ERDF Allocation by
Priority
Spending Priority
Share of Total ERDF Expenditure
(%)
1. Facilities for Productive Activities 28%
2. Road, Rail & Public Transport 20.5%
3. Business Development (SMEs) 10%
4. Image and Environment 14.5%
5. Tourism 23%
6. Research and Development, 
Vocational Training
4%
Source Strathclyde IDO (1993) Western Scotland Operational Programme - 1993 - ERDF Guidance
Pack (Glasgow: Strathclyde IDO).
Four points should be highlighted with regard to table 5.6. Firstly, the most 
important point to note about the 1993 Operational Programme is the 10% of ERDF 
resources allocated to Priority 3 (Business Development). While the earlier IDO had 
nominally allocated 16% to the similar Action Programme of'Enterprise, Innovation 
and Investment', this was primarily reimbursement to the Scottish Office for its own 
'Enterprise Initiative' awards. The 10% allocated to Priority 3 in 1993 was intended to 
support locally generated business support schemes. Secondly, the dramatic reduction 
in support for public transport schemes, from 37% of ERDF resources under the EDO 
to 20.5% in 1993, should be noted. The significance of this shift is softened by the 
increased allocation to 28% for Tacilities for Productive Activities' from the mere 8% 
allocated to 'Industrial sites and Premises' under the IDO. Hence, although the 
European Commission was able to promote a shift away from basic infrastructure 
provision (such as roads) to business development supported by local authorities, 
Priority 1 guaranteed that a large proportion of expenditure was still allocated to 
capital-financed schemes. Thirdly, the importance attached to the various Priorities by 
the European Commission was evident in the grant rate it approved for each. The 
European Commission approval of the 1993 Operational Programme stipulated that
the Commission would provide 50% support (the maximum possible in Objective 2 
regions) for projects under Priorities 3 and 4. The rate of assistance fell to 45% for 
Priorities 5 and 6 and to 40% for Priority 1. The grant rate for public transport 
infrastructure schemes was a mere 25% (European Commission 1993a: 11). Fourthly, 
given the changes in the strategic priorities ushered in during the 1993 transitional 
year, the IDO Executive team (see chapter 6) was compelled to issue an ERDF 
Guidance Pack for partners, and to run a series of seminars to inform the local 
partners of the changes in project priorities, eligibility and the greater emphasis on the 
integration of Funds (Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation 1993b).29
In short, the increased allocation of resources to revenue-financed business 
support schemes under the 1993 Programme indicates the greater capacity the 
European Commission enjoyed after the 1989 Regulations to shape strategic 
programming priorities. The Plan prepared for the post-1993 period, drawn up under 
the re-reformed Regulations, shows that this trend towards business support schemes 
has continued. However, the significance of the new additionality agreements and the 
greater involvement of Scottish Enterprise and the LEC Network in this period should 
also be recognised.
5.5.2 Programming with Transparency: the post-1993 Plan
The Western Scotland Regional Plan 1994-99 (Scottish Office/Strathclyde 
European Partnership 1994) is the most recent contractual document considered in this 
analysis. Although the Plan was drawn up to meet the requirements of the 1993 re- 
reformed Regulations, much of the detailed preparation of the document was 
undertaken by the partners before the Regulations were agreed, in the anticipation that 
there would be little significant change in the operation of the funds for the 1994-1999 
period. The Plan was submitted to the European Commission in March 1994. The 
emphasis placed on software measures was greater under the 1994 Plan than under any 
previous programme for Western Scotland.
It should be emphasised that the 1994 Plan was the first to be prepared after 
the RECHAR dispute and was therefore the first to be drawn up with financial 
transparency and under the 'subtractionality' arrangements analysed in chapter 4. In 
other words, all ERDF grants (whether capital or revenue based expenditure) are now 
passed on to the partners undertaking the project. More importantly, although the
29 ESF funding was available for projects under Priorities 3,4, 5 and 6 in the 1993 Operational 
Programme, and not fenced off under a separate Action Programme as had been the case under the IDO. 
It is relevant to note that almost twice as much ESF than ERDF was available under Priority 3 (business 
development) This reflects the fact that ESF expenditure for training schemes is primarily revenue 
expenditure anyway and did not need to be capped under this Priority in the same way as the ERDF.
resources have been top-sliced 'ex-ante' from the partners domestic spending 
allocations, the award of ERDF grant now carries an automatic permission to spend. 
The importance of the revenue-capital distinction in ERDF terms, which long 
determined how the UK central government approached projects and programming, is 
now far less relevant. Central government no longer blocks revenue financed projects 
on the grounds of ensuring non-additionality. Pressure from the European Commission 
for business support schemes, assisted by the LECs whose strategic priorities are 
aligned with DG XVI in this regard, met little resistance from the Scottish Office in 
1994.
The Plan for the post-1993 period was also the first to be drawn up involving 
the full regional partnership, which started preparing the document well in advance of 
the deadline for its submission to the European Commission. In effect, the 1993 
Programme had been determined for the regional partnership during the wider 
negotiations between the Commission and central government in 1989. At a CSF 
Monitoring Committee meeting on 3 November 1992, the partners agreed that they 
would need to consider a wide range of issues ahead of determining a strategy' for the 
post-1993 period. The Western Scotland partnership therefore agreed to set up a Plan 
Team to develop a draft plan (even though they did not know what the reformed 
Regulations would call for). The main task of the Plan Team was to set up a 
’streamlined and representational structure to gather information relevant to the 
growing number of partners in an effective fashion’.30 The Plan Team itself comprised 
eight officials from the wider group of around 140 partners. These Team members 
were drawn from the senior partners: the Scottish Office Industry Department; the 
Programme Executive; Strathclyde Regional Council; Glasgow District Council; the 
Head of Strategy Development for Scottish Enterprise; a Voluntary Sector 
representative; and an official from one of the LECs.
The Plan Team engaged in an exhaustive analysis of the Western Scotland 
regional economy, in consultation with the wider partnership. The Team prepared an 
overview of the key development issues facing the Western Scotland region and 
proposed strategic objectives for the new Regional Plan: Strathclyde Regional Council 
drew up a report on physical business infrastructure; Scottish Enterprise and the LECs 
drew up a report on non-physical business infrastructure; human resource development 
requirements were tackled by a representative of the voluntary sector; Glasgow 
District Council drew up a tourism strategy as well as a report on social and economic 
cohesion within the area. This latter reflects the sponsorship by Glasgow District 
Council of several of the ’Area Initiatives' within Glasgow's city boundaries. Papers on
30 'Western Scotland Objective 2 Regional Plan: Preparation of the Regional Plan including involvement 
of, and consultation with, the Partners', typescript.
all these issues were prepared and circulated early among the wider partnership early 
in 1993, with the agreement that all partners had the chance to comment in writing to 
the Plan Team before the end of March 1993. A series of workshops were also held in 
early April on several of the issue papers. While the European Commission desk- 
officer for the region was invited to attend these workshops, the invitation was turned 
down for practical reasons.
A further range of less contentious papers was prepared by the Programme 
Executive. These were not subject to the same degree of consultation and concerned 
the following issues: a socio-economic profile bf the region; an assessment of the 
impact of the IDO and of the lessons learned; a chapter on the environment; a paper 
on management and evaluation; draft selection criteria for projects and a financial 
plan. While it had not been clear throughout the Plan preparation if the partners were 
preparing a plan or a full programme, as the new Regulations had not been agreed, a 
final document was prepared with the aid of a consultant to draw all the papers 
together.31 The Plan submitted to the European Commission in March 1994 was 
therefore the first to have been prepared through a wide consultation of the 
partnership. The Plan itself emphasised the level of local involvement in its 
preparation:
The Plan has been produced by a team drawn from the principal 
economic and social development organisations in Western Scotland.
It has been developed and refined through numerous discussions, 
workshops and consultation seminars involving over 150 
representatives of the agencies of the partnership. The breadth of 
involvement and commitment secured by this process has itself 
enhanced the capacity for partnership action in the region and will 
increase the effectiveness of the Plan's delivery (1994: preface).
Interview sources in Western Scotland confirm that the post-1993 Plan was in fact 
drawn up in a much more open and consultative manner than any of the earlier 
documents in the region. While the Scottish Office's superficially liands off approach 
can partly be explained by the new additionality agreement and the fact that the 
resources to be allocated were top-sliced ex-ante by central government from the local 
actors' expenditure allocations, the role of the Programme Executive was also of some 
importance. The Executive had been in existence for five years by the time of the 1993 
Plan preparation (and the Director himself had been in post for all that time). A degree 
of trust had been built up among the local partnership with regard to the Executive and 
this body's strong role in the Plan Team facilitated a wider consultation than might 
otherwise have been the case.
31 This same consultant had worked on the original IDO submission in the late 1980s.
The Plan sets out four strategic priorities as follows: business environment; 
business development; tourism; and economic and social cohesion within the region 
(i.e. the targeting of blackspots of high deprivation). The allocation to these priorities 
is shown in table 5.7, which also indicates the trend in strategic priorities over the 
course of ERDF programming in Western Scotland.
Table 5.7: Structural Fund Expenditure by Priority in Western Scotland (1985-1994)
Priority
IDO 1988-1992 ;Op. Prog. 1993 Post-1994 Plan
Tourism 11% 13% 13%
Business Development • 9% 18% 33%
Business Environment •• 80% 69% 39%
Eco. & Soc. Cohesion •** - — 15%
Source : European Policies Research Centre ( 1994) Ex-Ante Appraisal of Objective 2 Regions: Western
Scotland (Glasgow: European Policies Research Centre)
* Business Development is used here to include expenditure on enterprise, innovation
and investment, employment and training, research and development.
•• Business Environment includes expenditure on environmental improvements.
industrial sites, transport, communications, productive activities (workshops, and 
drainage, sewerage, and waste before 1993).
.*• Economic and Social Cohesion indicates the new priority introduced for the post-1993
period and includes expenditure on business start-ups, employment and training, and 
environmental improvements in die most seriously disadvantaged areas of the region.
The most striking feature of table 5.7 is the 350% increase in the allocation of 
resources to business development between the 1988 programme and the 1994 Plan 
(which was drawn up without direct Commission involvement).32 Moreover, the 
earlier NPCI had not included any such measures as Article 15 projects were explicitly 
blocked at that time. Similarly, expenditure under the business environment category 
(incorporating earlier expenditure under environmental improvements, industrial sites, 
transport and communications and almost exclusively capital financed expenditure) 
has witnessed a reduction of over 50%. The breakdown of funding between the 
strategic priorities proposed in the 1994 Plan represents a significant shift in emphasis 
relative to the breakdown under both the IDO and the 1993 Operational Programme.
32 The apparent discrepancy between figures presented in Table S.7 and those presented in Table 5.6 is 
simply due to the fact that the expenditure figures provided in Table 5.6 refer to the ERDF component 
only, while the figures in Table 5.7 include ESF expenditure.
The European Policies Research Centre offered the following explanation for the shift 
from hardware to software in its appraisal of the 1994 Plan:
The strategy and priorities reflect a balance between the major plan 
partners, in particular between Strathclyde Regional Council and 
Scottish Enterprise. The major shift of the Strategy and financial 
allocation towards business development represents the greater 
influence of Scottish Enterprise [compared to the 1988 plan which was 
driven more by Strathclyde Regional Council] (European Policies 
Research Centre 1994: 36). .
While the reduced asset specificity of the resources brought to the contractual 
relationship by Strathclyde Regional Council is undoubtedly of great significance, it 
has also been suggested above that other factors were at play. Notably, the earlier 
pressure of the European Commission to promote such a shift and the removal of 
central government's block on revenue expenditure after the RECHAR transparency 
agreement have both been emphasised. In short, the shift in strategic programming 
priorities from infrastructure hardware to business software is a striking example of 
the malleability of ERDF programmes at the point of delivery.
5.6 Reprise and Snmmary
This chapter has provided a detailed analysis of the evolution of ERDF 
programming in Western Scotland, and the role of local partners therein. A central 
focus has been the extent to which the European Commission is able to frame such 
regional development programmes to reflect its own objectives. It has been suggested 
that in the UK, there is a great deal of tension between central government and the 
European Commission over the programming of ERDF actions. As Redmond and 
Barrett point out, it seems that the relationship between Britain and Europe in this 
area often represents a rather uneasy marriage of convenience between two different, 
if not conflicting, intellectual traditions. The Commission’s approach seems to owe 
much to French indicative planning experience whereas, of course, regional economic 
planning has never been firmly established in the UK' (Redmond and Barrett 1988:
31). As such, Mawson and Gibney's observation (quoted above) on UK policy towards 
the 'strategic approach' is worth repeating. The objective of central government in the 
UK is to 'secure the maximum ERDF entitlement with the minimum administrative 
difficulties' (1984: 53). This chapter has shown how the transaction costs of 
programming have in fact increased as central government can no longer treat the 
ERDF purely as a budgetary compensation mechanism.
The broader aim of this chapter (along with chapters 6 and 7) has been to test 
the applicability and utility of the model of policy implementation as incomplete 
contracting. To do so, five sets of questions derived from the model were set out at 
the beginning of this chapter. It is worth returning to those questions to illustrate that 
the model does indeed provide useful insights into the nature of policy 
implementation.
Firstly, who are the partners and what resources does each contribute to the 
exchange set up under the programming procedure? The Scottish Office Industry 
Department, Strathclyde Regional Council, DG XVI, and latterly the Scottish 
Enterprise Network were identified as the key partners. It was also suggested that 
central government and the local authorities were traditionally more concerned with 
attracting support for infrastructure projects, while DG XVI (supported recently by the 
Scottish Enterprise Network) has usually been more interested in industrial and 
business development measures. Although their strategic objectives may differ on 
close examination, all partners have increasingly devoted a large share of internal 
organisational resources to the requirements of programming. For example, the 
European Funds and Co-ordination Division within the Scottish Office Industry 
Department has grown in terms of staff numbers from 5 to over thirty in the last 
decade. The increasing resources are demanded by the nature of the exchange 
relationship.
The benefits to the European Commission of the contracting approach with 
central and sub-national actors are clear. At the most obvious level, the programme 
documents provide the Commission with much sought after information on the 
regional economy. In Western Scotland this was data which would not otherwise have 
been collected systematically in this fashion, let alone made available to the 
Commission. It has also been shown that the European Commission is unable to 
prepare ERDF programmes on its own. Not only does it lack the internal staff 
resources to do so, but the information required to prepare a coherent programme is 
widely dispersed at the regional level. Hence, a range of national and local actors are 
incorporated to provide the resources necessary to gather highly dispersed information 
on the regional economy. In fact, many local actors complain that the information 
requirements of the European Commission are excessive. One local government 
official grappling with the Commission's demands for information claimed ironically 
that 'Brussels wants to weigh the bricks’ (Preston & Hogg 1990: 34). The provision of 
such information allows the European Commission a role in determining expenditure 
priorities, and a say in the most sensitive question of determining the expenditure 
allocation to action programmes. From a Commission perspective, the advance
presented by this approach relative to the annual rubber-stamping of thousands of 
disparate projects was significant.
From the perspective of the regional actors, there were a number of perceived 
benefits from the exchange, despite the lack of true additionality. A Strathclyde 
Regional Council document lists some of the benefits as follows: an enhanced level of 
ERDF assistance (i.e. higher grant rate); ERDF grant assistance for small schemes 
which could not otherwise be supported outwith a programme framework; assistance 
for projects not eligible outwith a programme, such as environmental improvements, 
far greater certainty about levels of support; and, the decentralisation of decision­
making on projects from Brussels to the local Co-ordinating Committee in the region. 
In addition, the requirement that the economic development programmes of the major 
organisations with a role in economic development in the region should be brought 
together into a single coherent set of proposals and regular monitoring of these against 
common objectives was perceived as another benefit: 'no other similar arrangements 
currently exist to bring together these organisations in the region. Co-ordination also 
brings a closer relationship with Brussels and hence the opportunity for new joint 
proposals in future' (Strathclyde Regional Council 1988: 9). Central government has 
facilitated this co-ordination in the case of the ERDF as it is dependent on local actors 
applying for support. Central government wishes to draw down resources and requires 
local actors to submit a steady supply of projects in order to allow this to happen. In 
short, a complex exchange relationship has been established as local economic 
information and projects for co-financing are exchanged for some predictability in 
financial flows and guidance on how to apply for support.
The second and third sets of questions are closely related to the first. The 
growth and evolution of the partnership over the last decade is explained by the 
increased geographical coverage of the programme, as well as a wider range of 
eligible activities and the emergence of new partners (in particular Scottish Enterprise 
and the LECs). From a European Commission perspective, this has reduced the asset 
specificity of the resources brought to the exchange by the long-standing partners (in 
particular the local authorities). In other words, DG XVI is now less dependent on 
local authorities for the provision of projects it can co-finance. Moreover, the strategic 
priorities of the LECs are more in line with the European Commission focus on 
business support.
The importance of involving and motivating all the relevant local actors in the 
preparation of the regional development contract has been stressed by the Convention 
of Scottish Local Authorities. They claim that 'if the planning process is efficient and 
effective, it should produce confidence among the partners, confidence which should 
extend to the provision of greater regional/local responsibility within the partnership
mechanism' (COSLA 1991: 7). Undoubtedly this has increased the likelihood that 
competing objectives are introduced into the partnership. Analysis of the preparation 
of programmes has shown that partners expect 'a slice of the cake' if they are going to 
the expense of providing information and projects. Nevertheless, the common purpose 
of the partnership is also evident as a sense of trust seems to be emerging.
The duration of the exchange relationship has allowed shared values and an 
embryonic sense of trust to develop between the partners. This trust, which had not 
been facilitated by pre-existing domestic structures for regional planning or regional 
policy, is reflected in the agreement of the partnership to allow a Plan Team' to draw 
up the post-1993 Plan (in consultation with the whole partnership). The consultants 
appointed to appraise the post-1993 Plan found evidence of the sense of trust among 
the partnership. They pointed out that the Plan Team genuinely considered that the 
Plan 'reflects what the partnership wants to achieve and that the full partnership has 
been involved and is in agreement':
There has been a broad, partnership-based approach in the preparation 
of the Plan and, among the Plan Team members, substantial consensus 
on the overall strategy. The wide range of organisations involved and 
their different capabilities affected the extent to which they were 
able/willing to be involved in the consultation process (European 
Policies Research Centre 1994: 107).
In this way, an attempt had been made to address the identified need for greater 
ownership by the Partnership of the Strategy and its implementation by undertaking a 
wider consultation process' (ibid.: 107). However, the model of incomplete contracting 
also emphasises the fact that all bargaining is not condensed into the contract 
preparation phase. The incomplete nature of the contract, a consequence of the 
uncertainty surrounding regional economic performance and the complexity of 
planning a policy response, necessitates flexibility and adaptability in implementation 
structures.
The fourth set of questions posed at the start of this chapter concerned the 
extent to which the uncertainty and complexity surrounding the programming process 
rendered the contract incomplete. The unavoidably bounded rationality of the key 
actors means that contractual agreements leave a lot of gaps to be filled in. As quoted 
in this chapter, the Programme Director in Western Scotland has explained that 
around 50% of projects change their financial profile during the course of 
implementation due to changes in wider economic circumstances, changes in 
tendering documents or delays in projects. The programmes therefore allow for the 
ability to shift resources between sub-programmes and a complex set of committee 
structures has been set up to facilitate this flexibility. The European Commission
participates in these structures in order to monitor the enforcement of the contract 
according to its original spirit. The following chapter considers the precise nature of 
the governance structures the European Commission has been able to fashion in the 
region concerned in order to pursue its contractual objectives.
The final set of questions considered the extent to which the European 
Commission had succeeded over time in promoting its own priorities for development 
as the exchange relationship has matured. The gradual development of a more 
'strategic' approach has, in general, been a feature of programming in Western 
Scotland. The Commission's own priority within such an approach, to increase the 
proportion of resources allocated to business development and decrease the proportion 
allocated to basic infrastructure in Objective 2 regions more generally, was clearly set 
out in the Fourth Periodic Report on the regions of the Community (European 
Commission 1991e: 56). The Commission's ability to achieve this shift in Western 
Scotland has reduced the Secretary of State for Scotland's ability to shift around the 
resources within his budget according to one senior civil servant. The Scottish Office 
is now obliged to top-slice resources from the expenditure headings of local actors in 
order to reallocate the spending approval as projects are approved. According to this 
civil servant, trying to control the Structural Fund programming process is like 
steering a super tanker: you cannot stop it, you can put it in some directions but you 
cannot turn it around'.
The increased capacity of the European Commission to shape programming 
priorities is most evident in the shift in emphasis over time from infrastructure 
hardware to business software measures. The respective economic merits of 
infrastructure and business development projects for the eligible areas of Scotland was 
not considered in this analysis. It was more important simply to highlight this 
difference in the 'policy periphery' between the European Commission and UK central 
government. The public expenditure reasons behind this reluctance of UK central 
government to support schemes for SMEs, although disguised in economic terms, 
were also highlighted. As Commissioner Millan himself told the House of Lords 
Select Committee, the Government has been very reluctant to allow us [the European 
Commission] to co-finance local authority schemes for small and medium-sized 
enterprises'; moreover, it is not the case that the UK Government does not want to 
assist small firms, but that the limits put on the Commission 'are basically to do with 
the relationship between government and local authorities' (House of Lords 1992: 98). 
The European Commission's increased capacity over time to influence the allocation 
of resources to strategic priorities is therefore witnessed by the 350% rise in support 
for business development schemes in Western Scotland since the late 1980s. To this 
extent at least, it appears that UK civil servants at central and local level have been
required to adapt to the 'requirements of the Brussels mind'. It also appears that the 
Under-Secretary of State for Industry and Consumer Affairs is wrong when he 
suggests that the government will decide how the money is spent, and that is that’. 
However, the model of incomplete contracting emphasises that agreement of the 
programme is not the end of the process. Our analysis must also look at ex-post 
project selection and the extent to which the flexibility built into the contract is used 
to alter its final shape. The case study now turns to the structures through which this 
flexibility is ensured.
Chapter 6. Monitoring Arrangements: Enforcing the Contract
On-the-spot observation reveals considerable differences between 
partnership in programming and partnership in the management of 
implementation. The two forms of partnership often bring together 
different partners, each with its own motivation, expertise and working 
methods. The results are of higher quality when partners are involved in 
both functions (European Commission 1992d: 20).
People have felt that once you have agreed the Community support 
framework and the programme, that was the end of the story and the 
Commission should not have an interest in anything that happened after 
that. Well, it is not as simple as that, we have to maintain an interest... we 
have to be involved and sometimes the Member States do not appreciate 
that very much. They would rather like to be left to get on with things 
under their own steam and without us being involved, but 1 do not think 
that this is in accordance with either the spirit and principles or the 
practice of the regulations (Commissioner Millan in evidence to the House 
of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities 1992:96).
6.1 Introduction
This chapter provides an analysis of the institutional structures established in 
Western Scotland to ensure the enforcement of ERDF funded regional development 
contracts. As the above quotation of Commissioner Millan clearly indicates, the 
European Commission's involvement in the programming process does not end with 
the agreement of the programme. Rather, an ongoing contractual relationship is 
established. The European Commission has rejected the 'elegant simplicity’ of the 
direct financial transfers between member states sought by the UK Secretary of State 
for Trade and Industry (see chapter 4). On the contrary, the Commission has sought to 
move away from the purely compensatory function of the ERDF. DG XVI 
progressively managed to promote the principles of programming and partnership over 
the course of the 1980s in pursuit of an effective instrument for economic 
development. This chapter seeks to uncover the nature of the governance structures 
which have been established in accordance with the principle of partnership at the 
regional level in order to facilitate programming. Specifically, the focus is on the 
extent to which the European Commission has been able to shape these structures.
Mackintosh suggests that 'partnership' has become one of the buzz words of 
our times in the field of public policy generally, and local economic development in 
particular. However, the term tends to disguise the multiplicity of objectives that are 
pursued behind the screen of seemingly co-ordinated action:
There is of course real ambiguity and conflict within partnership 
schemes themselves. Such schemes are rarely well defined one-off 
deals between partners with clearly defined goals, but rather sites of 
continuing political and economic renegotiation (1992: 210-211).
As emphasised in chapter 2, Parri's model of 'territorial political exchange' 
(1989; 1990) provides a useful conceptualisation of the potential complexity of 
policy-making involving a variety of actors at different territorial levels. In the case of 
ERDF programmes, the European Commission clearly encourages lower-level actors 
to influence the content of the contract, in exchange for both relevant information and 
consent to the terms of the contract. The necessity of a constant supply of eligible 
projects from local actors, as well as periodic repetitions of the process, also mean 
that the exchange relationship established is not simply a one-off interaction. A 
complex institutional structure has therefore evolved to govern this relationship. The 
committee system which has developed opens up regular opportunities for local 
actors and the European Commission to raise issues (such as respect for the 
additionality principle) which central government would prefer not to have to address 
in such a forum.
As Laffan has suggested, the European Commission's goals of increased 
partnership with central government on the one hand, and with local and regional 
authorities on the other, may simply not be politically realistic (1989: 54). It was open 
to question at the time of the reform of the Structural Funds whether the European 
Commission would have the political capacity and power to ensure that its views 
would prevail in the new fora opened up by the partnership principle. Indeed, in an 
internal communication circulated early in 1989, the Commission expressed its 
disappointment at the lack of respect for the principle, pointing out that 'the Member 
States pay lip-service to the principle of partnership, but in practice the majority of 
them resist the decentralisation which partnership implies and are suspicious of the 
links which develop in the process of partnership between the Commission and 
authorities or organisations other than central governments'.1 How this particular 
tension was resolved in the case of Western Scotland is examined herein.
In line with the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting, the 
focus of the analysis presented in this chapter is again on the exchange between the 
European Commission and domestic actors in Western Scotland. The following inter­
linked questions, reflecting and developing upon the set of questions around which 
chapter 5 was structured, are considered in this chapter:
1 'Structural Funds: Principal Questions Raised by the Revision of the 1988 Regulations', 
Communication from Mr Millan, Mr Flynn and Mr Steichen. in agreement with Mr Paleokrassas, 
January 1993, typescript, p.7.
1. To what extent is each partner involved in the structures which have been 
established to monitor the enforcement o f the contract7 The partnership itself 
expressed the view that 'there must be maximum involvement of partners in the 
committees and greater ownership by the partnership of the strategy and its 
implementation' (Scottish Office/Strathclyde European Partnership 1994: 60) 
However, as shown in chapter 5, the number of partners (defined simply as all bodies 
eligible to receive Structural Funds assistance on the grounds that if they are able to 
apply for grant in support of projects, they can contribute in some way to the 
development and management of the programme) has increased from around six at 
the time of the NPCI to over 140 at present. As the number of partners has increased, 
has it been possible to involve every project sponsor directly in the implementation 
structure?
2. Linked to the first set o f questions above, to what extent are changes in the 
contract, and changes m the partnership itself, reflected in the evolution o f the 
institutional structures set up under the programming process m Western Scotland? 
As the Plan for the post-1994 period stated, the partnership operates in a complex, 
ever-changing and expanding area and therefore should be continually reviewing its 
strategy and operating practices to ensure an improved responsiveness to local 
circumstances’ (Scottish Office/Strathclyde European Partnership 1994: 59).
3. Has the duration o f the exchange relationship increased the sense o f trust 
among the partnership? Has the length of time for which they have been working 
together on ERDF programmes facilitated the emergence of shared beliefs about the 
nature of the agreement? For example, does every partner demand the right to 
participate in every committee, or has a representational system of committee 
membership evolved?
4. How is the incomplete nature o f the contract and the uncertainty surrounding
the planning process built into the institutional structures? More specifically, how do
the institutional structures incorporate flexibility and adaptability to unfolding
circumstances? It is suggested below that the way in which the partnership in Western 
Scotland has agreed to respond to unforeseen contingencies can be conceptualised as 
a process of relational contracting. Rather than agreeing on the detailed nature of 
individual projects, the partners have settled for an agreement framing their 
relationship in this field. That is, they have agreed on broad objectives and on criteria 
to be used in decision-making when unforeseen contingencies arise. In simple terms,
268
they have agreed to cross certain bridges when they come to them, and they have 
agreed in general terms how the bridges should be crossed at that time.
5. Has a professional community o f experts in the field of programming 
developed in Western Scotlandand if so, how has this expertise been built into the 
institutional structure? It is suggested below that the emergence of the Programme 
Executive as a 'special purpose institution' has facilitated co-operation between the 
partners and reduced many of the costs of contracting. However, as central 
government tries to establish control over the Executive, the trust the latter enjoys 
among the wider partnership will be gradually eroded.
These five sets of questions are addressed throughout the remainder of this 
chapter, which is organised in five sections. Section 6.2 examines the earliest 
proposed institutional arrangements for ERDF implementation in Western Scotland, 
those contained in the 1984 IDO Preparatory Study. While the authors of that study 
were perhaps optimistic with regard to the role they anticipated for local actors in the 
implementation structure, many of the principles identified in the study have 
nevertheless been reflected in the subsequent evolution of institutional arrangements. 
The StTathclyde IDO's subsequent structure is analysed in Section 63 before Section
6.4 examines the most recent changes to the institutional structures at the regional 
level. Section 6.5 then analyses the role of the 'independent' Programme Executive 
over the entire period, charged with the task of managing the implementation of the 
contract. The evolution of this 'third party' (which does not sponsor projects itself and 
exists solely to ensure the effective management of the programme) is examined in 
the light of the changing nature of the contract itself. A key strength of the model of 
policy implementation as incomplete contracting is the way in which it highlights the 
extent to which the existence of the Executive has facilitated a greater sense of trust 
and enhanced the level of expertise brought to the implementation of the programme. 
Section 6.6 provides a summary of the findings of this chapter, emphasising the broad 
applicability of the model to the case of ERDF implementation in Western Scotland. 
It is to the earliest proposals for institutional arrangements that the chapter now turns.
6.2 Early proposals: The Institutional Arrangements Proposed by the IDO
Preparatory Study
As part of the Preparatory Study for an IDO conducted in 1984, a technical 
seminar was called to make proposals for the management and administration of the 
IDO. The seminar involved economists and policy analysts from Strathclyde Regional
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Council, Glasgow District Council, the Scottish Development Agency, the Scottish 
Office and the Manpower Services Commission, with input from academics from 
Glasgow and Strathclyde Universities. The agencies participating in the seminar 
emphasised six points that needed to be built into the EDO implementation structure. 
Although they were not incorporated in institutional arrangements at that time, these 
points are worth considering in turn, as they have influenced many of the institutional 
developments in ERDF programming over the last decade in Western Scotland.
Firstly, the Study stated that the machinery must not function purely at an 
official level, but must include a political decision making dimension. Important 
political decisions need to be made with regard to the thrust of the IDO, the types of 
project to be supported, and the availability of local resources to support the EC 
contribution [emphasis added]' (Roger Tym & Partners 1984: 52). Despite this call, 
partnership in Western Scotland has never involved an overtly political membership. 
As suggested in chapter 5, this absence of elected officials weakens the local 
authorities' claim to be the only actors to bring ’democratic legitimacy' to the 
partnership.
Secondly, it was suggested that 'it is important that the administrative co­
ordination combines knowledge o f European priorities and procedures, with 
knowledge o f local needs and opportunities in Glasgow [emphasis added]' (ibid.: 52). 
In itself, this can simply be seen as an early statement of the objectives of the 
partnership principle, incorporating the co-ordination of a multiplicity of actors with 
flexibility to local conditions.
Thirdly, a need was identified 'to supplement the project and policy 
development capability of the EDO with the expertise and ideas o f parties concerned 
with the future o f Glasgow but outside government. These are primarily the private 
sector, trade unions and academic and university expertise':
The seminar concerning the IDO study served a useful function in 
focusing attention on economic development in Glasgow at an experts' 
level. There may be some advantage in developing this forum in future 
years. It would help produce new ideas for the IDO; it could be 
extended to business and trade union representatives and could, 
possibly, form a direct contact point between local and EC experts on 
regional development. If this route is taken it would be important that 
funding is made available to pay for meetings, and more importantly, 
to prepare expert papers and conduct any necessary research [emphasis 
added] (ibid.: 52-53).
Chapter 5 explained how the 'technical assistance' (TA) called for to provide sufficient 
resources to enhance the management of programmes was generally rejected by
270
central government in the UK as poor 'value for money'. As shown below, however, 
following the later 'transparency' agreement on additionality and the lifting of the 
block on revenue financing, such assistance did actually become available to local 
actors in Western Scotland. Similarly, recent developments in Western Scotland have 
seen the increased use of advisory groups and external policy advice.
Fourthly, the need to incorporate flexibility was reiterated when it was 
suggested that 'the IDO machinery should include a monitoring procedure able to 
make a general assessment of progress, and also charged with making known to the 
EC major problems that are emerging in the Programme [emphasis added]' (ibid.. 53). 
The way in which such flexibility was incorporated in subsequent institutional 
arrangements is examined below.
Fifthly, 'the IDO machinery should be able to report Glasgow's needs and 
opportunities, and allow them to be given priority in the various programmes of 
regional and national bodies concerned with the city [emphasis added]' (ibid.: 53). 
This was perceived as a key benefit for local actors involved in the exchange 
relationship with the European Commission.
Finally, the administrative procedure should be simple ... It should also be 
capable of subsequent extension if the boundaries are widened from Glasgow' to the 
whole conurbation; and it should draw in the various Directorates in Brussels involved 
in financing the IDO [emphasis added]' (ibid.: 53). As shown below, however, this 
simplicity has not been easy to achieve in practice as the complexity of the contract 
itself has increased.
The IDO Preparatory Study proposed that an administrative structure capable 
of addressing these six points would need to comprise two-tiers: 'a higher level 
political forum', and 'a working group responsible for day-to-day management' (ibid.: 
53). Furthermore, it would fall to the working group to establish contacts with the 
wider business, trade union and academic community through regular technical 
seminars. While such a two-tier structure was ultimately adopted in 1989, the role 
originally foreseen for Strathclyde Regional Council grossly overestimated the 
willingness of the Scottish Office to allow a decentralisation of management 
functions. The Study suggested that 'Strathclyde Regional Council should be 
appointed as the lead agency for the IDO, although the major role that it would be 
required to play is one of co-ordination' (ibid.: 53). The Scottish Office's Industry 
Department for Scotland (IDS) would be represented in the higher level political 
forum and the working group, but on a par with Glasgow District Council, the Scottish 
Development Agency and the Manpower Services Commission. As 'junior' partners, 
British Rail, the South of Scotland Electricity Board, British Telecom, the Scottish 
Gas Board, and the British Airports Authority should merely be Tcept informed of the
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progress of the Operation and given papers etc., and should have the right to be 
present at the Working Group when relevant’ (ibid.: 53-54).
The Study also raised the possibility of locating an office of the European 
Commission in Glasgow, but rejected this because of the cost and the fact that it 
would be at arm's length from the Commission in Brussels. Instead, the Study 
requested that the European Commission should appoint a representative to both the 
directing and working groups who would attend all meetings: 'this would allow the 
Commission to keep in direct touch with the progress of the Operation; it would 
maximise the prospect of "vertical integration" ef the IDO in that British local and 
central government representatives would be sitting alongside the EC; and it would 
allow close working relationships to develop between local and Commission EDO 
staff (ibid.: 54). The DG XVI official subsequently appointed with responsibility for 
Western Scotland has now retained that responsibility for almost a decade.
Figure 6.1. summarises the management structure proposed for Strathclyde 
IDO under the 1984 Preparatory Study. This consisted of three bodies: an IDO 
Directing Committee; an IDO Working Group; and an IDO Servicing Group. The 
proposals for each should be considered in turn.
IDO Directing Committee: The Study proposed that membership of the 
Directing Committee would comprise the Leader or Deputy Leader of Strathclyde 
Regional Council and Glasgow District Council, a Director-level appointment from 
the SDA, and senior officials from the European Commission, the Scottish Office and 
the Manpower Services Commission. The Leader of Strathclyde Regional Council, 
generally a high-profile political figure in Western Scotland, would chair the meetings 
which would be held twice a year. The functions of the Committee would be largely 
strategic: to set general guidelines for the future development of the IDO; to draw 
together budgets; to monitor progress of IDO projects; to sort out conflicts of interest 
between parties involved in joint working; and to make reports to the EC of major 
emerging trends that need to be included in the programme, and major difficulties that 
are arising from the priorities of the EEC or interpretation of its guidelines' (ibid.: 54- 
55). The lower-level tasks of day-to-day implementation would be performed by a 
Working Group of officials.
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Figure 6.1: Management Structure Proposed for Strathclyde IDO under the
1984 Preparatory Study
IDO Directing Committee
Strathclyde Regional Council (Chair) 
European Commission 
Glasgow District Council 
Scottish Development Agency 
Scottish Office 
Manpower Services Commission
IDO Working Group
Strathclyde Regional Council (Chair) 
European Commission 
Glasgow District Council 
Scottish Development Agency 
Scottish Office 
Manpower Services Commission 
and other agencies (when necessary)
IDO Servicing Group
Two officers based in Strathclyde 
Regional Council
a
£
Technical
Seminars
EDO agencies, 
Academic, 
Business and 
Trade Union 
Interests
Source: Roger Tym & Partners (1984) Integrated Development Operation far Strathclyde: Final
Report Preparatory Study (Glasgow Roger Tym & Partners).
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I DO Working Group: The Study suggested that the IDO Working Group would 
'provide the essential continuity for the project’. The membership of the group would 
be drawn from the same bodies as the Directing Committee, but at the non-elected 
officer level. The 'junior' partners need only participate in this group when necessary. 
Moreover, it was emphasised that 'active participation by the European Commission 
would be of special importance to the activities of the Working Group' (ibid.: 55). In 
effect, the Working Group would be a continuation of the Group that had managed the 
IDO study, and would continue to be chaired by the Regional Council. The Group 
would be closely involved in the day-to-day implementation of the IDO:
The functions of the group would be to package and co-ordinate bids 
for EC funds; to oversee the co-ordinated working of different 
agencies on projects; to update the IDO; to promote schemes and 
widen an understanding of EEC procedures and instruments among 
agencies potentially able to benefit from them in Glasgow; and to 
monitor progress (ibid.. 55).
Again, a call was made to devote resources to the effective management of the 
Programme: 'for the Working Group to be successful it should have a small budget to 
finance preparation of technical papers and undertake research assignments. This 
budget would also be used for commissioning independent monitoring studies of 
particular elements of the EDO programme' (ibid.: 55). Such 'technical assistance' did 
not become available until 1993.
IDO Servicing Group. The proposals for a servicing group are extremely 
interesting, as they planted the seed of the idea for the Programme Executive that was 
ultimately established as a 'special purpose institution' in 1989. At the time of the 
Preparatory Study, it was suggested that the nature of the IDO is not such that major 
new staffing arrangements would be either welcomed or justified':
We consider, however, that a considerable amount of work is involved 
in the tasks laid out for the Working Group... To an extent this will be 
carried out by the technical staff of the relevant organisations as an 
extension of their normal staff duties. In addition, however, there 
would be advantage in having a small core staff for the operation 
(possibly of two persons) able to deal with day-to-day matters of 
progressing bids and projects, answering enquiries, promoting the 
IDO, and developing background work on the projects. This group 
could develop to a position where it became the essential experts [sic] 
on all EC matters for bodies in Glasgow, a role in itself which would 
increase the integrating role of the IDO (ibid.: 55-56).
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Again, while the proposals highlighted the main administrative requirements that 
would arise as a result of agreement on the first ERDF programme in Western 
Scotland, the Study over-estimated central government's willingness to allow a lead 
role for the Regional Council when it suggested that the servicing group would 
'sensibly be located in the Chief Executive's Department of Strathclyde Regional 
Council', and that 'it should be funded jointly by the Regional Council and EC' (ibid.: 
55-56). Moreover, when it was ultimately set up in 1989, an attempt was made to 
ensure that some 'distance' was visible between Strathclyde Regional Council and the 
Executive in order to dispel any notion that the IDO was the responsible solely to the 
Regional Council. The aim was thereby to enhance the sense of trust among the 
partnership.
The failure of the 1984 IDO proposal and the subsequent approval of an NPC1 
for Glasgow have been analysed in chapter 5. The institutional arrangements set in 
place under the NPCI, the first ERDF programme in Western Scotland, were 
considerably simpler than the IDO Preparatory Study’s recommendations. Point 2 of 
the Addendum to the Commission Decision awarding an NPCI for the City of 
Glasgow established an NPCI Co-ordinating Committee. This met twice annually 
during the course of the NPCI and constituted between 12 and 14 officials: 
representatives of the Industry Department for Scotland, Strathclyde Regional 
Council, City of Glasgow District Council, the Scottish Development Agency, the 
South of Scotland Electricity Board, the Scottish Gas Board, British Railways, the 
Strathclyde Passenger Transport Executive and a representative of the European 
Commission nominated by the Directorate-General for Regional Policy. The meetings 
were chaired by a Scottish Office official, and the secretariat was similarly provided 
by the Industry Department for Scotland. No lower-level working group was 
established at that time.
Point 3 of the Addendum to the Decision stated that 'the Co-ordinating 
Committee shall co-ordinate the choice of measure under the programme and the 
administrative and financial arrangements for the implementation of the programme. 
It shall also monitor, evaluate and report on the implementation of the programme and 
may propose and adopt adaptations to it in the light of periodic assessments of the 
progress made and of the social and economic situation' (European Commission 
1988). Despite these requirements, the Committee structure for the NPCI was largely 
an irrelevance in terms of the final shape of the contract. The NPCI comprised a 
simple list of capital financed projects which had been planned long in advance. There 
was very little flexibility to change the NPCI and the lack of additionality presented a 
serious problem in drawing down resources, as will be shown in chapter 7. As it was 
not a high priority programme for any of the partners, no serious attempt was made to
address the institutional requirements of the NPC1. The partners had very few 
resources invested in the programming process at that time. Nevertheless, the NPC1 
represents the start of a learning process for both the European Commission and the 
domestic actors. Moreover, as shown in the previous chapter, the internal resources 
(most obviously in terms of staff) devoted by each partner to the programming process 
increased sharply in the late 1980s. The analysis now turns to the more complex 
structure set up under the IDO when it was eventually approved in December 1988.
6J The Strathclyde IDO Committee Structure
The most obvious lesson learned by local partners during the course of the 
NPCI was to scale down their expectations with regard to ERDF programmes. Not 
only was the process tightly controlled by central government through the public 
expenditure system to ensure a policy of non-additionality , but central government's 
reluctance to allow a decentralisation of management structures also became apparent 
This reluctance was subsequently overcome, to an extent, when the true costs of 
running a programme became apparent to the Scottish Office. At the time of the 1987 
application for an IDO, however, the institutional arrangements proposed were much 
more modest than those outlined in the original 1984 Study. The 1987 document 
emphasised only the minimum arrangements required to ensure implementation:
Implementation of the projects and programmes included in the 
integrated] 0[peration] will rest with the local organisations 
responsible. But special management arrangements are required for 
the 10 to perform the following functions:
promotion of the 10 to encourage local organisations to 
develop projects which would support the 10 objectives, and 
extend the range of measures in which the EEC participates; 
progress monitoring and periodic review of the 10; 
operation of financial procedures and periodic re-scheduling of 
projects covered by the NPCI and extensions, if required, to 
agencies not covered in the initial approval; 
drawing up supplementary programme submissions; 
advice and assistance in the preparation of applications for EC 
assistance which support the aims of the 10 (Industry 
Department for Scotland/Strathclyde Regional Council 1987:
86).
The proposed administrative arrangements reflected the 1984 proposals in that 
they would be based on four components: a Steering Group; a Co-ordinating 
Committee, Periodic Seminars; and servicing of the Steering Committee. The higher-
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level Steering Group would include the following members: a Scottish Office official, 
who would chair both the Group and the Co-ordinating Committee; two Strathclyde 
Regional Council officials; European Commission representatives; and one official 
each from the SDA, the Manpower Services Commission, and a single District 
Council (nominated by the Convention of Scottish Local Authorities). In other words, 
the Steering Group would not involve all the partners but only senior partners 
representing the wider partnership. The Co-ordinating Committee, by contrast, would 
comprise officer-level representatives from each organisation participating in the 
programme. Servicing of the Steering Committee and the Co-ordinating Committee, 
and arrangements for seminars would be undertaken jointly by EDS and Strathclyde 
Regional Council. Functions covered in this way would include: administrative 
arrangements for the Steering Group and Co-ordinating Committee; administrative 
arrangements for seminars; publicity for the programme, progress monitoring and 
preparation of review proposals; operation of programme procedures; 
recommendations to Steering Group on associated and extra projects; advice and 
assistance in preparation of applications (ibid.: 87). As Figure 6.2 shows, this basic 
structure was similar to that which emerged when the IDO proposal was approved.
The European Commission Decision of 21 December 1988 approving the 
Strathclyde IDO contained a section on the administration and monitoring of the 
programme. Paragraph 6 of the Decision stated that 'the United Kingdom authorities 
will establish co-ordination and partnership arrangements at all levels for the purpose 
of implementing the IDO. In that connection, a Co-ordinating Committee will be set 
up at local level comprising representatives of the national, regional, and local 
agencies responsible for administering the financial measures and of representatives of 
the Commission. Its mandate will be to monitor and evaluate the implementation of 
the programme' (European Commission 1988: 8). While the Decision also stipulated 
that the Co-ordinating Committee (which should meet at least twice a year) would 
adopt its own rules of procedure, it set out the key tasks of the Committee:
to ensure co-ordination between the choice of measures to be
implemented under the IDO and the administrative and financial
arrangements necessary for that purpose;
to ensure that all the measures financed are compatible with the
objectives and strategy of the IDO and comply with the rules and
guidelines for the relevant structural instruments;
to ensure co-ordination between the measures financed under the IDO
and other operations which contribute directly to its objectives;
to co-ordinate the publicity activities regarding implementation of the
IDO;
to monitor and evaluate the progress made in implementing the IDO;
to report annually... to the Commission on the progress made in 
implementing the IDO, the final report to include an assessment of the 
combined impact, expressed in macroeconomic as well as 
microeconomic terms, of the various measures implemented within the 
framework of the IDO in relation to the aims pursued; 
to recommend to the Commission modifications to the IDO where it 
considers this necessary in view of the socio-economic situation and 
progress made in implementing the IDO (European Commission 1988: 
9).
Many of these tasks were similarly supposed to have been performed by the 
earlier NPCI Co-ordinating Committee, but the final point on potential 'modifications 
to the IDO' was a new development. This was both a recognition of the fact that it was 
extremely difficult to reduce the uncertainty surrounding the planning process, and a 
peg on which to hang subsequent changes to the plan. As such, it testifies to the 
incomplete nature of the contractual agreement, the need for flexibility, and the 
potential for bargaining throughout the process. It also supports Commissioner 
Millan's claim that there is therefore a case for the European Commission to be 
involved at all stages. Consequently, the EC participated in the two lower-level 
working groups (one each for ERDF and ESF) set up in Western Scotland to follow 
the course of programme implementation and make recommendations to the IDO Co­
ordinating Committee on changes in the weight attached to each strategic priority.
The first meeting of the Strathclyde IDO Co-ordinating Committee took place 
on 19 May 1989 in Glasgow. It was attended by three IDS officials (one of whom 
chaired the meeting), one from the Department of the Environment, one from DG 
XVI, one from DG V, two from Strathclyde Regional Council and one each from the 
Training Agency, Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council, the SDA and ScotRail. 
One official from the Irvine Development Corporation represented the New Town 
Development Corporations and three District Council officials (one each from 
Glasgow, Motherwell and Inverclyde) represented the District Councils. In total, the 
first Co-ordinating Committee was attended by 16 officials, all non-elected. The first 
point on the agenda was the Chair's confirmation that the post of Programme Director' 
would be established within a Programme Executive with effect from 12 June 1989. 
The establishment of such an Executive (servicing group) was required by the 
European Commission in the 1988 approval of the IDO. The official who was 
appointed to this post was nominally on secondment from Strathclyde Regional 
Council's Chief Executive’s Office. As is emphasised in Section 6.5 below, the fact 
that this same official still holds the post of Programme Director six years after the 
post was created has allowed an element of continuity and the accumulation of 
Structural Funds expertise within the widely-respected Programme Executive.
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The first meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee also agreed the broad 
implementation structure for the IDO when three papers on the respective structures 
and roles of the Co-ordinating Committee, ERDF and ESF Working Groups, and the 
Programme Executive were approved. As considerably more time was spent agreeing 
the broad procedures and 'rules of the game' framing the exchange relationship than on 
detailed negotiation of project-level agreements, this lends some weight to the 
conceptualisation of the process as one of relational contracting. It was agreed that the 
Co-ordinating Committee would take an active role in the forward planning of 
measures to be funded under the IDO and in setting priorities for the funding of 
projects in relation to the EDO strategy. In short, the Co-ordinating Committee was 
responsible for the overall direction and policy of the EDO. To assist in this task, the 
Programme Director would inform the Committee fully of the way the Programme 
was developing and of the types of project likely to come forward to the Working 
Groups for consideration. Responsibility for the crucial task of project selection would 
rest mainly with the Working Groups, although some larger projects would be notified 
to the Co-ordinating Committee with appropriate recommendations. In the event, only 
projects of over £2 million (over £7 million for the Transport and Communications 
Action Programme under which projects were generally larger), or of particular 
strategic interest were to be referred to the Co-ordinating Committee. Any decision to 
vary the Working Group's recommendation would be justified by the Co-ordinating 
Committee. It was also agreed in principle that attendance at Working Group meetings 
should not be confined solely to potential applicants; in particular, it was deemed 
desirable to bring more 'neutral interests' into discussions. Finally, it was agreed to 
rotate the venue of meetings, ostensibly to give all partners an opportunity to show the 
Committee different aspects of the programme area, but also to create trust and avoid 
the impression that any one partner owned the programme.
The first meeting of the ERDF Working Group took place on 25 July 1989, 
shortly after the meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee. Unlike the Co-ordinating 
Committee, however, the ERDF Working Group did not operate on a representational 
basis. All partners with a project application on the agenda attended the meeting. The 
first meeting of the group therefore comprised 35 people: two IDS officials; the 
Programme Director; one DG XVI official; three from Strathclyde Regional Council; 
and one each from Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council; the Central Scotland 
Water Development Board; ScotRail, the South of Scotland Electricity Board; the 
British Waterways Board; and, The Wise Group (representing the voluntary sector). 
Each New Town Development Corporation sent an official, as did 16 of the 18 district 
councils. As the number of partners increased over the course of the IDO (through 
geographical extension of the programme area and the emergence of new actors), the
size of the ERDF Working Group expanded. While the ESF Working Group meeting 
operated on a 'representational basis' whereby one official spoke for the interests of a 
large number of organisations, the ERDF Group did not enjoy the same level of trust. 
As the Pieda evaluation of the IDO discovered, at one point the number of people 
attending the ERDF Working Group reached 75, making it extremely 'unwieldy' as a 
decision-making body (1993: 16). The problems caused by such large numbers were 
accentuated by the European Commission's insistence that decisions should be taken 
without votes, through the 'consensus' of the partnership.
It appears that participants were essentially risk-averse since, as Brunskill has 
emphasised, the involvement of all project sponsors in the ERDF Working Group 
meant that it was in no-one's interest to question any partner's proposals (1992: 15). 
The ability of the Working Group to select those projects which best addressed the 
objectives and met the targets of the IDO, irrespective of the identity of the project 
sponsor, was thereby impaired. The fact that the first meeting considered 110 ERDF 
project applications across the seven ERDF Action Programmes, but only rejected four 
can be seen as evidence of the reluctance of partners to criticise each other's 
applications. Rather, each organisation was present primarily to ensure that its 
applications were approved. Similarly, the level of discussion that could be held on 
110 separate projects in the course of one meeting was limited. DG XVI consequently 
pressed for more detailed information on each project in future, and it was agreed that 
the Programme Director should collaborate with the European Commission to design 
new application forms which provided evidence to justify projects in economic 
development terms.
6.3.1 European Commission Guidance to the Partnership on the Role o f
Monitoring Committees
As emphasised in chapter 5, the Strathclyde IDO was approved only days 
before the new Structural Fund Regulations came into force. The new Regulations, 
with strengthened provisions for partnership, forced the European Commission to 
prepare some guidance on the role of Monitoring Committees (as they were known 
under the new Regulations). In March 1990, DG XVI issued a 'Guidance Note' on 
Monitoring Committees for Objective 2 Community Support Frameworks, prior to a 
meeting of all the UK partnerships in Brussels on 3 April 1990. The Note reminded 
authorities that the tasks of the Monitoring Committees had been set out in the CSF 
implementation provisions, but provided further guidance on their establishment and 
operation. With regards to the scope of the Committees, it was suggested that a single 
Monitoring Committee should be set up for each CSF. With regards to their
composition, the Note suggested that the member state and Commission must 
designate their representatives to the Monitoring Committee within 60 days of 
notification to the Member State of the Commission Decision. A two-type 
membership was also proposed: permanent members of the Committee, representing 
local, regional, national and other bodies contributing to the CSF; and, non-permanent 
expert members.
The Note also provided guidance on internal rules o f procedure for the 
Committees, which was of direct relevance to Strathclyde IDO. While the 
implementation provisions for the CSFs stated that the Monitoring Committees should 
establish their own rules of procedure, including any appropriate organisational 
arrangements, the Commission set out what it expected to see in the rules. It proposed 
that the following points should figure in the internal rules of procedure of all 
committees:
Decisions should be taken on the basis of a consensus between 
the permanent and, if present, non-permanent members in the 
Committee, and should not be put to a vote. This applies 
equally to decisions of the Committee on modifications of the 
CSF or the forms of assistance which fall within its capacity.
The Chairman should be assisted by a Secretariat consisting of 
officials from the Member State concerned.2
Both these proposals were designed to consolidate the partnership approach, to 
avoid open divisions and to strengthen the sense of trust between the actors.
Below the level of the CSF Monitoring Committees, the Note also set out 
guidelines on the administrative arrangements for Operational Programme 
Monitoring Committees in Objective 2 Areas. This two-tier structure reflected the 
structure already established in the Strathclyde IDO area, with a higher-level Co­
ordinating Committee and lower-level ERDF and ESF Working Groups. The Note 
suggested that distinct Operational Programme Monitoring Committees should be 
established to maximise the flexibility of the programme. Their task should be to 
follow regularly and oversee the execution of the programme, to propose and, where 
appropriate, to adopt the necessary modifications of the programme in line with the 
rules set out in the Community Support Framework'.3 No later than three months after 
the adoption of an Operational Programme by the Commission, the member state 
should nominate and indicate to the Commission the Chairman and permanent 
members of the Monitoring Committee for the Programme, comprising the local,
2 Directorate-General for Regional Policies, Commission of the European Communities. 'Guidance 
Note: Monitoring Committees for Objective 2 Community Support Frameworks', March 1990, 
typescript, p.2.
3 See footnote 2, 'Guidance Note', p.6.
regional, national and other bodies contributing to the programme. Again the lower- 
level Committee would adopt its own rules and procedures, but decisions must still be 
taken by consensus.
Even though the Strathclyde IDO was approved before the new Structural Fund 
Regulations entered into effect, the Guidance Note prepared by the European 
Commission on the internal rules of procedure for CSF and Operational Programme 
Monitoring Committees was of considerable importance in Western Scotland. As 
explained in chapter 5, a Regional and Social Conversion Plan still had to be 
submitted for the Western Scotland Objective 2 àrea ( including Ayr and Girvan), and 
the area was the subject of a Community Support Framework. In addition, parts of the 
Western Scotland programme area were eligible under Community Initiatives drawn 
up under the reformed Regulations. This created a highly complex implementation 
structure under which lines of responsibility were not always clear. By September 
1991, including ESF and Community Initiatives, the Western Scotland partnership 
comprised a network of numerous groups and committees. These included the 
following: the Western Scotland CSF Monitoring Committee/Strathclyde EDO Co­
ordinating Committee, which usually met as one committee since it comprised the 
same people and covered the same area; the ERDF Working Group (comparable to an 
Operational Programme Monitoring Committee); the ESF Working Group; the 
Western Scotland RECHAR Programme Monitoring Committee; the Western 
Scotland RECHAR Working Group; the Western Scotland RENAVAL Programme 
Monitoring Committee; The Western Scotland RENAVAL Working Group, and a 
Tourism Strategy Sub-Group. The head of the European Funds and Co-ordination 
Division in the Scottish Office Industry Department chaired the Western Scotland CSF 
Monitoring Committee/Strathclyde IDO Co-ordinating Committee meetings, to which 
all the lower-level groups and committees were responsible.4 The head of the 
Programme Management Unit within the EFC Division chaired the Working Groups, 
while the IDO Executive Programme Director chaired the Tourism Strategy Sub- 
Group.5
4 It should be noted that the Western Scotland programme area was relatively straightforward in terms 
of its committee structure compared to the Objective 2 region of Eastern Scotland While the Western 
Scotland programme was largely located within the boundaries of one large Regional Council, the 
Eastern Scotland programme involved four regional councils: Central, Fife, Lothian, and Tayside. The 
inability of the partners there to agree a common programme led to the establishment of four 
geographically distinct Operational Programmes within the CSF Structure, each with its own 
expenditure allocation, its own Programme Monitoring Committee and Working Groups. By late 1991, 
the Scottish Office therefore chaired a total of around 17 committees related to the implementation of 
Structural Fund programmes (including Objective 5b and Community Initiative programmes).
5 The Programme Executive (including the Higher Executive Officer who worked half-time for the 
Programme Management Unit in the EFC Division of the Scottish Office) provided the secretariat for all 
these meetings and thus stood at the centre of the network of committees and groups
Notwithstanding the apparent complexity of this implementation structure, one 
of the key tasks for which it was designed was to enhance the flexibility of the 
programme and its responsiveness to local conditions. The main burden of 
responsibility in this task fell to the Working Groups. The specific tasks set out in the 
European Commission's Guidance Note issued to the UK partnerships on the role of 
the Operational Programme Monitoring Committees in the day-to-day implementation 
of the Programme were directly relevant to the Strathclyde ERDF Working Group. 
The main tasks were set out as follows:
1. to ensure that the actions assisted by the Community are implemented in 
accordance with:
the objectives, the strategy and the financial and physical targets set out 
in the programme;
the priorities agreed in the Community support framework;
the regulations and guidelines governing the Community’ Structural
Funds;
the conditions and provisions annexed to the Commission decision 
approving the programme, 
the stated Community policies.6
2. to consider individual projects put forward for Community co-fmancing by 
local, regional, national or other bodies contributing to the programme, and to 
select projects in accordance with the priorities and selection criteria 
established in the programme;
3. to propose financial, physical and performance indicators;
4 to monitor and evaluate the progress made in implementing the programme
and to give an opinion on the annual progress reports to be submitted to the 
Commission;
5. to propose any measures necessary to correct delays in the implementation of 
measures revealed by the monitoring;
6. to modify in agreement with the Commission's representatives(s) the financial 
tables by switching not more than 15% of one sub-programme to another over 
the whole period of the programme, or by switching 20% from one annual 
instalment to another, provided that the total amounts of each of the Funds are 
not affected. The Commission and the Member States shall be informed 
accordingly.
Any modification will be subject to approval by the Community Support 
Framework Monitoring Committee insofar as it involves consequent 
modification of the indicative financial allocation of the Community support 
framework.
For modifications above these thresholds, the monitoring committee for the 
operational programme must refer to the monitoring committee of the 
Community support framework;
6 An annex on 'Observing Community Policies' explained EC competition policy rules, public 
procurement provisions, guidance on investments in sensitive or ailing industries, and requirements 
regarding the protection of the environment
7. to ensure and co-ordinate the promotion and the publicity of the operational 
programme and of the Community contribution,
8. to give an opinion on proposals for technical assistance for implementation, 
monitoring or evaluation of the programme;
9. to keep the monitoring committee of the Community support framework 
informed on the implementation of the programme, in particular as concerns 
co-ordination with other measures in the area.7
Points 5 and 6 above are particularly relevant to this analysis. Despite the 
exhaustive process of programme preparation analysed in chapter 5, it was recognised 
that the planning exercise could not produce an effective contract pre-programmed in 
all respects. Recalling Majone and Wildavsky, policies cannot 'spring fully armed 
from the forehead of an omniscient policymaker... something has to be left to chance’ 
(1979: 189). While an attempt had been made to control indirectly the effects of the 
discretion enjoyed by local actors in the post-programming phase (by involving the 
actors in the preparation of the plan itself), the likelihood of changing economic 
circumstances and expenditure slippage dictated that flexibility was required. 
However, the European Commission sought to place limits on this flexibility by 
stipulating that only 15% of the expenditure originally proposed for any sub- 
programme could be shifted into another sub-programme during the life of the 
programme. Moreover, the Commission would be a member of the Committees 
deciding any such re-routing of expenditure and would therefore participate in the 
bargaining which was a feature of the whole implementation process, and not simply 
of the preparation of the contract.
The first meeting of the Western Scotland Community Support Framework 
Monitoring Committee was held on 26 September 1990 in Glasgow. The composition 
of the Committee broadly reflected that of the IDO Co-ordinating Committee, but 
included a greater number of central government officials.8 The terms of reference 
adopted for the Committee reiterated its role in providing broad strategic guidance. It 
was agreed that the final decision on expenditure variations between sub-programmes 
compared to the initial estimates included in the indicative financial plan would rest 
with the CSF Committee. More significant changes would be referred to the 
Commission for adoption in agreement with the member state. Again, the concept of 
relational contracting is of some use here. Rather than attempting the impossible task
7 Directorate-General for Regional Policies, Commission of the European Communities, 'Guidance 
Note: Monitoring Committees for Objective 2 Community Support Frameworks', March 1990, 
typescript, pp. 6-7.
8 Following European Commission pressure on the issue, some consideration was given to the inclusion 
of the social partners, but IDS maintained that they could not be regarded as 'competent authorities' for 
the purposes of the Committee as they did not spend Structural Fund resources. The Scottish Office 
nevertheless emphasised that their door was 'always open' if either the Scottish Trade Unions Congress 
or the Scottish CBI wished to raise informally any issues related to the Funds
of pre-programming all projects in advance, the partnership agreed on broad targets 
and then negotiated over who had the right to alter those targets.
This was the committee structure governing the implementation of the 
Strathclyde IDOAVestem Scotland CSF at April 1992, as summarised in Figure 6.2. 
The Scottish Office Industry Department was firmly established in the lead role. The 
chairperson, a senior Scottish Office civil servant, had an effective veto over 
committee membership, convened committee meetings and drew up the agenda for 
meetings (this latter with the assistance of the Programme Executive). Nevertheless, 
the involvement of European Commission officials in these committees was well 
established and generally accepted. From the European Commission perspective, this 
was a radical departure from the earlier project-by-project appraisal system whereby 
officials in Brussels rubber-stamped large numbers of projects (although the NPCI 
committee system had provided some experience of regional partnerships and 
familiarised Commission officials with local actors). Responsibility for specific 
regions and regular visits to those regions changed the role of DG XVI desk-officers. 
DG XVI therefore prepared guidance for its own officials on the Commission's role at 
the regional level. The main points of this guidance should be highlighted briefly to 
illustrate the Commission's own interpretation of the nature of the committees and the 
tasks of the desk officers.
6.3.2 European Commission Internal Guidance on the Role o f Desk-Officers
The first point to note is that the text of the 1989 Regulations makes no 
reference, either directly or indirectly, to the notion of the desk-officer (rapporteur). 
Nevertheless, within the European Commission each Operational Programme is the 
responsibility of a desk-officer, who is expected to take part directly at the regional 
level in the framework of partnership. Each desk-officer therefore fulfils two tasks: he 
or she has to become familiar with the socio-economic profile of the relevant region, 
while at the same time ensuring that partners at the regional level respect other 
Community policies (with regard to the environment for example). This first task is of 
great importance if the desk-officer is to fulfil his or her role as a negotiator. At a 
minimum, knowledge of the regional economy's strengths and weaknesses, an 
understanding of the legal and administrative structure of the member state, and of 
public expenditure processes are necessary. Such knowledge is a prerequisite for the 
desk-officer's role in monitoring the preparation and execution of the development 
contract at the regional level. This monitoring involves not only ensuring that the 
terms of the contract are observed, but also modifying the programme in line with the 
contingencies which emerge during the implementation process [... réorienter d'autre
part l'action à partir des nécessités apparues en cours d'exécution].9 Again, the 
incomplete nature of the contract is apparent through the emphasis on the provisions 
for uncertainty.
The guidance for desk-officers also stressed that the regional-level monitoring 
committee is not simply 'an accompanying committee': 'its role is rather that of a 
steering committee (comité de direction), that means it is a management body to 
prepare and take decisions'. Such decision-making could not involve votes, since 'in 
view of the tasks pursued by the Community structural policies and in the spirit of the 
partnership principle decisions of the monitoring committee should preferably be 
taken by consensus'. Nevertheless, on issues concerning the eligibility and conformity 
of operations with the Regulations governing Community structural policies, on 
questions of the overall coherence of the CSF and/or a form of assistance with the 
stated priorities and in areas where stated Community policies could be affected the 
Commission has a non-negotiable right of veto'.10 This last right of the European 
Commission is largely a negative one, vetoing projects the desk officer considers 
ineligible or unsuitable, rather than the proactive ability to shape individual project 
applications.
In summary, the years from early 1989 to late 1992 witnessed the development 
of a complex network of committee structures involving the European Commission in 
the implementation of the Strathclyde IDO/Westem Scotland CSF in line with the 
principle of partnership. According to Brunskill, however, this partnership may have 
been 'more apparent than real', as several partners felt that discussions took place 
largely between the Scottish Office and the European Commission with little regard to 
the wider partnership (1992: i). Nevertheless, all partners participated in the ERDF 
Working Group, the level at which project decisions were taken. 'Consensus' decision­
making in this forum was facilitated in the early days by the fact that money was 
essentially 'chasing projects' and no hard decisions had to be made. By 1992, however, 
partner status had been extended to a range of new bodies, notably the Scottish 
Enterprise and LEC Network, and resulted in some very large committees with 
cumbersome procedures and extensive circulation of papers. The shift to a new 
Operational Programme in 1993, with its focus on smaller scale projects rather than 
large transport schemes, also required an overhaul of procedures. The 1993 changes to 
the committee structure should be analysed before turning to the role of the 
Programme Executive over the period 1989-1994.
9 Guide a /'usage des rapporteurs, document interne DG XVI.
10 See footnote 9, Guide, pp. 1, 5.
Figure 6.2: Management Structure of Western Scodand CSF/Strathclyde IDO April 
1992
Western Scotland CSF/ Strathclyde 
[DO Co-ordinating Committee
Scottish Office Industry Department (Chair) 
Dept, of Employment (ESF Unit) -
Department of Trade and Industry 
European Commission (DG XVI & DG V) 
Strathclyde Regional Council 
Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council 
3 District Councils 
Scottish Enterprise & LECs 
Irvine New Town Development Corporation 
Scottish Business in the Community O
IDO Programme Executive
5 Full-Time Staff
*
* 5
ERDF Working Group
Scottish Office Industry Dept. (Chair) 
European Commission (DG XVI) 
Strathclyde Regional Council 
Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council 
18 District Councils 
Scottish Enterprise
5 Local Enterprise Companies 
3 New Town Development Corporations 
Scottish Business in the Community 
ScotRail 
British Waterways Board 
Clyde Port Authority 
Central Scotland Water Dev. Board 
Civil Aviation Authority 
Voluntary Sector Bodies 
Local Economic Development Bodies
ESF Working Group
Scottish Office Industry Dept. (Chair) 
Dept, of Employment (ESF Unit) 
European Commission (DG V) 
Strathclyde Regional Council 
Dumfries and Galloway Regional Council 
Scottish Enterprise 
1 LEC representative 
2 Enterprise Trust representatives 
1 rep. of Higher Education Institutions 
1 rep. of Voluntary & Training Orgns.
1 rep. of Local Economic Initiatives
Source: Pieda pic. (1993) Strathclyde Integrated 
Development Operation: Interim Evaluation 
(Edinburgh: Pieda pic ).
6.4 The 1993 Committee Re-organisation
The Strathclyde IDO officially came to an end on 31 December 1992. An 
Operational Programme for 1993, under the Western Scotland CSF, was approved by 
the European Commission to provide some continuity of funding in the eligible region 
until the new round of programming officially began on 1 January 1994. As examined 
in chapter 5, the 1993 Operational Programme involved a number of changes from the 
experience of the IDO. Most notably, support for large-scale infrastructure projects 
was cut back. Moreover, the 1993 programme was the first to be implemented after 
the 'transparency' agreement between the UK government and the European 
Commission following the RECHAR dispute. The approval of supplementary' 
spending credits for all projects (whether capital or revenue financed), made possible 
by the ex-ante top-slicing of the partners’ expenditure allocations, seemed set to 
increase the competition for funds. The Operational Programme itself highlighted a 
number of key issues that had to be addressed within the regional implementation 
structure:
the growing number of individual project applications that 
require to be appraised, accorded priority, considered and 
approved efficiently;
the anticipated growth in the number of eligible partners in 
1993;
the need to develop clear selection and ranking criteria for 
assessing project applications under each of the new priorities, 
the greater competition for funds which more flexible 
eligibility criteria and the new financial arrangements are 
likely to lead to in 1993;
the need for more emphasis on monitoring and evaluation; and 
the scope for integrating the decision-making on ERDF and 
ESF project applications (Strathclyde Integrated Development 
Operation 1993a: 39).
The document therefore proposed that the structure should be amended for the 
implementation of the 1993 Operational Programme to take account of the changes 
that will occur in 1993. Two key questions had to be addressed. The first was how to 
streamline committee procedures. The second revolved around the fact that the 1993 
Programme involved a shift to smaller scale business development, research and 
development, or tourism related schemes as opposed to large scale infrastructure: this 
would generate a larger number of smaller projects which would be much harder to 
assess, monitor and evaluate. A common solution to both these questions, proposed by 
both the Scottish Office and the Programme Executive, was the greater use of small,
'quasi-independent' advisory groups to prioritise projects. The prioritisation of projects 
at an advisory group level would free committees to focus on strategic guidance and 
monitoring. In order to keep committees small and manageable, the representational 
approach would be adopted: every partner need not participate directly in the 
committees. To facilitate this approach, the advisory groups themselves would be 
provider-led: that is, the group for each spending Priority would comprise the partners 
with the major interest in that Priority. As one Scottish Office interviewee suggested, 
the aim was to streamline by creating 'a series of interlocking networks’ allowing 
partners to present their views and guarantee that their voice is heard on issues of 
interest to that partner. It should be emphasised at the outset, however, that the 
European Commission does not participate in the advisory groups.
Five advisory groups were established in 1993 with the aim of developing 
detailed strategies for each Programme Priority, and to undertake detailed appraisal 
and ranking of project applications. The five groups reflected the Priorities of the 1993 
Programme and operated under the following headings: Tourism, Business 
Development', Vocational Training Facilities, which considered both ESF project 
applications for training schemes, and ERDF applications for vocational training 
facilities; Research and Development', and, the Physical Infrastructure Advisory’ 
Group, which considered applications for environmental improvements, roads, 
industrial sites and premises, and public transport schemes. The first three listed above 
had existed prior to 1993, the Tourism Group having been set up in 1990.
Each group was chaired by a representative of the Programme Executive and 
comprised between seven and nine representatives of the partnership, and 'where 
appropriate', independent external experts. The European Commission had sought 
unsuccessfully to delete the reference to 'where appropriate' when the advisory groups 
were established. As the Programme Director suggested, however, even the region's 
universities are now eligible for support, so that it had become increasingly difficult to 
find 'independent' experts. In effect, the Programme Director proposed the 
membership of each group, after discussion with the partnership, but the final list of 
members was approved by the Scottish Office. Membership of each group was 
intended to reflect interest and expertise in the particular topic of concern, and 
specialists could therefore be drawn from the wider partnership, and need not be 
members of the Programme Monitoring Committee. In the event, all five advisory 
groups involved the providers of project applications under the relevant heading. For 
example, the Tourism Advisory Group was chaired by the Programme Executive and 
comprised nine members drawn from those partners who submit the majority of 
projects under the tourism heading. All the advisory groups were similarly staffed with 
representatives of those undertaking the relevant projects. Of course, there is an
obvious technocratic reason for this: the partners most qualified to appraise the quality 
of a tourism project are those involved in developing the tourism sector. However, it 
should be emphasised that the creation of a layer of advisory groups, in which the 
European Commission simply does not have the resources to participate, takes the 
main responsibility for advising on project prioritisation outside of the fora in which 
the Commission officers have an active role.
The partnership agreed in 1993 that a three-tier implementation structure 
should be introduced, comprising the CSF Monitoring Committee, the Operational 
Programme Monitoring Committee as well as the new advisory groups. The CSF 
membership remained largely unchanged, comprising senior partners on a 
representational basis as had been the case in previous years. The Operational 
Programme Monitoring Committee, which in effect merged the old ERDF and ESF 
Working Groups, would have been too large to function effectively had every partner 
taken part. It was recognised that the partners varied in terms of their size, the scope of 
their economic development functions, and the centrality of European funding to the 
partner’s strategic objectives. Table 6.1 lists the membership of the Operational 
Programme Monitoring Committee as agreed by the partnership for 1993. The 
membership of the committee therefore comprised less than 30 officials and sought to 
recognise different constituencies of interest, and the contribution different partners 
made to economic development generally in Western Scotland. The new Committee 
also sought to maintain continuity with IDO arrangements, draw on existing 
experience, reflect a geographic spread of representatives through the region, and take 
account of the availability and seniority of representatives.
The 1993 Operational Programme Monitoring Committee, as a 'new' 
committee in Western Scotland, was expected to fulfil the following tasks:
to consider and approve ERDF applications;
to consider ESF applications and make recommendations to
the Department of Employment.
to ensure projects are compatible with the objectives of the 
Programme and comply with the relevant EC Directives and 
Regulations;
to monitor financial progress of the Programme and to consider 
recommendations to the CSF committee on the virement of 
funds between priorities;
to agree detailed strategies, selection procedures and criteria 
for each priority;
to monitor project outcomes against targets; 
to promote integration and co-ordination of projects and 
programmes where appropriate;
to promote the programme and to ensure adequate publicity of 
the Structural Funds;
to ensure the wind-up of Strathclyde IDO and deal with 
continuing issues.11
While in the past projects above a fixed expenditure threshold had to be considered by 
the higher-level IDO Co-ordinating Committee/CSF Monitoring Committee, the 1993 
Operational Programme Monitoring Committee could consider and approve all 
projects. However, it became increasingly difficult for the Programme Monitoring 
Committee (and the European Commission as a member of that committee) to 
question the recommendations of the 'expert' advisory groups.
Table 6.1: Western Scotland -1993- Operational Programme Monitoring Committee
Partner Representation Number of Partners 
Represented
Scottish Office Industry Department Chair
Programme Executive Secretariat
European Commission (DGs XVI & V) 2 representatives
Scottish Office Industry Department 1 representative
Department of Employment 1 representative
Scottish Enterprise 1 representative
Strathclyde Regional Council 1 representative
Dumfries & Galloway Regional Council 1 representative
Local Enterprise Companies 2 representatives 5
District Councils 5 representatives 19
Higher Education Institutions 1 representative 4
Further Education Colleges 2 representatives 20
New Town Development Corporations 1 representative 3
Voluntary Sector/Charitable Trusts 3 representatives approx. 20
Local Economic Initiatives/Enterprise Trusts 3 representatives approx. 20
Other national and regional public sector 
organisations (ScotRail, Scottish Tourist 
Board, Scottish Natural Heritage etc.)
2 representatives approx. 10
Source. Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation (1993) Western Scotland Operational 
Programme - Programme Monitoritig Committee, Paper 1: Report on the Role and Membership of the 
Committee Structure for Managing the 1993 Operational Programme (Glasgow: Strathclyde Integrated
Development Operation Programme Executive).
11 Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation, Western Scotland Operational Programme - 
Programme Monitoring Committee, 'Report on the Role and Membership of the Committee Structure 
for Managing the 1993 Operational Programme', March 1993, typescript, p.2.
in summary, it is obvious that is has not been possible to involve each partner 
in every committee or group set up to manage the implementation of the European 
funded development programmes in Western Scotland as the size of the partnership 
has increased. Changes in the nature of the contract, as well as changes in the 
partnership itself, have been reflected in the evolution of these institutional structures. 
A representational approach to membership now exists in both the higher-level 
committee for strategic guidance, and in the lower-level Programme Monitoring 
Committee. Superficially, this may be interpreted'as evidence of an increased sense of 
trust among the partners as every partner does not demand the right to participate in 
every committee. However, when the composition of the new advisory groups is taken 
into account, it becomes apparent that the main partners are still represented at the 
point at which project prioritisation takes place for the Priorities in which they have a 
specific interest. Moreover, few partners would have the resources to participate in all 
the advisory groups and committees as these have increased in number. Nevertheless, 
some attempt has been made to incorporate a higher level of expertise in the project 
prioritisation exercise, even if this now excludes the direct participation of the 
European Commission.
A further question of relevance is the extent to which the continuing evolution 
of the partnership structures has been understood by the partners themselves. The 
European Policies Research Centre found that 'in responding to the partnership survey 
undertaken in 1994, 47% of respondents replied that they felt unable to comment on 
committee structure or the dissemination of information, due to a lack of information 
and knowledge about the processes’ (1994: 108). The significance of this problem 
appears to have increased with the introduction of a representative approach for the 
new Programme Monitoring Committee: 'it was not surprising that the 39% who 
indicated satisfaction with the information dissemination and committee structure 
directly correlated to committee membership. There is a marked distinction between 
those partners who are very well informed and involved, and those who seem much 
less aware of the procedures and processes’ (ibid.: 108). The EPRC evaluation 
concluded that although information flows have been relatively good hitherto, the 
growing number of partners increases the need for an efficient dissemination system: 
'partners must be clearly aware of the key points of the strategy and the opportunities 
for their participation in the programme' (ibid.: 115). The role of the Programme 
Executive in this regard is of central importance to the effective functioning of the 
implementation structure. As the only actor to participate in all the committees and 
advisory groups, and with the sole responsibility of ensuring that the programme is 
efficiently managed, the Programme Executive stands at the centre of the network of
committees which constitute the partnership in Western Scotland. It is to the 
Executive that the analysis now tums.
6.5 The 'Independent' Programme Executive
As suggested above, the original IDO Preparatory Study had proposed the 
creation of an 'IDO Servicing Group' based in the offices of Strathclyde Regional 
Council. This idea was not pursued during the years of the Glasgow NPCI, when the 
secretariat for the.programme was largely provided by the Industry Department for 
Scotland. As the size and complexity of the regional development contract increased 
with the subsequent approval of the Strathclyde IDO, the running costs incurred by the 
Scottish Office in terms of staff resources appeared set to rise. Moreover, given the 
size of the IDO, the Commission required that a full-time executive to manage the 
programme was established (Brunskill 1992: 14). This request was approved by the 
Scottish Office, and since 1989 most of the preparation and secretarial work for the 
Western Scotland programme (drawing up agendas, screening projects, issuing papers 
and minutes for example) has been undertaken by the Programme Executive (PE). 
Between 1989 and 1994, the Strathclyde IDO PE was the only secretariat located 
outwith central government for an ERDF programme in the UK. Although provisions 
for co-ordination between the Scottish Office and the PE have been built into the 
institutional arrangements from the earliest days (through the Higher Executive 
Officer who works part-time for both),12 the PE has been able to build its own positive 
reputation for effective programme management, not only among the partnership in 
Western Scotland, but throughout the UK regional partnerships and in the European 
Commission. This section analyses the development of the PE between 1989 and 1994 
to assess the extent to which it has enabled a core set of officials to build up the skills 
and expertise necessary to facilitate implementation of the regional development 
contract. It considers the level of trust that the PE has been able to create among the 
partnership, but examines whether the recent trend towards greater supervision of the 
Executive by central government endangers this enhanced sense of trust.
The Strathclyde IDO Programme Executive has become well-known in 
Western Scotland. It is doubtful at best whether the European flags and publicity 
displaying the IDO logo erected at the sites of ERDF funded projects have made much 
impact on the wider public in the region. However, among the rather more focused 
group of economic development actors there, the PE is clearly identifiable and is now 
seen by potential project applicants as the first 'port of call' for European funding.
12 The Programme Executive was also obliged to consult the Department of Employment on all ESF 
matters.
Brunskill found a general satisfaction among the regional partners with their 
relationship to the Programme Executive, pointing out that the body enhanced 
comprehension of the IDO and was perceived as 'close' to the projects:
Another desirable feature is the 'quasi' independence of the Executive 
with their first priority given to the operation of the EDO rather than 
say to a government department or a large local authority. In legal 
terms the EDO is answerable to the S[cottish] 0[ffice] and the 
Commission. However, in practice there does appear to be a 'working 
gap' in accountability, although working decisions are usually 
discussed with S[trathclyde] R[egional] C[ounciI] and the SO ... While 
the Executive is primarily an administrative body, it is clear that their 
role has expanded further than this. Closeness to projects, an overall 
view of the IDO development has meant that members of the 
Executive were clearly aware of emerging problems and were working 
with the Committees and selective partners to address these issues.
This process enabled practical implementation problems to be linked 
with policy debate, usually a weak link in the chain (1992: 14).
Just how the Programme Executive, until recently a unique body in the
implementation of European-funded regional development contracts in the UK, has
been able to develop this role has never been explored. Moreover, what is the
significance of this role in terms of the effective implementation of the contract, and 
how have practical implementation problems been linked with policy debate?
Although the original IDO submission had specified that a Programme 
Executive would provide the secretariat and administrative support to the two-tier 
committee structure, and outlined the broad functions of such a body, no detailed 
thought was given to the development of the Executive. The staff requirements of the 
PE were not detailed, beyond suggesting that a full-time Programme Director should 
be appointed. The Programme Director was appointed in June 1989. This official was 
seconded from the Chief Executive's Office of Strathclyde Regional Council and 
therefore had some knowledge of the IDO background and application process, but he 
quickly had to establish some 'distance' between his new role and his employer. To 
assist the Director, an administrative officer was appointed in November 1989 and a 
clerical assistant was appointed in January 1990. Alongside the part-time financial 
controller seconded from the Scottish Office, this meant that the PE had a staff of 
three and a half officials in its first few months of existence. Two further senior 
appointments (Programme Managers for the ERDF and the ESF programmes) were 
made in March 1991. Funding at that time, in the absence of technical assistance from 
the European Commission because of government additionality rules, came largely 
from Strathclyde Regional Council as the major partner, although twelve other
partners (including the New Town Development Corporations and seven district 
councils) each made annual contributions.
Since becoming operational in June 1989, the workload and responsibility of 
the PE has increased steadily. The first six months of the Executive’s work were taken 
up with simply establishing the office, convening the Co-ordinating Committee and 
Working Groups, and clearing the two year backlog of ERDF project applications (the 
programme initially considered eligible expenditure retrospectively to 1 January' 
1988). In addition, an application process for ERDF and ESF projects had to be 
established. The consultants subsequently appointed to evaluate the IDO’s 
performance suggested that the fact that the Executive only became operational well 
into the life of the IDO handicapped the monitoring and development of the 
programme (Pieda pic 1993). However, this delay seems inevitable given the 
retrospective nature of the initial funding and the fact that the first committee, charged 
with approving administrative arrangements for the implementation of the 
programme, did not meet until mid-1989. By 1991, however, regular meetings took 
place and financial control systems had been approved.
By 1992 the specific role of the Programme Executive in the implementation 
of the contract was becoming clearer. The Executive can clearly be viewed as a 
’special purpose institution’. In May 1992, a RECHAR Monitoring Committee was 
established to provide guidance for the use of funds approved for Western Scotland 
under that Community Initiative. At its meeting of 19 May 1992, the RECHAR 
Monitoring Committee approved a report on the management of the RECHAR 
Programme. While the report set out the terms of reference for the Committee itself, 
of more interest in this context is the role spelt out for the Programme Executive. By 
this stage, the PE had been in operation for three years and the report presents one of 
the clearest statements of its role. Although the report referred primarily to the 
RECHAR programme, the role set out was the same as that performed by the PE with 
respect to the mainstream programmes. While the Scottish Office Industry Department 
remained responsible for all ERDF financial matters and the Department of 
Employment for all ESF financial matters, including payments and claims, the specific 
functions of the PE in programme management were set out as follows:
(i) assisting authorities to develop eligible projects that meet the 
programme objectives:
(ii) ensuring properly completed, justified and appraised 
applications are presented to the Committee;
(iii) acting as the secretariat to the Committee by ensuring timely 
preparation of reports for and minutes of meetings, 
maintaining records of project applications, decisions and
financial progress, and issuing project approvals with the 
appropriate conditions of award;
(iv) monitoring projects' physical and financial progress against 
targets and schedules and preparing progress reports for the 
Committee and Commission; and
(v) ensuring authorities are aware of their responsibilities for 
complying with EC Directives, in particular, these relating to 
public procurement, the impact on the environment and state 
aid notification.13
It should be noted that by 1992 the PE was therefore expected to take a more 
proactive role in project development. Rather than a simple secretariat processing 
applications, the PE assisted partners in the development of suitable projects for 
support. This function increased in importance as new, less-experienced partners 
became eligible for support and as the shift in emphasis of the programme away from 
large-scale infrastructure continued. Pieda therefore found that, while the Programme 
Executive's checking of projects was relatively 'passive' in the early days, an increasing 
amount of its time is taken up in the eliciting of proposals, their subsequent analysis, 
discussions with the project's sponsors, re-drafting and re-submission of projects and 
their eventual presentation to the Working Groups (1993: 17). As a result, the role of 
the PE in determining the ultimate shape of the contract, through shaping the nature of 
the projects assisted, has also increased. The strategic importance of the PE to the 
European Commission in the tatter's attempts to shape the implementation of the 
contract is therefore potentially of great significance. That the European Commission 
supported the technocratic' role of the Executive can be seen in its consistent support 
for an increase in the resources devoted to the PE, not least through technical 
assistance.
A series of papers examining the future staffing and funding requirements of 
the Programme Executive were prepared for consideration by the Strathclyde IDO Co­
ordinating Committee/CSF Monitoring Committee throughout 1992 and early 1993. 
The staff of the PE in 1992 had been appointed only to 31 March 1993, three months 
after the completion of the IDO on 31 December 1992. However, approval of the new 
Western Scotland CSF for 1992/93 and the certainty of a new Operational Programme 
for 1993 led to the need to extend the employment contracts of PE officials. 
Furthermore, the expected workload generated by the new programme necessitated a 
review of staff numbers and responsibilities, and the wider role of the Executive in 
programme implementation. Both the Scottish Office and Strathclyde Regional 
Council (with the backing of the European Commission desk-officers for the region)
13 Western Scotland RECHAR CSF Monitoring Committee, 'Report on Management of the RECHAR 
Programme', May 1992, typescript, p.2.
agreed in general terms that extra staff were required for the PE. The Chief Executive 
of Strathclyde Regional Council agreed to continue the secondment of the Programme 
Director and to maintain financial support. Furthermore, the Director of Personnel of 
the Council suggested that three additional professional staff and three administrative 
staff were required. To finance this expansion in the Executive, the Council decided to 
pursue support under the Commission's technical assistance provisions. Moreover, at 
this time the Scottish Enterprise and LEC Network had been recognised as eligible for 
support, and their involvement was seen as an opportunity to spread the burden of 
contributing to the costs of programme management. The partnership convened a 
small advisory sub-committee of the CSF Monitoring Committee to examine the role 
of the PE and decided to approach the LECs for support.
A number of changes in the nature of the contract itself, which had required a 
reorganisation of the committee structures, also drove the need for change in the 
structure of the Programme Executive. A greater number of partners, increased 
competition for funds and the likelihood of smaller projects seemed set to increase the 
PE's workload, as did the Commission's calls for clearer project selection strategies 
and improved monitoring and evaluation. As the Executive devoted more of its time to 
such requirements, there was the danger that the partnership (and the European 
Commission therein) would become over-reliant on certain partners for programme 
management matters, such as the preparation of annual reports. In other words, as the 
Programme Executive was drawn further into the provision of monitoring and 
evaluation, the asset specificity of the resources provided by spending partners (such 
as data in project applications) was set to rise unless the resources of the Executive 
were increased.
In October 1992 the sub-committee of the CSF Monitoring Committee set up 
to examine the Programme Executive reported to the full Committee. It had met on 
three occasions and comprised senior members of the partnership: chaired by the 
Scottish Office, it had been attended by the Programme Director and representatives 
of Strathclyde Regional Council, Inverclyde District Council, Motherwell District 
Council, and Enterprise Ayrshire. The European Commission input into discussions 
was made indirectly through the Programme Director, who was in regular contact with 
the DG XVI desk-officer for the region. The sub-committee reached agreement over 
the future funding of the PE. The twelve junior partners agreed to continue their 
annual financial contribution, while Strathclyde Regional Council repeated its 
commitment to maintain both its contribution and the secondment of the Programme 
Director. For the first time, five LECs agreed to an annual contribution of around 
£20,000 each. The sub-committee also agreed to expand the PE by creating the posts 
of senior programme manager and two assistant programme managers, as well as two
further clerical posts. The general conclusion of the sub-committee was that the PE 
model was effective, but that the issue should be reviewed over the longer term.
The Scottish Office in particular had become aware by 1993 of the enhanced 
role developed by the Programme Executive in the implementation of Structural Fund 
programmes in Western Scotland. The expansion of the PE in terms of its annual 
budget and staff resources had been rapid since 1989. Moreover, the lifting of the 
block on revenue financing meant that a number of employment arrangements might 
need to be reviewed in order to secure technical assistance from the European 
Commission.14 More importantly, the new transparency arrangements combined with 
the new priorities of the programme meant that the enhanced role of the Executive in 
project development placed a considerable discretion in the hands of the PE in 
indirectly allocating public expenditure approvals within the region. Consequently, the 
Scottish Office prompted a review of the longer term organisation of the Programme 
Executive. The sub-committee of the CSF therefore continued its deliberations on the 
future development of the Programme Executive.
In May 1993, the sub-committee on the Programme Executive made a further 
report to the CSF Monitoring Committee. Following discussions among the 
partnership in late 1992 and the lessons of the Pieda evaluation, the sub-committee 
had clarified the essential requirements that were necessary. It was clear that the 
existing model had worked well, and therefore that changes should be evolutionary' 
and intended to develop present arrangements for the future. Although it was a widely 
held view among the partnership that the PE should be as independent as is practicable 
of any one partner and serve the interests of all partners, there was still a need to have 
a lead partner to act as employer and hence as the sponsor of technical assistance 
applications. Interview sources have suggested that, although the report emphasised 
that the partnership operates in an ever-changing and complex environment, and 
therefore that growth in management tasks was likely to continue in the next round of 
the Structural Funds from 1994, behind this rationale for modifications to the PE 
structure, there lay the intention of the Scottish Office to increase its own supervisory 
role over the Executive.
A Joint Management Board was therefore set up by the partnership, largely at 
the insistence of the Scottish Office. The Board is essentially a formal sub-committee 
of the CSF Monitoring committee, with the prime task of overseeing the work of the 
Programme Executive. Membership comprises the Scottish Office as the main
14 The paper Structural Policies - Technical Assistance Granted to Member States in the context o f the 
Reform of the Structural Funds of December 1990 set out the main items that can be funded through 
technical assistance, studies into various sectors, economic issues, preparation of programmes, training 
for partners, improved secretariat functions, evaluation, publicity campaigns, and computerised 
monitoring systems. There could be no technical assistance for secondees, but TA would be available to 
fill the post left in the seconding organisation
implementing authority, and Strathclyde Regional Council as the official employer of 
the PE staff and hence the sponsor of the technical assistance application. In addition, 
it was suggested that three or four other partners should be involved on the Board, 
including at least one representative of the Scottish Enterprise Network and at least 
one District Council. The Programme Director would be expected to attend meetings, 
as would any other staff as required. In the event, the sub-committee on the 
Programme Executive essentially transformed itself into the Joint Management Board. 
It was agreed that the Board should meet twice a year and as often as business 
requires, and its terms of reference set out the following tasks:
to oversee and guide the Programme Executive in 
relation to the implementation of the Programmes; 
to account for the expenditure by the Programme 
Executive, including determining the annual 
contributions of partners, approving items of 
expenditure over an agreed delegated limit and forward 
planning;
to prepare an annual report on the work of the 
Programme Executive including an annual financial 
statement for the CSF Monitoring Committee; 
to monitor the staff structure and workloads, make 
adjustments where required within the agreed budget 
and make recommendations for any changes that 
require additional resources.15
The funding of the PE was also changed for the post-1993 period. Its budget is 
now met 50% from technical assistance, following the success of the application for 
such support, with the rest coming from subscriptions. Although the Commission 
would not allow the Programme Executive to charge a levy on individual awards, 
when an authority becomes a partner (in effect when it submits its first application), it 
pays a flat rate subscription. Thereafter it pays a subscription rate of 0.4% on project 
approvals: in other words, for every £1000 a partner receives in grants, at the end of 
the year it contributes £4 in administrative charges, although partners with annual 
grant awards below £50,000 a year are exempt from charge. In this way, the Scottish 
Office has effectively persuaded local actors to provide the resources for programme 
management, while central government retains a strong role in supervising the PE 
through the new Joint Management Board. This created some resentment among local 
partners who, having increased their staff resources devoted to Structural Fund 
programmes, found a reluctance within the Scottish Office to do the same for the
15 Western Scotland CSF Monitoring Committee, 'Report from the Sub-Committee on Future Funding 
and Staffing of the Programme Executive', May 1993.
region. The transfer of management functions to regional actors has saved the Scottish 
Office a significant administrative burden.
It should be noted that by 1993 the Programme Executive was responsible to 
the Scottish Office and the Department of Employment as the lead departments on the 
ERDF and ESF respectively, indirectly to Strathclyde Regional Council as the 
employer of PE officials, and directly to the Joint Management Board on operational 
matters. Interviews have suggested that as the links between the PE and any one of 
these bodies are strengthened, the Executive's responsibility to the partnership as a 
whole is reduced, as is its ability to secure the partnership's trust. The Executive 
enjoys the trust of the partnership only to the extent that it attempts to share influence 
for all, rather than to guarantee influence for any one partner. Nevertheless, the PE has 
been able to develop a reputation for fair and effective programme management over 
the short period in which it has been in existence. Similarly, a store of Structural 
Funds expertise has been established in the Programme Executive core. This 
reputation has been facilitated by the fact that the post of Programme Director has 
been held by the same official since the post was created, and this official retains the 
confidence of the partnership.16
6.6 Reprise and Summary
This chapter has analysed the institutional structures created in line with the 
partnership principle at the regional level in Western Scotland. While chapter 5 
examined the way in which development programming was conducted among the 
regional actors in Western Scotland, chapter 6 has focused on the structures 
established with a view to ensuring such programmes are effectively executed. As 
suggested at the start of this chapter, however, partnership schemes are 'rarely well 
defined one-off deals between partners with clearly defined goals, but rather sites of 
continuing political and economic renegotiation' (Mackintosh 1992: 210-211). A 
highly-detailed analysis has shown, for the first time, the nature of this complex, 
multi-tiered structure, and the involvement of European Commission desk officers 
therein. Again, the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting has 
highlighted a number of key features of this structure. It is therefore instructive at this
16 In May 1993, at the first meeting of the CSF Monitoring Committee for the 1993 Programme, the 
Programme Director argued that the Programme Executive should retain its name as everyone in the 
public sector in the West of Scotland knew the Strathclyde IDO Programme Executive. To change the 
name in line with the change in programme would involve a loss of the PE's hard-earned reputation. 
Although the Scottish Office and the European Commission undertook to consider the possibility of 
retaining the name, it was later changed to the Strathclyde European Partnership, not least because the 
European Commission did not want the Executive to retain the reference to the name of the pre-reform 
IDO. As shown herein, the structure and role of the Executive itself have evolved considerably since the 
original approval of the IDO
stage to return to the set of questions posed at the start of this chapter. Firstly, the 
extent to which each partner is involved in the structures which have been established 
to monitor the enforcement of the contract was questioned. Secondly, how have 
changes in the contract, and in the composition of the partnership itself, been reflected 
in the evolution of those structures? Thirdly, the model teaches us to look for the 
emergence of trust as an implicit form of contracting which reduces the costs of co­
ordinated action. These three questions are closely linked and can be considered 
together at this stage.
The requirement to monitor the implementation of the regional development 
contract has resulted in the creation of new institutional arrangements at the regional 
level, which would not otherwise have existed in Western Scotland. However, various 
actors in that region have differing ideas about the nature of partnership, not least 
central government and the European Commission. As the Tavistock Institute of 
Human Relations found in the case of the Eastern Scotland Objective 2 CSF, 'the main 
polarisation is between those that regard CSF partnership as a "vertical" and 
hierarchical arrangement and those who see it as "horizontal" and egalitarian. There is 
also a lack of clarity and agreement about the functions of partnerships and their 
meetings, for instance whether they are concerned with communication, co-ordination 
or decision-taking':
A vertical partnership would emphasise control, based on the differing 
perspectives, powers and responsibilities of successive 'levels' of 
government: the Commission, national government, the Regions, the 
Districts and, perhaps, non-governmental organisations. A horizontal 
partnership would encompass all these bodies but emphasise a spirit of 
open discussion and joint problem-solving in relation to priorities, 
projects and procedures. However, it should be noted that this is an 
ideal which in reality would be likely to be accompanied by a range of 
manoeuvres as partners seek to pursue their special interests and arrive 
at consensus (1991: 19-20).
Such a polarisation is evident in the case of Western Scotland. From the 
earliest days of the IDO Preparatory Study, Strathclyde Regional Council, with some 
support from the European Commission, saw the partnership as a 'horizontal' 
arrangement. The institutional arrangements for the Glasgow NPCI, however, bore the 
imprint of the Scottish Office's view of partnership as a 'vertical' arrangement. Central 
government's intention to 'control' the partnership has been evident throughout the 
period under examination, most recently in the attempt to enhance its supervisory role 
over the Programme Executive through the creation of a Joint Management Board.
Not only are varying definitions of the principle of partnership evoked by 
different partners, but partnership itself can take a variety of forms at different phases 
of the programming process. While chapter 5 illustrated the involvement of different 
partners in the programme preparation phase, this chapter has shown that even within 
the programme monitoring phase itself, partnership takes many forms. Higher-level 
strategic committees have generally operated on a representational basis, while lower- 
level operational committees for ERDF management involved all partners during the 
period in which project selection was undertaken primarily at that level. The lower- 
level monitoring committee in Western Scotland was only able to move to a 
representational membership when the primary responsibility for project selection was 
devolved to a series of advisory groups for each priority. These groups themselves (set 
up in response to the increase in number of partners, greater competition for funds, 
and generally greater size of projects) are now comprised of the main partners with 
strategic interests under the relevant priority, and do not directly involve the European 
Commission. In other words, partners are still represented at the level at which project 
prioritisation takes place. Moreover, the sub-committees and groupings which have 
periodically been established by the partnership to consider changes in institutional 
structures (such as the sub-committee on the Programme Executive or even the Plan 
Team examined in chapter 5) have comprised representatives of the 'major* partners: 
the Scottish Office, Strathclyde Regional Council, and more recently, Scottish 
Enterprise. Horizontal' or 'egalitarian' conceptions of the partnership principle have 
generally been put aside when decisions regarding changes in the partnership 
structures themselves have to be made.
The limits of partnership have been acknowledged by the partnership itself in 
the most recent document analysed herein, the Plan for the post-1993 period. By 1994, 
a core of actors in Western Scotland had accumulated around a decade of experience 
of working in partnership on European funding at the regional level. The 'basic 
principle of partnership', according to the Plan document, 'is that all eligible 
organisations who receive Structural Fund support through the Programme should be 
involved in the Programme implementation' (Scottish Office/Strathclyde European 
Partnership 1994: 57). While this had been achieved during the years of the 
Strathclyde IDO when partners comprised primarily a range of bodies supplying 
public infrastructure investment, the expansion of the partnership in 1993 had forced a 
review of partnership arrangements. In other words, the inherent limits in decision­
making using the horizontal approach to partnership had been reached. At the same 
time, the persistence of central government's vertical approach was reaffirmed: 
'although the aim has been to devolve as much of the programme management and 
administration to the Programme Executive, there are tasks that remain the
responsibility of the Scottish Office as the implementing authority. The Scottish 
Office Industry Department for both ERDF and ESF (recently transferred from the 
Department of Employment) has overall responsibility for approval of projects, 
payments, audit and accountancy of the Structural Funds' (Scottish Office/Strathclyde 
European Partnership 1994: 59).
The emergence and development of a sense of trust among the partnership is 
most evident in the evolution of the Programme Executive. This body, which has 
evolved in an incremental manner, remains responsible for the collection of 
monitoring information at the project level on physical progress, financial progress 
and performance outcomes. The Executive was until recently a unique body in the 
UK, charged with the overall task of guaranteeing the effective management of the 
programme in the best interests of all the partners to the contract. As such, it has been 
suggested herein that the Executive is best conceptualised as a special purpose 
institution. Given the range of the interests it seeks to accommodate, however, and 
different conceptualisations of partnership, the PE's role has proved far from 
straightforward, not least because the it has not always enjoyed the resources to 
undertake the task. The fact that the Programme Executive is viewed by the 
partnership as a largely independent body, and that it does not undertake projects 
itself, has been a prerequisite for the development of the problem-solving capacities of 
the former and the level of trust it has been able to evoke.
The introductory section of this chapter also questioned the extent to which a 
professional community of experts in the field of programming has developed in 
Western Scotland. The recent emergence of the advisory groups can be seen as an 
attempt to build accumulated expertise into institutional structures. The future 
relationship between the advisory groups (the remit of which is to provide expert 
advice on specific strategies, the development of assessment schemes, and 
recommendations on project applications) and the Programme Executive (which 
chairs advisory group meetings) will be a central test of the extent to which a problem­
solving approach has developed through the wider partnership in Western Scotland. 
The way in which this relationship evolves, without the direct participation of the 
European Commission, will illustrate whether partnership in Western Scotland 
remains primarily a mechanism for carving up resources, or whether the European 
Commission's intention of securing greater cohesion in measures to support regional 
development has been realised. In the past, central government itself has most 
obviously sought to claim all the financial benefits of the programming process by 
refusing to respect the principal of additionality. As it increases its control over the 
Executive (through the Joint Management Board), it also endangers the trust that body 
has accumulated among the partnership.
Finally, it should be noted that a key focus of this chapter has been on the 
extent to which the institutional structures of partnership have been designed to ensure 
local flexibility and adaptability to unfolding circumstances. As emphasised in chapter 
5, the programme preparation phase can result only in an incomplete contract in that 
the solutions to many potential problems are not worked out in advance. Rather, the 
ongoing relationship between partners is recognised and institutional structures are 
designed to respond to changing circumstances as necessary. As the Commission's 
own guide to the reform of the Structural Funds noted, monitoring may give rise to the 
need for adaptations. It has been suggested in this chapter that the response of the 
partnership in the case of ERDF implementation can usefully be conceptualised as one 
of relational contracting. Paragraph 6 of the 1988 IDO Decision (European 
Commission 1988) emphasised the likelihood of modifications to the programme after 
it had been agreed. Rather than seeking to anticipate such adaptations, however, the 
partnership simply set broad targets and agreed who had the right to modify the 
programme. The higher-tier Co-ordinating Committee was therefore responsible for 
overall direction and policy, and could change the expenditure profile of the 
programme (re-directing up to 15% of any sub-programme into other sub- 
programmes). This left a great deal of discretion at the regional level after the 
agreement of the programme. It is from the output in institutional terms to the policy 
output in terms of projects supported that this analysis now turns.
Particular facts may vary but the general story is the same: a sensational 
announcement from Washington on page 1, temporary local jubilation, 
permanent difficulties, and, perhaps years later, a small blurb on the back 
page signalling the end (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973:135).
News of a £1 billion investment to transform Strathclyde's economy has 
left the region wondering whether there is, after all, a Santa Claus. The 
announcement yesterday that the European Commission is giving £380 
million, said to be its biggest financial aid package ever, as the largest 
slice of funding, led Mr Ian Lang, the Scottish industry minister, to say:
"This is a tremendous Christmas present for Strathclyde" (The Scotsman 
22 December 1988).
7.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the ultimate phase of the contracting process, the 
selection of projects within the framework of the regional development strategy This 
phase is perhaps the least explored, due to the difficulty of accessing data on 
individual projects supported within the region, and the even greater difficulty of 
accessing data on those project applications which are rejected. Nevertheless, this is a 
crucial element of European regional development policy: as suggested in the 
introductory chapter to this thesis, policy emerges across the whole process from the 
agreement of the Regulations to the ultimate co-financing by the European 
Commission of local partners’ projects. The relationship between the partners across 
all stages takes place within the framework of the regional development contract, but 
the ultimate shape of that contract depends on the phase of project selection just as it 
depends upon the Regulations. Pressman and Wildavsky's pessimism was intended to 
forewarn of the many pitfalls that lie between initial policy decisions and the ultimate 
output of a policy. The optimism they predict at the moment of a policy announcement 
was no less apparent in the case of the Strathclyde IDO than it had been for the 
Oakland project which provided their case study. This chapter looks at the policy 
output of the regional development contract in Western Scotland.
The front page announcement in The Scotsman newspaper on 22 December 
1988 of a 'Christmas present for Strathclyde' seemed almost too good to be true. The 
newspaper pointed out that IDO status for the high-unemployment areas of 
Strathclyde would bring, among other benefits, the following: 5,000 new jobs by 1992 
through inward investment, particularly in new technology; 25,000 jobs by the year 
2000, through the creation of 2,000 small and medium-sized businesses; 5,000 jobs 
for Glasgow by the year 2000 resulting from the city's international promotion; and,
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more than 40,000 training places for the region's unemployed. The Pieda evaluation 
of the IDO (1993) illustrates that the targets set by the partners themselves for the 
programme were somewhat less wildly optimistic. Nevertheless, it is accurate to 
suggest that the initial euphoria in the press has been followed with little public 
scrutiny of the programme’s performance, and the winding up of the IDO at the end of 
1992 did not receive the same fanfare. What happened between 1988 and late 1992 in 
terms of programme output is analysed herein.
This chapter, the third and final chapter of the case study of ERDF 
implementation in Western Scotland, complements the previous two in their 
assessment of the applicability and utility of the model of policy implementation as 
incomplete contracting. In short, the emphasis at this point is on the incompleteness 
of the original contract, and how the inevitable flexibility of the agreement can be 
used opportunistically by domestic actors (in this case central government) to re­
shape the contract at the project selection stage. The focus of this chapter is primarily 
on the period up to mid-1992, as information on the output of post-IDO programmes 
is much more difficult to obtain (for practitioners as well as academics). As such, this 
chapter is necessarily shorter than the previous two, although it again develops and 
examines a set of questions designed to test the applicability and utility of the model 
developed in chapter 2. The ability of the European Commission to shape the ultimate 
output of the programming process remains at the centre of the analysis.
The key questions addressed in this chapter reflect and develop upon those 
around which chapters 5 and 6 were structured. The focus of analysis is still on the 
nature of the exchange between the European Commission and domestic actors in 
Western Scotland:
1. When does the final shape o f the regional development programme become 
apparent7 Does the ultimate output of the programme reflect the targets and the 
proposed expenditure profile of the contractual document? To what extent is the final 
shape of the contract malleable throughout the course of the exchange relationship? 
Chapter 5 showed how the contract itself 'leaves gaps' to be filled in during project 
selection in that provision is made for changes in the allocation of resources to each 
sub-programme. Chapter 6 examined the institutional structures by which this 
flexibility is ensured. In this chapter, it is argued that central government uses this 
flexibility to re-direct the programme away from software measures and back to 
infrastructure measures.
2. To what extent have 'rational' resource allocation strategies been adopted in 
Western Scotland7 In other words, as the exchange relationship has endured, has the
European Commission succeeded in its attempt to impose a strategic planning 
approach on the local partners, or does project selection remain simply a 'haphazard' 
process?
3. To what extent has the Programme Executive assisted the European 
Commission in this regard, and has the trust and reputation built up by the Executive 
facilitated a problem-solving approach at the regional level? Alternatively, are the 
actions of the partners best described simply as a form o f’funding consciousness'?
It should be emphasised that the focus of this chapter is on the output of the 
regional development programme in terms of out-turn expenditure for each sub- 
programme. Aggregated project targets and outputs are presented in the Pieda 
evaluation (1993), but these are of less relevance to this thesis. The amount of money 
allocated to each sub-programme, compared to how much the original contract 
specified would be allocated, is a better indication of the way in which the contract 
was modified than is evidence on the shortfall between project targets (in terms of 
jobs created for example) and project outputs. Moreover, data on programme 
outcome (in terms of the impact of the project outputs on the performance of the 
regional economy) are of even less relevance for this thesis. The research approach 
adopted in this chapter, as proposed by OToole, favours the social-scientific 
questions of implementation research, rather than causal explanations of regional 
economic development:
This conceptualisation includes actions of implemented ... while 
explicitly not encompassing all consequences flowing from the 
initiation of the policy action. Thus, for example, if implemented 
cany out intended behaviours but those behaviours fail to have the 
effects the policy-makers had expected, there is a "failure". But the 
problem is not an implementation problem, as the term is intended 
here. For the failure lies in a lack of understanding of the connection 
between the social action engendered and its effects on the real world, 
rather than (for instance) in a collective action problem, or 
recalcitrance, or a lack of monitoring. In other words, a theory of 
implementation would explain the behaviours of implementing actors, 
not necessarily predict the ultimate success of policy makers or other 
actors in achieving stated objectives ... The key point for present 
purposes is that implementation theory encompasses questions that are 
clearly social-scientific (1993: 30).
Rather than presenting an economic evaluation of ERDF programmes in Western 
Scotland, this chapter presents an analysis of the reasons why the ultimate shape of 
the programme in expenditure terms differs from its ex-ante stated shape.
The remainder of this chapter is organised in five sections. Section 7.2 
presents a brief analysis (in financial terms) of the earliest programme of ERDF 
expenditure implemented in the west of Scotland. The Glasgow National Programme 
of Community Interest experienced an overall underspend on projected expenditure 
of 24%. The reasons why this occurred are examined before turning to the larger, and 
more complex Strathclyde IDO. Section 13  compares the spending targets of the 
original 1988 IDO document with the expenditure profile of the IDO at May 1992. 
The proposed expenditure allocations set for each Action Programme are considered 
alongside out-turn expenditure. Given the sensitivity of this issue, the analysis draws 
heavily on the publicly available information contained in Pieda's 1993 interim 
evaluation of the IDO. The key finding of this section is that resources nominally 
allocated to revenue-financed business development schemes were re-directed during 
the course of implementation towards capital-financed infrastructure projects. Section
7.4 analyses the general process of virement by which this re-direction of financing 
took place. The analysis in Section 7.5 then turns to the question of project selection 
strategies, and more particularly to European Commission attempts to encourage 
transparency in the way in which resources are allocated to projects, before Section
7.6 summarises the key findings of this chapter. It is to the 'expenditure slippage' 
under the first programme of ERDF expenditure in the case study region that the 
analysis now turns.
7.2 Expenditure Slippage under the Glasgow NPCI
The experience of the Glasgow NPCI shows how' difficult it was for the 
regional partners simply to spend financial resources in the early days of ERDF 
programming. It was already clear by April 1987 that the NPCI was going to register a 
severe underspend on its projected expenditure. There was such a large underspend on 
the roads sub-programme of around 40%, which in turn formed a massive percentage 
of the whole programme, that there was in effect an overall underspend of 24% on the 
proposed expenditure. The official explanation "for this slippage, in which there is 
undoubtedly some truth, was that unforeseen planning delays and an over-estimation 
of the amount that could be ’drawn down' were the source of the problem. As 
suggested below, however, central government controls on capital expenditure were 
undoubtedly more significant.
At a meeting of the NPCI Co-ordinating Committee in late April 1987, the 
Industry Department for Scotland suggested that the main objective of the Programme 
had become to 'commit' as much as possible of the £68.2 million ERDF award before 
the end of the Programme period, i.e. before 31 December 1987. 'Commit', the Chair 
of the Committee explained, did not mean that the money had to be spent by that date, 
but rather that projects had to have started by then.1 In an attempt to spend all the 
money, it was decided that suitable projects started before 31 December 1987 would 
be eligible. Nevertheless, as table 7.1 illustrates, there was still an overall underspend 
of almost £30 million on the programme, amounting to the failure to draw down over 
£17 million in ERDF grant. The only sub-programme with a significant overspend was 
tourism, but this was achieved through the inclusion of one relatively large project, 
sponsored by Glasgow District Council, to convert the city's Kelvin Hall into an indoor 
sports arena and museum. This overall underspend can be interpreted as a 'failure' on 
behalf of central government as it failed in its own objective of 'drawing down' 
resources to the benefit of the Treasury. Likewise, DG XVI had failed to ensure that 
the budget allocated to the city was spent, and hence the local actors had also missed 
out on potential interest payment savings on capital works that they would have 
undertaken anyway. The reasons for this underspend can be considered under two 
headings: eligibility of the partners; and, additionality in practice.
1 Minutes of the Meeting of the Co-ordinating Committee for the National Programme of Community 
Interest (NPCI) for the City of Glasgow, held on 28 April 1987 at the City Chambers, Glasgow
Table 7.1: Glasgow NPCI (1985-88) Underspend/Overspend by Sub-Programme
Planned
Expenditure
£
Actual
Expenditure
£
Underspend/
Overspend
%
Roads 56,000,000 33,093,572 -41%
Public Transport 23,000,000 20.312.116 - 12%
Water & Sewerage 11,000,000 11,493,200 _ + 4.5%
Industrial Development 7.500,000 5,7%,099 - 23%
Vocational Training 4,100,000 1,927,887 -53%
Energy 10,400,000 9,260,031 - 11%
Environmental Improve. 7,000,000 5,023,310 - 28%
Tourism 5,000,000 7,815,160 + 56%
Grand Total 124,000,000 94,721,375 - 24%
Source : The Scottish Office ( 1993a) Glasgow National Programme of Community Interest Final Report
(Edinburgh: The Scottish Office)
Eligibility o f the Partners: To an extent, this problem, which revolved around 
the issue of British Gas privatisation, had been anticipated by the European 
Commission. As suggested in chapter 5, the partners had recognised at the outset the 
likelihood that privatisation would mean that British Gas projects were no longer 
eligible. With the election of the Conservative Government in the UK in 1979, an 
initiative had been launched to increase share-holding among the public and to 
transfer certain services and industrial activities from the public to the private sector. 
Many of the privatised bodies were involved in the provision of infrastructure and had 
thus been eligible as public bodies for ERDF support: Associated British Ports, British 
Telecom, British Gas and regional water authorities. These bodies could attract a 
significant percentage of ERDF resources given the importance of infrastructure in 
terms of regional development as it was stressed by the UK government in the context 
of EC regional policy. However, ERDF eligibility for such bodies became an overtly 
political problem as the opposition Labour Party was firmly opposed to privatisation. 
Some Labour MEPs criticised the Commission for grant aiding bodies about to be 
privatised on the basis that the aid would go directly to shareholders. Point 10 in the 
Addendum to the Decision (whereby the Commission would review the eligibility of 
British Gas were it to be privatised) had been included to guard against this accusation
(see chapter 5). However, the Commission had been unable to anticipate the 
bargaining which subsequently occurred over when privatisation actually took place.
The Commission believed that the date of privatisation of British Gas was 6 
November 1985 (the date of the announcement of the privatisation in the Queen's 
Speech to Parliament), before the NPCI Decision was even announced. As a result, the 
Commission suggested that point 10 of the Addendum, suspending British Gas 
projects, should apply immediately. The Scottish Office, by contrast, argued that the 
real date of privatisation was 25 July 1986, the date of Royal Assent of the 
privatisation legislation (The Gas Act). A long process of bargaining began in which 
the Industry Department for Scotland maintained that projects initiated by British Gas 
before July 1986 should be supported, or else there would be an underspend on the 
energy sub-programme. The Commission replied that British Gas had been privatised 
without grant having been allocated to projects in question, and that the share sale 
price was struck without reference to ERDF grant. Any allocation of ERDF would 
therefore result in a windfall gain to the private shareholders. The Commission view 
eventually prevailed and British Gas projects dropped out of the programme. As the 
sole supplier of gas-related infrastructure, the asset specificity of the resources brought 
to the exchange relationship by British Gas was high. A change in the status of that 
body resulted in a failure of the programme to achieve its aim of assisting gas supplies 
to new industrial developments. Subsequent changes in project eligibility, in particular 
the loss of eligibility for such projects, reduced the significance of this problem.
Additionality in Practice: By far the most significant obstacle to the fulfilment 
of the NPCI contract (in terms of spending the money) was the policy of central 
government not to issue supplementary spending approvals to allow authorities in 
receipt of ERDF grant to undertake additional capital expenditure. Prior to the 
approval of the NPCI, the Scottish Office had written to the programme participants to 
emphasise that the ERDF bid had been made on the strict understanding that no 
supplementary approvals would be issued on receipt of ERDF grant. In other words, 
proposed expenditure would need to be accommodated within existing capital 
consents. IDS officials emphasised that the intention was to maximise Community 
resources to the UK, but without increasing domestic expenditure. The result of this 
policy stance was a severe programme underspend, as there was little incentive for 
local actors to proceed with low priority projects for which they would only receive a 
marginal financial benefit.
Another aspect of the additionality problem was the refusal of central 
government to approve ERDF Article 15 measures. Examined in depth in chapter 3 
above, these were essentially measures aimed at assisting small and medium-sized
enterprises (SMEs) to expand their activities and obtain access to new technology, 
with a view to exploiting the potential for internally-generated regional development. 
The key point noted above is that such measures (for example, supporting the running 
costs of centres to promote technology transfer) would be financed through local 
actors' revenue budgets. Hence, central government would have little direct control 
over the grant were it to pass finances on to local authorities. The UK government 
therefore simply refused to process Article 15 applications, thereby avoiding the 
problem of whether or not to transfer the aid for such measures to the authorities 
concerned. Point 5 of the Addendum to the Decision stated that the Co-ordinating 
Committee shall give active consideration to proposals for measures as envisaged in 
Article 15 of Regulation 1787/84 to exploit the potential for internally generated 
development of the area covered by the programme with a view to their inclusion in 
future requests for aid in respect of further programmes for the development of the 
City of Glasgow'. However, an extensive range of local authority applications under 
Article 15 were simply blocked in London several years after the 1984 Regulation. As 
De Witte has suggested more generally, the separate treatment of Article 15 measures 
(outwith programme arrangements) actually served to limit rather than encourage their 
financing (1986:429-430).
The problem of expenditure slippage was also a feature of the subsequent 
Strathclyde IDO. By the time the IDO was approved, the partners had gathered some 
two years experience of programming. However, the extension of eligibility to new 
partners and the introduction of ESF financing to the contract made programming 
significantly more complex. It is to the IDO spending targets and expenditure outputs 
that this chapter now turns.
7J Strathclyde IDO: Spending Targets and Expenditure Outputs
The approval of Strathclyde EDO in December 1988 marked the introduction 
of the strategic programming approach in Western Scotland. It should nevertheless be 
emphasised that executing the programme still involved the financing of a series of 
projects, selected at the regional level. Projects were financed in the context of a 
number of Action Programmes, set out in chapter 5 above. Chapter 5 also indicated 
that the United Kingdom government allocated a lower percentage by far than any 
other member state to 'software measures'. Against this background, the fact that the 
European Commission was able to secure an allocation of 16% of the proposed ERDF 
resources under Strathclyde IDO to the 'Enterprise, Innovation and Investment' Action 
Programme can be seen as something of a breakthrough, as the NPCI had not 
included any business support measures. However, this section emphasises that the
programme itself is not the end o f the process. Table 7.1 shows the difference 
between budgeted and actual expenditure approvals for each Action Programme. The 
table is of crucial importance as it shows the capacity of central government to re­
allocate expenditure after the agreement o f the contract away from the revenue- 
financed Action Programme it opposed, to the capital-financed Action Programmes it 
favoured (such as Tourism Development' and Industrial Sites and Premises').
The distinction made by central government between capital and revenue 
expenditure for ERDF purposes is again very relevant, although it is 'a limitation that 
national government imposes on the use of European funds which do not themselves 
recognise a distinction between capital and revenue' (PACEC 1991: 21). The 
distinction became central to DG XVTs attempts to shape programmes in the UK, as 
noted by Jones Economics Consultants: 'some ERDF is provided for "software” type 
business development measures. These are revenue expenditure and there are 
generally no restrictions on authorities' freedom to use the grant to finance additional 
expenditure. This partly explains the Commission's policy of seeking to increase the 
importance of these elements within the CSF at the expense of infrastructure' (1991: 
43-44). Chapter 5 showed the 350% increase since the late 1980s in the share of such 
expenditure under strategic programming priorities for Western Scotland. However, 
table 7.1 illustrates the need to look beyond this headline figure. The Enterprise, 
Innovation and Investment Action Programme was the main Action Programme 
providing for revenue-financed projects by local authorities. Only around 22% of the 
original budget proposed for that Action Programme in the original IDO document 
had been spent by May 1992, the final year of the IDO's operation.
Tabic 7.2: Strathclyde EDO Budgeted and Actual ERDF Commitments at May 1992
Action
Programme
<«)
Original
Budget
(b) 
Budget at 
Feb. 1991
(c) 
Budget at 
May 1992
(d)
Approvals
&
Application 
s at May 
1992
(e)
Percentage
Resources
Committed
(d/c)
Enterprise, 
Innovation & 
Investment
£37.354m £34.436m £15.836m £8.456m 53%
Industrial Sites 
& Premises
£18.100m £18.100m £25.100m £21.520m 86%
Tourism
Development
£ 17.000m £19.550m £29.550m £20.622m 70%
Transport & 
Communications
£85.350m £85.350m £85.350m £79.652m 93%
Underground
Services
£57.200m £57.200m £57.200m £56.756m 99%
Environmental
Improvements
£ 14.200m £14.200m £14.200m £7.81 lm 55%
Voc.Training
Facilities
£2.450m £2.900m £4.418m £3.452m 78%
Total £231.654m £231.654m £231.654m £ 198.269m 86%
Source Pieda (1993) Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation: Interim Evaluation - Final
Report (Edinburgh: Pieda)
At the mid-point of the EDO's execution in January 1991, the Enterprise, 
Innovation and Investment Action Programme was the only sub-programme showing 
a serious underspend. The consultants appointed to evaluate the IDO claimed that the 
underspend was due to two factors: a low take-up of resources under the central 
government Regional Enterprise Grants (REG) scheme which formed a large part of 
the Action Programme; and, the failure of the partnership to develop a strategic 
business development framework:
On the available evidence, this Action Programme appears to have 
fallen short of its aims - both in tenns of committing resources and 
generating output. This shortfall may, in part, be attributed to an 
excessive focus on REG; take-up of REG was less than expected.
More fundamentally, the experience of this Action Programme 
exemplifies the difficulties of setting up active business development 
projects. Unlike physical infrastructure projects, it is not generally 
possible to take business projects 'off the shelf and there can be 
difficulties in funding projects whose fundamental requirement is, as 
with business development, for revenue support (Pieda 1993: 32).
The Programme Executive's own progress report for the first three years of the 
IDO suggested that a major contributing factor to the under-spend in the Enterprise, 
Innovation and Investment Action Programme was indeed the much lower than 
anticipated take up of Regional Enterprise Grants. It was then predicted that take-up 
expenditure for REG may only amount to 15% - 20% of its target allocation of £21.7 
million (Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation 1991). Central government, 
responsible for the scheme, pointed out that REG was created in 1988 at exactly the 
same time as the IDO, and was created on the basis of a number of assumptions about 
expected ERDF receipts. It had been difficult to make assumptions about what would 
have happened in terms of company's demand for support. However, the partnership 
was annoyed with the criticism by the consultants that a lack of strategic awareness 
caused the underspend under the Action Programme. Interview sources in the 
Commission and in the local partnership have confirmed that the real reason for the 
underspend was the refusal by the Scottish Office to allow local authorities to 
present business development schemes to the Co-ordinating Committee for approval. 
In effect, central government vetoed the allocation of resources under this Action 
Programme to local authorities in order to assure its policy of non-additionality.
The underspend under the Enterprise, Innovation and Investment Action 
Programme was so striking that the EDO Co-ordinating Committee meeting of March
1991, called to review the implementation of the IDO over the first three years, had to 
consider the necessity of transferring ERDF resources between Action Programmes.
The way in which such flexibility was built into the programme at the outset was 
examined in chapter 5. Moreover, the discussion of relational contracting in chapter 6 
emphasised the procedure by which partners agree to shape the terms of the 
relationship rather than specifying in advance the exact performance required. The 
following section considers the way in which the flexibility of the programme was 
employed in practice.
7.4 Virement. The Flexibility of the Contract
Virement is the term used by the European Commission to denote the 
flexibility allowing the transfer of resources after the agreement of the original 
programme. The Commissioner for Regional Policies has emphasised the importance 
of such procedures:
Within the programmes themselves, within the priorities under the 
programmes, we make adjustments all the time. Supposing you had a 
particular heading Business development to help small business' and 
that was going well - even though, as it happens, we have got 
difficulties with the United Kingdom Government on that particular 
aspect of things - we would want to transfer money away from, say, a 
programme for tourism development which was not going very well.
These are hypothetical examples, but there is within the arrangements, 
under the Community Support Framework, a certain flexibility which 
can be operated at the monitoring committee level. Bigger transfers in 
percentage terms require the authority of the Commission, but the 
flexibility is there (House of Lords 1992:97).
The Strathclyde IDO Co-ordinating Committee recommended a virement of 
resources under the IDO in 1991, and this was agreed by the Commission by letter in 
October of that year. The original ERDF allocation to the sub-programme for 
Enterprise, Innovation and Investment had been £37.3 million for the period 1988-
1992, amounting to approximately 16% of the total ERDF allocation to the IDO. In 
March 1990, the Co-ordinating Committee agreed an initial virement of £2.92 million 
out of this sub-programme into the Tourism' Action Programme (£2.55 million) and 
’Vocational Training Facilities' Action Programme (£0.37 million). However, in 
August 1991, after a full review of the implementation of the ERDF element of the 
IDO, the Co-ordinating Committee agreed the following further modifications to the 
ERDF financial plan:
(i) that the Tourism Development Action Programme be increased by £10 
million;
(ii) that the Industrial Sites and Premises Action Programme be increased by £7 
million;
(iii) that the Employment and Vocational Training Action Programme be increased 
by £1.6 million; and
(iv) that to fund these increases, £18.6 million should be transferred out of the 
Enterprise, Innovation and Investment Action Programme to the above three 
Action Programmes.
The virement would leave just £15.8 million under the Enterprise, Innovation and 
Investment Action Programme, £8.5 million of which had already been allocated. In 
June 1991 the Scottish Office had informed the Commission by letter that the 
indicative split of the remaining £7.3 million ERDF would be £3.5 million to local 
authority business development projects, and £3.5 million to Scottish Enterprise and 
LEC projects (also promising that the funds to the LECs would be additional to the 
resources already allocated to Scottish Enterprise and LECs by the Scottish Office). 
Hence, central government undertook to recognise the Commission's preference for 
local business development projects, as opposed to those run by central government 
itself.
The Commission, unwilling to be blamed for an underspend on the whole 
programme, eventually approved the virement. In agreeing to the virement in October
1991, the European Commission insisted on the following conditions: the break-down 
of remaining resources should be as stated in the Scottish Office letter (i.e. half to 
LECs and half to local authorities); that this would not prejudge the Commission 
decision on the eligibility of the LECs; that the Programme Executive should present 
to the Co-ordinating Committee an analysis of the impact of the virement on the 
IDO's targets and strategies; and, that the approval would not prejudge the break­
down by priorities of the additional Community Structural Funds available for 
Western Scotland under the Community Support Framework for the period 1992-
1993. Moreover, the Commission insisted on the development of clearer strategies for 
the allocation of resources at the regional level. It is to project selection strategies that 
this chapter now turns.
7.5 Project Selection Strategies
The question of resource allocation strategies at the regional level is highly 
detailed and technical. It is also a relatively dull topic, so at this stage of the case 
study the reader should be spared excessive detail. The point to note is that project 
selection strategies, whereby resources are ultimately allocated to projects at the
regional level, are of great significance in the final shape of the contract. By October
1992, over 300 ERDF applications were approved under the IDO, and another 150- 
200 new project applications were received annually by the Programme Executive. 
The Commission wanted to see the development of clear strategies for selecting 
between project bids. In short, the European Commission wanted to see a move from 
mere 'funding consciousness' in all eligible regions towards a more strategic 
awareness of programming issues, ensuring that the 'commitment of participant 
authorities goes beyond the desire solely for a successful bid for funding support' 
(Conran Roche Planning 1991: 61 ).
The Commission itself provided only simple guidance on projects at the 
regional level. The basic economic rationale for Community intervention in Objective
2 regions was specified in guidelines which were adopted by the Commission in 
February 1989, stressing productive investment to create employment. For example, 
rather than providing basic infrastructure which is usually already in place in 
Objective 2 regions (in northern member states), activities should focus on 
modernising areas and infrastructures which, though run-down, offer the potential to 
support economic activity if they are redeveloped. However, the approach to 
Objective 2 remains flexible, as is shown by the seven development priorities which 
were specified for Objective 2 areas in the first Annual Report on the Implementation 
o f the Reform o f the Structural Funds as follows:
(i) Schemes to improve the scope for developing productive activities (e.g. the 
provision or regeneration of sites for industrial and commercial use and 
associated training projects);
(ii) Schemes to promote the development of new business (e.g. the provision of 
training, support and joint business services);
(iii) Schemes to improve the environment and enhance the image of rundown 
industrial areas;
(iv) Schemes to promote and develop tourism,
(v) Schemes to encourage research and development, in particular by the
provision of vocational training facilities;
(vi) Schemes to promote trans-frontier co-operation;
(vii) Schemes to improve the transport infrastructure ( 1990: 51 -52).
This does not go much beyond a basic description of the eligible activities in 
development regions. From the late 1980s, however, the European Commission has 
been involved at the regional level where it has been possible to give clearer 
guidance. The Assistant Secretary in the Scottish Office gave his view of the 
Commission's role in Monitoring Committees to the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the European Communities in 1992:
Our position in committees, which are attended by the Commission, is 
that we are always grateful for their guidance on questions, for 
example, of eligibility and various technical administrative issues that 
come up, but when it comes to a question about the priority of a project, 
providing that it is eligible under the terms of the programme and the 
Community support framework - the regulations and so on - the 
decision on the project is taken in that committee, which is chaired by 
the Scottish Office. Decisions as far as possible are taken by 
consensus... the Commission does have an input into the judgement of 
priorities at the initial stage from its European-wide perspective. 
However, when it comes to the detailed implementation of the 
programmes, while the Commission does have a role to play, the 
questions of judgement about what are the priorities within Strathclyde 
... are for the Scottish Office and the various local bodies involved in 
the programmes (House of Lords 1992:35-36).
The European Commission disposes of the negative power to veto any project 
on the grounds of eligibility, that is, on questions whether the project occurs within the 
programme area, whether it corresponds to one or more of the priorities defined in the 
programme document, whether its expenditure can be contained within the 
programme period, or whether the sponsor is eligible. However, the Commission 
believes that central government exercises a more important veto over which projects 
actually make it to the Committee meetings in the first place. That is, it pre-screens 
projects before the Commission is involved.
Now, at the end of the day because the government departments do 
have a veto - in other words, nothing is agreed unless they agree it - 
there has been a tendency in the UK to try to pre-screen projects, not 
necessarily on their merits as they would be considered by the regional 
or local authority concerned, but in terms of the Government's own 
priorities rather than the local authorities. Now, we have tried to 
prevent that happening (House of Lords 1992:96-97).
This pre-screening was most evident in the blocking of Article 15 projects during the 
NPCI, and in the refusal to consider locally sponsored business development projects 
under the Enterprise, Innovation and Investment Action Programme of the IDO. 
Hence, the Commission demanded greater clarity in the project selection process.
The first ERDF Working Group meeting for Strathclyde IDO took place in 
July 1989. Around, 100 projects were submitted for consideration, and, in each case 
representatives of the authority concerned were invited to speak in support of their 
own projects. This was followed by a Group discussion on the relative merits of the 
project before a decision was taken, by consensus. The Commission expected to see 
more information to justify the inclusion of projects in the IDO in economic
development terms and to satisfy themselves that authorities were meeting publicity 
and tendering requirements. Leitch points out that the large number of participants in 
the IDO and the consequent 'complex network of inter-organisational links' makes 
rational decision-making difficult. 'While there may be a consensus concerning the 
objectives of the IDO, there may be a lack of depth to this, with more prominence 
given to the objectives of the individual organisations by the participants concerned in 
the IDO'. Further, the early meetings of the IDO committee considering ERDF 
applications has indicated this. Here the representatives were unwilling to criticise 
projects submitted by other organisations, for fear that they, in turn, would criticise 
the validity of their own projects when these were being considered. This could well 
lead to the situation where schemes which only just meet the selection criteria are 
approved, at the expense of better schemes later on in the timescale of the IDO, when 
the money begins to run out' (1989:43).
Central government decisions regarding the suitability of projects are 
invariably justified with reference to the search for Value for Money, or VFM for 
short. The initials VFM have gained a certain notoriety in the European Commission 
among desk officers who deal with the United Kingdom. Every desk-officer who 
dealt with the UK expressed their frustration in interviews at the frequency with 
which central government officials repeated these words with no explanation of how 
VFM was assessed. The Government's own guide to project appraisal in central 
government, widely known as The Green Book explains the difficulty of pinning 
down value for money: 'good appraisal leads to better decisions and VFM. It calls for 
flexibility and imagination. It is not a ritual in which rigid rules are applied to the 
letter. Evaluation of past decisions is also important, and relevant to the appraisal of 
future decisions’ (Her Majesty's Treasury' 1991: 5). VFM is shorthand for the final 
social and economic benefit of a policy in relation to the cost, and usually refers to 
the optimum combination of 'economy, effectiveness and efficiency', each very 
difficult to define. Nevertheless, the Guide continues by recommending that 
systematic appraisal entails clarity over objectives, about alternative ways of meeting 
them, and estimating and presenting the costs and benefits of each option. Appraisal 
should therefore provide 'a framework for rational thought about the use of limited 
resources'(ibid.: 5). Cost-benefit analysis is not always appropriate in the case of 
the Structural Funds, which entail social objectives that are not easily expressed in 
money terms. Weighting and Scoring techniques have therefore been set out as one 
form of appraising ERDF projects. The various types of projects that come forward 
even within an Action Programme are very different. Weighting and scoring is 
devised to allow the comparison of'apples and pears', as a number of attributes of any 
given project are specified. In the case of the ERDF, the attributes of projects that are
particularly highly desired include the following: a high degree of integration with 
other ERDF assisted projects; linkage with other Structural Funds or loan instruments; 
the generation or protection of employment; a beneficial impact on the environment; 
and a strong relation to the objectives set out in the strategy. Scoring scales are then 
defined, and weights are designed to assess the importance of each of these attributes 
against each other, the relative importance of a unit change for a score in each 
criterion being indicated by the weight attached to that score. Among ERDF 
partnerships in Western Scotland, such a system now allows proposals to be ranked 
relative to each other. However, weighting and scoring obviously does not take the 
politics out of resource allocation.
Clearly, the idea of calculating a 'score' to judge the merits of 
competing projects risks giving a spurious objectivity to what is in 
reality a highly subjective judgement. The calculations depend upon 
the weightings applied to the various criteria - a process which is 
based on the subjective viewpoints of individuals... In actual fact, the 
whole scoring system is a means, not of assessing the worth of 
individual projects in a detached way, but of putting into practice the 
Commission's own objectives for the allocation of the ERDF 
(Croxford, Wise & Chalkley 1987:33-34).
Section 6.1.1 of the Western Scotland CSF document specified that the 
designated authority with overall responsibility for implementing the CSF (i.e. the 
Scottish Office) should propose methods for defining, selecting and implementing the 
projects to be financed under the CSF to the Monitoring Committee. At the CSF/IDO 
Monitoring Committee meeting held in Glasgow early in the life of the programme in 
September 1990, a paper entitled 'Method and Procedures for Defining, selecting and 
Implementing Individual Actions or Projects' was presented. It was stated that the 
criteria used to establish the development priority options in the first instance should 
be reflected in the criteria used for the selection of individual ERDF and ESF 
projects. Each project must demonstrate that it meets these criteria in the following 
ways: by having identified aims and objectives which are compatible with, and 
contribute to, those of the CSF, and, by complementing the goals of the IDO to 
maximise where possible the linkages between the use of ERDF and ESF. In addition 
to the specified criteria, consideration should be given to the expenditure profiles set 
out in the CSF and IDO documents, the contribution the project could be expected to 
make to meeting the IDO targets; and, where appropriate, to the relative priority 
accorded to the project by the project sponsor. Projects should therefore be 
considered by the relevant working groups in line with these criteria.
In short, an attempt has been made to make project selection more 
technocratic. Each of the advisory groups now operates a project ranking system 
elaborated with the assistance of the Programme Executive. Although the European 
Commission approves the ranking system, it does not participate in the actual 
advisory group meetings.
7.6 Reprise and Summary
As the final chapter of the case study o f Western Scotland, this chapter has 
considered the importance of project selection, the ultimate stage in the ERDF 
programming process there. The key argument made in this chapter is that the 
original programme document constitutes only a very incomplete agreement. The 
actual process of resource allocation at the regional level can not be tackled in the 
original contract, as the partners are not aware at the time of drawing up the 
programme the nature of the projects that will be submitted by project sponsors 
several years into the programme. This leaves considerable discretion at the regional 
level in interpreting the nature of the original agreement. It has been shown herein 
that central government uses this flexibility to re-direct the shape of the programme, 
after the initial agreement, away from expenditure priorities it opposes to those it 
favours. Consequently, the European Commission, seeking to limit this discretion, 
now insists on the development of transparent selection strategies.
The thrust of the European Commission's approach to programming and 
partnership is that it is not a sign of success simply to spend the money allocated to a 
region. Rather, the Commission seeks a strategic approach to resource allocation 
within the region, in that the partnership should prepare and implement a 'rational 
development strategy' maximising the output of the programme in economic 
development terms. The Commission's own 'mid-term review1 of structural policies 
maintained that the multi-annual planning technique was designed to induce the 
partners to adopt a 'strategic approach, resulting in greater selectiveness and 
coherence in the measures part-financed by the Community' (1992a: 24). By the 
Commission's own standards, however, 'this shift has not yet yielded the expected 
results’ (ibid.: 24). The Commission rehearsed its usual complaint that the 
programmes prepared by the partnerships did not pay sufficient attention to the 
• quantification of the objectives to be achieved. Consequently, at the project selection 
stage, resource allocation is driven primarily by what is eligible ’and is influenced by 
an a priori allocation of resources among financial instruments, instead of being 
focused on designing programmes made up of mutually-supporting measures defined 
in relation to specific objectives' (ibid.: 24).
Such findings have also been substantiated by academic accounts of the 
resource allocation process at the regional level:
When the focus of analysis is sharpened to see what is happening 
within the assisted areas, it becomes clear that much ERDF 
expenditure has been essentially 'ad hoc' and haphazard in nature.
Grants have gone to individual, often totally unconnected projects 
in a way which reflects varying levels of initiative and resources at 
local level rather than any coherent strategies of regional 
development (Wise & Croxford 1988: 169).
This seemingly erratic style of resource allocation is not surprising if, as Keating has 
suggested, 'development policy is not a rational, goal-oriented activity but a political 
process in which diverse goals compete and outcomes are complex and unique to 
localities' (forthcoming). Nevertheless, the European Commission has sought to 
impose some 'rationality' in the allocation of resources. To this extent, DG XVI desk- 
officers Tiave been drawn into the role of being the guardian of the rules rather than a 
partner in joint negotiations ... The difficulties arise because of the assumption that 
rules will provide certainty about what is or is not acceptable' (Tavistock Institute of 
Human Relations 1991: 15).
The final chapter of this thesis emphasises the applicability of the model of 
policy implementation as incomplete contracting to the case of ERDF programmes in 
Western Scotland. More importantly, it draws attention to the analytical insights 
provided by the model. This chapter has shown the relevance of the incompleteness of 
the incomplete contract. The flexibility necessarily built into the original agreement 
means that the final shape of the programme is malleable at numerous points, right up 
to the final selection of individual projects. From the perspective of the European 
Commission, it is therefore essential to align the incentives of actors in the region to 
respect the original terms of the contract. It has been suggested in this chapter that the 
promotion of a professional, technocratic approach to project selection is one way in 
which the Commission tries to ensure such motivation. In the conclusions which 
follow, some attention is paid to the wider means by which the European Commission 
can try 'to make the partnership principle work', thus shaping the final output of the 
programme in the process.
Chapter 8. Conclusions: Policy Implementation as Incomplete Contracting
As stated at the outset, the primary aim of this study has been to develop a 
model of policy implementation that illuminates the complexity of the ERDF 
partnership process and facilitates analysis of the role of the European Commission in 
implementation in this policy field. It is suggested that the model of policy 
implementation as incomplete contracting elaborated in chapter 2 provides a useful 
addition to the implementation studies literature. While chapters 3 and 4 analyse the 
evolution of the ERDF to assess the extent to which changes in the Regulations at the 
European level provided the European Commission with the tools to engage in direct 
exchanges with sub-national actors, the case study of Western Scotland employs the 
incomplete contracting model to analyse the nature of that exchange for a specific 
region. It is of course a truism that models in the field of policy analysis are 
themselves only ever incomplete. To repeat Rhodes’ observation, 'models in the social 
sciences are never wholly satisfactory. They are more or less useful' (1980: 312). It is 
obviously not suggested that the model developed in this thesis is unique in 
illuminating and explaining the complexity of the ERDF partnership process. 
Nevertheless, the concluding pages of this study are devoted to highlighting the extent 
to which the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting is a useful 
addition to the literature. What are the key features of the exchange relationship 
between the European Commission and domestic actors that are illuminated by the 
model?
This concluding chapter begins with a reminder of the importance attached to 
the Structural Funds at the European level itself. As the Funds have increased in size at 
the same time as the European Commission has progressively succeeded in re­
directing their role away from a purely compensatory function to the task of economic 
development, so the effectiveness of Community intervention has increasingly been 
scrutinised. This ’effectiveness’ is considered in Section 8.1. As well as seeking a 
concentration of resources on the most seriously disadvantaged regions, however, 
recent changes in the Structural Fund Regulations have also sought to increase the 
effectiveness of implementation arrangements in the regions themselves. Until now, 
there have been very few in-depth analyses of the nature of these arrangements for any 
specific region. The strengths of the model developed herein for this purpose are 
highlighted in Section 8.2. In short, this section demonstrates both the empirical 'fit' of 
the model, and its analytical value. The conclusions are then broadened out in Section 
83  which considers some general implications of this analysis for the implementation 
structures set up under the principle of partnership at the regional level. The study 
closes with some concluding remarks on the potential lessons of the incomplete
324
contracting model for students of the wider EC policy-making process. Given the 
open-ended character of much of the Community's legislation, agreements reached at 
the European level in other policy sectors may usefully be modelled as incomplete 
contracts between the European Commission and actors within the member states. It is 
with the 'effectiveness' of EC regional policy, however, that this chapter begins.
8.1 The ’Effectiveness’ of EC Regional Policy
The seemingly inexorable growth of the Structural Funds budget, and hence 
the relative importance of structural spending among European policies involving 
direct expenditure, were noted in the introductory chapter of this study. The reasons 
for this growth, whereby the Structural Funds will take up around a third of the total 
EU budget by 1999, lie in the logic of the horizontal negotiations between member 
states at the European level (McAleavey 1994). The logic of budgetary expansion has 
not been a focus of this study. However, as the size of the resources at the European 
Commission's disposal in this field have increased, so attention to the 'effectiveness' 
of such spending has intensified. Those member states which are net contributors to 
the budget (located primarily in northern Europe) increasingly call for evidence of the 
impact, and success, of structural spending in recipient member states (located 
primarily in southern Europe). As is widely acknowledged by policy analysts, 
however, the criteria of ’success' and 'failure' for most policies are notoriously vague 
and elusive (Lewis 1984). The concept of policy success can only be measured 
against objectives, but against whose objectives?
Pressman and Wildavsky (1973) taught an earlier generation of 
implementation researchers to reduce their expectations of policy performance. As 
suggested in chapter 2, Bardach perhaps took this pessimism to the extreme when he 
noted that 'even the most robust policy - one that is well designed to survive the 
implementation process - will go awry. The classic symptoms of underperformance, 
delay, and escalating costs are bound to appear* (1977: 5). In the case of the Structural 
Funds, the European Commission currently faces the fundamental problem of 
'absorption' in several southern member states. As the sheer volume of resources has 
increased, the capacity of these member states simply to spend the money 
(irrespective of the subjective quality of development schemes) has been pushed to 
the limit. This problem was recognised in a key Commission document on 
Community expenditure:
All in all, structural operations accounted for 27% of the Community 
budget in 1992 compared with 17% in 1987. Contrary to one of the 
main fears voiced at the time of the 1988 reform, practically all the 
appropriations available for the 1989-91 period have been taken up.
The outlook for 1992-93 is promising. This proves that the partnership 
built up with the regions and Member States is a method that works 
(European Commission 1992c: 9).
Does the simple ability to spend available resources really indicate that 
partnership is 'a method that works'0 Were it sufficient merely to spend the money, 
direct financial transfers between member state exchequers would provide a more 
efficient solution with reduced transaction costs. As suggested in chapter 3, this may 
indeed have been a more efficient (if controversial) solution to the issue of net budget 
contributions in the early 1970s. Derthick has' suggested, however, that the real 
objectives of a given policy, and the premises upon which it is based, may avoid 
scrutiny as long as the nature of the policy itself is 'ambiguous, inconsistent, obscure 
and paradoxical’ (quoted in Bolderson 1982: 289-301). To use the language of the 
garbage can model developed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972; 1976), the 'choice 
situation' may include policy choices which appeal simultaneously to politicians 
across the political spectrum and/or public officials from a variety of organisations.
In the case of Western Scotland, expenditure allocated to the region has 
generally been spent, with the exception of the earliest ERDF programme, (the 
Glasgow NPCI) which registered a large underspend. The utilisation of available 
resources certainly constitutes an element of 'success' for all the participants: central 
government has managed to 'draw down' the maximum possible level of ERDF 
finances for the region to the benefit of the Treasury; local partners have generally 
been able to secure a share of this expenditure, their ultimate reason for participating 
in the exchange; and, the European Commission has succeeded in spending its budget 
for the region. However, this 'successful outcome' need not necessarily bear any 
relation to the stated objectives of the regional development programme. Then again, 
as emphasised throughout this study, it can be argued that the stated objectives of the 
programme were (at least in the early years of the Fund) simply a screen behind which 
the true objective of budgetary compensation could be pursued. As Coates and 
Wallace (1984) concluded in their discussion of how European funds are spent in the 
UK, there may be no single judgement that can be offered about success: execution 
may be efficient, but so long as the wider purposes of the funds remain controversial 
or obscure there will be conflicting judgements about their effectiveness.
As shown in the empirical analysis presented herein, this ambiguity of policy 
objectives is a recipe for incremental policy development. The ERDF has gradually 
been focused more convincingly on its stated development objective, but only in a 
highly piecemeal fashion. Paraphrasing March and Olsen (1976), it was shown in 
Chapter 3 that DG XVI has sought to move the policy in its own desired direction, 
away from a purely compensatory role to a development fund assisting small business
competitiveness in disadvantaged regions. To this extent, DG XVTs actions support 
the claim that the European Commission often operates as a 'policy entrepreneur’, 
seeking 'windows of opportunity' through which to push preferred ideas and policy 
options (Majone 1994; cf. Eichener 1992; Dehousse & Majone 1993; Deeken 1994). 
However, as the ERDF is increasingly accepted as a tool for economic development, it 
is also now evaluated as such.1 The Regulations governing the implementation of the 
ERDF reaffirm the statement in Article BOA of the Single European Act, that through 
the funds, the 'Community shall aim at reducing disparities between the various 
regions and the backwardness of the least favoured regions’. At the most simplistic 
level, the ERDF has failed in this task.
In general terms, as the size of the Structural Funds budget has increased, 
regional disparities have widened, although this is obviously not to suggest that there 
is some causal link at work. Trends in regional disparities are extremely difficult to 
interpret-, not simply because successive enlargements of the EU have brought in new 
member states with differing regional economic profiles to existing members. 
Simplifying the picture greatly, the European Commission's own analysis suggests that 
there was a slight increase in regional disparities in terms of income (per capita GDP) 
in the Community in the early 1980s. The Fourth Periodic Report on the Social and 
Economic Situation and Development o f the Regions o f the Community in 1991 also 
found that these disparities remained roughly constant through the later 1980s. The 
same decade saw a pronounced widening of disparities in levels of employment in 
various parts of the Community as the spatial effect of the decline in manufacturing 
industry became apparent (European Commission 1991e). One widely cited fact is that 
regional disparities in income per head in the European Community remain at least 
twice those in the USA (House of Lords 1992: 7). The Fifth Periodic Report on the 
Social and Economic Situation and Development o f the Regions o f the Community 
published in 1994 began by stating that 'the economic situation confronting the regions
1 One Commission official at a Conference of the European Regions of Industrial Technology (RETI) in 
Florence on 22 September 1994 urged delegates to provide information with which the Commission 
could show the success of Structural Fund Programmes: 1 think that the Commission, the member 
states, the regions and local participants in the effort must be able to demonstrate in respect of pre­
determined, quantitative objectives the quality of the programmes. We have to ensure quality and we 
have to prove it. We need to be able to show that the cohesion effort is more than just the result of a 
political deal and more than just an act offaith ... Let us know more also in Brussels about your 
success stories ... Send us slides and photographs, send us diskettes, send us anything you like which we 
can use to show to the eternal sceptics that this work is not only politically necessary but economically 
useful.
2 Some controversy exists in the analysis of trends in regional disparities in western Europe over recent 
decades. Leonardi finds evidence of'constant and significant convergence in levels of economic and 
social cohesion in the Community and within nation states during the last 40 years' (1993: 492). Hooghe 
and Keating, however, convincingly argue that Leonardi's methodology is very much open to challenge 
and cite a range of more sophisticated analyses which show the complexity of the true picture (1994: 
388-389). The European Commission's own analysis of trends in regional disparities does not support 
Leonardi's interpretation.
of the Community in 1993/94 could scarcely be more different from that which 
prevailed when the Commission produced the previous Periodic Report at the end of 
1990' (European Commission 1994a: 9). By the mid-1990s, the Community's economy 
was at the end of a relatively deep recession, and disparities in regional unemployment 
rates had widened further. At the same time, a new set of challenges (including the 
prospect of economic and monetary union, further enlargement of the EU, and new 
trading relationships with the states of Eastern Europe) seemed likely to increase the 
pressure yet further on weaker regional economies.
The drive towards economic and monetary union (EMU) in particular indicates 
the secondary role of regional policy in the EC. EMU will not be achieved, or will not 
be sustainable, in the absence of a real convergence between the member states in 
terms of national budgetary deficits and price inflation. In the broad policy agenda of 
the Community, the cohesion effort, in the sense of achieving ’an acceptable degree of 
real disparities’ as indicated by regional GDP per head or unemployment levels, is a 
related but secondary concern (House of Lords 1992: 7). Since the earliest days of the 
Fund, DG XVI has acknowledged the role of the ERDF as an ’accompanying measure’, 
a tool to soften the regional impact of the main EC policies rather than the leading 
edge of a wider policy aimed at balanced regional growth across the Community. The 
first annual report on the ERDF insisted that ’the correction of regional disparities 
requires that regional policy should be seen as the geographically-oriented element in 
an overall structural policy requiring the co-ordination of all Community general and 
sector policies and financial instruments, which should in their turn be closely 
coordinated with national policies and measures affecting the regions' (European 
Commission 1976a: 25-26). It is debatable whether the objective of balanced regional 
development has been recognised as the central task of the ERDF itself, let alone as a 
key objective of the wide range of EC policies. As well as insisting that the ERDF did 
not constitute EC regional policy on its own, the first annual report also emphasised 
that its small size meant that it would have little impact on regional disparities:
It must be stressed at the outset that the European Regional 
Development Fund is not to be confused with Community regional 
policy. It is but one instrument of that policy, though, for the present at 
least, one of the most important. The Fund alone, especially at its 
present size, cannot bring about the structural changes necessary to 
bring the regional imbalances in the Community within acceptable 
limits (European Commission 1976a: 5).
However, how large would the budget need to be to bring disparities 'within 
acceptable limits'? More importantly, how are 'acceptable limits' of inequality 
determined within a political community? After looking for lessons in the literature of
'fiscal federalism', one official from DG II (Economic and Financial Affairs) has 
concluded that 'specific intervention to promote inter-regional equity is a recurrent 
bone of contention in most if not all economic unions since its scale and distribution 
are largely matters of political choice' (Reichenbach 1994: 206). Against this 
backdrop, assessments of the effectiveness of Community regional policy are difficult 
to approach. When faced with scepticism over the results of structural intervention, 
the European Commission can always resort to the untestable assertion that, in the 
absence of Structural Fund support, inter-regional disparities would have been even 
worse.
Given the difficulty of demonstrating the 'effectiveness' of the ERDF and the 
Structural Funds in general, many authors have questioned the rationale of European 
Commission involvement in regional economic development policy. The first report 
of the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Communities dealing with 
the ERDF explored this question, pointing in particular to the importance of 
Commission involvement on cross-border schemes (1977: 16). Pinder points to 
competition between regions for mobile growth, therefore identifying a need for 
policy harmonisation at the European level to prevent competitive out-bidding for 
investment (1983: 74). Armstrong provides a detailed analysis of the assignment of 
regional policy powers in the Community and concludes that several criteria 
(including 'democratic control') favour member state control, while various 'spillover 
criteria', financial transfer and co-ordination criteria all favour Commission 
involvement (1983; cf. Vanhove & Klaassen 1987: 394-401). The debate is not 
considered in this study. Rather, it is simply acknowledged that the ERDF began its 
life as a political compromise. Derthick's suggestion that the greater the number of 
objectives pursued, the less likely a policy is to come under severe scrutiny in terms 
of its stated objectives, has been supported herein. The ERDFs initial task of 
budgetary redistribution, which remains important, guarantees its existence in the 
gambit of European policies. As suggested throughout this study, however, the 
European Commission has sought to carve out a role in regional economic 
development behind the seemingly intergovernmental screen.
The European Commission has consistently stressed the long-term nature of 
the problems facing regional economies, and hence the need for related policies to be 
conceived in a similarly long-term perspective (European Commission 1991e: 15). 
The aim of the reform of the Structural Funds was not just to concentrate the actions 
of the Funds on a limited number of priority objectives, but also 'to establish a new 
approach to implementation and management (ibid.: 53). This latter may also be a 
necessarily long-term process. And yet, the European Commission has sought to 
guide the implementation of programmes. The model developed to consider the
extent to which the European Commission has been successful in this respect, and the 
broader findings of the research project on Commission involvement at the regional 
level, should now be summarised.
8.2 The Model of Implementation as Incomplete Contracting
As suggested in chapter 2, implementation research could benefit from some 
additional 'assistance in rendering theoretically sensible the important issues that are 
the subjects of investigation' (O'Toole 1993" 28). This is not to imply that 
implementation research as it stands is fatally flawed, or that analysis hitherto has 
been superficial. On the contrary, both top-down and bottom-up approaches have 
provided key insights into the nature of the implementation process in contemporary 
polities. The inevitability of policy adaptation and change through implementation is 
now widely accepted by policy analysts, irrespective of whether this change derives 
from the inability of top-level actors to structure tightly enough the implementation 
process, or from the unavoidable discretion enjoyed by local level actors whose 
interests are not necessarily aligned with those of top-level actors. Nevertheless, the 
persistence of top-down and bottom-up differences between analysts has contributed 
to the loss of momentum sustained by implementation research in recent years 
(Goggin, Bowman, Lester & OToole 1990). In the case of European Community 
policy-making and implementation, the dramatic increase in legislation at the 
European level has not been matched by a corresponding focus in the field of policy 
analysis on the difficulties of implementing European policies, despite the obvious 
problems of control faced by the European Commission in this respect. The model 
developed herein aims to build on the complementary insights of both the top-down 
and bottom-up approaches and provide a conceptual framework wherein the key 
concerns of each approach can be integrated.
In the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting developed in 
this thesis, the primary methodological innovation is a shift in the unit of analysis. 
Under the top-down approach to policy implementation, the main focus of analysis is 
on the ex-ante legal and political structuring of the implementation process by top- 
level actors. When a policy decision is under preparation, how clearly are its 
objectives stated? Is the policy based upon an accurate causal theory? How can the 
compliance of implementing officials and target groups be enhanced by legal means? 
Under the bottom-up approach, the main focus of analysis is on the ex-post 
motivations of local-level actors, given the inevitable discretion such actors enjoy in 
executing policy decisions. In the framework developed herein, the starting point is 
the adoption of an exchange-based conceptualisation of power. Given the discretion
enjoyed by lower-level actors in situations of multi-organisational policy-making, and 
the undisputed access of higher-level actors to greater political resources, the 
relationship between participants in the policy field is conceptualised as an exchange. 
Under such a relationship, the actors at the higher territorial level allow lower-level 
actors to influence 'public decisional' and implementation processes, in exchange for 
the tatter's consent to the former (Parri 1989; 1990). Under the incomplete contracting 
model of policy implementation, the main focus of analysis becomes the exchange 
between the various actors involved in the relationship.
One immediate conceptual advantage of the incomplete contracting model is 
that it does not make the assumption that either the ex-ante phase of preparing a 
policy decision, or the ex-post phase of executing that policy decision should be given 
greater analytical attention than the other. Rather, the exchange relationship between 
actors covers both the ex-ante preparation and ex-post execution phases. The 
contracting approach of Oliver Williamson teaches that co-ordination and motivation 
are mutually important tasks under any form of economic organisation. Given that the 
information required to determine the best use of scarce resources is highly localised 
and dispersed, the actions of various actors must be co-ordinated to form a coherent 
contract. However, plans are not self-executing and require that all actors must be 
motivated in accordance with the terms of the contract. Bargaining cannot be 
concentrated in either the ex-ante phase (as top-down approaches often suggest), or in 
the ex-post phase (as bottom-up approaches suggest), but is a continuing feature of 
the entire exchange relationship. In this way, the model of incomplete contracting 
provides a valuable conceptual tool by which to integrate the temporal foci of both 
top-down and bottom-up approaches.
In the conceptual language developed in chapter 2, any exchange relationship 
is governed by a contract. This contract need not be an explicit legal document, but 
may simply involve the implicit recognition by participants in an exchange 
relationship that the relationship is somehow in their interests, and hence that their 
behaviour can be co-ordinated in ways that are mutually beneficial (Milgrom & 
Roberts 1992: 127). It was suggested in the empirical analysis presented above that 
the actors in the ERDF policy implementation process have voluntarily entered into 
such a relationship, which in this specific instance is governed by a written contract in 
the shape of a regional development programme. In conceptual terms, however, what 
is it about the exchange between the actors that is relevant to implementation 
analysis? Three key elements of the exchange were sketched as central to the 
analytical model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting: the level of 
complexity and uncertainty of what performance will be required; the asset specificity 
of the resources brought to the exchange by each participant; and the frequency of the
exchanges or the duration of the exchange relationship. Each of these, and the 
questions they highlight, should be summarised in turn.
(i) Complexity and Uncertainty The complexity of designing agreements to 
achieve economic and/or political aims, combined with the uncertainty about the 
conditions that will prevail when a contract is being executed make it impossible, or 
at best extremely expensive, to determine ex-ante what should be done in even 
possible contingency (Milgrom & Roberts 1992: 32). This problem derives from the 
bounded rationality of real actors: policy makers are not omniscient. To repeat 
Majone and Wildavsky's suggestion, implementation can never spring be pre­
programmed and so something must be left to chance (1979). Instead of incurring the 
expense of seeking to draw up a complete contract, pre-programmed for all 
eventualities, participants in an exchange relationship may settle for a relational 
contract. Such contracts essentially represent an agreement that frames the entire 
relationship. Broad goals and objectives are agreed, rather than detailed plans of 
action. Rather than contemplating what to do under every contingency, the contract 
stipulates only the criteria to be used in deciding what to do should unforeseen 
contingencies arise, as well as the mechanisms for resolving disputes should any 
occur. In general terms, the level of complexity and uncertainty illustrate the extent to 
which contracts can only ever be incomplete. The model of policy implementation as 
incomplete contracting therefore prescribes a focus on the level of complexity 
inherent in, and the level of uncertainty surrounding, any exchange.
The complexity of aligning the interests and actions of a multiplicity of actors 
in the preparation of a regional development programme was shown in the case of 
Western Scotland. Each partner, with its own decision-making procedures and 
strategic priorities, is committed to a regional development contract which seeks to 
operate in the interests of all 140 or so participants. Simultaneously, the contract must 
be flexible enough to respond to unfolding economic circumstances. As a result, the 
actors in Western Scotland have entered into a relational contract which specifies the 
broad goals they are seeking to achieve to their mutual benefit, but leaves some 
flexibility in the choice of measures to reach these goals. The model therefore focuses 
on the extent to which flexible procedures are built into the contract at the ex-ante 
stage, and how each participant seeks to influence those procedures. It also focuses on 
the 'rules of the game' set out under such procedures, to assess who is given the task of 
deciding what to do should the original contract require amendment.
(ii) Asset Specificity Another dimension of the exchange highlighted by the 
model of incomplete contracting is the extent to which the resources brought to the 
exchange by individual actors are specific to that exchange. As Williamson suggests, 
'specialized assets cannot be redeployed without sacrifice of productive value if
contracts should be interrupted or prematurely terminated', while general purpose 
resources do not pose the same difficulties (1985: 54). This observation highlights a 
number of aspects of the exchange which are relevant to the incomplete contracting 
model of implementation. Most simply, what are the resources brought to the 
exchange by each partner? These can take the form of physical assets (such as 
buildings and technical support), locational assets (such as information on local 
economic circumstances), or human assets (such as knowledge, expertise and 
experience). The extent to which these assets are specific to the exchange (i.e. they 
cannot be redeployed elsewhere) is of great significance. The higher the level of asset 
specificity of a resource, the greater the likelihood that the actor providing that 
resource will seek to frame a contract that guarantees some return to investment.
In the case of ERDF programme implementation in Western Scotland, each 
partner has been required to increase the level of officials' expertise in the 
programming process in recent years as the complexity of that process has risen. In 
many ways, this asset is specific to the Structural Funds given the lack of domestic 
economic development planning in the UK. The creation of specific posts within 
local organisations with the sole task of increasing the share of Structural Fund 
assistance attracted to that organisation is an example of asset specific investment that 
at first sight seems likely to increase the pursuit of an organisational rationale by that 
actor within the implementation structure. As suggested in the following section, 
however, the creation of a corps of professionals engaged in the implementation of 
the programme may indirectly shape the motivations of the local partnership in the 
direction of the programme rationale.
From the European Commission’s perspective, the most significant resources 
brought to the exchange by local actors are the provision of the local economic data 
required to prepare a co-ordinated development programme for the region, and the 
supply of local projects which the European Commission wishes to co-finance within 
the framework of that programme. As shown for Western Scotland, the European 
Commission (and central government) was dependent upon Strathclyde Regional 
Council bringing forward sufficient numbers of eligible projects between 1975 and 
the early 1990s so that the ERDF budget for the region could be spent ('drawn down'). 
The extent to which the European Commission could turn to other major actors in the 
region to provide such project proposals was limited: those actors which did exist did 
not have the resources required to bring forward the required number of suitable 
projects. With the creation of Scottish Enterprise, however, the European 
Commission's dependence on the Regional Council was relaxed to the extent that it 
could then turn to the Enterprise Network as a major partner providing projects which 
the Commission was willing to co-finance.
(iii) Frequency and Duration o f Exchanges The frequency and duration of an 
exchange are further crucial dimensions, not sufficiently emphasised in other 
approaches to the study of policy implementation. In one-off agreements, partners to 
the exchange are unlikely to design separate contractual arrangements to govern the 
relationship. Any disputes can simply be resolved by legal means. However, when 
partners interact frequently, or the exchange lasts for a significant period of time, it is 
more likely that some form of contractual arrangement will be designed specific to 
that relationship. When asset specificity is high, the continuation of the relationship 
itself is valued by participants. Special purpose institutions, tailored to the particular 
requirements of the relationship, may thus emerge to improve the efficiency of the 
exchange and reduce the costs of resolving disputes. More importantly, parties 
involved in a long relationship with frequent interactions can develop understandings 
and routines to reduce the need for explicit contracting arrangements (Milgrom & 
Roberts 1992: 31). In this way, the model of incomplete contracting highlights the 
extent to which a sense of trust, mutual commitments and shared values can develop 
through the contracting relationship.
In the case of Western Scotland, the Strathclyde IDO Programme Executive 
was identified as a special purpose institution that has facilitated the programming of 
ERDF expenditure in the region. As a nominally 'independent' actor, which does not 
itself spend ERDF finances, the Executive has earned the trust of the partnership over 
the six years in which it has been in existence. The Executive stands at the centre of 
an emerging community of expertise in the use of Community funds in Western 
Scotland. As this level of trust and expertise increases (founded largely on the basis of 
the perceived independence of the Executive), so the burden of the ex-ante 
programming procedure may be reduced as the Commission requires only a looser 
specification of proposed actions. However, as shown in chapter 6, as central 
government seeks to re-central ise control over programme management through the 
new 'Joint Management Board' supervising the Executive, so the trust generated by 
the Executive will gradually be eroded. As the perceived independence of the body is 
compromised, so the local actors will become less willing to place their trust in the 
Executive.
Together, these questions of asset specificity, complexity/uncertainty, and 
frequency/duration highlight the key dimensions of the exchange. The incomplete 
contracting model thereby illuminates the nature of the exchange relationship created 
under the regional implementation structure. As well as focusing on formal 
characteristics of the structure (such as the broad rules of the game, the resources 
provided by individual actors, and ex-ante attempts to try to ensure compliance), the 
model also highlights the motivations of local actors, the possibility of opportunistic
behaviour, and the importance of the interactions of those actually involved in policy 
execution at the local level. In this way, the model provides a conceptual framework 
within which the valuable and complementary insights of both the top-down and the 
bottom-up approaches can be integrated.
A wider question highlighted by the model of policy implementation as 
incomplete contracting is the nature of the governance structures created to ensure the 
execution of the contract. In other words, what is the nature of the implementation 
structure? How does that structure seek to provide flexibility to respond to unfolding 
economic circumstances, but, at the same time facilitate the monitoring of actions to 
ensure conformity with the terms of the contract? In addition, the asset specificity of 
resources brought to the exchange by partners will shape their attitude to 
participation, while the frequency and duration of the exchange will shape the extent 
to which trust has been built into the institutional arrangements. Adopting the 
European Commission perspective (in contrast to the vast majority of contemporary 
analyses of the Structural Funds), this study has sought to answer the following 
central research question: what is the nature of the governance structures that the 
European Commission has been able to fashion at the regional level in its attempt to 
shape the implementation of the incomplete contract over the course of the 
programme in order to pursue its own objectives?
The incomplete contracting model developed in chapter 2 and summarised 
above provides a useful means by which to answer this central research question. As 
highlighted by the model, the ability to shape the ex-ante preparation o f a contract 
must be accompanied by the capacity to shape the incentives and motivations o f 
lower-level actors in the ex-post bargaining process. The contention that the shift 
over time in the use of ERDF resources away from projects supporting capital- 
financed hardware, towards projects supporting revenue-financed software (long 
resisted by central government in the UK) indicates the increasing capacity of the 
European Commission to shape the overall priorities of the development programme, 
is supported by the data presented on the case of Western Scotland. However, it has 
also been shown that discretion is inevitable given the impossibility (and 
undesirability) of preparing a 'complete contract'; hence, central government in the 
UK is able to use this flexibility to re-direct expenditure after the approval of the 
programme back towards hardware measures (as shown in chapter 7). This supports 
both the contention that the final shape of the EC-funded regional development 
'contract' is malleable at a multitude of points, and that the European Commission 
enjoys relatively greater direct discretion in preparing the contract than in ensuring its 
priorities are respected. The means by which the European Commission can seek to
shape indirectly the ex-post implementation of the contract are summarised in the 
following section 8.3.
The model developed herein also highlights other key data from the case study 
of Western Scotland to support several of the working hypotheses sketched in the 
introductory chapter. The working hypothesis that the European Commission is 
highly constrained in its ability to prepare regional development programmes on its 
own is clearly supported in the case study. Following from this, the technocratic 
importance of the partnership principle to the European Commission in its aim to 
prepare co-ordinated regional programmes focused on economic development (rather 
than budgetary redistribution between member states, or regional political 
mobilisation within member states) has also been demonstrated. The increased 
number of participants in the programming procedure has clearly introduced a wider 
range of organisational objectives into the implementation structure at the regional 
level. Most obviously, the recent participation of Scottish Enterprise has increased the 
supply of software schemes at the local level, facilitating the Commission's objective 
of reducing the share of expenditure devoted to infrastructure, but also increasing the 
competition for funds among the partnership. The extent to which the European 
Commission is able to shape indirectly the motivations of local actors and hence 
reduce the likelihood of ex-post opportunism is the focus of the following section.
83 Making the Partnership Principle Work
This section presents some general normative conclusions on what might be 
done to ensure that the partnership principle operates more effectively. The words 
’more effectively' should not, however, set alarm bells ringing in the mind of the 
reader. It is accepted that economic development is an inherently untidy process of 
political choices, and indeed, it is argued throughout this thesis that the objectives of 
such policy are of a highly ambiguous nature. Paraphrasing Lindblom, the politics of 
European regional development policy are not for curing. At this late stage, the study 
does not fall into the trap of believing that every problem has a solution. As stressed 
in the introductory chapter, this thesis constitutes first and foremost an analysis o f 
policy, rather than an analysis for policy. Nevertheless, it behoves such an in-depth 
study of implementation as this is to use the tools of policy analysis to venture some 
indications of the way in which the regional partnerships might evolve. This section 
seeks to make such recommendations without resorting to dry, technocratic analysis 
with little recognition of the fundamentally political environment of European 
regional development policy.
The obvious question to raise at this point is to ask for whom the partnership 
principle should be made to work more effectively? In other words, if the partners at 
the regional level bring a range of distinct political and organisational objectives to 
the partnership fora, as has been argued above, then 'more effective' performance of 
the partnership may have different implications for each partner. In line with the 
perspective adopted throughout this study, these prescriptive conclusions are 
presented from the European Commission's viewpoint. For DG XVI, the success of an 
Objective 2 regional development programme should ultimately be measured in the 
economic terms of a decline in unemployment in the region as new, stable jobs are 
created, and the broader development of a diversified regional economy with 
strengths in innovative and competitive economic sectors. In organisational terms, at 
a minimum the European Commission requires that the multiplicity of actors 
involved in the implementation of the regional development programme must have 
contributed to the development of a co-ordinated strategy, and that their participation 
in the implementation structure is guided by a programme rationale while 
organisational objectives are secondary. How can the European Commission 
encourage the development of such an implementation structure?
It should be stressed that the strategies open to the European Commission in 
developing the partnership principle are primarily indirect and informal. The 
principle, as set out in the Regulations, leaves a great deal of discretion in the hands 
of the relevant member state to determine how the partnerships should be organised. 
As stressed in earlier chapters, the European Commission cannot change the legal or 
administrative structures of the member states. More importantly, it has been shown 
herein, from statements of the European Commissioner responsible for regional 
policy to the DG XVI internal handbook for desk-officers, that the European 
Commission has no desire to change such structures. Rather, as the Commission 
wants to build a sense of partnership with regional actors, it seeks to avoid legal 
remedies that might jeopardise working relationships. The European Commission 
therefore simply works with the administrative structures it finds within member 
states, but seeks indirectly to change the behaviour of the regional actors within them. 
From the Commission perspective, making the partnership principle work effectively 
can be viewed as a typical principal-agent problem. According to principal-agent 
theory, political control can be facilitated if political principals have the freedom to 
select their agents and impose an incentive structure on their behaviour. Although the 
European Commission has only a limited capacity to select its own agents (given the 
asset specificity of the resources brought to the exchange by key local actors), it 
clearly seeks to shape the incentives of those actors. In other words, the Commission
identifies ways in which to motivate the partners in line with the terms of the 
contract.
Although difficult to conceptualise in social scientific terms, virtually all 
interviewees identified the human dimension as extremely important in the effective 
implementation of regional development programmes. The programme manager of 
the Dutch South Limburg ERDF development programme has argued particularly 
forcefully that any programme should take the form of a development contract 
between a wide range of authorities, but that promotion of the programme is 
necessary to remind the partners of their obligations as well as the opportunities of the 
programme. Consequently, although a coherent programme, ample resources, and 
professional guidance are all important, the key requirement is an adequate level of 
human skills:
A good working relationship with Brussels as well as with the national 
government agencies involved [influences effectiveness]. We need 
formal structures - where none existed originally - but these depend on 
people. It is important to have the right people involved' ... 'the 
Programme management role is important. Ideally we need a 
'workaholic', an enthusiastic programme leader supported by 
politicians. The human aspects are veiy important. The programme 
needs human skills [emphasis in original] (Broos 1991: paras. 5b; 5e).
The 'human dimension' of partnership is one factor that the European Commission 
can influence indirectly. This can be conceptualised not just in the technocratic sense 
of promoting expertise, but also as the evolution of reputation effects and trust. 
Toonen's general contention that it is sometimes easier to adopt Community 
procedures in the absence of a standing policy organisation (1992: 109) can be 
falsified in the case of ERDF programme implementation in the UK, as it does not 
recognise the fact that pre-existing structures and working relationships may facilitate 
trust between domestic actors.
Trust is of crucial importance in developing an effective partnership 
procedure. As Mutti has suggested, the irreducible existence of uncertainty, 
ambiguity and interpretative manipulation in the rules of political exchange', can only 
in part be contained by greater ex-ante specification and formalisation (1990: 201). In 
other words, truly effective complete contracts are virtually impossible to prepare. 
However, as suggested in chapter 2 above, the existence of trust 'makes it unnecessary 
to resort to excessive formalization and detailed specification of the rules of the 
exchange', and therefore makes the entire process of political exchange potentially 
more elastic, dynamic and wider* (ibid.: 210). Mutti provides a wide-ranging 
definition and account of the role of trust in political exchange relationships, but it is
the work of Milgrom and Roberts which is again particularly useful in this respect. 
They use the language of contracting to suggest that an important adjunct to 
incomplete written contracts are the unarticulated but (presumably) shared 
expectations that the parties have concerning the relationship' (1992: 132). These 
shared expectations can be understood as implicit contracts, and the authors give the 
example of corporate culture as an illustration of the extent to which shared and 
commonly understood expectations can economise on bounded rationality and 
contracting costs. Corporate culture, understood as 'a shared set of values, ways of 
thinking, and beliefs about how things should be'done’, is not normally captured in a 
written document or even stated orally, yet it can be a powerful guide to determining 
the action to take under unexpected contingencies (1992: 132). How can such a sense 
of shared values be instilled among the regional partnerships implementing ERDF 
development programmes?
It should again be stressed that a co-operative culture of problem-solving 
cannot be enforced legally. On the contrary, recourse to legal remedies might cause a 
severe deterioration in the contracting relationship. This point has been emphasised 
by Majone, who also stresses the importance of trust in facilitating co-operation, 
simplifying transactions and tapping the resources of knowledge and experience 
accumulated by other actors: trust, and the reputation system upon which trust is 
based, are essential to sustaining co-operation in a world of self-interested 
individuals, and 'for governing contractual relations more complex than simple spot- 
market transactions' (1995: 1). The costs of organising, implementing and monitoring 
collective decisions are greatly increased if the parties to the agreement do not trust 
each other, but 'unfortunately, the current debate on this issue tends to be legalistic, 
and seems to assume that trust can be elicited by preaching or imposed by judicial 
fiat' (ibid.: 2). On the contrary, 'mutual trust and credible commitments cannot be 
achieved by ... legal obligations, but only by changing the motivations of all the 
relevant actors' (ibid.: 18). The European Commission should seek to shape these 
dimensions of the contract.
Trust is vital for a system as complex as the regional partnerships 
implementing ERDF programmes. The contracts themselves call for a recognition of 
the common purpose of the partners, and the repeated references by interviewees and 
in official documents to the importance of common ownership of the programme 
emphasise the importance of shared values. The Commission can seek to promote this 
trust in three indirect, but closely inter-related ways: through the assurance of 
continuity over time; by supporting the political independence of key implementing 
bodies; and through the promotion of professional networking schemes. These should 
be considered in turn.
(i) Continuity over Time The importance of the frequency and duration of the 
exchange relationship is a key dimension of the model of incomplete contracting 
developed in this study. The allocation of Structural Fund resources at the regional 
level is not simply a one-shot, zero-sum game in which the incentives for partners to 
co-operate are minimal. On the contrary, decisions form part of an inter-related set of 
decisions taken by the partnership which are repeated over time. The importance of 
iteration in allowing co-operation to emerge is a noted feature of the game theoretic 
literature: the evolution of co-operation requires that individuals have a sufficiently 
large chance to meet again so that they have'a stake in their future interaction' 
(Axelrod 1984: 20). Were the Structural Fund resources for a five year period for a 
given region to be allocated in a one-off meeting of the partnership, not only would 
this be suboptimal in the sense that there would be very little flexibility to respond to 
unfolding circumstances, but there would also be little incentive for the partners to 
co-operate at such a meeting which could conceivably degenerate into a naked, value- 
claiming exercise with little reference to the goals of the contract. By contrast, regular 
partnership meetings take place over the course of a multi-annual development 
programme and, in the case of Western Scotland, a series of specialised working 
groups have evolved under the guidance of the Programme Executive. It should also 
be noted that the post of Programme Director has been held by the same official since 
the creation of the Executive in 1989, while the DG XVI desk-officer for the region 
has been in post since the negotiation of the Glasgow NPCI. From the European 
Commission perspective, this continuity should be encouraged. Maintaining the 
responsibility of a desk-officer over a number of years not only allows that official to 
build up considerable practical experience and detailed knowledge of the specified 
region, but also allows a sense of trust to evolve between the partnership and the 
geographically distant DG XVI in Brussels.
Milgrom and Roberts have emphasised the importance of time in the 
evolution of implicit contracts, such as trust and shared values. They suggest that 
under any system of relational contracting, governing the broad exchange 
relationship, implicit contracts 'set expectations and establish decision processes to 
deal with the inevitable unforeseen circumstances while avoiding some of the 
difficulties of writing explicit detailed contracts' (1992: 139). The longer the time 
horizon over which similar interactions will occur, the greater the incentive to build 
and maintain a positive reputation. In the case of Objective 2 programme 
partnerships, an actor's concern with reputation can be an effective check on 
opportunistic behaviour. Milgrom and Roberts would therefore prescribe that where 
an issue arises of which party should have the discretion to direct activities when 
unforeseen events occur, this should be the one 'with most to lose from a damaged
reputation. This is likely to be the one with the longer horizon, the more visibility, the 
greater size, and the greater frequency of transactions' (1992: 140). Applying this 
prescription to the regional partnership in Western Scotland, the Programme 
Executive should be empowered to direct activities under such circumstances. This, 
however, is a prescription and not a prediction. Empirical analysis has shown that 
central government actually retains a great deal of control over the partnership, and is 
indeed increasing its direct supervision of the Executive's activities. Some of the 
implications of this re-centralisation can be considered under the following heading 
of political independence. ~
(ii) Greater Political Independence Majone (1993a; 1995) has considered the 
potential importance of 'political independence' in the realm of regulatory policy­
making in the EC. The fear that national governments may use regulatory tools 
strategically, to pursue short-term political advantages rather than regulatory 
objectives is arguably the main source of mutual distrust and lack of policy 
credibility':
The way out of this dilemma is to grant more independence to national 
... regulators so that their commitment to a set of objectives decided at 
the European level is not compromised by domestic political 
considerations or by ministerial interference. Independence changes the 
motivation of regulators whose reputation now depends more on their 
ability to achieve the objectives assigned to their agencies than on their 
political skills. With independence, a problem-solving style of policy­
making tends to replace the more traditional bargaining style (Majone 
1995: 19-20).
This lesson from regulatory experience has some relevance for the case of 
ERDF implementation at the regional level examined in this study. The Programme 
Executive in Western Scotland endeavours to assure the partnership that its 
organisational aim is to promote the goals of the programme, thereby operating in the 
best interests of all participating actors. As suggested throughout this analysis, the 
Executive has been able to fulfil its tasks and gain the widespread trust of the 
partnership only because it has been seen as an independent body. Brunskill (1992: 
14) identified some of the positive features of the 'working gap' in the Executive's 
accountability. However, the creation of the Joint Management Board at central 
government's instigation has been perceived as an attempt to re-establish control over 
the Executive and therefore endangers some of the trust built up by the body. In terms 
of facilitating policy-leaming and developing a co-operative approach to programme 
implementation, the 'independence' of the Executive should be strengthened and not 
compromised. The broad significance of such special purpose institutions, tailored to
the specific circumstances of the exchange relationship, is a key lesson of the 
contracting approach.
(iii) Networking The development of professional networks of policy 
implemented within the region, within the member state, and transnational^, 
potentially offers one of the most fruitful means by which the European Commission 
can indirectly strengthen the partnership principle and increase commitment to 
programme objectives. It can be shown empirically that the European Commission 
places great emphasis on professional networking in many policy sectors in an 
attempt to shape the incentive structure within which member state actors operate 
Again drawing lessons from the realm of EC regulatory policies, Majone suggests that 
the European Commission should play a key role in facilitating and co-ordinating the 
work of EU regulatory networks of officials employed in the same policy area, since 
'such regulatory networks serve a variety of useful functions, including the exchange 
of information and the comparative evaluation of new policy ideas and instruments' 
(1995: 22; Rose 1993). More importantly, however, such team work allows credibility 
to develop whereby the regulator has an incentive to maintain his or her reputation in 
the eyes of fellow regulators within the network.
Using the terms developed by March and Olsen in their 1989 study 
Rediscovering Institutions, the promotion of professional networking can be viewed 
as an attempt to shift the behaviour of institutional actors from the 'logic of 
consequentiality' to the 'logic of appropriateness'. In other words, the development of 
a professional community with its own norms of behaviour may facilitate the 
promotion of action based 'more on identifying the normatively appropriate behaviour 
than on calculating the return expected from alternative choices' (1989: 22). If the 
sense of a professional community of ERDF project sponsors and programme 
managers is developed at the regional level, then it is less likely that partners will 
shun co-operative behaviour in favour of post-contractual opportunism. Actions are 
more likely to be determined by what seems to be appropriate when partners are 
judged by peers who value professional contributions to programme objectives.
Directorate-General XVI of the European Commission has undertaken a 
number of initiatives to promote networks of programme managers and project 
sponsors involved in the implementation of ERDF schemes. Most obviously, at the 
regional level the partnership principle itself seeks to promote such co-operation. 
Also at the regional level, the availability of technical assistance' through the multi­
annual programmes is partly designed to encourage regular technical seminars among 
the partners. At the member state level, DG XVI has on occasion invited all the UK 
Objective 2 partnerships to Brussels at the same time to participate in technical 
seminars there. Most interestingly, however, the European Commission is currently
seeking to set up a regular course for programme managers from all eligible member 
states. In a press release in January 1994, the European Commission announced a 
training programme for managers of Structural Fund actions in the member states. 
The Commission selected a number of transnational pilot projects to train officials 
from local and regional governments responsible for the implementation of schemes 
in the framework of the Structural Fluids. This training, or formation de développeurs 
communautaires, is designed to assist officials in drawing up, managing and 
monitoring schemes within the framework of CSFs. It can be concluded that regular 
contacts between programme implemented from different member states increases 
the sense of a professional esprit de corps and places a premium on the value of 
professional credibility and reputation.
Together, the importance of continuity over time, freedom from political 
interference, and professional networking offer indirect means by which the European 
Commission can seek to improve the effectiveness of regional partnerships. The focus 
on the 'human dimension' of programme implementation is an unavoidable 
consequence of the Commission's inability to alter directly the structures within 
which this behaviour takes place. This section has sought to provide some conceptual 
tools with which to emphasise the importance of the human dimension identified by 
interviewees. The final section of this thesis considers the potentially wider lessons of 
the model of policy implementation as incomplete contracting for students of the 
wider EC policy-making process.
8.4 Concluding Remarks
This concluding chapter has reiterated some of the strengths of the model of 
policy implementation as incomplete contracting. However, before speculating as to 
the potentially wider significance of the model, some of the limits of the model 
should be acknowledged. For example, the wider economic and financial 
environment within which the exchange relationship is situated should not be 
obscured. Scottish Enterprise's acceptance as an eligible body for Structural Fund 
purposes can be explained in terms of the asset specificity of the resources it brought 
to the exchange, but the wider economic questions of additionality and political 
preferences should not be neglected. The broader methodological criticism that 
assumptions about motivations are at best dubious, can easily be refuted in this 
context. Empirically, it can be shown that individual actors (invariably non-elected 
officials) participate in the implementation structure and enjoy considerable 
discretion with regards to their behaviour in that structure. This is a basic premise of 
the bottom-up approach to implementation analysis. Moreover, as suggested in this
chapter, although the European Commission is unable to shape the administrative 
structures within which implementation takes place, it can seek to alter the actions of 
local actors indirectly. Consequently, the emphasis placed on motivational factors in 
this study is warranted given the Commission perspective adopted herein. 
Notwithstanding these potential criticisms, the model clearly illustrates the 
importance of both ex-ante and ex-post bargaining, focuses on the exchange 
relationship spanning both 'phases', and pinpoints the key dimensions of that 
exchange.
The potential relevance of the model of policy implementation as incomplete 
contracting derives directly from the nature of contemporary governance in the 
European Community. This study of intra-state implementation has revealed a highly 
complex, inter-organisational environment involving the European Commission 
behind the outer-shell of the member state. The extent to which the European 
Commission is able to frame regional development programmes reflecting its own 
objectives, and which it is able to implement in the environment of partnership, 
provides a useful test-case of the Commission's role in the process of policy-making 
and implementation. Marks' identification of a process of 'multilevel governance' 
(1992; 1993) in this field echoes the broader findings of Scharpf (1995). 
Intergovemmentalism and neofunctionalism are being replaced by notions of multi­
level governance. As Majone suggests then, 'if the future of the Union lies not in more 
centralization but in closer cooperation among the different levels and institutions of 
governance, then the member states must be prepared to take concrete measures to 
improve mutual trust and the credibility of their own commitment to the common 
objectives' (1995: 29). Contracting approaches are thus of some conceptual value.
The open-ended nature of directives suggests that these Community acts (and 
perhaps also other instruments of the 'soft law1 variety) may be usefully modelled as 
'incomplete contracts' between the European Commission and the member states. 
Thereby, the importance of motivational factors can be highlighted
It is important to keep in mind the open-ended character of most 
Community acts, and of the founding treaties themselves. The most 
frequently used instrument of social regulation, the directive, is 
binding only "as to the results to be achieved" (Articles 189 of the 
EEC Treaty and 161 of the Euratom Treaty) but leaves "the choice of 
form and methods" to the national authorities. In other words, the 
directive lays down an objective and leaves it to the member states to 
achieve that objective according to such means as they see fit (Majone 
1994: 12).
Complete contracts, totally pre-programmed in all respects are simply not a 
feasible model for EC legislation. Directives should not be overloaded with so much 
detail that they become like Regulations. Directives must be flexible enough to 
respond to changing conditions and their implementation can therefore be 
conceptualised as a process of relational contracting: 'it may be argued that the 
original concept of the European directive, as it appears in the founding treaties, is 
quite close to the philosophy of relational contracting, while attempts to erase the 
difference between directives and regulations represent a misguided response to the 
problem of contractual incompleteness' (Majone'1994). The wider potential value of 
the incomplete contracting model is that it could take analysis of Community policy­
making beyond a primarily legal perspective to incorporate the significance of trust 
between contracting partners.
This thesis should finish with one final reflection on the Structural Funds. It is 
conceivable that the 1994-1999 Structural Fund programming period represents the 
peak of European Community involvement in policies for economic and social 
cohesion in the current member states. The European Commission itself 
acknowledges that it is impossible to predict the size and the nature of the Structural 
Funds beyond 1999, but as such funds now constitute one third of the Community’s 
total budget, development programmes are likely to be scrutinised as never before. 
Moreover, the potential enlargement of the European Union beyond the present 
fifteen members to the Visegrad countries of the East would place considerable strain 
on the Structural Funds in their present form, and raises the question whether it would 
be feasible to continue Objective 1 support at current financing levels. The Director 
in DG XVI responsible for Objective 2 programmes between 1989 and 1993 has 
warned of the dangers of the increased emphasis on interstate transfers: 'all the talk of 
interstate transfers will move the Community regional policy away from Community 
economic development and back to the member states. This will in turn mean a move 
back to differing approaches to regional development and regional support. The result 
is that regional policy is moved away from the Commission' (Meadows 1991: point 
5.3). Perhaps the single most obvious conclusion of this thesis is the cost of disguising 
an interstate compensatory mechanism in the clothes of a regional development 
strategy: if the Structural Funds are regrettably to perform merely a budgetary 
redistribution function, then the straightforward but controversial transfer of cheques 
between member state exchequers seems to offer the most efficient policy option.
Appendix 1 - List of Interviews
The following interviews were conducted over a period of four years. The 
interviews were semi-structured and were conducted 'face-to-face', usually lasting 
between 30 minutes and two hours. Formal interviews with Scottish Office officials 
were mostly conducted before or after the period in which the author was employed 
as a Scottish Office official. The numerous informal discussions enjoyed with 
colleagues have obviously not been included in this list. Finally, it should be noted 
that most of the key protagonists were interviewed more than once: in such cases, the 
dates of interviews are listed.
I. United Kingdom
1. David Martin MEP, Vice President of the European Parliament, Member of 
the European Parliament Committee on Regional Policy, Regional Planning 
and Relations with Regional and Local Authorities; Edinburgh, 28 March
1991.
2. Senior Executive Officer, European Funds and Co-ordination Division,
Scottish Office Industry Department; Edinburgh, 16 April 1991.
3. Principal, European Funds and Co-ordination Division (European Central 
Support Unit), Scottish Office Industry Department; Edinburgh, 16 April
1991.
4 Senior Executive Officer, European Funds and Co-ordination Division
(Programme Management Unit), Scottish Office Industry Department; 
Edinburgh, 9 January 1992 and 16 January 1992.
5. Higher Executive Officer, European Funds and Co-ordination Division 
(Implementation of European Review), Scottish Office Industry Department; 
Edinburgh, 16 January 1992.
6. Principal, European Funds and Co-ordination Division (Structural Funds 
Policy and Plan Writing), Scottish Office Industry Department; Edinburgh, 16 
January 1992.
7. Head of Policy Strategy Group, Scottish Enterprise; Florence, 25 May 1992.
8. European Funds Project Officer, Chief Executive's Department, Strathclyde 
Regional Council; Glasgow, 12 January 1993.
9. Projects Officer, ScotRail; Glasgow, 12 January 1993.
10. Senior Accountant, British Gas; Edinburgh,14 January 1993.
11. Special Projects Officer, European Affairs, City of Glasgow District Council; 
Glasgow, 15 January 1993.
12. Associate Director, European Policies Research Centre, University of 
Strathclyde; Glasgow, 11 February 1993.
13. Group Interview, Senior Consultants, PA Cambridge Economic Consultants 
Limited; Glasgow, 19 March 1993.
14. Director of the Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of 
Newcastle upon Tyne; Newcastle upon Tyne, 24 March 1993.
15. Senior Executive Officer, European Funds, Northern Regional Office of the 
Department of Trade and Industry; Newcastle upon Tyne, 24 March 1993.
16. Researcher, Centre for Urban and Regional Studies, University of Newcastle 
upon Tyne; Newcastle upon Tyne, 20 April 1993.
17. Principal, Urban Policy Division, Department of the Environment West 
Midlands Regional Office; Birmingham, 27 April 1993.
18. Project Officer, Scottish Council of Voluntary Organisations; Edinburgh, 30 
July 1993.
19. ERDF Programme Manager, Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation; 
Glasgow, 6 August 1993,4 January 1995.
20. Assistant Secretary, European Funds and Co-ordination Division, Scottish 
Office Industry Department; Edinburgh, 15 September 1993.
21. Programme Director, Strathclyde Integrated Development Operation;
Glasgow, 22 December 1993.
22. Senior Principal, European Funds and Co-ordination Division (Programme 
Management Unit), Scottish Office Industry Department; Edinburgh, 23 
December 1993, 19 August 1994.
n. European Commission
23. Director, Directorate D, Objective 2 and 5b Operations, DG XVI; Brussels, 15 
December 1991,10 July 1992,5 Octoberl994.
24. Peter Schmidhuber, European Commissioner (with responsibility for Budget 
and Financial Control); Florence, 21 February' 1992.
25. Assistant to Director General (responsible for regional policy advice), DG 
XVI; Brussels, 20 March 1992.
26. National Expert (seconded from the Scottish Office) in DG XVI; Brussels, 24 
March 1992.
27. Head of Unit, DG XXII (Co-ordination of Structural Policies); Brussels, 27 
April 1992.
28. Desk Officer for Western and Eastern Scotland Objective 2 programmes, DG 
XVI; Brussels, 10 June 1992,3 May 1994,25 November 1994.
29 Desk Officer for North East England and English West Midlands Objective 2
programmes, DG XVI; Brussels, 11 June 1992, 18 February 1993,5 October
1993.
30. Member of the Cabinet of Commissioner Millan (Commissioner with »
responsibility for Regional Policies); Brussels, 14 July 1992.
31. Desk Officer for North Rhine-Westphalia Objective 2 programmes, DG XVI; 
Brussels, 14 July 1992.
32. Official in Local Economic Development Unit, DG XVI; Brussels, 14 July
1992.
33. Official (responsible for verification of additionality), DG XVI; Brussels, 17 
July 1992.
34. Desk Officer for Nord-Pas de Calais Objective 2 programmes, DG XVI; 
Brussels, 20 July 1992.
35. Head of Local Economic Development Unit, DG XVI; Brussels, 20 July 1992.
36. Statistician (with responsibility for Objective 2 eligibility and the drafting of
the Periodic Report); Brussels, 15 February 1993.
37. National Expert (seconded from the Scottish Office) in DG XXII (Co­
ordination of Structural Policies); Brussels, 16 February 1993.
38. Official in Unit for Co-ordination of Evaluation, DG XVI; Brussels, 4 
October 1993.
39. Member of the Cabinet of Commissioner Millan (Commissioner with 
Responsibility for Regional Policies); Brussels, 25 November 1994.
40. Desk Officer for ESF programmes in the UK, DG V; Brussels, 25 November
1994.
IÏL Miscellaneous
41. Senior Executive, Scottish Enterprise; Brussels, 27 March 1992.
42. EC Liaison Officer, Strathclyde Regional Council; Brussels, 15 May 1992.
43. Director, Antenne de Bruxelles, Région Nord-Pas de Calais; Brussels, 7 July
1992.*
44. Director, Association of European Regions of Industrial Technology (RETI); 
Brussels, 8 July 1992*, 18 February 1993.
45. Director, Northern Ireland Centre in Europe; Brussels, 9 July 1992.*
46. Senior Official, Wales European Centre; Brussels, 9 July 1992.*
47. Delegate, Patronat Català Pro Europa, Delegaciô de Brussel-les (Catalan 
Representation Office in Brussels); Brussels, 9 July 1992.*
48. Director, Verbindungsbüro Nordrhein-Westfalen (North Rhine-Westphalian 
Representation Office in Brussels); Brussels, 13 July 1992
49. Chief Executive, Scotland Europa Office; Brussels, 16 July 1992.
50. Principal (with responsibility for Regional Policy), Office of the United 
Kingdom Permanent Representative to the European Communities (UKREP), 
Brussels, 20 July 1992,16 February 1993.
51. Director, European Regional Affairs Consultants (ERAC - Boxtel); Florence, 
19 June 1994.
* The five interviews marked with an asterisk were conducted jointly with Dr James Mitchell of the 
Department of Government, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow
The development of regional policy in Great Britain has been covered in detail 
elsewhere (Parsons 1986; Prestwich & Taylor 1990) and need only be sketched briefly in 
this Appendix as a context for the analysis contained in the main text. The emergence of 
British regional policy can be traced to the 1930s and to the growth of high levels of 
unemployment in the so-called 'depressed areas', which included South Wales and 
Northern England as well as parts of Scotland. These were precisely the areas where there 
was a concentration of declining industries such as coal mining, shipbuilding, iron and 
steel, and textiles. The Special Areas (Development and Improvement) Act 1934 
designated four 'Special Areas': South Wales, Ncuth East England, West Cumberland and 
parts of West Central Scotland. These were renamed Development Areas' and were 
extended to include other towns and cities under the Distribution o f Industry Act 1945, 
which enabled the Board of Trade to provide basic public services, reclaim derelict land 
and make loans to specific industrial undertakings in such areas. A 'negative strategy' was 
added to British regional policy for the first time in 1947 with the establishment of a 
system of Industrial Development Certificates (IDCs) to control the location of new 
factory developments. A further development took place in 1960 when the Local 
Employment Act abolished Development Areas and gave the Board of Trade power to 
designate Development Districts' on the basis of Local Employment Exchange areas. The 
maximum total population coverage reached at this time was 16.8% in 1966 (Nield & 
Carling 1992).
Throughout the period from the 1930s to the 1960s, the rationale for government 
intervention in the form of regional policy in the UK was primarily social. McCrone 
(1969) has emphasised the enmeshing of the social, economic and political objectives of 
British regional policy. Anderson, however, suggests that 'although official government 
pronouncements on the objectives of regional policy convey a natural dovetailing of 
social and economic goals, British regional policies in practice reveal an overriding 
concern with social objectives' (1992: 59). The focus on concentrated 'black spots' since 
the 1930s and the resultant targetting of unemployment, outmigration, and the breakdown 
of communities testify to the primacy of the social rationale. Anderson conludes that 
British regional policy has constituted a system of'first aid' rather than an integral part of 
a strategy for economic expansion. The 'short-lived break' from this approach which 
occurred in the 1960s, when planning experiments were conducted as regional policies 
were grafted onto national planning targets, merely serves to highlight the distinction 
between the dominant British approach and the subsequent European-inspired approach 
of the 1980s and 1990s. The period in the 1960s when British regional policy makers 
actually 'trumpeted the virtues of planned state intervention in the economy' should 
therefore be sketchly briefly (Anderson 1992: 60).
In 1965 the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA), newly created by the Labour 
Government of that time, took over the regional policy and planning functions of the 
Board of Trade. The DEA presented a 'national spatial framework of regions within which 
economic planning could take place' (Prestwich & Taylor 1990: 138). As well as 
producing a national economic plan, the DEA introduced some administrative changes for 
the eleven 'Standard Planning Regions’ (England was divided into eight planning regions,
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while Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland were each given planning region status. 
Standard Planning Regions are now used only for the presentation of regional statistical 
data). The administration of each Region was placed under the control of two separate 
planning bodies: a Regional Economic Planning Council and a Regional Economic 
Planning Board. The membership of the Councils was drawn from people living and 
working in the region (from industry, local authorities, and the universities for example) 
with the local knowledge and the experience to discuss the formulation and 
implementation of a regional development plan for their own region. The Boards were 
responsible for the day-to-day routine of preparing regional plans and co-ordinating the 
regional aspects of different government departments (ibid.: 138). The DEA, which was 
abolished in 1969 after only four years, was a .radical, short-lived experiment that has 
never been repeated in the UK. Its demise was a result of inter-ministerial rivalries and 
clashes with pre-existing bodies. Nevertheless, the experiment is instructive in that its 
rejection illustrates the absence of a tradition of comprehensive economic planning in the 
UK. The programming procedure ultimately introduced under the EC Structural Funds in 
the 1980s found no counterpart in the UK. On the contrary, the programming principle 
met with profound scepticism amongst British civil servants, many of whom recalled the 
ill-fated DEA experiment of the 1960s.
While organisational change in the late 1960s was radical with the emergence and 
decline of the DEA experiment, changes in the specific policy instruments employed 
remained primarily incremental. The Industrial Development Act 1966 abolished 
Development Disticts and replaced them with Development Areas’. These were the 
largest areas to date, and included the whole of Scotland except Edinburgh. In 1967 the 
Regional Employment Premium was created as a straight pay-roll subsidy for firms with 
manufacturing operations in Development Areas. A new category of region 
(corresponding largely with the pre-war Special Areas) was established in 1967: firms 
moving into the 'Special Development Areas', which were set up in response to a series of 
coal mine closures, could receive building grants (at a rate of 35% of costs), assistance 
with operating costs for a transitional period and rent-free government-owned factories 
for up to five years. Further incremental changes were instituted by the Local Employment 
Act 1970, which created 'Intermediate Areas' to encourage 'the growth and proper 
distribution of industry' where the problems were not so acute as to require use of all the 
powers available in Developments Areas and Special Development Areas. At that time 
there were therefore three types of assisted area, and rates of government assistance 
varied between each. Under the 1972 Industry Act automatic Regional Development 
Grants were paid at the rate of 20% of a firm’s costs in Development Areas and 22% in 
Special Development Areas, while a selective aid scheme also operated under the name of 
Regional Selective Assistance. Between 1975 and 1979, assisted area coverage peaked at 
just under 50% of the working population of Great Britain (Nield & Carling 1992). 
However, the late 1970s also witnessed the beginning of the decline of British regional 
policy.
Characterising post-war regional policy as 'a form of spatial Keynesianism', Martin 
and Tyler identify the three main premises upon which it was based. Firstly, the problem 
of economically depressed areas was interpreted as primarily structural in nature, 
resulting from localised deficiencies in demand. Secondly, the case for government
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intervention was justified both on social and economic grounds. The social objective was 
generally to reduce regional imbalances in employment prospects, while the economic 
goal was to realise national efficiency gains by utilising unemployed labour in the pursuit 
of non-inflationary growth in the national economy. Thirdly, it was assumed that the 
solution to the regional problem was to redistribute industry from low-unemployment 
growth regions to high-unemployment depressed regions. This was to be achieved through 
a system of investment controls in the growth regions and capital grants and subsidies in 
depressed regions. As Martin and Tyler point out, this general policy model was 'accepted 
to a greater or lesser extent by all post-war governments, both Labour and Conservative, 
up to the end of the 1970s' (1991: 8).
As Anderson explains, however, the cross-party commitment to regional policy 
began to unravel after 1976 as a result of several factors: the emergence of 
unemployment throughout the UK as result of the first OPEC crisis; severe fiscal 
constraints facing British policy makers; the perception of poor achievements in the 40 
years in which regional policy had been in operation; and greater attention to urban 
decline in response to growing crisis in the inner cities (1990: 238). Around this time, the 
Industrial Development Certificate control system fell into disuse, while in 1976 the 
Regional Employment Premium was abolished. Against this background, Anderson 
suggests that the Thatcher assault on regional economic policy1 was 'not a 180-degree 
turn in approach'. Rather, 'the distinctive element' was the combination of expenditure 
reductions with an explicit rejection of the assumptions and goals of regional policy' 
(ibid.: 239). Shortly after taking office in 1979, the Conservative Government announced 
a cut of £300 million in regional policy expenditure and warned of a sharp reduction in 
the coverage of Assisted Areas in the near future. Although the final abolition of the IDC 
control was largely symbolic, since it had not been applied since the mid-1970s, the 
major changes introduced by the Thatcher Governments between 1979-1988 amounted to 
more than simple changes in terms of geographical coverage and the instruments of 
regional policy. As well as the drastic cuts in finances, two changes characterise British 
regional policy in this period: firstly, an emphasis on development from within rather 
than the relocation of firms into assisted areas; and secondly, the continuing emphasis on 
the social rather than the economic rationale for such policy which provoked a shift in 
focus from regional development per se to urban policy and decline in inner cities. These 
should be considered in turn.
Following the announcement in 1979 by the new Secretary of State for Industry, 
Keith Joseph, of a rescheduling of Assisted Area status, coverage fell from 44% of the 
British population to 27% in 1982. The Assisted Areas map is based on the 322 travel-to- 
work-areas' (TTWAs) into which Great Britain is divided by the Department of 
Employment. Regional Development Grant remained payable at the rate of 22% in 
Special Development Areas but was reduced from the rate of 20% to 15% in 
Development Areas. Regional Development Grant in Intermediate Areas was abolished. 
These were the first of many steps by the Thatcher Government to scale down regional 
policy (Prestwich & Taylor 1990: 153). The White Paper on Regional Industrial Policy' of 
December 1983 led to further changes in November 1984. At that time the three types of 
Assisted Area were reduced to the two which continue in existence today: Development 
Areas (DAs) and Intermediate Areas (IAs), covering 35% of working population (DAs
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covering 15% and LAs covering 20%). The Government was not able to cut back on 
assisted area coverage in 1983 as much as they had intended, partly as a result of 
backbench unrest coming from Conservative MPs representing Assisted Areas which 
were set to lose out, and partly as a result of the need to protect the UK's ERDF take-up 
which required that eligible regions should be in receipt of domestic regional assistance 
(Anderson 1990: 239). Indeed, the coverage of Intermediate Areas actually increased 
dramatically as a result of new areas being designated in Greater Manchester, Sheffield 
and parts of the West Midlands (Birmingham) to ensure that they would qualify for ERDF 
grants (Prestwich & Taylor 1990: 153).
In 1988 the Government announced its new industrial strategy in the context of the 
move to a Single European Market after 1992, & strategy contained in the White Paper 
'DTI - Department o f Enterprise' (Cm 275). Three further regional policy changes were 
introduced as a result of the 'Enterprise Initiative': firstly, the system of automatic 
Regional Development Grants was abolished; secondly, a system of discretionary 
Regional Enterprise Grants was introduced; thirdly, The Consultancy Initiative* was 
launched. In Scotland these schemes are operated jointly by the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) and the Scottish Office. Regional Selective Assistance (RSA) (amounting 
to around £200 million in 1992-93, broken down as £85 million for England, £62 million 
for Scotland, and £56 million for Wales) provides selective grants for businesses 
proposing new investments which create or safeguards jobs in Assisted Areas. The system 
of Regional Enterprise Grants (REG) is financially much smaller and comprises two 
types of grants: Regional Investment Grants (totalling £7 million in 1992-93, of which 
Scotland received £1.6 million) are paid to firms with fewer than 25 employees in 
Development Areas and in some Intermediate Areas, at a rate of 15% of costs up to a 
maximum of £15,000, to support investments such as diversification or expansion; 
Regional Innovation Grants (totalling £4 million in 1992-93, of which Scotland received 
£1.6 million) are paid at a rate of 25% up to a maximum of £25,000 for innovative 
projects involving technical risk to firms with fewer than 50 employees in Development 
Areas, Intermediate Areas and regions eligible under Objective 2 of the Structural Funds 
(Leslie Hays Consultants Limited 1990). Other DTI programmes, such as the Enterprise 
Initiative Consultancy Scheme, are not exclusively targetted on geographical areas, but 
have more favourable conditions in Assisted Areas. This constituted a package of around 
£60 million for Great Britain as a whole in 1992-93, providing financial assistance for 
companies with fewer than 55 employees to buy-in outside expertise for 5-15 days to 
tackle strategic and management issues. Two thirds of costs are paid to firms in Assisted 
Areas, but only half elsewhere.
It is important to note that British regional policy was changed fundamentally by 
the DTI's 1988 revisions. Again, regional policy was spared complete abolition even 
though the automatic Regional Development Grants scheme was abolished. The objective 
of central government involvement became that of encouraging 'self-help', and promoting 
competitiveness: 'its role was to become part of a government drive to encourage self- 
help, regional development 'from within', and a renewed commitment to enterprise. This 
approach marked a radical break with traditional regional policy, as the government 
reinterpreted the regional problem as one of economic inefficiency due to supply-side 
rigidities and a deficiency of entrepreneurial activity in the depressed areas. The policy
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response was therefore to help the depressed areas to improve their competitiveness and 
productivity, and to remove supply-side rigidities which prevent industry' and commerce 
from generating self-sufficient growth. The key to reducing growth was therefore believed 
to be the stimulation of indigenous regional enterprise’ (Armstrong & Taylor 1993: 208). 
In short, regional policy became a policy for small firms, and no longer focused on the 
relocation of large firms to Assisted Areas. The focus shifted to indigenous development, 
although any foreign investment would of course be welcomed as an added bonus The 
Thatcher Governments sought to emphasise improved competitiveness rather than the 
subsidisation of employment.
At the same time as the Department of Trade and Industry promoted a shift in 
focus to enhanced local competitiveness, the Department of the Environment pressed for 
a greater recognition of the problems of urban areas, an issue that had come on to the 
agenda in the mid-1970s (Anderson 1992: 72-73). The Local Government Planning and 
Land Act 1980 established the basis for Urban Development Corporations' and 
■Enterprise Zones’ (Prestwich & Taylor 1990: 150). Urban Development Corporations 
(UDCs) were single purpose agencies charged with the task of assisting the private sector 
to carry out the regeneration of derelict urban areas. Originally set up for the London and 
Liverpool Docklands, eleven UDCs were established in England and Wales through the 
1980s. Enterprise Zones (EZs) constitute focused development sites in which firms 
benefit, among other things, from exemption from local authority business rates, and 
simplified planning controls. The first phase of designation of such zones took place in 
1981-82 and included Clydebank (a town on the outskirts of Glasgow lying within the 
subsequent European Integrated Development Operation for Strathclyde). A second 
phase in 1983-84 designated smaller urban areas as EZs. The third phase spanned several 
years and came in response to closures of industries in towns which were highly 
dependent on a single source of employment: Inverclyde, which was dependent on 
shipbuilding, and most recently the industrial steel area of Lanarkshire, were both 
designated as EZs and both lie within the Structural Funds Objective 2 programme area 
of Western Scotland. In total 28 Enterprise Zones were designated between 1981 and 
1993 (Brodtman & Johnson 1993). Both the UDCs and EZs innovations were indicative 
of the increasing attention paid to urban regeneration in the 1980s. In addition, around 
£80 million was also spent in Scotland in 1993/1994 through the Urban Programme 
(Bennett & Krebs 1991: 39-40). The Scottish Office's own Urban Partnerships provide a 
further £2.3 million to secure comprehensive economic, social and physical regeneration 
in four deprived, peripheral housing estates.
Armstrong and Taylor point to the coincidence of the downgrading of regional 
policy and the ascendancy of urban policy in Britain (1993:207). The authors graphically 
illustrate the long term decline in spending on regional policy: from almost £1100 million 
in 1981 to under £600 million in 1988 (at 1985 prices). Simultaneously, urban policy 
expenditure rose from around £200 million in 1981 to £500 million in 1988. Moreover, 
1989 was the year when urban policy expenditure overtook regional policy expenditure 
for first time, amounting to over £600 million compared to £400 million for regional 
policy (ibid.: 208). Moore and Booth (1986) consider the experience in Western Scotland 
of some of these urban policy innovations, in particular the Enterprise Zone at Clydebank
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and the Glasgow Eastern Area Renewal (GEAR) project. Lever (1986) considers more 
generally the benefits to Western Scotland of British regional policy assistance.
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Appendix 3 -Key Dates in the Programming of ERDF Actions in
Western Scotland
17 Dec. 1979
1 April 1982
20 Dec. 1982
27 July 1983 
5 Dec. 1983
Oct. 1984
18 Dec. 1984
Jan./May 1985 
15 May 1985 
12 Sept 1985 
12 Dec. 1985
24 June 1986 
July/Aug. 1986 
Sept/Oct 1987
19 Oct 1987 
Oct/Nov. 1987 
27 Jan. 1988
Feb. 1988
10 Feb. 1988
22 April 1988 
May/July 1988 
25 July 1988
11 Oct 1988
Oct 1988 
21 Dec. 1988
lJan. 1989 
May 1989
Concept of an IDO for Strathclyde first raised at a meeting of 
Strathclyde Regional Council (SRC) and Scottish Office officials. 
Policy and Resources Committee of SRC agrees to seek IDO status 
for Strathclyde.
Application made by SRC to Scottish Office for EC financial aid to 
conduct preparatory study.
European Commission agrees to pay 75% of the £90,000 study costs. 
Roger Tym & Partners Consultants appointed to assist in preparation 
of study.
Final report of IDO Preparatory Study submitted to European 
Commission.
EC response suggests an interim National Programme of Community 
Interest (NPCI) for the city of Glasgow.
NPCI drawn up by Industry Department for Scotland.
Draft NPCI submitted to the EC.
Revised NPCI submitted to the EC.
NPCI covering infrastructure expenditure (back-dated) from 1 June 
1984 to 31 December 1987 approved by EC.
Visit by SRC delegation to Brussels regains IDO momentum.
SRC and SO officials start to prepare new IDO proposal.
Informal draft of revised IDO submission passed to the European 
Commission and circulated around DG's V, XVI and the Task Force 
for SMEs for consultation.
Official IDO proposal submitted to the European Commission. 
Internal consultation between DGs in the European Commission. 
Commission's Technical Group on Integrated Approaches' did not 
accept proposal as a suitable basis for an IDO.
Inter-service meetings in the European Commission to co-ordinate 
comments to assist redraft of IDO proposal.
First meeting between Commission and UK central government 
convened to present detailed comments on IDO proposal.
First revised IDO proposal submitted to European Commission. 
Internal consultation between DGs in the European Commission. 
Second UK central government - European Commission meeting 
convened, at which Commission requested substantial improvement 
to the IDO proposal and a reduction in the finance requested.
Second revised EDO proposal submitted to the European 
Commission.
Further intemal consultation between Commission DGs.
IDO covering period 1 January 1988 to 31 December 1992 approved 
by the EC.
New Structural Fund Regulations come into force.
Scottish Office submits a 'Regional and Social Conversion Plan' for 
the Objective 2 area of Western Scotland.
19 May 1989
June 1989 
March 1990
12 Oct. 1990
20 Mar. 1991
Late 1991 
the
Jan. 1992
of
Nov. 1992 
31 Dec. 1992 
May 1993
1 Jan. 1994 
March 1994
First meeting of the Strathclyde IDO Co-ordinating Committee in 
Glasgow.
Programme Director takes up post.
DG XVI issues 'Guidance Note' on Monitoring Committees for 
Objective 2 Community Support Frameworks.
EC approves the extension of the programme area to cover Ayr and 
Girvan travel-to-work-areas.
Commission decides to maintain existing list of eligible Objective 2 
areas for 1992-1993 period.
Extensive discussion between DG XVI and the Scottish Office on 
eligibility of Scottish Enterprise^and LECs for ERDF purposes.
DG XVI officially inform UKREP of decision to agree to eligibility 
Scottish Enterprise and the LECs.
Plan Team set up to prepare plan for post-1993 period.
Official completion of IDO.
Joint Management Board set up to oversee functioning of the 
Programme Executive.
’Re-reformed’ Structural Fund Regulations come into force.
Western Scotland partnership submits new plan for the post-1993 
programming period.
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